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Introduction
Janos Gacs and Georg Winckler
In recognition of the key position of international trade in the transition and
the need for concentrated discussions of topical trade issues the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) organized an international
conference on "International Trade and Restructuring in Eastern Europe"
which took place in Laxenburg, Austria, on 19 and 21 November 1992. The
Austrian National Bank joined IIASA to co-sponsor the event. Participants
of the conference were experts of international economics and trade policy
from East and West, policy makers, and representatives of international
organizations like the IMF, the Commission of the European Communities,
the OECD, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). The papers prepared for the event and the lively discussions during
the conference itself prove that the topics are intellectually challenging and
timely for policy makers.
It has widely been recognized that international economic relations play
a crucial role in the transition of countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The scope, speed, and success of the efforts to transform the formerly cen-
trally planned economies to market economies have increasingly become de-
pendent on the pattern these countries have in their relation to the rest of
the world.
Transition comprises three major processes: macro-stabilization, mar-
ketization, and restructuring. The success of these three hinges to a large
extent on the response of these economies to the new conditions set by
international trade and exchange regimes.
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Many of the new governments in these countries have found that the
most appropriate fixed point (the so-called nominal anchor), to which stabi-
lization measures should be attached, is the nominal exchange rate of their
own currency. A more reasonable exchange rate than that in the former
system of central planning has required a full reorganization of trade and
exchange relations including the establishment of some kind of currency con-
vertibility and deregulation of international trade transactions. Part I of this
book deals with exchange rate regimes that have played and may playa role
in supporting political and macroeconomic stabilization, on the one hand,
and competitiveness of domestic production, on the other.
For the new, democratically elected governments of Central and East-
ern Europe marketization means primarily the establishment of basic insti-
tutions of the market, liberalization of prices, decentralization of financing,
providing the opportunity for free entry and fair competition, and priva-
tization of the majority of formerly state-owned companies. It was soon
recognized that without an increasing reliance on international trade, as
well as external financial and technical assistance, the transition to the mar-
ket would be delayed for an intolerably long time. Liberalized imports and
joint ventures may promote competition in a heavily monopolized economy;
privatization would be slower without the participation of foreign investors,
and it would be harder to establish basic institutions of the market without
the technical assistance of international organizations.
The switch from one system to the other implies an enormous restruc-
turing of trade and production, as well as a major reallocation of the factors
of production. In signaling the preferred directions for restructuring, inter-
national trade is an extremely sensitive instrument: through world market
prices, through demand for exports and supply of imports, international
trade gives guidelines to producers who were accustomed to the distorted
signals of a planned system. The collapse of trade in the framework of the
CMEA has caused additional pressures for international readjustment in
these economies.
As a consequence of systemic changes and the demise of the CMEA the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have had to undergo far-reaching
geographical and sectoral restructuring of their production and trade since
1990. This restructuring has no parallel in history apart from those countries
in the transition to a wartime economy. For foreign trade the structural
changes had two implications: (1) shift in the sectoral and geographical
composition of trade and (2) the modification of the behavior of enterprises.
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Part II of this book covers the first dimension, and Part III is devoted to
the changes in trade-related enterprise behavior. In the following sections
we provide a short review of the papers with emphasis on their keypoints or
novelty.
Part I: The Role of Exchange Rate Regimes
The papers collected in Part I deal with the role of exchange rate policy in
reform economies. With respect to policy outcomes, as observed in the first
paper by Gabor Oblath, there are striking similarities among Hungary,
Poland, and the CSFR; to this list one might add Slovenia (see the paper
by Joze Mencinger). The similarities are:
1. Indicators of real exchange rate changes point to upward movements,
reflecting persistent inflationary pressures, albeit to a different degree
among the countries.
2. Although real appreciations occurred, the current account performances
are surprisingly favorable.
3. Foreign reserves could be built up.
4. Convertibility of currencies, at least in the form of de facto current
account convertibility (Hungary), has been established and is about to
be extended.
Of course, many of these similarities were triggered by a universal and
sharp output decline which occurred throughout the region. Yet, despite
these similarities of policy outcomes, a surprising diversity of exchange rate
regimes exists in the four countries mentioned.
Oblath reports that Hungary implemented a significant, yet gradual
trade liberalization program. Due to this gradualism and Hungary's relative
macro stability, there were no significant devaluations during the reform pro-
cess (the largest, 15 percent, occurred in early 1991). Recently, the exchange
rate has increasingly been used as a major instrument for fighting domestic
inflation.
In Poland, as described by Leszek Jasinski in Chapter 2, the shock
therapy introduced in early 1990 went along with a nominal anchoring of the
exchange rate. This pegging to the US dollar, however, came under pressure
by domestic inflation and eroding export profitability. As a consequence, in
May 1991 the zloty was devalued and pegging to a basket of five currencies
commenced. In October 1991 a crawling peg system was introduced (with
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constant daily devaluations). Hence, in contrast to Hungary, Poland has
increasingly moved away from nominally anchoring its currency and now
aims at keeping constant its real exchange rate.
In the CSFR, as explained by Miroslav HrnCir in Chapter 3, the shock
therapy of 1 January 1991 was accompanied by pegging the koruna to a
basket of five currencies, like in Poland in 1990. But in contrast to Poland,
nominal anchoring of the koruna could successfully be maintained, although
no formal commitment has been announced.
Joze Mencinger analyzes the creation of Slovenia's new currency in
Chapter 4. The description of how this birth came about is worthwhile
reading for those engaged in creating new currencies in other parts of the
former Eastern bloc.
Although Slovenia experienced similar outcomes to the three other re-
form countries, its exchange rate regime is different. Due to an initial ab-
sence of foreign reserves, Slovenia, like Bulgaria and Romania, opted for
floating exchange rates. As a consequence of a lack of confidence in the new
currency, nominal depreciations occurred far beyond the purchasing power
parity. But these depreciations, backed by an output decline, helped to cre-
ate a comfortable external position: current account surpluses accompanied
the accumulation of foreign reserves, both at the central bank and at the
commercial banks.
Obviously, a diversity of exchange rate regimes exists: the exchange rate
either has not been changed significantly since the very beginning (Hun-
gary) or, after initial sharp devaluations, has been used as a nominal anchor
to cope with inflation (CSFR and Poland in 1990); or the exchange rate
changes have served to support the competitiveness of the economy (Poland
in 1992). In one case, Slovenia, exchange rate changes were to equilibrate
the foreign exchange market, without aiming at establishing nominal or real
anchors. Given such differences in policy how can the similarity in outcomes
be explained?
One alternative explanation is supported by the common economic ar-
gument that, despite real appreciations, the large differences between the
purchasing power parity and the real exchange rate, established at the be-
ginning of the reform processes, have since caused the good external per-
formance (reinforced by the output decline at home). This argument is
advanced by Oblath. Yet, for Hrnclf, the reform economies of Central Eu-
rope are still far from being homogeneous enough to react sensitively to price
and exchange rate changes. He doubts that the exchange rate level and the
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exchange rate regime have significant effects at all. Firms might just try to
export, whatever the exchange rate is, as they try to sell their production
abroad, given the recession at home.
Hence it is not surprising that Oblath and Hrncir also have differing
views concerning the medium and long term. Whereas Oblath again uses
common economic wisdom, Hrncir speaks of long-term costs of devaluation-
type approaches. According to him a "hard currency" option would, by dis-
ciplining economic agents, contribute to an overhaul of the economy, forcing
firms to concentrate more on higher value-added products.
Part II: Trade Liberalization
and Emerging Trade Patterns
Part II deals with trade liberalization and emerging trade patterns, especially
with respect to the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland. The papers presented in
this section demonstrate that exports of these countries have concentrated
on mature low-skill labor-intensive products, or capital-intensive products
using old technologies (paper by Giovanni Graziani). As a consequence,
the competitiveness of the export sector has been deteriorating (paper by
Herman W. Hoen) and even within the Visegrad Group the share of sophis-
ticated manufactures, primarily machinery, has decreased dramatically in
mutual trade (paper by Sandor Richter). Obviously industries have become
"senile" (paper by Dariusz Rosati quoting Williamson). Yet, despite these
difficulties in modernizing industry and in defending international market
shares, countries rushed to liberalize their economies between 1989 and 1991
at an unprecedented speed (paper by Janos Gacs). While an opening up
seems to be essential in the transition to market economies, restoring ex-
ternal equilibrium in a period of industrial restructuring implies some kind
of protection, be it through tariffs or a sufficiently devalued exchange rate.
But which protection should be chosen to facilitate the emergence of modern
industries?
Janos Gacs in Chapter 5 describes the unprecedented speed of trade
liberalization. Even Hungary, which opted for a more gradual stabilization
of the macro-economy, rushed to open its markets in 1989. The CSFR was
the boldest in opening its market among the three. According to Gacs, the
usual stumbling blocks of social and entrepreneurial resistance to liberaliz-
ing trade were absent, due to the legacy of the shortage economy and the
disarray in production and trade. Pressures toward establishing stronger
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protection for domestic production, however, are being unleashed. In 1992,
as a consequence, each country attempted to establish at least moderate
tariff protection, although international commitments in GATT and to the
EC make this task quite difficult.
In Chapter 6 Dariusz K. Rosati refers to the case of Poland and dis-
cusses the changes in its trade patterns and trade policies. He offers general
observations on the optimal pattern of trade policies in the transition from
central planning to a market system. The empirical evidence he finds sup-
ports the view that trade liberalization is necessary and has to be carried
out early when reforming an economy, yet the sequence and extent of liberal-
ization is crucial. Exchange rate devaluations cannot bear the entire burden
of adjustment and of realigning competitiveness. Customs tariffs should be
treated as an important instrument of structural policies and should not be
constantly changed in pursuance of short-term macroeconomic policy goals
(such as budgetary equilibrium). Trade liberalization should not put too
much competitive pressure on too many economic agents, otherwise social
and political problems inevitably emerge.
Prior to the fall of the CMEA, mutual economic relations among small
Eastern European economies were of minor relevance, since trade with the
Soviet Union had always dominated the CMEA. Since the fall of the CMEA,
economic cooperation among Bulgaria, the CSFR, Hungary, Romania, and
Poland has gained in importance. But what trade patterns will emerge is
still an open question which Sandor Richter examines in Chapter 7. While
the potential for trade with Western Europe is huge, the potential for mu-
tual trade among Eastern European economies is limited. Richter reaches
this conclusion by comparing Eastern Europe to other regions of medium-
or lower-level economic development. In these regions (e.g., Southeast Asia
and Southern Europe), despite all attempts to enhance regional economic
integration, mutual trade cannot replace trade with the highly industrial-
ized "core" of the world economy. For Richter, this has an important policy
implication: there is no modernization and economic growth for Eastern Eu-
rope without intensive trade with the GECD, especially with the European
Community.
The chapter by Giovanni Graziani complements Richter's analy-
sis. While Richter follows the structural rearrangements accompanying the
demise of the CMEA and the collapse of Soviet Union's trade in Central
Eastern Europe, Graziani analyzes the patterns of these region's broaden-
ing trade with its most important market: the European Community. He
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confronts recent successes of Central and Eastern European economies in
increasing their sales to Western Europe with the shortcomings and weak-
nesses of the structural composition of this trade. He finds that even after
the decline in the share of fuel-based primary products in the exports from
Bulgaria, the CSFR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania to the EC, these ex-
ports are still relatively biased in favor of resource-based products, many of
them requiring substantial amounts of capital. Since Central Eastern Eu-
rope is generally not abundant in natural resources and its own sources of
capital are scarce, one can conclude that the recent pattern of exports is still
reflecting the misallocation of resources caused by the irrational system of
prices and other fundamental features of the past regime. The other disap-
pointing characteristic of Eastern European exports, as stressed by Graziani,
is that non-resource-based manufacturing is concentrated in mature, stan-
dardized, labor-intensive, and low-technology-intensive, as well as relatively
slowly expanding, sectors. In these sectors, both the competition of newly
industrialized countries and the protection of EC economies are especially
strong.
As for the future international division of labor, Graziani forecasts no
dramatic changes in Eastern European exports to the EC, at least in the
near future. He envisages some rearrangements mainly in favor of food
and mature labor-intensive sectors, especially if these shifts are going to be
reinforced by appropriate exchange rate policies. An important implication
of Graziani's analysis is that future structural changes in Eastern Europe's
exports to the EC will be determined perhaps more by the level of protection
in the two regions than by the reallocation of resources in Eastern Europe.
Chapter 9 by Herman W. Hoen analyzes the export performance in
manufactured products of the Visegnid countries (the CSFR, Hungary, and
Poland) on the EC market with the method of constant-market-shares analy-
sis. By separating an effect that he denotes as the competition effect, he finds
the astonishing result that from 1989 to 1991 the three countries achieved
improvements in their competitiveness in Western markets that surpassed
the progress made in any previous four-to-seven-year period. He also ob-
serves that the improvements in competitiveness were achieved in the three
economies in different commodity sectors. On these grounds he envisages a
further development that would bring about no strong competition among
the Visegrad three for EC market shares.
What are the policy conclusions to be drawn from Part II of the book?
One can argue that only temporary protection is needed, even restricting the
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protection to sector-specific or even product-specific tariffs (Rosati), since
according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of relative factor abundance, given
that these countries have a well-educated labor force and spend a relatively
large share on education, there is a comparative advantage in high-skill, high-
tech products (Graziani). In addition, as Richter points out, the eagerness
to cooperate with the EC as well as the proximity to the EC - perhaps
triggered by an initial technology transfer from the West, but maintained by
profitable, industrial innovation - will make the modernization of industry
and sustainable economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe very likely.
Yet, the "senile industries" may turn out to have been protected for too
long (Rosati), public disappointment with unfavorable liberalization effects
may already be too strong (Gacs), and protectionist behavior of the EC will
require other, more strategic trade reactions by the Visegrad countries.
Part III: Enterprises and Trade Restructuring
The behavior of enterprises, the topic of Part III, is a very special aspect of
trade restructuring in Eastern Europe. The response of the firms in these
economies to external demand and supply shocks must have been essen-
tially different from the response of enterprises in long-established market
economies. First, recent shocks themselves are very special and extremely
strong (we refer here only to the fact that the collapse ofthe CMEA combined
with the effects of stabilization have driven these economies into slumps that
can be compared only to the Great Depression). Second, the enterprises
themselves go through such fundamental changes (in terms of their owner-
ship structure, management, inter-enterprise and government relations, and
financing) that necessarily alter their traditional behavior in coping with the
pressing need of restructuring.
All three papers in Part III intend to verify standard wisdom related to
microeconomic adjustment and restructuring in Eastern Europe:
1. No real adjustment to the changes in the world market took place in
enterprise activity before the collapse of the communist regime, and the
enterprises of the new system should start from scratch.
2. Price and trade liberalizations and privatization are urgently needed in
these highly monopolized economies to induce competition; the effects
of liberalization will soon make themselves felt.
3. Once private companies are established enterprise performance is bound
to improve in both domestic and foreign markets.
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Each paper tests one of these hypotheses, yet instead of confirming them
they conclude that earlier assumptions should be reconsidered and refined.
A common inference from the three papers is that some past features of
enterprises and market structure have lasting impact on enterprise behavior
even after the introduction of major reforms. The transition of firms is not
so fast and not so radical as many considered it earlier.! Cost and price
sensitivity was not absent from earlier enterprise activity (paper by Laszlo
Halpern), liberalization of prices and imports (at least for the short run)
went along with more domestic monopolistic structures (paper by John S.
Earle and Andreas Worgotter), and serious investors deliberately make use
of past favorable economic performance of state-owned firms, rather than
start with a tabula rasa (paper by Janusz M. Dabrowski).
The studies also suggest, however, that when the changes in the envi-
ronment reach a certain threshold it is in fact justified to speak about a new
era of enterprise behavior, the novel features of which are worth trying to
identify. Trade reorientation as interpreted by Halpern was completed in
Hungary by 1991, and a further investigation should look for new character-
istics in enterprise activity. Dabrowski has found that if there was a shift in
enterprise behavior in recent years it was related more to the change in the
general economic environment after the introduction of the reform program
of Poland in early 1990 than to changes in the structure of ownership. Earle
and Worgotter have identified a peculiar relation between profitability, mar-
ket structure, and import liberalization and assert that for the long run the
beneficial effects of price and trade liberalization would inevitably unfold.
So much for the common lessons of the three studies. Two of the papers
use unique sets of data for their analysis. Halpern uses selected balance
sheet as well as profit and loss accounts data of several hundred Hungarian
enterprises. Dabrowski analyzes the results of a comprehensive monitoring
survey of 55 Polish firms having been privatized using different principles in
recent years.
In the estimation of his trade reorientation equation Laszlo Halpern
in Chapter 10 confirms the hypothesis that Hungarian firms were already
cost-responsive before 1989, while the years offast reorientation (1989-1991)
showed a reduced rather than an increased cost sensitivity. It is interesting to
learn, however, that the enterprises did not give up calculating (and basing
IFor instance, Blanchard et al. (1991, p. xiv) have argued that most of the ex-state
firms that accounted for the bulk of industrial production will have to close; only a few
will survive and expand.
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their sales decisions on) the level of export subsidies until these subsidies
were completely phased out. The most obvious reason for reorienting exports
sales to the West (Le., the sharp decline of CMEA trade) is confirmed by
the regressional calculations. With respect to future rational behavior, it is
promising that the dollar price of dollar exports have had a long-run effect
on enterprise decisions on the direction and the volume of trade.
In addition to these econometric estimates, Halpern provides a compre-
hensive multidimensional statistical analysis of data collected for almost a
thousand major Hungarian exporting firms. The most interesting findings
are the following: in the years of reorientation enterprises with high exports
polarized in terms of profitability; the tendency that firms with fast-growing
exports realize low profits has changed substantially and by 1991 the enter-
prises achieving a fast-growing dollar export had significantly higher profits
than the rest; the share of large firms producing dollar exports decreased,
although at a moderate rate.
Janusz M. Dabrowski in his analysis of the behavior of privatized
enterprises in Poland uses a sample of Polish enterprises that have gone
through different paths (different methods) of privatization in recent years.
The separation of the impact of the starting position of the firms, the ef-
fects of macroeconomic stabilization, the loss of markets, and ownership
transformation have helped to demystify the institutional changes related to
privatization.
The Polish experience shows that a combination of a solid starting posi-
tion and the "proper" method of privatization was necessary for enterprises
to achieve a sustained development in domestic and foreign markets. The
starting position was favorable when the equipment was relatively modern,
employees skilled, the management good, and the enterprise already well es-
tablished on Western markets. The promising path of privatization was the
so-called capital way, where the enterprise was first transformed to a joint-
stock company and the owner of the shares (the treasury) sold the shares to
foreign or domestic investors.
A significant difference could be identified, however, between companies
taken over by foreigners and those acquired by domestic businesses. When
control parcels of the shares were acquired by foreign investors, the result
was usually an accelerated process of financial, production, and market re-
structuring. The companies privatized in this way had access to new selling
outlets, capital, and technology transfer.
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When a company was taken over by a domestic investor, there were sel-
dom quick positive results. Domestic investors, as a rule, do not explore
in advance the firm they are going to take over; they do not determine
their market position and are rarely aware of how to operate them. Domes-
tic owners do not plan or are simply unable to strengthen their new firm
with additional investment, by introducing modern technology, and have no
means to provide access to additional markets.
In formerly centrally planned economies where some basic features of
the market environment have been established the study of the use and
misuse of monopoly power is justified, particularly since planning created
an extremely monopolized structure of industry and even services. John
s. Earle and Andreas Worgotter in Chapter 12 start their analysis of
monopoly power in the CSFR with the basic dilemma of Eastern European
economies embarking on transition: how to sequence measures of liberal-
izing prices and liberalizing foreign trade, on the one hand, and demolish-
ing non-natural monopolies, on the other. Given the unique opportunity
for completely reorganizing the structure of their industry the governments
coming into power following the political changes in Eastern Europe had,
at least in principle, the possibility of phasing out many of the monopolies
before monopolies could take advantage of the newly opening possibilities
from price liberalization. For a diversity of reasons, however, none of the
Eastern European governments chose this sequence.
Even if sequencing is no more a question of decision, it is highly im-
portant whether the enterprises that have received their independence and
acquired monopoly power will really behave the way we would expect them
to in a market environment: that is, maximizing profit by restricting the
volume of output and increasing prices. Given that price liberalization was
accomplished simultaneously with trade liberalization in the CSFR, the hy-
pothesis that import competition disciplines the behavior of domestic mo-
nopolists is worth considering.
Earle and Worgotter use industry-specific time series of concentration
ratios, domestic producer prices as well as export and import prices to draw
preliminary conclusions concerning the development of monopoly power fol-
lowing basic measures of liberalization. They find a strong association of
concentration and profitability after price liberalization which indicates that
monopoly elements are present and manifest themselves the way we would
expect in a market environment. The test of the import discipline hypoth-
esis, however, did not bring the expected results. Different attempts at the
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estimation either did not result in a significant relationship or produced
unexpected relationships. They found that, under their specification, an in-
crease of import penetration does not decrease, but rather raises profits in
Czechoslovak industries. This unique result of the authors, however, should
be handled with caution. As they emphasize, the static effect of monopoly
power on inflation of producer prices was negligible if compared to the effects
of other policy changes, like the devaluations of the Czechoslovak koruna and
liberalization of fuel prices.
The three parts of this book do not contain all papers presented at the con-
ference on "International Trade and Restructuring in Eastern Europe." In
order to keep the volume at a reasonable length and to enhance its focus,
the editors decided to limit the papers to those on Central Eastern Europe
(mostly the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland). This decision required that sev-
eral interesting papers on Russia and the Baltic Republics had to be omitted.
We do not claim that this volume covers all the topics worth analyzing un-
der the heading of trade and restructuring in Eastern Europe. In fact, some
important subjects, like joining different regional organizations (EC, EFTA,
and others), were deliberately excluded. To enlarge the analytical part of
the book and to vary the issues covered, the editors have decided to also
include some of those papers that provoked strong critical remarks by the
participants of the conference. For all papers, invited comments helped to
stimulate the discussion and to prepare the revisions. Since these revisions
made some comments obsolete, not all are included.
We think that the issues the papers address are extremely crucial, not
only from the point of view of international trade relations but, more gen-
erally, in their relation to the success of the transition.
Reference
Blanchard, 0., Dornbusch, R., Krugman P., Layard, R., and Summers, L. (1991)
Reform in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Part I
The Role of Exchange Rate Regimes

Chapter 1
Exchange Rate Policy and
Real Exchange Rate
Changes in Economic
Transition
Gabor Oblath*
Introduction
The issue of changes in the real exchange rate (RER) has become rather
controversial in discussions about exchange rate policy in some of the for-
mer socialist, currently transition, economies of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE).! The countries concerned are those that are relatively developed and
have achieved a measure of relative macroeconomic and exchange rate sta-
bility. These countries - namely, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
*This chapter is based on a paper written during the author's stay as a visiting scholar with
the Unit for East European Economies of the Bank of Finland. I gratefully acknowledge
the research support provided by the Bank of Finland and the comments of the members of
the unit. Andrew Berg, the discussant of the paper at the IIASA conference, Janos Gacs,
and Laszlo Halpern also offered useful comments and suggestions; Glen Harma helped
in the language editing. The views expressed are those of the author and should not be
attributed to the Bank of Finland.
lSee, for example, HrnCir (1992), KOPINT-DATORG (1992), and Winiecki (1992) on
the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland respectively.
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(CSFR), Hungary, and Poland - went the furthest among countries of the
region in liberalizing the domestic and foreign sectors of their economies and
in implementing de facto resident convertibility of their currencies.2 This
paper focuses on the experiences of these three countries (referred to as the
three), but in particular on those of Hungary. The nominal exchange rates
of the three countries display either relative (Hungary and Poland) or, for
the time being at least, absolute stability (CSFR)j in the parallel (black)
markets, where they exist, there are no sizable premiums on foreign rates of
exchange.
For all three economies, the available indicators of real exchange rate
changes show an upward movement, though the time profile and the measure
of the real appreciation is different for each country (see Table 1.1 and
Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3; exchange rate data for the CSFR can be found in
Table 3.3 in Chapter 3 by HrnCit).3
Besides this phenomenon, there are many further similarities in economic
trends and conditions in the three countries. First, in each of them a very
rapid liberalization of trade occurred. Although, in contrast to the shock
approach implemented in the CSFR and Poland, Hungary is considered to
have pursued a gradual strategy; actually by international comparison all
three countries opened up their economies very rapidly, especially in view
of the exceptionally powerful protection these countries had provided for
their industries prior to liberalization. A distinctive element that may be
considered part of the protection in each country was the special trade and
payments arrangement they had with their Eastern trading partners. The
formally multilateral, but actually bilateral, arrangements in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) system offered the producers of the
member countries markets almost completely sheltered from international
2Until the outbreak of the civil war, the former Yugoslavia also went a long way toward
liberalizing its economy. The former German Democratic Republic (GDR), after the cur-
rency union with an extremely overvalued exchange rate, institutional shock therapy, and
the vast resource inflow from the western part of the country, is in no way comparable to
the other countries of the region. The stabilization and liberalization efforts in Slovenia
and Estonia, though apparently successful, are too new to offer grounds for comparison.
3 A real exchange rate index is interpreted as the ratio of a country's relative price
(or cost) index to its nominal exchange rate index. Relative price indices indicate the
ratio of the country's domestic price (cost) changes to price (cost) changes abroad. The
real exchange rate of a country is considered to appreciate if the nominal devaluation
(or depreciation) of its currency is smaller than the country's relative inflation. In this
chapter an "upward movement" of the RER signifies a real appreciation and a "downward
movement" of the RER indicates a real depreciation.
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Figure 1.1. Hungary: nominal and real effective exchange rates, 1985=100.
Source: International Financial Statistics, various issues.
competition. The demise of this system and the accompanying collapse of
intraregional trade occurred in conjunction with the rapid dismantling of the
protection that had been accorded to their industries. Since views concerning
the impact of these changes on the required movements in exchange rates
differ, one of the themes to be discussed in this chapter is the effect of import
liberalization and the collapse of the CMEA markets on "warranted" (that
is, economically justified) RER changes.
A further similarity in the three countries is their surprisingly favorable
recent foreign trade and payments performance. Capital inflows - most
notably in Hungary's case, but in that of the other two countries as well -
contributed to an increase in international reserves. Trade performance is
considered to have been surprisingly good because, in spite of the large drop
in exports to the Eastern markets, the trade balance deteriorated much less
than originally expected.
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Figure 1.2. Poland: nominal and real effective exchange rates, 1985=100.
Source: International Financial Statistics, various issues.
These favorable developments in the external sector seemingly fully jus-
tify the aforementioned upward movements in RERs, as does a further com-
mon feature of these countries: the very large difference between the purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) and the exchange rate of their currencies, indicating
a very significant undervaluation of these currencies relative to their PPPs.
However, both of the factors that may contribute to the real appreci-
ation of the currencies under discussion, and, by implication, might justify
this trend, are subject to further considerations. On the one hand, the im-
pressive trade and payments performance of these countries has been closely
associated with the sharp decline in economic activity, involving a substan-
tial and prolonged drop in production (especially that of industry), as well
as a significant increase in unemployment. Moreover, the remarkable im-
provement of the balance of payments, at least in two of the three countries,
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= 100. Source: Table 3.3 of Chapter 3 by Hrncir in this book.
has been partly due to the inflow of foreign capital, the nature and longevity
of which requires further analysis. On the other hand, the interpretation
of the massive deviations between PPPs and exchange rates also deserves
further study. Although it is very likely that the scope of the current dif-
ferences ought to decrease as these countries are drawn closer - in terms of
both institutions and income levels - to Western market economies, it is by
no means self-evident that this is to be seen as a short-term process. The
case may be just the opposite; that is to say, in the short or even medium
run, but especially at the early stages of economic transition and in the
deep economic slump that now prevails in these countries, the temporary
maintenance of the existing differences between exchange rates and PPPs
may be economically justified and, therefore, constitute a legitimate goal for
exchange rate policy.
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This brings us to our final topic: exchange rate policy proper. The
discussions and controversies over the fundamental determinants of the ex-
change rate levels and changes become practically relevant through their
influence on exchange rate policies. Even if it is true that in the long run
exchange rates are determined by "fundamentals," that is, by underlying
economic factors, in the case of a pegged exchange rate it is the perception
of policy makers that has the most significant short-run influence. There-
fore, the role of the exchange rate as a policy instrument demands special
consideration.
In all three countries, at one time or another, the goal of controlling
inflation came to the foreground; exchange rate policy was seen as an adjunct
to this goal. This is true to a lesser degree for Poland after May 1991, when
the fixed rate was abandoned, after which a crawling peg was introduced in
October 1991, following a substantial increase in domestic prices. But in the
CSFR, and in Hungary as well, the exchange rate has become to an increasing
extent a major instrument for combating domestic inflationary pressures. In
the CSFR the rate fixed in late 1990 has served as a nominal anchor in
the tidal wave of inflationary pressure that came with price liberalization;
in Hungary, without using it as a nominal anchor, it still became the most
important policy device for reducing inflationary expectations and inflation
itself. In the case of the latter there was a further argument presented in
favor of an exchange rate policy aiming at real appreciation, according to
which the burden of foreign debt and debt service expressed in domestic
currency could be reduced - at least in relative terms - by a rise in the real
exchange rate. Indirectly, this view also concerns the anti-inflationary role
of exchange rate policy.
This paper reviews some of these issues concerning real exchange rate
changes and their implications for exchange rate policy in the three coun-
tries. Although we focus on the experiences of these specific countries, and
in particular on Hungary, we also look at some general issues concerning
exchange rate policy during the transition. The particular features of the
countries will be compared and, if appropriate, contrasted with one another
and with those of other transition economies.
In the next section we deal with some of the similarities and differences
in the countries' initial conditions and their relation to other countries of the
region in terms of exchange rate system and related policy framework. In the
third section issues concerning the measurement and interpretation of RER
changes are discussed. Next, the specific problems of RER movements in
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transition economies are treated. This is followed by a review of the potential
impact of import liberalization and of the special factors behind trade and
payments developments. The final section treats the relationship between
PPPs and exchange rates in the three countries, discusses its relevance for
exchange rate policies, and draws some conclusions.
Economic Transition and Exchange Rate
Developments: Preliminary Considerations
Exchange rates in traditional and modified
centrally planned economies
In the typical centrally planned economy (CPE) the official exchange rate
had no economic role whatsoever. It served statistical purposes (it was used
for expressing the "devisa equivalent" of foreign trade transactions), but it
did not function as an exchange rate. It did not affect export revenues or
import costs in the domestic currency, which were determined by the price
equalization system.4 Comparing the official exchange rate to the (tourist)
black-market rates, it may have seemed logical to conclude that the official
rate overvalued the currency. This seemingly logical inference, however,
would have missed the point, since the "overvaluation" of the currency can
be interpreted only in regard to conversion factors that perform at least some
of the functions of an excha,nge rate. But in the traditional CPE no such
concept could be interpreted, at least not for foreign trade and payments.
Whatever level it assumed, the official rate had no effect on trade flows. 5
In those economies of CEE that were characterized by the traditional mode
of central planning at the start of the transition, an important first step in
the stabilization and transformation program was the establishment of an
exchange rate. The establishment of an exchange rate in all cases involved
a substantial devaluation of the official rate; but, as indicated, these cannot
be interpreted as adjustments of already existing exchange rates.
4The essence of the price equalization (PreisalJsgleich) system is that producers of
exports and users of imports receive and pay, respectively, domestic accounting prices
that could be - in fact, were - quite different from foreign prices converted at the official
exchange rate (see, for example, Wolf, 1988; and Wiles, 1969).
5Though this statement holds as a general proposition, it requires some qualifications.
As pointed out, for example, by Schrenk (1991) and Lawson (1988), a change of the official
exchange rate could have macroeconomic effects by influencing the net position of the price
equalization fund.
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The situation was different in Hungary and Poland where, as a result of
partial reforms of the traditional central planning introduced earlier (in the
late 1960s and early 1980s, respectively), commercial exchange rates had
been set. True, these were not uniform de facto rates, since an extensive
system of export subsidies and import controls was tied in with exchange
rates. However, in the case of these reformed, or modified, centrally planned
economies (MCPEs) certain concepts and models of exchange rate deter-
mination and the entailed effects of exchange rate changes started to make
sense.6 For example, the concept of overvaluation of the currency at the
commercial exchange rate became relevant; the trade regime could be inter-
preted as one based upon a multiple exchange rate system and the effects
of exchange rate adjustments on the trade balance became a relevant issue.
However, in spite of these significant changes, partly because of the general
characteristics of the MCPEs (limited autonomy of microeconomic agents,
price controls, underdevelopment of financial intermediation, and so on) and
partly due to the features of the trade regime, the role of the exchange rate
remained limited even in those countries that moved furthest toward "mar-
ketizing" the Soviet-type economic system. As for the trade regime, even
the most "marketized" economies (Hungary and Poland) remained excep-
tionally closed in terms of institutions and trade policy. There were several
insulating features. First, there was the system of import controls, namely,
formal and informal quantitative restrictions on foreign purchases (Gacs,
1991). Second, the state foreign trade organizations were also involved in
checking imports. Third, and of particular importance, the state trading
system in conjunction with the CMEA offered sheltered, secure markets for
a significant part of domestic output, in particular for industrial production.
These features resulted in a limited role for the commercial exchange rate in
MCPEs as well.
Therefore, in order that the exchange rate perform its proper role, in
MCPEs two tasks were necessary. First, macroeconomic balance had to be
achieved and the misalignment of the commercial exchange rate deriving
from macroeconomic causes (excess domestic demand at the ruling official
exchange rate) corrected. It is not likely that this could be accomplished
gradually; it had to be done in one step. The second task pertains to the in-
stitutional framework of exchange rate policy, most importantly to the degree
of liberalization of foreign trade. The proper approach to opening up these
60n the concept of MePE and related effects of devaluations see, for example, Wolf
(1985).
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economies is far from being self-evident. Several authors hold that there
are persuasive arguments for the gradual opening up of extremely protected
economies such as those of the transition countries of CEE.7 Nowadays, the
accepted view seems to be that import liberalization ought to be carried
out as rapidly as possible. We return to this point later; for now, suffice
it to say that the radical and instant opening up of (as often stated: the
immediate introduction of convertibility in) tightly closed economies has no
historical precedents. It is likely to involve significant economic and social
costs, especially if accompanied by the collapse of a large previously pro-
tected foreign (CMEA) market. Nevertheless, the nature and magnitude of
these costs, as compared with the potential benefits of a radical opening up,
is subject to controversy. From the point of view of this paper, however, it
is not the general economic and social costs that are relevant, but rather the
impact of these factors on exchange rate policy in general and on the extent
of devaluations in particular.
Factors affecting the initial devaluation
It may be conjectured that at the start of the transition process, the mag-
nitude of the initial devaluation of the official exchange rate depends on the
following factors. First, and perhaps most important, is whether or not a
commercial exchange rate existed at all prior to the transition. IT it did
not exist, the primary task is the creation of an exchange rate either by
the authorities or by economic agents. It should not be presumed that the
participants in a newly established foreign exchange (auction) market have
better information than the authorities about what the "proper" level of the
exchange rate is. To be sure, both are likely to possess very limited knowl-
edge, especially regarding its medium- or longer-run level. Therefore, the
initial devaluation is likely to depend on the parallel (black) market rate,
which offers at least some guidance, however biased and distorted it may be.
Since, as already mentioned, in the traditional centrally planned economies
the official exchange rate had no economic role (its level was often fixed
at some outmoded gold parity meant to express the "strength" of the cur-
rency), it is reasonable to expect that the creation of an exchange rate will
normally involve a substantial devaluation. Its magnitude may be larger if
left to the market, because uncertainties over government policies, spillover
effects from other markets, and the lack of other financial assets are bound
7See, for example, Levcik (1991), McKinnon (1991), Kaves and Oblath (1991), and
Oblath (1991).
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to push the domestic price of foreign exchange to an artificially high level
(see, for example, the early experiences of Bulgaria or the sharp depreciation
of the ruble in 1992). However, if a country has no international reserves, it
may have no choice but to let the currency float.
Second, the extent of the initial devaluation depends on the intensity
of the inherited macroeconomic imbalances, in particular excess domestic
demand. This, as is well known, may have two components: a "stock," of-
ten referred to as monetary overhang, and a "flow" deriving from budgetary
deficits and/or wage increases that are unsustainable at current price and
exchange rate levels. It is worth noting that the second (flow) type of macro
imbalance may also occur in a market economy maintaining fixed exchange
rates, though the latter would normally not have to deal with the peculiari-
ties stemming from the prevalence of officially fixed (controlled) prices, and
the magnitude of such an imbalance would likely be much smaller. At any
rate, the problem in this case is in the incompatibility between the level (or
growth) of aggregate domestic demand, on the one hand, and that of the
fixed exchange rate, on the other. To tackle this imbalance, it is necessary to
devalue the currency and reduce domestic demand. Note, however, that this
may be accomplished at any (for example, unchanged) level of protection of
the domestic economy.
This takes us to the third factor that may affect the initial extent of the
devaluation: the change of the institutional setting, most importantly the
trade regime. In this context, issues concerning two important and partly
related matters are raised: the impact of trade liberalization on exchange
rates and the collapse of Eastern (CMEA) trade. As for trade liberalization,
it can be expected that, other factors being equal, the further an economy
has been from an open trade regime (that is, the closer it has been to the
traditional model of central planning8 ) and the more swift and radical the
trade liberalization, the larger is the necessary initial devaluation. This
conjecture, in agreement with the standard literature of trade theory and
policy, implies that a more gradual import liberalization and/or a transitory
"tariffication" of former quantitative restrictions would require a smaller
devaluation than would otherwise be the case.9 .
The impact of the collapse of Eastern trade is less clear-cut. While some
implications of this shock indicate the necessity of additional devaluation
8The former nonexistence of a commercial exchange rate may indeed be considered
an indication that the economy had approached the ideal type of "total closedness"; see
Oblath (1988) on this point.
9See, for example, Corden (1987), Krueger (1978), Edwards (1992), and Rodrik (1992).
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(beyond that warranted by the foregoing factors), some others point in the
opposite direction. Although we return to this point in a later section,
some preliminary remarks are in order. On the one hand, the dramatic fall
in exports to the former CMEA area necessitates the reorientation of this
trade toward the West (at least a part of it), involving higher costs and/or
lower prices - suggesting the necessity of further devaluation. The terms-of-
trade shock associated with the switch from ruble (clearing) trade at CMEA
prices to dollar trade at world prices and the resulting deterioration in the
trade balance carry the same implication (Oblath and Tarr, 1992). On
the other hand, the large fall in exports to the East could contribute to
an easing of the domestic imbalance (excess demand) or induce companies
to explore Western markets. Furthermore, depending on the institutional
details, in particular the former domestic cross rate between the dollar and
the ruble, the switch could even increase the home currency revenues of those
companies that manage either to reorient their former Eastern exports or to
keep their Eastern markets. All in all, the effect of the collapse of Eastern
trade on the exchange rate is ambiguous and without further inquiry definite
statements cannot be made.
Let us now try to apply this framework to the three transition countries.
While Hungary and Poland, the two former MCPEs, already had commercial
exchange rates before the transition, the CSFR introduced one only in 1990.'
The CSFR's economy had clearly been the most closed of the three. How-
ever, from the point of view of macroeconomic imbalances, it was perhaps
in· the best situation. In this respect, Poland clearly was in the worst state:
before the stabilization and liberalization program its inflation approached
rates associated with hyperinflation, with simultaneously increasing short-
ages. Hungary's domestic market in turn was relatively stable (at the cost
of very large foreign indebtedness), and it probably went the furthest among
countries of CEE in reforming its economy under the predemocratic po-
litical system. In the present context, it is particularly noteworthy that,
in 1989, Hungary launched a significant, but gradual, trade liberalization
program aimed at removing administrative (nontariff) trade barriers on its
imports. The other two countries chose a more radical approach to trade
liberalization. Poland opened up its economy in one stroke and introduced
the (resident) convertibility of its currency in early 1990. Although there
are some differences in details between the Polish and the CSFR trade and
foreign exchange reforms, the similarities are more significant (see Chapter 5
by Gacs).
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The foregoing discussion helps explain the similarities and differences
in exchange rate changes and related policies in the three countries. Given
Hungary's relative macro stability and gradual liberalization strategy, there
were no significant devaluations (the largest, 15 percent, occurred in early
1991).10 In Poland and in the CSFR, in turn, very large devaluations were
effected. Although at the outset Poland was considerably more open than the
CSFR, its macroeconomic imbalances were far more severe; and since both
opted for a radical and rapid opening, in spite of their initial differences,
both had to devalue their currencies drastically.
It should be noted that up to this point only nominal devaluations have
been discussed. The real impact of nominal exchange rate changes depends
on factors affecting domestic price changes following exchange rate adjust-
ments; this issue is treated in the next section.
An important topic, however, should be addressed before treating the
problems of real exchange rate changes: domestic price liberalization. If
the formerly controlled prices are liberalized simultaneously with the de-
valuation, the change in the real exchange rate is necessarily much smaller
than what might be expected without the removal of price controls. A cru-
cial question here is whether a real devaluation is necessary in the context
of the reform package or would a nominal adjustment suffice. For reasons
to be discussed, there are several conceptual problems with the precise in-
terpretation of this question, but at least a preliminary assessment can be
given. Berg and Sachs (1992) explicitly address this matter; their answer
is no. In an analysis of the Polish experience, they assert that in a situa-
tion characterized by large monetary overhang and price controls (and, as
a consequence, shortages and queuing), a nominal devaluation accompanied
by price liberalization solves the macroeconomic imbalance without a real-
devaluation. The point where their reasoning appears to be at odds with
the implications of the framework presented above is in the impact of trade
liberalization. While they claim that opening up (convertibility of the cur-
rency) requires just a nominal devaluation and price liberalization to absorb
the overall excess demand (see, in particular, Berg and Sachs, 1992, pp. 121-
124), our framework builds on the assumption that opening up the economy
necessitates additional devaluation as compared with the one required for
restoring macroeconomic balance at an unchanged level of protection. This,
I°It is worth noting that export subsidies have also been removed gradually, thus the
former de facto multiple exchange rate regime was unified.
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though it has not been stated explicitly, implies that opening up warrants a
devaluation in real terms.
The two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. There are two
potential ways to reconcile them; both are treated in the sections that fol-
low. One is through rendering due attention to the effects of changes in
the level of activity - an issue not even touched upon as yet. Thus it is
conceivable that a stabilization package aimed at absorbing excess domestic
demand and correcting macroeconomic disequilibria, combined with instant
trade liberalization and nominal devaluation, results in so deep a recession
that the liberal trade regime turns out to be sustainable even without a real
depreciation. The other possibility is that the conventional indicators of real
exchange rate changes should not be taken at face value with respect to tran-
sition economies. We now turn to the problems involving the measurement
and interpretation of RER changes.
Real Exchange Rate Movements:
Problems of Measurement and Interpretation
The measurement and interpretation of real exchange rate changes in general
raise several difficult issues. Nevertheless, it is no exaggeration to say that
the problems in the case of market economies seem trifling compared with
those involved in quantifying and interpreting RER movements for transition
economies.
Generally speaking, three types of seemingly technical questions have
to be resolved when measuring changes in RERs. First, a choice has to
be made of whether the RER is calculated using just two currencies or all
partner currencies, that is, whether a bilateral or a multilateral comparison
is made. In the latter case, the question arises as to the proper basket
(weighting system). We rely mainly on the latter concept, but, as it would
lead us too far afield and, moreover, it is not specific to transition economies,
we shall ignore the weighting issue in this chapter. Second, a choice has to
be made of the relevant price (cost) index or indices. Third, the base period
has to be determined relative to which the RER changes are measured (see
the thorough survey by Maciejewski, 1983).
These questions are evidently not just technical; they are closely re-
lated to the conceptual issues in interpreting RER changes. In broad terms,
RER indices reflect deviations of a currency's exchange rate from purchas-
ing power parity (PPP). Given that RER indices are, by definition, ratios
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of index numbers, they are conceptually related to the relative version of
the PPP theory. But this doctrine, even in its relative form, is not a sin-
gle theory; it consists of several alternative theories (see Officer, 1982; and
Dornbusch, 1985). An important aspect in which the various approaches dif-
fer is which price (cost) index is considered relevant for PPP computations.
This underscores that the choice of the price index in RER calculations is
likely to be more than just a technical issue. More to the point, the inter-
pretation of RER indices requires either the acceptance of (or some version
of) the PPP theory or a broader theoretical framework, involving the con-
cept of an equilibrium exchange rate. This framework, in turn, would have
to specifically address the role of relative prices (thus PPP) in determining
the equilibrium exchange rate. By implication, not just the role of relative
price changes would have to be clarified, but also that of the absolute PPP,
specifically the relationship between price levels and exchange rates, as well
as the association between exchange rate equilibrium and equilibrium rela-
tive prices (specifically between those of traded and nontraded goods) in the
home country.
Needless to say, this paper does not address all these issues. The pur-
pose here is to demonstrate that the measurement and interpretation of RER
changes raise a number of general conceptual and methodological problems
even in market economies. In the following sections, we show that the prob-
lems involved are yet more complex and difficult for transition economies.
RER Changes and Economic Transition
In the case of the transition economies, three points deserve special attention:
the distinctive problems associated with the selection and interpretation of
the relevant price indices; the choice of the base period; and the interpreta-
tion of the structural factors related to, or affecting, RER changes.
Price indices
As pointed out by Maciejewski (1983), there are at least as many choices
regarding the "correct" price indices for calculating RERs as there are an-
alytical or policy questions pertaining to price (cost) movements (expressed
in a common currency) of a given country relative to the rest of the world.
This is important because different price and cost levels in any country may
change in different proportions, and so can the cross-country ratio of the
various price and cost indices. There is, however, a special issue in the case
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Table 1.2. Consumer price indices (CPI) and producer price indices (PPI),
previous year = 100.
CSFR
Hungary
Poland
1990
CPI
110
129
685
PPI
104
122
722
1991
CPI
174
135
170
PPI
177
129
148
Source: International Financial Statistics, October 1992.
of transition economies involving unusual problems - namely, the liberal-
ization of prices. Depending on the timing and the type of domestic price
liberalization, producer and consumer price changes can deviate to a signif-
icantly larger extent than is normal in market economies. This, as shown
in Table 1.2, holds the least for the CSFR, where some important consumer
prices have still not been liberalized. In Hungary consumer prices consis-
tently increased to a larger degree than producer prices as prices were being
liberalized, whereas in Poland there were significant differences between the
rates of change of the two price levels in the years 1990 and 1991, but in the
reverse fashion.
Therefore, depending on whether a producer or consumer price index is
used in calculating the RER index and which particular subperiod is consid-
ered, quite different results may be obtained, indicating divergent movements
in RERs. One reason why it is vital to be aware of this divergence is that
the informational content of the two types of RERs - the one based on the
consumer price index (CPI) and the other on the producer price index (PPI)
- is quite different. With some simplification, the RER index based on rela-
tive PPIs may be considered to reveal changes in domestic exporters' price
or cost competitiveness in foreign markets. The RER index involving CPI
comparisons in turn offers a rough indication of changes in domestic pro-
ducers' price competitiveness vis-a.-vis imports. This, of course, should be
regarded as a very rough indicator; nonetheless, it should be taken seriously,
especially at a time of radical trade liberalization. We shall return to this
point later.
The other aspect of the divergence between the RER indices based on
PPI and CPI comparisons has been amply treated in the international lit-
erature (see, for example, Aghevli et al., 1991; and Edwards, 1992): it may
offer a rough idea of the change in the relative price of the tradable relative
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to the nontradable sector in the domestic economy.u This relative price is
an especially important one: it is often referred to as "the" real exchange
rate in the theoretical literature (see Bruno, 1976; Dornbusch, 1988; and
Neary, 1988). Its particular significance lies in the fact that changes in it af-
fect the domestic demand for and supply of tradable and nontradable goods
(services), respectively; it influences relative profitability of, and therefore
the incentives for investment in, the alternative sectors - a central issue in
transition economies.12
These observations are meant to call attention to some implications of
applying alternative price indices to RER calculations and to caution against
judgments based on a single RER index. The case in point is using only the
RER index based on PPI comparisons for evaluating exchange rate devel-
opments. This, as mentioned above and discussed later, might be a suitable
indicator of changes in export price competitiveness, but in itself may turn
out to be misleading.
Beyond the actual choice among the available price indices, there is a
further difficulty, quite specific to transition economies, concerning the com-
putation and interpretation of RERsP This stems from the difficulty of
comparing price indices between a period in which acute shortages prevail,
with another in which the shortages have already been eliminated. The prac-
tical implication of this problem is that RER movements before and after the
elimination of shortages (namely, the pre- and post-stabilization periods) are
not likely to be directly comparable. As a result, the presentation of RER
indices as a continuous time series over the two periods may give rise to
misleading interpretations. This is the case because with the elimination (or
significant alleviation) of shortages, various types of costs previously associ-
ated with the shortages, for example, queuing (Kornai, 1980) - evidently not
included in the official price index - are also eliminated. This issue may be
especially relevant for Poland (where, as we shall see, the RER appreciated
to the greatest extent since 1990); less for the CSFR; and probably the least
for Hungary.
11 If traded goods' prices were equalized internationally, the ratio of the price of traded
goods to that of nontraded goods would move in line with relative CPIs; see the derivation
in Aghevli and Montiel (1991).
12This point was made especially forcefully by Winiecki (1992).
13Though the other price (cost) indices (GDP deflators, unit labor cost index, and so
on) have not been treated, the problems regarding their use may be traced to those already
discussed.
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This perhaps is an even more difficult issue than the previous one. In order
that the interpretation of RER movements not lead analysts and policy mak-
ers astray, the base period should, at least in principle, be a period in which
the actual exchange rate corresponds to its equilibrium value. Although the
concept of an equilibrium exchange rate is far from unambiguous, most defi-
nitions associate it with an exchange rate consistent with both external and
internal balances. External balance normally refers to a sustainable balance
on the current account; internal balance is related to full employment or the
natural unemployment rate. Understandably, the literature on equilibrium
exchange rates does not consider the absence of general shortages a com-
ponent of the definition of "internal balance."14 The incorporation of the
concept of "internal balance" is due to the recognition - presented first and
most forcefully by Robinson (1937) and Harrod (1939) - that equilibrium in
the balance of payments may be achieved at any (low) level of economic ac-
tivity. For contemporary market economies, the significance of this element
in the definition is related to the fact that, while the balance of payments
may be influenced by cyclical fluctuations in economic activity, the equi-
librium exchange rate, at least if interpreted as its medium- or longer-term
value, is not subject to such cyclical variations.
Evidently, it is not easy to identify real-world situations corresponding
to this definition of the equilibrium exchange rate. The less so, since nei-
ther the concept of external nor that of internal balance is really clear-cut.
Nevertheless, there are pragmatic ways of forming rough judgments of how
far the exchange rates of certain OECD countries have deviated from their
medium-term levels in specific time periods. This is clearly not saying a
great deal, but it certainly is more than what we can say about the level of
exchange rates in transition economies, where the problem is not in iden-
tifying a period of exchange rate equilibrium, but the certainty that in the
past (namely, under central planning) no such period could possibly have
existed. This is clear enough in the case of countries where commercial ex-
change rates simply did not exist. But the statement holds also for MCPEs,
where, as discussed earlier, serious domestic and external imbalances and/or
l40fficer (1982) presents a comprehensive review of the historical evolution and alterna-
tive interpretations of the concept of an equilibrium exchange rate. We bypass that branch
of the literature which considers this concept irrelevant or misleading (for example, Robin-
son, 1937; and Balassa and Schydlowski, 1968), but we certainly agree with Edwards's
(1992) contention that "there is not a single equilibrium exchange rate."
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a large arsenal of nontariff and nonmarket barriers to imports, as well as
complicated and differentiated export subsidies, held sway.
The foregoing explanation has both practical and theoretical implica-
tions. Practically speaking, the choice involving a pre-transition base period
does not make much sense, or may lead to false conclusions. It may, of
course, be interesting to look at the RER before and after significant stabi-
lization and liberalization measures were introduced, but, as noted above,
time series of RER indices for the transition period should not be interpreted
simply as the extensions or continuations of pre-transition time series, even
if the price indices and weighting systems are the same for the two periods
(that is, the RER index is formally of the same type). Thus, the correct,
or at least conceptually acceptable, base period would be one involving the
identifiable beginning of the transition (or one immediately following it).
This is easy in the case of countries where stabilization-cum-liberalization
measures were introduced in a single policy package (Poland) or where these
measures followed one another within a short time span (CSFR). Hungary
is a special case in this respect, since both reform and stabilization measures
were introduced gradually and stretched over a long period. Nevertheless, as
we shall see, some signals, stemming from the sequencing of liberalization,
may assist us in chosing the potential base periods.
Turning to the theoretical implications, the most significant is that in
the case of transition economies no proper standards exist for evaluating the
level of the exchange rate. To put it differently, it is not simply difficult,
but literally impossible, to interpret the concept of an equilibrium exchange
rate in the pre-transition period, even in the very loose sense referred to
above. That exchange rate, in turn, which is introduced as part of a major
reform package is not likely to represent an equilibrium rate; as a matter
of fact, it is not meant to and, indeed, cannot possibly be one. It is worth
recalling that the concept of an equilibrium exchange rate incorporates the
notion of full employment (or natural unemployment rate); that is to say,
some normal level of activity over the business cycle. Now, in the case of
transition economies, it is hopeless to try to interpret either the normal level
of activity or cyclical movements. The level of activity is falling everywhere
in CEE, and, since nothing is known about its normal level, there are no
clues as to whether the observed decline is already too large or further falls
are still inevitable, and, if so, how large these are supposed or expected to
be. The relevance of this question, as we have already seen, stems from
the fact that a sustainable external balance may be achieved at any (low)
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level of activity, and - before turning to empirical matters - one should be
aware that there were good reasons for adding the activity criterion to the
definition of exchange equilibrium.
Therefore, there are no solid grounds for assessing what constitutes an
equilibrium exchange rate in an economy under transition. Except for very
drastic misalignments, it is impossible to tell whether an observed rate is
below or above its normal level. As a consequence, the question whether or
not RER changes of particular currencies have already gone too far in either
directions is more or less irresolvable. It is, or at least should be, possible,
however, to look at current and past movements of RERs and form some
judgment on the direction of change. When making a judgment, several
factors are considered either explicitly or implicitly. In what follows we try
to be explicit and present an overview of the structural factors that are likely
to affect RER changes in the transition period.
Factors influencing RER movements
It is worth recapitulating: changes in RERs may offer relatively unambiguous
guidance to the evaluation of actual exchange rate movements if the base
period entails an equilibrium exchange rate, the alternative relative price
indices do not deviate significantly, and, most importantly, there are no such
structural changes which in themselves warrant RER changes. IS From the
above discussion it should be clear that neither of the first two conditions are
fulfilled in the transition economies of CEE. In this section we concentrate
on the third item: structural changes.
It should be emphasized at the outset that in this context two issues
are actually involved. One concerns the explanation of observed RER move-
ments. The other is related to the identification of factors that may affect
the warranted changes in RERs. The two do not necessarily correspond to
each other - at any rate, not in the short term. Actual RER changes, unless
the currency is freely floating, are influenced mainly by decisions of policy
makers regarding nominal exchange rates in the face of domestic price in-
flation (the latter only partly under policy control, and itself a function of
nominal changes in the rate of exchange). The real exchange rate, there-
fore, is not a direct policy instrument. In case of a floating rate, the decision
uSee, for example, Dornbusch (1985). The reader is reminded that the fourth related
issue, the "appropriateness" of the weighting system for calculating real effective exchange
rates, is not discussed in this paper.
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maker with respect to the change in the nominal exchange rate is the market.
But, as discussed, the participants in foreign exchange markets in transition
economies may be driven to their decisions by the lack of financial instru-
ments other than foreign exchange, and their information on factors affecting
the exchange rate is likely to be more limited than that of the official decision
makers.
The term warranted RER movements is meant to express changes justi-
fied or required by underlying economic factors, be they taken into consid-
eration by policy makers (or/and the market) or not. Note that, for reasons
treated earlier, the concept of the equilibrium exchange rate is avoided. This
is not just a difference in terminology. On the one hand, warranted changes
in RERs may be influenced by factors not directly related to observed bal-
ance of payments (BOP) performance. On the other hand, as we shall try to
demonstrate, factors affecting BOP developments may induce unwarranted
RER movements. In the following, we first review the factors related to
warranted RER changes; this may serve as a reference for explaining actual
movements in RERs.
Four major factors, in principle, should have a significant impact on
RER movements in the transition period. The first is trade liberalization;
this is treated in a following section. (As mentioned earlier, we consider
the liberalization of imports a factor warranting a real depreciation.) The
second is the collapse of Eastern trade. The third is the elimination of various
domestic and external impediments constraining these countries' exports to
the West. The fourth factor is the emancipation of the service sector in the
transition period.
It is difficult to asses the impact of the collapse of Eastern markets: the
effects in the short run may be the opposite to those in the long run. There
are three quite different sets offactors at work here. One is the impact on the
domestic currency costs and revenues of companies that used to trade with
the CMEA countries; another is the reaction of these companies to the trade
collapse in terms of their attempts to increase sales to the West; and the third
relates to the combined influence of these factors on the convertible-currency
balance of trade in the countries concerned.
The first and early assessment of these factors (see Table 1.3) may lead
to the conclusion that the overall trade performance of the three countries
following the demise of the CMEA trade arrangements was remarkably good,
certainly much better than could be expected after a roughly 50 percent
decline in their exports to former CMEA partners.
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Table 1.3. Indicators of external performance, billions of US dollars.
Country 1990 1991 1992
Trade Balance
CSFR -0.78 -0.45 -0.90
Hungarya 0.94 -1.11 -0.37
Poland 2.20 0.10 0.50
Current Account
CSFR -1.10 0.36 0.20
Hungary 0.13 0.27 0.32
Poland 0.70 -1.70 -0.30
Foreign Direct Investment
CSFR 0.18 0.60 1.06
Hungary 0.31 1.46 1.47
Poland n.a. 0.09 0.76
4Trade balance in the current account differs significantly from these data: for 1990, 0.35;
for 1991, 0.19; for 1992, -0.05.
n.a. = not available.
Sources: International Financial Statistics, OECD Economic Outlook, East-West Invest-
ment News, and national statistics.
The other factor to be considered is the impact on the domestic price
level (and by implication on relative price and RER movements) of the elim-
ination of the special pricing system associated with CMEA trade. As dis-
cussed and formally demonstrated in Oblath and Marer (1992), the exis-
tence of the peculiar trading and pricing system associated with the CMEA
resulted in the extension of the nontraded sector to involve actually traded
goods, but with prices differing from (in fact lower than) world market prices.
Looking at warranted RER changes from this angle, the switch to dollar
trade and world market prices should contribute to the real appreciation of
the currencies involved. Nevertheless, it is by no means evident that this
factor is supposed to work in the short run. The third aspect related to the
discontinuation of CMEA trade certainly offers a different indication: the
abandonment of this special trade regime amounts to a much more exten-
sive trade liberalization than that indicated by customary measures - the
last factor, therefore, points toward the need for a real depreciation.
However, before discussing the effects of trade liberalization, it is worth
taking a brief look at the other factors influencing warranted RER changes.
The removal of various domestic and external impediments that formerly
constrained exports is particularly important. As for the domestic factors,
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the efficiency-enhancing effects of the elimination of the monopolistic posi-
tion of foreign trade organizations (FTOs) in trading with foreign countries
are likely to have a favorable impact on the relative cost and price position
of domestic exporters. This factor, therefore, in and of itself would call for
a real appreciation of the currency, as would the beneficial effects of trade
liberalization with respect to the availability of imported inputs for export
goods. As for the external factors, the dismantling of foreign trade barriers,
in particular those of the EC, also point toward a real appreciation.
This conclusion may be reinforced by the required relative price changes
within the countries. In each of the economies of CEE, services were sub-
stantially underpriced. What was referred to as the emancipation of this
sector, also argues for the increase of its relative prices - pointing to the
necessity of a real revaluation.
All in all, most factors considered thus far seem to point to the necessity
of an appreciation of the RER in transition economies. However, the time
horizon in which these factors are supposed to exert their influence is far from
clear. Two major issues still have to be discussed to clear up this point. One
is trade liberalization, and the other is foreign economic (balance of trade
and payments) performance. But before reviewing these crucial issues, it is
worth taking a look at actual RER developments in the three countries.
Actual RER movements
As indicated by Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, RER indices based on consumer
prices displayed a marked upward movement i~ both the CSFR and Poland
following the implementation of radical stabilization-cum-liberalization pro-
grams. The real appreciation appears to be more pronounced in the latter
country. The reasons for this difference are related to the fact that while both
countries decided to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor during the
introduction of major price liberalization measures, Poland did not, whereas
the CSFR did, succeed in promptly bringing down the rate of inflation. The
CSFR still maintains the nominal exchange rate introduced in late 1990, at
the outset of its program. Poland in turn had to give up its adherence to
a fixed rate and introduced a crawling peg in 1991, in order to arrest the
deterioration of its producers' international price and cost competitiveness.
At the end of 1992, RER indices of the two countries indicate a real appre-
ciation of roughly 24 percent in the CSFR and 80 percent in Poland since
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the beginning of their respective programs. 16 This is a significant difference
indeed, even if the fact that Poland started its program one year earlier than
the CSFR is taken into account. It is possible, but not very instructive, to
compare the RER index to its level in the pre-transition period. The real
effective exchange rate of the CSFR koruna is still somewhat below its level
in early 1990, while that of the Polish zloty has increased to above the level
prevailing in 1988-1989.
In Hungary, as already mentioned, there was no identifiable starting
point of the transition; therefore, there is no single obvious choice regarding
the base period. As shown in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 during 1988 and
1989 both the nominal and real exchange rates (based on consumer prices)
were fairly stable. However, beginning in early 1991, a sharp upward trend
can be observed. True, there was a real depreciation of about 13 percent
between 1985 and 1988, but since the first quarter of 1990, the real effective
exchange rate of the forint appears to have increased some 27 percent. The
reason why early 1990 may have particular relevance as a base period is that
this marked the start of the second stage of the country's trade liberalization
program, involving the liberalization (more specifically, "de-licensing") of a
major part of competitive imports. (In the preceding stage, namely, in 1989,
mainly noncompetitive imports were liberalized.)
If producer, rather than consumer, prices are used to quantify RER
changes (Table 1.2), the real appreciation of the forint appears to be more
modest. It is the PPI that is used by the National Bank of Hungary for mon-
itoring RER movements. However, as noted above, the content of the two
indices differs and, especially in a period of large-scale import liberalization,
due attention has to be given to the differences.
In the case of the other two countries, the CPI and the PPI do not
display a consistent divergence (at least not for the two years reviewed).
Thus, unless a specific and very short time span is surveyed, the divergence
between the two indices should not fundamentally change the assessment
regarding the CSFR and Poland.
Finally, the question naturally arises: how can the observed movements
in RERs be explained, and to what extent do they correspond to the war-
ranted movements discussed above? Although we do not claim to be able to
give definite answers, an attempt is made in the next section to address these
16If the last quarter of 1989 is taken as the base period for Poland, the real appreciation
is smaller, roughly 40 percent.
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fundamental questions as we turn to a discussion of the impact of import
liberalization and external performance.
Import Liberalization and
External Economic Performance
Foreign trade liberalization was one of the most important measures intro-
duced in the reform packages aimed at achieving economic transition; as
a matter of fact it was often considered the cornerstone of liberalization
policies. Nevertheless, the implications of very rapid and radical import
liberalization in countries of CEE is still a subject of controversy.
In our interpretation, other factors being equal, it is necessary that the
drastic liberalization of imports be associated with, in fact compensated
by, a real depreciation. If this is not the case, then other, more powerful,
factors have to be influencing RER changes. However, it should be important
to clarify whether these counteracting factors are of a short- or long-term
character.
First, it may be useful to spell out the reasons why a real depreciation
is warranted at the time of a wide-scale import liberalization. One is that
companies having been well protected (including the noted effects of CMEA
trade) are not likely to become competitive unless the former protection
built on administrative controls is, at least temporarily, replaced by market-
oriented policy instruments. The best solution is the introduction of provi-
sional tariffs, but, ifthis is not a viable alternative (as in the case of Hungary,
see, for example, Oblath, 1991), then a real devaluation is necessary. In both
the CSFR and Poland some temporary surcharges were introduced at the
time of trade liberalization; nevertheless, their economies became the most
open ones in Europe (see ECE, 1992). Later on, the surcharges were rapidly
reduced or removed - indicating a larger real appreciation de facto than in-
dicated by RER indices only. Nowadays, in turn, there are indications that
in both countries, and also in Hungary, pressure is mounting for increasing
protection of domestic activities, and the authorities are likely to yield, at
least to some degree, to this demand. This turn of events, in our view, is
partly a result of the real appreciation of these currencies.
But why and how was the real appreciation sustainable? This question
leads to the other reason why the exchange rate is normally expected to
depreciate in real terms in the context of trade liberalization. The effects
of such measures on the balance of trade and payments are usually adverse,
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Table 1.4. Indicators of real activity, percent change.
1990 1991 1992
1.0
3.5
-4.5
-9.8
-7.5
-15.2
-10.2
-14.1
-16.0
-21.2
-3.3
-9.6
-1.5
-3.7
CSFR
GDP
Industrial production
Hungary
GDP
Industrial production
Poland
GDP -11.6 -9.0
Industrial production -23.3 11.9
Source: National statistics and KOPINT-DATORG, 1992 and 1993.
at least in the short run. These effects are supposed to be counteracted
by devaluation or depreciation. But in the three countries reviewed, the
trade and payments balances did not deteriorate significantly; the external
economic performance of these countries, as noted, was surprisingly good.
Two components of external economic performance should be treated sepa-
rately. One is trade performance proper; the other concerns the balance of
payments.
Some recent statistics on foreign trade and payments of the three coun-
tries are presented in Table 1.3. There is a clear tendency toward improve-
ment in the current account. Trade balances have also been improving,
and, due to the significant inflow of foreign capital, the overall balance of
payments performance may be considered very satisfactory.
Trade performance in all three countries seems to be very much domi-
nated by developments in the domestic real economy, most notably by the
sharp recession (see Table 1.4). The demand for imports has been falling,
and companies having lost their Eastern and domestic markets had no choice
but to try to increase their exports to the West, even when such trade was
unprofitable. Although no systematic analysis is available, there is casual
evidence from Hungary on the behavior of firms under such circumstances.
Many of them cover current losses on export sales by living off their assets,
for example, selling their branches, real estates, and so on.17 Evidently, this
process is not sustainable. Moreover, it should be recalled that in Hun-
gary's case the alternative RER indices reflect a weaker (or more rapidly
17 On average, industrial exports were not profitable in 1991 (see Antal6czy and Koltaine,
1992).
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weakening) competitive position for domestic producers (vis-a-vis imports)
than that for exporters. All in all, the favorable trade performance of these
countries seems to be strongly associated with economic recession.
But what about the other component of balance-of-payments perfor-
mance, e.g., foreign capital inflow? The evidence is even more sporadic
on this than on factors affecting trade flows. Experiences in Hungary -
the country that has recorded the largest capital inflow within the CEE
region (see Table 1.3) - indicate that a major part of the capital inflow
recorded as "foreign direct investment" is in the form of short-term deposits
with commercial banks. (Note that due to tight monetary policies in the
three countries, interest rates have been high by international standards.)
Therefore, this capital inflow, unless spent on imports, which would actu-
ally constitute a healthy and welcome development, directly contributes to
either real appreciation or - by increasing international reserves of the cen-
tral bank and thus the monetary base - inflation in these countries. "Once
foreign investments and other private long-term capital inflows make their
way into the countries [as is happening in Hungary] a Latin American-type
real appreciation syndrome may set in," warned Bruno (1992). Still, he was
mildly optimistic, expecting that there are substantial untapped sources of
productivity growth in these economies.
This, indeed, is likely to be the case. But the critical question facing
policy makers and analysts is whether the short-term real appreciation of the
currencies of transition economies actually helps, or hinders, the tapping of
these sources. The Latin American experiences alluded to certainly indicate
that the real appreciation of the currency may be the factor most detrimental
to trade liberalization and related outward-looking development strategies.
Exchange Rate Policy and Purchasing
Power Parities: Concluding Remarks
In the three countries reviewed, a major objective of recent exchange rate
policy has been to try to provide a firm basis for the anti-inflationary aims
of overall economic policy. This policy line was' abandoned in Poland after
having proved unrealistic and unsustainable, but in the other two countries
it still prevails. The real appreciation of the currencies of the other two coun-
tries certainly had, and may even continue to have, beneficial effects on price
performance, but, as we have tried to indicate, it may not be sustainable in
the long run, or only at the cost of further losses in output.
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Table 1.5. Overview of Eastern European exchange rates. For most of
1992 data are forecast.
Jan. Apr. Jul. Oct.
CSFR koruna
Market/Official exchange rate (koruna/$) 1990 16.29 16.67 16.37 20.18
1991 27.65 29.92 31.00 29.89
1992 28.36 28.85 29.70 29.95
PPP exchange rate (koruna/$) 1990 6.20 6.15 6.51 6.83
1991 8.54 9.71 10.01 9.93
1992 10.27 10.34 10.89 11.28
Ratio of Market/Ppp exchange rate 1990 2.63 2.71 2.52 2.95
1991 3.24 3.08 3.10 3.01
1992 2.76 2.79 2.73 2.65
Hungarian forint
Market/Official exchange rate (forint/$) 1990 62.36 65.21 64.01 61.37
1991 68.59 75.18 77.29 75.21
1992 76.92 79.80 82.14 82.83
PPP exchange rate (forint/$) 1990 29.00 31.75 32.60 33.76
1991 37.37 41.42 43.32 44.24
1992 46.82 49.18 50.09 50.12
Ratio of Market/Ppp exchange rate 1990 2.15 2.05 1.96 1.82
1991 1.84 1.81 1.78 1.70
1992 1.64 1.62 1.64 1.65
Polish zloty
Market/Official exchange rate (zloty/$) 1990 9,500 9,500 9,500 9,500
1991 9,500 9,500 11,453 11,153
1992 11,247 13,500 14,313 14,794
PPP exchange rate (zloty/$) 1990 2,450 3,360 3,720 4,093
1991 5,081 5,790 6,204 6,655
1992 7,578 7,931 8,359 8,701
Ratio of Market/Ppp exchange rate 1990 3.88 2.83 2.55 2.32
1991 1.87 1.64 1.85 1.68
1992 1.48 1.70 1.71 1.70
Source: PlanEcon, 1992.
Both domestically and abroad, however, there is a school of thought
that considers real appreciation not a source of problems, but rather a sign
of becoming a normal country. Those who support this view refer to the
fact that in transition economies the official exchange rate strongly underval-
ues the domestic currency relative to purchasing power parity (PPP). This
claim is clearly borne out by the data (see Table 1.5) taken from PlanEcon
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(1992). The latest comprehensive review of real income levels and PPPs
(Summers and Heston, 1991), in which Hungary and Poland were included,
reveals figures for 1988; they are more or less in line with those suggested
by PlanEcon.
These findings are subject to several interpretations. They may indeed
reflect the fact that there is ample room for further real appreciation of
these currencies, and, generally speaking, there is nothing wrong with this
assertion. If, however, it is claimed on the basis of PPP figures that the
currencies of CEE transition economies may, or should, appreciate in real
terms in the short run, then this proposition has to be handled with care. It
is well known that countries of different income levels have currencies whose
exchange rates deviate from PPPs more or less in line with differences in
relative real incomes. I8 But in the case of transition economies there are
good reasons for more than normal deviations. For overcoming the legacies
of central planning, and, in particular, the consequences of the extreme
closedness of the economy, to establish a viable export sector and enable
domestic industries to compete with foreign exporters, the maintenance of
a substantial difference between exchange rates and PPPs may be crucial.
The gap between exchange rates and purchasing power parities will surely
narrow as the real performance provides support. But there is no need to
hurry. Even newly industrialized countries, with much more competitive
export sectors, suffered when they experienced the inevitable eventual real
appreciation of their currencies (Park and Park, 1991). Central Eastern
Europe is far from being too competitive, and its industry badly needs clear
signals for export-oriented investments.
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Comments on Gabor Oblath's Paper
Andrew Berg
I would like to begin by complementing the author on a careful and thorough
analysis of a complex issue. He reviews the facts and the arguments about trade
policy (particularly import liberalization) and nominal exchange rate policy in the
peculiar environment of reforming Soviet-style economies.
These remarks come in two sections. The first discusses the primary analytic
question raised by the author: the coexistence of real exchange rate appreciation,
substantial import liberalization, and large (initial) trade surpluses in all three
countries. The second section turns to some of the policy questions raised by the
author.
The author notes three basic facts: the substantial real appreciation observed
in each country since liberalization (using official price indices); the sudden (to
varying degrees) liberalization of foreign trade; and the surprisingly large trade
surpluses observed in all three countries. The author proposes, then, a basic puzzle:
How can we explain this apparently anomalous combination of events, since trade
liberalization would seem to call for a real depreciation to maintain external balance?
He suggests four possible answers: the CMEA trade shock; the fact that the cur-
rencies were undervalued according to measures of purchasing power parity (PPP);
large capital inflows; and the results of the domestic recession on demand for im-
ports and exportables.
I have little to add to his discussion of PPP and capital inflows, except to say
that I agree that there are good theoretical and empirical reasons for PPP to fail to
hold even in the long term. He makes an interesting point about the impact of the
CMEA trade shock: the decline in CMEA trade is not like a usual terms-of-trade
shock. We normally think of a model with at most one export and one import
good, and in this situation it is difficult for a terms-of-trade shock to result in an
improvement of the trade balance, with the real exchange rate held constant. To
the extent that there are two trade sectors of the economy where the goods are
not close substitutes, as they may plausibly be assumed to be in this context, it is
possible that the decline in domestic demand stemming from the decline in demand
for CMEA exports will cause an increase in the trade surplus with the convertible
currency area.
It is important to note, though, that the timing of events in Poland helps to
eliminate the CMEA shock as a candidate for explaining the author's puzzle. The
combination of a strongly positive trade balance, an appreciating real exchange rate,
and rapid import liberalization was observed in Poland in 1990, before the brunt of
the CMEA shock.
The author seems to put considerable weight on the explanation that domestic
recession explains the three facts mentioned above. This is possible, of course,
but the story is not so simple as the author makes out; and the facts, at least
in Poland, are not so kind to this interpretation. First, it must be a domestic
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recession somehow caused by the trade liberalization that justifies the appreciation
and positive trade performance. For if the primary cause of the recession were to
lie elsewhere, for example, in domestic monetary policy, then the huge increase in
convertible-currency imports observed in 1990 in Poland would be anomalous.
But the evidence is inconsistent with the view that the flood of imports was
an important cause of the recession. First and most importantly in Poland the rise
in imports in 1990 took place after the fall in the state sector industrial production
which is the primary component of declining activity. The decline in industrial
production in Poland in 1990 was complete by the end of the first quarter (of course
the CMEA shock led to a further decline in 1991). Imports did not increase sharply,
however, until after this point. In support ofthis point, Berg and Sachs (1992) show
that there is no positive relation between import penetration and declines in output
across 2-digit industries, either in 1990 or in 1991.
Of course over time the logic of the reform program suggests that domestic
output should decline and imports grow in those sectors in which the reforming
country does not have comparative advantage. But in the context of the elimi-
nation of pervasive shortages that characterized particularly Poland of these three
countries, this effect could easily be swamped. Specifically, the pre-reform situation
was not a market equilibrium. In part, this meant that some sectors were overpro-
ducing and some underproducing compared to a market equilibrium, with forced
substitution ensuring that all was consumed (see Berg, 1993, for such a model).
With liberalization, some sectors that had been discriminated against could then
observe an increase in both imports and domestic demand as the forced substitution
away from this sector ended with liberalization.
I would argue that something like this process, in which sales declined for many
goods that could no longer find demand due to the end of forced substitution, was
behind the recession of 1990. Thus, the dominant economic process since radical
reform, in addition to the CMEA shock, has been a reallocation of factors in more
productive directions, as the large-scale state industry favored in the previous era
gave way to small-scale private enterprise, at least initially concentrated in services.
In this context, estimates reported in Berg and Sachs (1992) generate two
results worth emphasizing here. First, the overall decline in GDP was much smaller
than the official estimate of 12 percent. Our best guess of the decline as measured
from the demand side was 5 percent. Second, a large part of the output decline in
1990 was surely due to inventory disinvestment, especially in material. Holding of
excessive materials inventories was a prominent feature of Soviet-style economies.
Indeed, even using "conservative" assumptions (in the sense oftending to understate
the decline in inventory investment), we calculated that the decline in inventories
of 6 percent more than matched our estimate of the decline in GDP calculated from
summing the components of final demand of 5 percent. 1
IBerg and Sachs (1992) also estimated the change in GDP by summing value added
across sectors. Here, however, the only adjustment made was to substitute official estimates
of private sector employment changes for GUS (Central Statistical Office) measures of
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This estimate has recently received support from a GUS/Polish Academy of
Sciences study of the change in national income between 1989 and 1992. Rajewski
(1993) discusses a variety of problems with official statistics and tries to estimate
directly the size of the unmeasured "second economy." His conclusion is that: "The
size of the second economy, carefully estimated, has reached a level of 20 percent of
GDP in 1992. Therefore, if the second economy is taken into account the 1989-1992
fall in GDP was of the 5 percent to 10 percent magnitude." Given the fact that the
collapse of the CMEA trade regime in January 1991 represented a large negative
shock to all the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, perhaps on the order of
3 percent of GDP (Berg and Sachs, 1992; Rodrik, 1992), and that much or all of
the remaining GDP decline can be accounted for by inventory disinvestment, little
room is left for traditional aggregate demand shocks to play an important role.
Having reviewed the author's explanations of the puzzle he presented, I would
like to propose a further possibility that he seems to reject. He is careful to empha-
size the non-market-clearirig nature of the pre-liberalization equilibrium in these
countries, in terms of both the initial exchange rate, as is common particularly in
LDCs, and domestic prices, which is more unusual. He does not quite, however,
add this to his list of possible explanations.
In Berg and Sachs (1992), as mentioned by the author, liberalization is not
associated with a devaluation of the real exchange rate. Initially, the model economy
is characterized by a monetary overhang. Foreign exchange is rationed, the currency
is not convertible, and most domestic goods markets do not clear. Capital flows
are exogenous, so the volume of imports is determined by the volume of exports.
The excess domestic demand reduces the supply of exportables available for export,
hence reducing the quantity of imports. The overhang is eliminated by a sharp
devaluation and proportional increase in the domestic price level. The overall effects
are: (1) the elimination of shortages on all markets; (2) a proportional rise in the
overall price level and nominal exchange rate, hence no change in the real rate; (3)
a tendency for both imports and exports to rise as the result of elimination of the
monetary overhang.
Thus, while the author is correct to point out that in a market economy import
liberalization ceteris paribus requires a devaluation, the initial exchange rate in
the countries under consideration is precisely not a market-equilibrium rate, and
furthermore the domestic prices implied by that rate are not market-equilibrium
prices, as required by this framework.
As the author correctly emphasizes, policy questions revolve around the nom-
inal exchange rate, not the real exchange rate. He discusses primarily three
output changes in private sector services, so the resulting estimate of -10 percent is dose to
the official estimate. The demand-side estimates should be given more weight, as they rely
heavily on consumer survey data which are much less susceptible to the danger that they
mismeasure private-sector activity. The supply-side estimates place the greater reliance on
data coming from traditional methods of measurement which emphasize socialized sector
production.
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questions: Was the initial devaluation appropriate? Should radical trade liberal-
ization be undertaken? And how should the nominal exchange rate be used in
bringing down the rate of inflation?
I would like to frame the policy debate somewhat differently. One of the goals
of rapid trade liberalization in Poland was to import a system of relative prices into
an economy which had not had a sensible and reliable price system for decades,
and indeed the rapid liberalization of January 1990 fulfilled one of the goals of the
policy: relative prices seem to have moved toward world prices. This is in contrast
to a decade of partial and failed attempts to adjust relative prices. One of the basic
reasons for reforming trade rapidly in a post-Soviet-style economy such as Poland's is
the special need to realign relative prices in an environment from which competition
has been absent for many decades. Trade and current account liberalization playa
special role in "importing" a relative price structure and imposing price and market
discipline.
In support of this proposition, note that relative prices seem to have approached
much more closely those of Western countries since liberalization. Using data from
30 consumer goods, the simple correlation between the Polish relative prices and
the West German relative prices was 0.29 in 1987 and 0.81 in January 1990 (FTRI,
1990; Jasinski, 1990).2
To get a better idea of the dynamics of price adjustment, Berg (1993) examines
the correlation between 3-digit producer price vectors for 85 branches of industry
in Poland at different points in time.
Three points emerge: (1) leading up to and during the hyperinflation, relative
nonfood prices actually diverged from world prices, except for some convergence in
November 1989; (2) the largest relative price movements were in January 1990; (3)
after liberalization in January 1990 price movements were small.
There has been much discussion about whether trade liberalization succeeded
in "importing competition," that is, in weakening the monopoly power in domestic
industry that had been feared would be destructive after price liberalization. Look-
ing at whether relative prices converged seems to me to be a much more robust
test of this proposition than an examination of, for example, correlations between
profitability and import penetration. The above data strongly suggest that trade
liberalization did indeed promote domestic competition and weaken the power of
domestic traded goods monopolies by reducing their ability to distort relative prices.
Thus there is little evidence that trade liberalization was responsible for the
initial output decline. Instead, along with macroeconomic policy, it established an
appropriate set of relative prices. More generally, a return to the European economy
is a key aspect of Polish economic and political strategy, and, while there have been
some increases in tariffs and reimposition of trade controls, the dramatic opening
did more than anything to signal to producers and consumers that the old system
2That is, 0.29 is the simple correlation between the price vectors for the two different
countries, where the components of the vectors are the relative prices for the various goods
in the basket in terms of a common nlJmeraire.
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would not return. Furthermore, not mentioned at all in the paper in its discussion of
trade liberalization is the fact that liberalization brings immediate direct benefits,
in terms of new consumer and investment goods (imports of bananas and Western
machine tools increased manifold in Poland in 1990).
Finally, a need for import liberalization does not of course, imply that tar-
iffs should be eliminated. But the author's remark that the "first-best" response to
widescale import liberalization is introduction of provisional tariffs seems rash. Bar-
ring externalities in adjustment [adjustment costs alone are not enough, as Mussa
(1982) pointed out], the optimal response is to do nothing. If there are external-
ities in adjustment, such as capital or labor market imperfections, the first-best
response is to directly address those externalities. Second-best might well be a
temporary devaluation, which would have the advantage over tariffs that it would
not discriminate against exports. Only after this would temporary import tariffs
be preferred.
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Chapter 2
The Polish Exchange Rate
Policy and Economic System
Transformation
Leszek Jasinski
The Internal Convertibility and System Transition
The establishment of the internal convertibility of the Polish zloty was one
of the most important ingredients of the system transition program that was
launched in the beginning of 1990. A solid cmrency was necessary to start
the process of liberalization of foreign trade and the economy as a whole.
The efficient functioning of a market economy is impossible without free
access for every economic agent to foreign exchange. All forms of central
allocation of foreign currencies, typical for centrally planned economies, had
to be terminated.
In 1989, when the first non-communist government came to power in
Poland, the zloty was considered one of the weakest European currencies:
the inflation rate was 20 to 30 percent a month, real interest rates were
negative, and the economy as a whole suffered from severe disequilibrium.
The zloty did not adequately fulfill the functions of money. It was neither a
good medium of exchange because of permanent shortages nor a good unit
of account because prices for many services were in fact denominated by US
dollars. It was not a good medium of storing value either, because it did
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not pay to save the domestic currency. The Polish economic problem of that
time was not only to manage the transformation from a centrally planned to
a market economy, but also to contain galloping inflation or "shortflation,"
Le., the peculiar combination of inflation and shortages.
The currencies of communist economies were, in fact, never convertible,
neither for residents nor for foreigners. This feature has been a decisive
element of the economic, social, and political isolation of these societies and
remained a stumbling block to a rapid opening to the world economy.
The System of Internal Convertibility
In the last days of 1989, many Polish economic laws, including one on for-
eign currencies operations, were changed. With the adoption of the revised
foreign currency law the zloty was made convertible for firms and resident
citizens. According to this law, commercial banks running foreign exchange
operations were licensed to sell foreign currencies to firms that needed them
to pay for imports, and exporters had to sell to banks the foreign exchanges
they received for exports. Payments for imports, as well as revenues from
exports, were kept in bank accounts in national currency, and banks con-
verted the payments into foreign exchange. The official exchange rates were
fixed by the central bank, the National Bank of Poland, and published every
day.
Now there are about 20 commercial banks licensed to run the foreign
currency operations; however, in 1989 there were only three. Households
can buy and sell foreign currencies at a chain of exchange offices, which
are either private or state-owned. The rates they offer are not controlled,
but differences between them and the rates the central bank maintains are
negligible.
Foreign reserves in Poland have been sufficient to meet the demand for
the foreign exchange since the beginning of 1990. The system has operated
smoothly, and its existence has never been endangered. The surpluses in
Poland's foreign trade in 1990 and 1992 made it possible for the country
to accumulate reserves. Before implementing the program of currency con-
vertibility, Poland was granted a one-billion-dollar stabilization fund by the
Western democracies to support the system, but until now it was not nec-
essary to use it. Poland was the first Eastern European country that could
establish a sound system of current-account convertibility.
The Polish Exchange Rate Policy
The Exchange Rate Policy since 1990
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The internal convertibility of the zloty was introduced on 1 January 1990.
On the same day the new exchange rate was fixed at 9,500 zlotys per US
dollar. This was achieved by a substantial devaluation and was preceded by
a series of "predevaluations" in December 1989. The new exchange rate was
high enough to enable the authorities to keep it stable for a long time, which
was much longer than originally expected.
The devaluation was accompanied by new currency arrangements; the
zloty was pegged to the dollar. Earlier, it had been pegged to a basket of
currencies.
The new solution has met some criticism. The American currency serves
as a means of payment for approximately 50 percent of all Polish foreign
trade. In 1990, the main Western European currencies appreciated in value
to the US dollar, which has made this system advantageous for exporters who
used, for example, the German mark as a currency of contract. But in 1991,
after the Gulf War, the position of the dollar on the international financial
markets improved, and this made the position of "non-dollar" exporters
worse.
Nowadays, in fact, only very few currencies are pegged to the dollar.
This currency arrangement of 1990 made Poland a member of the small
club of the "dollar followers."
The new exchange rate, 9,500 zlotys per US dollar, remained unchanged
until May 1991, despite a hefty 250 percent inflation in 1990, which was a big
surprise for many observers. The real appreciation of the Polish currency did
not prevent the record-high level of exports, amounting to US$11.8 billion
in 1990. The high level of trade surplus gave rise to many arguments for
lowering the rate. There is some evidence that this would have been carried
out in the summer of 1990, but the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait pushed the
price of crude oil much higher and the idea was rejected.
In May 1991, the pressure of the exporters' lobby and the political oppo-
sition for changing the rate was very strong. The zloty was devalued by 17
percent, and the new price of the dollar was increased from 9,500 to 11,100
zlotys. The devaluation coincided with the introduction of the new currency
arrangement. Instead of a single currency, the zloty was pegged to a basket
of five currencies: the American dollar, the German mark, the British pound,
and the French and the Swiss francs. The weights of particular currencies in
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the basket corresponded to the frequency of their use in payments in respect
to Polish foreign trade and were 45, 35, 10, 5, and 5 percent, respectively.
This arrangement is still in use.
In October 1991, the crawling peg system was introduced: every bank
day the value of the basket was increased by nine zlotys. The rates of the
zloty against the five currencies was based on their actual prices on the
international exchange markets.
In February 1992, the zloty was once more devalued, this time by 12
percent. The crawling peg system, despite the devaluation, remained un-
changed.
Since January 1990 the nominal exchange rate has grown (nominal de-
preciation), but in fact, taking inflation into account, the zloty has appreci-
ated in real terms. To analyze how this has happened we shall use the real
effective exchange rate, the dollar equivalent of the average wage in Poland
and the so-called money-value coefficient (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2).
The real exchange rate is the price of a foreign currency after eliminat-
ing the inflationary effects in all countries concerned. We have chosen two
moments in the past to define the constant values of the zloty: the beginning
of 1990, when internal convertibility was introduced, and the beginning of
1991.
To calculate the real effective exchange rate we used the five currencies
of the arrangement basket and the Same weights as in this basket. The
coefficient of the money value indicates the overall changes of the money
value, both internal and external, and is the weighted average of the inflation
rate and the real effective exchange rate. The weight for the effective rate is
the ratio of exports to the gross national product.
The real exchange rate of the zloty against the dollar declined in 1991
by 26 percent, while the real effective rate grew by 38 percent. Accordingly,
the zloty's appreciation was very high in this period. One must realize that
the de facto exchange rate for importers was much higher than indicated
because of customs and tax duties. But if compared with the first part of
1989, that is, the time before the galloping inflation and the introduction
of the internal convertibility of the zloty, the exchange rate Was lowered by
more than a third. This meant that exporters had to substantially reduce
their costs or accept a much lower level of profitability.
By August 1992, the situation had, in fact, changed very little compared
with December 1991. The real exchange rate against the dollar Was a little
lower than it had been eight months earlier, and so was the real effective rate.
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Table 2.1. The nominal and real exchange rates of the zloty against the
dollar (at the end of the month).
Months Nominal Real rates in zlotys as of Real rateO
1989-1991 rate Jan. 1, 1990 Jan. 1, 1991 Jan. 1, 1991=1.00
January 1989 508 3,581 11,247 1.184
July 830 3,710 11,654 1.227
December 6,500 7,621 23,938 2.520
January 1990 9,500 9,500 29,839 3.141
April 9,500 4,150 13,036 1.372
July 9,500 3,611 11 ,341 1.194
October 9,500 3,319 10,424 1.097
December 9,500 3,025 9,500 1.000
January 1991 9,500 2,654 8,336 0.877
February 9,500 2,500 7,852 0.827
March 9,500 2,402 7,545 0.794
April 9,500 2,348 7,376 0.776
May 11,105 2,684 8,431 0.887
June 11,458 2;650 8,324 0.876
July 11,304 2,622 8,234 0.867
August 11,270 2,606 8,186 0.862
September 11,096 2,467 7,750 0.816
October 11,203 2,420 7,600 0.800
November 11,154 2,340 7,350 0.774
December 10,957 2,233 7,014 0.738
January 1992 11,483 2,182 6,854 0.721
February 13,200 2,470 7,757 0.817
March 13,497 2,482 7,797 0.821
April 13,746 2,444 7,678 0.808
May 13,827 2,370 7,445 0.784
June 13,512 2,286 7,179 0.756
July 13,618 2,278 7,154 0.753
August 13,449 2,196 6,897 0.726
aCalculations from previous column.
Source: Author's calculations.
The decline of the effective rate was mainly the result of the appreciation of
the German mark against the dollar.
The money-value coefficient decreased in 1991 by 30 percent, that is, at
a slower pace than the inflation rate. This resulted from the appreciation of
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Table 2.2. The effective exchange rates, value of money, dollar equivalents
of average wages in Poland (at the end of the month).
Jan. 1, 1990 = 1.0
Months
1989-1991
January 1989
July
December
January 1990
April
July
October
December
January 1991
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
January 1992
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
Real effective
rate
0.923
0.918
0.432
0.345
0.784
0.873
0.918
1.000
1.138
1.228
1.361
1.417
1.212
1.268
1.264
1.267
1.317
1.340
1.359
1.378
1.451
1.295
1.293
1.316
1.342
1.339
1.329
1.340
Money value
coefficient
21.83
13.54
3.50
2.97
1.35
1.18
1.09
1.00
0.90
0.86
0.85
0.83
0.79
0.77
0.77
0.76
0.74
0.73
0.71
0.70
0.67
0.64
0.63
0.62
0.60
0.59
0.59
0.58
Average wage
in dollars
64
97
106
137
158
157
177
184
181
152
150
159
160
167
180
189
209
181
160
171
175
165
173
181
184
Source: Author's calculations.
the Polish currency in real terms. Furthermore, in August 1992 it was 12
percent lower than in December 1991.
The dollar equivalent of average wages in Poland since January 1991 has
ranged between 157 and 209. The dispersion was high and many ups and
downs could be noted.
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Poland is still a country with high inflation. The prices are now generally
not controlled by the state. The only exceptions are the prices of energy
carriers, rents, and public transportation rates. They also represent the last
products and services that are still centrally subsidized.
The inflation in Poland has been of both the cost-push and demand-pull
type. Many factors make prices rise, for example, the monopoly market
structure, wages growing more rapidly than labor productivity, the budget
deficit, the credits granted for firms unable to repay them, reduction of
subsidies, and the crawling peg system.
The open inflation in Poland and the introduction of currency convert-
ibility have changed the role of devaluation in the economy as a whole: the
relation between changes in the zloty price of the dollar and the aggregate
price level has become close.
As the analysis based on input-output calculations indicates, after May
1991, following the 17 percent devaluation of the zloty, the average level of
wholesale prices increased by 9.4 percent.1 Following the introduction of the
crawling peg system in October 1991, wholesale prices increased by 5.2 per-
cent by the end of the year. The impact of devaluations on consumer prices
was 12.3 and 6.5 percent, respectively, for the two devaluation episodes.
Purchasing Power Parity of the Zloty
The estimation of the purchasing power parity (PPP) of a currency is some-
times quite a complicated problem. To accomplish a calculation we analyzed
the prices of about 100 consumer goods and services in Poland and Germany.
To find the PPP of the zloty against the US dollar, we used the PPP of the
German mark against the dollar. Since we had at our disposal two different
estimates of PPP for the currencies of Germany and the United States, we
could also calculate two PPP estimates for the currencies of Poland and the
United States. The PPP of the zloty in August 1992 was 6,800 or 8,850 zlo-
tys per US dollar. The first result seems to us more credible. In the case of
the former estimate the rate was 45 percent higher than the exchange rate,
while in the latter it was 29 percent higher. At the beginning of 1991 these
deviations were 154 and 95 percent, respectively. The relative convergence
IThe calculations were carried out by Vingo Borzym of the Foreign Trade Research
Institute, Warsaw.
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of the exchange rate and the purchasing power parity of the Polish currency
can be observed.
We are of the opinion that the zloty's exchange rate will remain over-
valued for a long time. Important proof of this is the very low current level
of wages in Poland (from the point of view of Westerners), denominated in
dollars.
As far as the structure of prices is concerned, the statistical analysis of
110 products and services leads to the conclusion that we have been expe-
riencing a relative convergence of price structures between Poland and the
countries of Western Europe since 1989.
Convertibility and Profitability of Exports
The level of the exchange rate has its impact on the preference of domestic
producers to sell on export markets. In 1990, there was a rapid growth of
exports in Poland: the exports to hard currency markets have amounted to
US$11.8 billion, its volume increased by about 40 percent. This growth was
made possible by the significant devaluation of the zloty at the beginning of
1990 and the declining aggregate demand on the domestic market, a result
of the measures aimed at containing inflation. The stable exchange rate in
1990 and in the first months of 1991 decreased the profitability of exports
and also influenced the export preference.
The profitability of the top 500 exporters and all Polish enterprises in
1990-1991 is shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. One can clearly see that there
has been a rapid decrease of gross and net profitability in 1991 both of big
exporters and of all firms.
During the entire span of time under investigation, the profitability of
big exporters was significantly higher than that of all the enterprises. The
relative difference between the gross profitability of the two groups of enter-
prises was much larger in 1991 than in the previous year. From January to
August 1991, however, the profitability in both groups declined and the gap
between the two groups became narrower.
Polish exporters have amalgamated in an informal strong lobby. The
lobby has always based its activity on the expectation of the devaluation of
the zloty which, to some extent, can be seen as typical old-style pressure on
the central administration against the financial regime. Nevertheless, the
need for substantial export profitability and the necessity for new invest-
ments in exporting industries cannot be ignored.
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Table 2.3. The profitability of the top 500 exporters and of all firms in
1990-1991.
Gross profitability (in percent)a
Time
Jan.-Dec. 1990
Jan.-Mar. 1991
Jan.-Jun. 1991
Jan.-Aug. 1991
Jan.-Oct. 1991
Top 500 exporters
(1)
39.8
14.7
12.6
10.3
n.a.
All firms
(2)
29.4
8.3
6.7
6.2
6.1
(1):(2)
135.4
177.1
188.1
166.1
n.a.
aThe gross profitability is defined as the relation of the gross profits to the costs. This
ratio is usually lower than that using the costs of the production sold.
Source: J. Piotrowski in The Polish Foreign Trade in 1991, Foreign Trade Research Insti-
tute, Warsaw.
Table 2.4. The net profitability of enterprises in 1990-1991, in percent.a
Time Exporters All firms
Jan.-Dec. 1990 n.a. 10.6
Jan.-Mar. 1991 5.4 0.7
Jan.-Apr. 1991 4.3 0.1
Jan.-Aug. 1991 3.4 -0.1
aNet profitability is the relation of net profit to total revenues.
Source: J. Piotrowski in The Polish Foreign Tmde in 1991, Foreign Trade Research Insti-
tute, Warsaw.
The financial standing of particular exporting industries has varied sub-
stantially. There were industries in which the export profitability was smaller
than the profitability of sales on the domestic market. These have been for a
long time, for example, metal-processing, precision instruments, engineering,
steel, paper, and leather manufacturing industries.
The devaluation of the zloty in May 1991 was, in fact, intended to pro-
mote Poland's exports. It has virtually stopped the diminishing export prof-
itability, but did not bring a radical change in the financial situation of ex-
porters in the long run. Another move toward the exporters' requirements
was introducing the crawling peg exchange regime in October 1991, and the
devaluation of the zloty in early 1992.
Unfortunately we have no exact data on the profitability of enterprises
for 1992. The devaluation in February 1992 was followed by a relatively high
current account surplus in the spring of 1992. It is not yet easy to answer
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the question whether or not the new zloty price of the dollar was the main
reason for the advantageous development of the balance of payments.
The General Economic Background of
Exchange Rate Policy
One of the fundamental principles of centrally planned economies was the
allocation of foreign exchange by command of the central administration.
The establishment of the convertibility of the zloty brought with it the danger
that foreign reserves, which now are available to all economic agents, can be
easily exhausted. As we already know, this danger did not become a reality
in Poland. This, however, poses the question: What factors helped the
foreign exchange market achieve a balance?
As a first factor we have to stress that, according to the main target of
consecutive Polish governments, the money supply was kept under control.
Table 2.5 lists the development ofthe transaction money (Md, broad money
(M3 ), and net domestic assets, all in real terms. The data clearly show that
since a decline in the first months of 1990, the money supply grew and
afterwards has remained at a relatively stable level.
In addition, the Polish economy has been in a recession, which has
mainly hit the sector of big state-owned enterprises. Data for the indus-
trial production of this sector are given in Table 2.6. One can observe that
industrial production declined sharply in recent years, but in 1992 it showed
the first signs of recovery.
Table 2.6 also gives evidence that budget receipts and outlays have di-
minished seriously in real terms after the implementation of the new eco-
nomic policy in 1990. The first impulse was the fall of budget receipts in
late 1990. This prompted the government to execute stricter control over
outlays which, however, could not prevent a relatively high level of deficit.
At the end of 1992, this stood at about 8 percent of the GDP. The deficit
might have been much higher if outlays had not been cut down. The money
supply was kept under control all the time, and crowding out, not printing
paper money, was the main instrument used to finance the budget deficit.
As a further factor contributing to the rapid restoration of balance on
the market of foreign exchange we refer to the favorable performance of
foreign trade in 1990-1992. As already mentioned, the surpluses achieved in
these years contributed substantially to the accumulation offoreign exchange
reserves.
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Table 2.5. Real money supply in Poland, end of month, January 1991 = l.
Net domestic
Year Month MIa Mab assets
1989 12 0.7507 0.7751 2.5834
1990 1 0.6136 0.6106 1.3943
2 0.5982 0.5999 1.1186
3 0.7019 0.6995 1.1248
4 0.7587 0.7445 1.0869
5 0.8181 0.7945 1.0540
6 0.9093 0.8738 1.0871
7 1.0159 0.9630 1.1155
8 1.1369 1.0641 1.1995
9 1.1661 1.0925 1.1777
10 1.1729 1.1024 1.1909
11 1.1970 1.1270 1.2165
12 1.1379 1.1161 1.0698
1991 1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2 0.9596 1.0025 0.9980
3 0.9510 1.0393 1.0344
4 0.9605 1.0880 1.1132
5 0.9637 1.1052 1.1244
6 0.9436 1.1035 1.1436
7 0.9883 1.1551 1.1695
8 1.0210 1.1933 1.2086
9 1.0014 1.1813 1.1970
10 0.9959 1.1593 1.2207
11 0.9686 1.1345 1.2049
12 0.9541 1.1323 1.2158
1992 1 0.9152 1.1011 1.1735
2 0.9037 1.1109 1.1915
3 0.9126 1.1302 1.1962
4 0.9257 1.1365 1.1723
5 0.9033 1.1152 1.1549
aM1 = transaction money.
bM3 = broad money.
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the National Bank of Poland.
Consequences of Convertibility
We can say that while nearly all the elements of the economic policy of all
Polish governments after 1989 were criticized by the opposition, the internal
convertibility of the zloty was an exception. But this does not mean that
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Table 2.6. Budget receipts, outlays, and industrial production in real
terms, January 1990 = 1.
Budget Budget Industrial
Year Month receipts outlays production
1990 1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2 0.8697 0.8890 1.0408
3 0.8454 0.9059 1.1038
4 1.0568 0.9239 0.9821
5 0.9678 0.9168 1.0036
6 0.8704 0.9882 0.9688
7 0.8252 0.7792 0.9422
8 0.7778 0.7964 1.0207
9 0.8064 0.9014 1.0206
10 0.9045 0.9166 1.1228
11 0.8613 0.9906 1.0823
12 1.1045 1.4951 0.9954
1991 1 0.5059 0.5088 0.9129
2 0.6277 0.7455 0.7998
3 0.5864 0.7944 0.8230
4 0.5578 0.7393 0.7181
5 0.5701 0.5831 0.6747
6 0.4317 0.6497 0.6703
7 0.5785 0.6643 0.6739
8 0.4948 0.6840 0.6785
9 0.4765 0.6346 0.6814
10 0.5835 0.7271 0.7326
11 0.4999 0.6155 0.6634
12 0.7095 0.8588 0.6702
1992 1 0.3773 0.5288 0.6228
2 0.4875 0.6233 0.5937
3 0.6053 0.7286 0.6995
4 0.6136 0.6827 0.6595
5 0.5037 0.6054 0.6154
6 0.4920 0.8147 0.6542
7 0.5900 0.7640 0.6560
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Central Statistical Office.
the actual exchange rates were not criticized - on the contrary; there were
many arguments claiming that they were either too low or too high.
It is not easy to separate the consequences of the introduction of currency
convertibility from the consequences of other elements of the economic policy.
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But let us try to enumerate at least some occurrences in Poland that we
believe took place due to the internal convertibility.
First of all, economic calculations in Polish firms have changed. The
competition of foreign products has had an effect on pricing, management,
and marketing. The progress has been impressive and unprecedented. Easy
access to foreign exchange has resulted in a large inflow of imported goods
- sometimes of high quality, sometimes of low quality. The competition of
the imports has changed the market structure, and most state-owned firms
could only lose against foreign competitors. It was argued by the political
opposition that the government did nothing to protect the national economy.
The current account convertibility has also been advantageous for the
position of the Polish zloty on the home market, increasing confidence in the
currency. For many decades in the past, due to the absence of the capital
markets and due to negative real interest rates on zloty deposits, the best
way to save was to buy dollars or other Western currencies, which served as
a kind of security. For years, the black-market exchange rate of the dollar
increased according to the rate of inflation of the zloty, or even to a faster
rate.
Full Convertibility Ahead?
Can one expect the full convertibility of the zloty? In 1992 this problem
was not publicly discussed. But what are the obstacles to full convertibility?
First of all, Poland belongs to the group of highly indebted countries. If
Poland's debts are reduced, or servicing the debts becomes easier, the central
financial authorities will be in a better position to declare full convertibility.
Still today, high inflation and, because of this, high interest rates make
Poland's financial position much different from that of the countries of the
European Monetary System.
The Polish law on foreign investments allows foreign investors to transfer
their profits home. From this point of view, the rapid implementation offull
convertibility is not necessary.
Poland is a candidate for membership in the European Community. All
available evidence points to the possibility that Poland can join the EC soon
after 2000. Full convertibility, however, is one requirement that has to be
fulfilled before that time.
The Western European democracies did not make their currencies fully
convertible immediately after the Second World War; it took several years
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until they reached that stage. I believe that for Poland and for foreigners
possessing the Polish zloty and using it in their businesses the (at least) five
years' time that we can expect before full convertibility is not too long.
Chapter 3
Economic Recovery and
Foreign Exchange Rate
Regime: The Case of the
Czech Republic
Miroslav Hrncif*
Introduction
The key issue facing transition economies in Central Europe has been the
initiation of economic recovery.
The transition economies suffered a rather severe decline in economic
activity and in real incomes. The former CSFR,l despite its relatively sta-
bilized initial macroeconomic conditions, experienced a 15 percent decrease
in its GDP and a 24 percent decrease in real wages in 1991 (see Table 3.1).
*The author is grateful to G. Fink, R. Portes, C. Wihlborg, and S. Wright for helpful
comments on the first version of the paper.
1 As of early 1993, the CSFR ceased to exist as a federal state. Its successors are two
separate entities, the Czech and Slovak republics which form a special type of customs
union. Their "inherited" common currency survived, however, only during the first month
of the existence of the new states.
The discussion of this article, written in late 1992, while referring to the developments
in the former the CSFR addresses issues relevant to both newly created national states.
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Table 3.1. Main macroeconomic indicators 1989-1992, annual change in
percent.
1989 1990 1991 1992a
GDP
CSFR 1.4 -1.8 -15.1 -8.5
Czech Republic n.a. -1.9 -14.5 -6.7
Gross industrial production CSFR 1.0 -3.7 -21.2 -12.4
Unemployment rate (end of period)
CSFR n.a. 1.0 6.6 5.0
Czech Republic n.a. 0.8 4.1 2.6
Inflation rate CSFR (CPI, average) 1.4 10.0 57.9 10.3
Real wages CSFR 0.9 -5.6 -24.3 8.0
a 1992 preliminary.
Source: Statistical Bulletin, Federal Statistical Office.
In 1992 the decrease in the overall economic activity persisted; according
to preliminary figures, GDP declined by 8.5 percent (in the Czech Repub-
lic, by 6.7 percent). Real wages, on the other hand, have recovered and,
despite the significant drop in economic activity, the level of unemployment
has decreased.2 Data for the second half of 1992 signaled certain stabiliza-
tion of the level of economic activity, particularly in construction, trade,
and services; however, these sectors have not yet revealed a reversal of the
underlying trends.
In 1992, the GDP in real terms was thus in the former CSFR about
only three-quarters of the 1989 level. Such a deterioration in macroeconomic
performance exceeded by far the worst recession recorded in any comparable
market economy over a period of several decades.
Unlike in stabilized market economies, cyclical factors were not the main
causal factor. Rather, this deterioration was caused by the legacy of the
progressing decay under the former centrally planned economy framework,
2The ratio between the trends in economic activity and in the level of unemployment
which developed in the former CSFR in 1991 and 1992 was rather peculiar. An extraordi-
nary deep fall of GDP was not accompanied by a corresponding increase of unemployment.
As follows from data in Table 9.1, compared to the 15.1 percent fall of GDP in 1991 the
level of unemployment increased to a relatively modest 6.6 percent from almost zero rate
in 1989. It remained well below the current European standard.
Even more startling, a subsequent drop in the volume of economic activity of 8.5 percent
occurred in 1992 while the level of unemployment decreased to 5 percent. In the Czech
Republic this divergence was even more pronounced (compare Table 9.1).
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and intensified by the impact of restrictive macroeconomic policies and by a
number of shocks, both external and domestic, in the still mostly unchanged
institutional and systemic environment.
The situation in the transition economies was rather a structural de-
pression, if not a slump, significantly dissimilar to the "classical" case of a
cyclical recession in market economies. The character of the problem faced
points to the limitations of anti-cyclical policies in the context of transition
economies.
A reversal of "downward" expectations, reflected by an extremely sharp
decline in investments, is hindered not only by demand-side constraints, but
also by perseverance of institutional rigidities interrelated with policy flaws
in the promotion of supply-side adjustment.
Under a rather imperfectly competitive environment in the domestic
economy the incentives to invest and the prospects for any "real" investment
to turn profitable are conditioned by the parallel behavior of other investors.
A reversal of existing expectations could evidently take place, more likely and
more timely, provided a positive solution of the implied coordination problem
is achieved. Dornbusch (1990) has identified this coordination problem in
the context of the IMF model and through the lessons from Latin America
as an "economy wide" externality, and found that its solution could hardly
be left to market forces only.
The effects of the domestic environment on expectations of economic
agents have become increasingly interrelated with those of the external en-
vironment also in transition economies. Given the stage of openness to the
outside world already achieved and a desirable continuation of this process,
any recovery of domestic activities in the Czech Republic could be made
sustainable only if an adequately growing export potential matches the in-
creasing import over the medium-term horizon. The economy-wide priva-
tization process initiated, along with hoped-for increased inflow of foreign
direct investment, should make this desired outcome more probable.
The legacy of past developments under the virtually closed econ-
omy framework represents, however, another "externality" in transition
economies. To cope with it, an export-oriented strategy, including export
promotion schemes and support of related services, institutions, and infra-
structure, seems necessary to correct for the inherited drawbacks.
In this context, this chapter examines the role of the foreign exchange
rate in transition and in economic recovery of the Czech Republic: options
of foreign exchange rate regimes are analyzed to determine how they could
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affect the development path of the economy and to find the one that could
be used.
Foreign Exchange Rate in the Former CSFR
Changed institutional setting
Despite being "nominally" in existence, the foreign exchange rate was con-
sidered to be of minor importance under the centrally planned economy
framework, maintained in the CSFR up to the late 1980s. The "official"
exchange rate was kept overvalued, while, on the other hand, various black-
and parallel-market rates tended to depress unrealistically the external value
of the currency. Moreover, the "implied" exchange ratios were widely diver-
sified across both trade and non-trade flows.
With the start of the transition in early 1990, a unified exchange rate was
introduced that eliminated the duality of so-called commercial and tourist
rates. A radical move toward opening of the CSFR economy, including
the implementation of limited (internal) currency convertibility and foreign
trade liberalization in early 1991, was paid for "in advance" by the three
consecutive devaluations of the unified exchange rate of the CSFR koruna
(CSK) vis-a.-vis convertible currencies in the course of 1990.3
Since January 1991, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of the
CSK has been pegged to a basket of five currencies.4 The aim was to use the
fixed exchange rate as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization. This
approach followed the stabilization programs applied elsewhere, reflecting
that the foreign exchange rate is a special "macroeconomic" price, with
substantial impact across the entire national economy. Although advancing
along this strategy of "nominal exchange rate anchor," the CSFR authorities
3The CSK was devalued by 16.6 percent on January 8, by 55.3 percent on October 15,
and by 15.98 percent on December 28. Though it could be argued that the initial ratio
hardly represented an exchange rate proper, the cumulative depreciation in the course of
1990 was substantial: after the third devaluation in late December 1990, the exchange
rate changed to CSK 28 per US dollar, as compared to CSK 14.29 per US dollar in late
December 1989.
'Both the composition of the basket and the relative weights of individual currencies
are, however, revised on an annual basis. The respective shares in 1991 were: German
mark 45.52 percent, US dollar 31.34 percent, Austrian schilling 12.35 percent, Swiss franc
6.55 percent, British pound 4.24 percent. The revised composition in 1992 was German
mark 36.15 percent, US dollar 49.07 percent, Austrian schilling 8.07 percent, Swiss franc
3.79 percent, French franc 2.92 percent.
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did not commit themselves to any preannounced period of keeping the given
exchange rate unaffected.
In reality, the peg has been kept since January 1991. The changes in
the CSK's exchange rate during this period reflected only the development
in the cross rates of the basket currencies.
Given all the upheavals accompanying the start of transition, the un-
touched peg (for more than two years) may appear surprising. It has been
made possible by an unexpectedly favorable development of foreign exchange
flows in the period mentioned. Both trade balance and current account in
convertible currencies have substantially recovered after a sharp deteriora-
tion in 1990. In 1991, a surplus of US$0.3 billion on current account was
achieved instead of an envisaged deficit of US$2.5 billion. And again in 1992,
instead of a predicted deficit of US$0.6 billion a surplus of US$1 billion to
US$1.5 billion was attained.
This outcome is to be viewed as a coincidence of two factors which
worked in the same direction during this period:
• The first, in fact, "programmed" impact was that of the wide margin
between the current exchange rate and the domestic purchasing power
parity (PPP) of the currency, which was purposely further widened by
three devaluations of the domestic currency in the course of 1990.
• The second one, a deep protracted recession in the domestic economy,
represented, on the other hand, both an unpredicted and unwelcomed
phenomenon. The extent of the recession in reality substantially outran
not only the government forecasts, but also "the black vision" of the
skeptics.
Divergent foreign and domestic purchasing power of the CSK
A wide gap between the domestic and external values of their currencies was
a common feature of the former centrally planned economies. In the case of
the CSFR, the gap widened further in nominal terms in the very beginning
of the transition as a result of the devaluations in the course of 1990.
Most expert studies identified the domestic -PPP of CSK in early 1990,
i.e., the start of the transition, in the range of CSK 7 to 8 per US dollar.
Using the midpoint ofthe interval, i.e., CSK 7.50 per US dollar, as a bench-
mark, the resulting development of the PPP in the course of the transition
is presented in Table 3.2.
The identified decrease in the implied purchasing power of the CSK with
respect to the US dollar from CSK 7.50 in January 1990 to CSK 12.52 in
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Table 3.2. Exchange rate (ER), purchasing power parity rate (PPP), and
parallel market exchange rate of the CSK in 1989-1992, CSK per US dollar,
average per period.
1989
1990/1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1991/1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1992/1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Official
ER
(1)
15.05
16.29
16.60
16.72
16.67
16.64
16.58
16.37
15.89
15.71
20.18
23.63
24.19
27.65
27.24
28.74
29.94
30.12
30.89
31.00
30.53
30.03
29.89
29.15
28.55
28.36
28.78
29.16
29.06
28.84
28.42
27.61
27.25
27.18
27.38
28.54
28.60
PPP
(2)
7.50
7.50
7.49
7.46
7.46
7.45
7.42
7.96
8.09
8.08
8.12
8.27
8.27
10.35
11.07
11.61
11.78
11.98
12.16
12.15
12.13
12.11
12.08
12.23
12.36
12.47
12.49
12.49
12.52
12.54
12.53
12.61
12.64
12.84
13.05
13.28
13.39
ER/PPP
ratio
(1:2)
2.01
2.17
2.22
2.24
2.23
2.23
2.23
2.06
1.96
1.94
2.49
2.86
2.92
2.67
2.46
2.48
2.54
2.51
2.54
2.55
2.52
2.48
2.47
2.38
2.31
2.27
2.30
2.33
2.32
2.30
2.27
2.19
2.16
2.12
2.10
2.15
2.14
Parallel
market
rate
42.39
40.39
43.46
40.88
39.81
33.20
35.88
33.55
32.99
33.42
38.52
42.45
42.10
36.34
32.04
33.93
31.60
31.18
32.45
32.37
32.85
32.30
31.27
30.74
30.44
30.12
30.19
30.21
29.76
29.37
30.44
29.16
28.79
29.36
29.61
31.40
31.30
Source: International Financial Statistics; PlanEcon, 1992; State Bank of Czechoslovakia.
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April 1992 reflects the CSFR's inflation differential as measured by ratios of
consumer price indices (CPIs) for the given period.
As follows from data in Table 3.2 (see also Table 1.5 in Chapter 1), the
disparity between the PPP and the CSK's exchange rate culminated toward
the end of 1990 (after devaluations and a sweeping liberalization of domestic
prices). In December 1990 the implied exchange rate/PPP ratio amounted
to 2.92, since then it has decreased continuously; by April 1992 it was at the
level of 2.32.
The study by PlanEcon (1992) evaluated the PPP of the CSK in early
1990 even more favorably, CSK 6.20 per US dollar in January 1990 and CSK
10.34 per US dollar in April 1992. While diverging in their initial level, the
resulting rate of change of the PlanEcon estimates coincides with the above
estimates for the period examined.
The exchange rate/PPP ratio that study gave for the Hungarian forint
was 2.15 in January 1990, decreasing to 1.62 by April 1992. For the Polish
zloty the corresponding figures were 3.88 and 1.70, respectively.
Comparing these findings for Hungary and Poland with the above results
for the former the CSFR, the following conclusion may be drawn:
• While in the beginning of 1990 the extent of the disparity in all three
reforming countries appeared to be significantly wider than in compa-
rable market economies,S the implied exchange rate/PPP ratio for the
CSK fell only modestly up to mid-1992, unlike in Hungary and Poland.
• This implies that the CSK has been kept relatively undervalued with
respect to convertible currencies, and in the course of the recent pe-
riod this has become the case with respect to the Polish zloty and the
Hungarian forint.
The impact of the transition on nominal and
real exchange rates
In the period from January 1990 to May 1992 the NEER of the CSK de-
preciated to 56 percent of its value, as a result of devaluations in 1990.
However, the real effective exchange rate (REER),6 calculated on the basis
of the CPI, depreciated as well despite a high inflation differential against
5 According to Summers and Heston (1988), the respective ratios (ERDI coefficient) for
comparable European countries in 1985 were as follows: Spain 1.81, Ireland 1.34, Greece
1.70, Portugal 2.28, and Turkey 2.99.
6Greater value than 100 signifies appreciation and less than 100 depreciation.
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the countries of basket currencies. Though only by 6 percentage points, the
level of the REER was in May 1992 still below its January 1990 base (see
data in Table 3.3).
Parallel calculations for Hungary and Poland indicate REER apprecia-
tion of both the forint and the zloty in 1990 and 1991. Between January
1990 and May 1992 the forint's REER appreciated by 32 percent, while the
zloty's appreciation was much sharper, by 140 percent.
However, the CSK's REER has tended to appreciate as well recently.
Along with a marginal appreciation of the NEER expressed in terms of US
dollars, CSK's REER appreciated by 7 percent in the year ending May 1992.
The divergent trends in the REERs across the reforming countries were
conditioned by substantial differences in their inflation records and to some
extent also by the difference in the transition strategies adopted:
• In Poland at the beginning of 1990, and in the CSFR a year later, the
move to a limited currency convertibility was associated with substan-
tial devaluations. Moreover, the authorities in both cases opted for a
deliberate overshooting of devaluation, setting the exchange rate close
to a parallel market or a "marginal" rate. Hungary, on the other hand,
followed a more gradual path of liberalization, accompanied by repeated,
but relatively modest, devaluations of the forint. Reflecting these differ-
ences, the nominal exchange rate of the Polish zloty depreciated between
1989 and 1992 much more than the CSK rate, while the Hungarian forint,
on the other hand, depreciated significantly less in nominal terms.
• As for inflation in the respective period, the CSFR record was more
favorable than that of Hungary, and certainly much more favorable than
Poland's (compare Table 3.4). In the CSFR, apart from a price jump in
January 1991 following the sweeping price liberalization (CPI increased
by 25.8 percent only in this month), inflation was well under control
during the entire period examined, with the monthly average at 0.6
percent for the year ending May 1992.
To conclude, due to a substantial devaluation of the CSK's NEER asso-
ciated with a relatively modest increase in the domestic price level since the
start of the transition, the implied exchange rate/PPP ratio decreased much
less in the CSFR than in Hungary and Poland. Consequently, in comparative
terms the CSK has continued to be undervalued.
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Table 3.3. Effective exchange rates of the CSK, percent, January 1990 =
100.a
Consumer prices Consumer prices
NEERb of basket countries of the CSFR REERc
1990/1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2 96.78 100.36 100.19 96.62
3 96.91 100.65 100.39 96.66
4 96.91 100.83 100.58 96.67
5 96.72 100.98 100.48 96.25
6 97.26 101.29 100.77 96.76
7 97.11 101.42 108.49 103.89
8 96.95 101.95 111.29 105.84
9 97.02 102.53 112.16 106.13
10 74.26 103.20 113.42 81.62
11 62.19 103.15 115.73 69.78
12 60.87 103.20 115.73 68.26
1991/1 53.69 103.81 145.56 75.29
2 53.58 103.99 155.60 80.18
3 53.77 103.99 163.42 84.50
4 54.17 104.38 166.31 86.30
5 54.21 104.51 169.59 87.96
6 54.36 105.20 172.59 89.18
7 54.36 105.85 172.68 88.69
8 54.17 105.95 172.88 88.40
9 54.03 106.22 173.26 88.14
10 53.96 106.46 173.17 87.76
11 53.74 106.89 175.77 88.37
12 53.58 106.98 177.80 89.05
1992/1 53.89 107.30 179.54 90.16
2 54.28 107.85 180.41 90.79
3 54.42 108.24 181.08 91.05
4 54.49 108.51 181.95 91.37
5 54.27 108.90 182.63 91.01
6 53.90 109.18 183.20 90.45
7 53.22 109.25 184.65 89.96
8 52.93 109.49 185.71 89.78
9 52.90 109.76 189.09 91.14
10 53.13 110.16 192.95 93.06
11 53.85 110.58 196.62 95.75
12 53.66 110.64 198.26 96.16
aDMO.65 and US$O.35 per CSK.
bNEER: Nominal effective exchange rate.
cREER: Real effective exchange rate.
Source: State Bank of Czechoslovakia; International Financial Statistics.
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Table 3.4. Consumer prices in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland from 1986
to 1992, average annual percentage rates over the previous year.
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
CSFR 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.4 10.0 57.9 10.3
Hungary 5.3 8.6 15.5 17.0 28.9 35.0 23.0
Poland 17.7 25.0 60.0 251.0 586.0 70.0 43.0
Sources: Statistical Bulletin; International Financial Statistics; OEeD Economic Outlook.
Inflation differential
Though the inflation record of the former the CSFR was relatively favorable
in terms of transition economies, the inflation rate experienced was consider-
ably above the "standard" of the European market economies, and is likely
to remain so in the Czech Republic in 1993 as well.
In 1992, the projected inflation rate was between 12 percent and 15
percent. In reality CPI increased by 11.5 percent compared to the end of
December 1991, and by 10.3 percent compared to the year 1991.
The inflation rate in 1993 is again expected to range between 17 per-
cent and 20 percent. As in 1992, the main "culprits" are increases in still
administered prices and institutional changes. Whereas in 1992 these were
increases in energy prices and in rents, the shift to a value-added tax (VAT)
regime in the beginning of 1993 and some further increases of energy prices
are expected to be the main factors inflating the price level in 1993. The
changeover to VAT alone increased the domestic price level by more than
7 percent at the beginning of 1993. Moreover, the split of the federal state
inevitably generated further inflationary pressures.
Given a "positive" inflation differential vis-a.-vis countries of basket cur-
rencies to which the currency ofthe Czech Republic, the Czech koruna (CK),
is pegged, the trend toward a further appreciation of the REER of the CK
will persist. It implies a gradual erosion of the gap between the current ex-
change rate and PPP of the CK. In the past, however, the competitiveness
of the exchange rate was based on this particular gap.
Along with the impact of inflation differential, the hoped-for revival 'of
economic growth is expected to add pressures to balancing foreign exchange
flows. Consequently, both of the main factors which worked up to the second
half of 1992 to increase the current account surplus are likely to subside or
to disappear altogether. The Czech Republic, though later than Poland and
Hungary, is thus faced with the issue of what type of foreign exchange rate
strategy to adopt in coping with the challenges of competitiveness in the
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world market and of balancing foreign exchange accounts in the medium
run.
Both Hungary and Poland have recently adjusted their nominal exchange
rate level to reestablish balance in their external accounts. In 1990, the Pol-
ish authorities fixed the nominal exchange rate of the zloty as part of a
stabilization package to fight existing hyperinflation. The peg was in reality
maintained far beyond the preannounced period, despite considerable dete-
rioration of competitiveness and emerging balance of payments deficits in
late 1990. This development was criticized by a number of observers as an
outright policy mistake (see, for instance, Chapter 2 by Jasinski and Chap-
ter 6 by Rosati). The growing inflation differential ultimately induced the
authorities to resort to repeated devaluations of the zloty in 1991 and 1992,
which were later accompanied by the adoption of a crawling peg system.
In a less inflationary environment, the Hungarian authorities coped with
the ensuing price-level differential via repeated discrete devaluations of the
forint. The policy followed, however, was not to correct for its entire extent,
but to press the Hungarian firms for a gradual competitive adjustment.
Exchange Rate Regime Options
Despite significant progress toward a market economy framework accom-
plished within a relatively short time span, the transition economies of Cen-
tral Europe are still far from being homogeneous enough to react sensitively
to price and foreign exchange rate developments. It appears therefore, justi-
fied to claim that given this state of affairs the impact of the foreign exchange
rate level and the foreign exchange rate regime must be less significant com-
pared to market economies.
In the dislocated economies of Eastern Europe, the exchange rate is far
from the pervasive price that it is thought to be in the West .... In other
words, the exchange rate can hardly be relied upon to anchor an economy in
which competition is limited, marketing nonexistent and communications
appalling. [Fry and Nuti, 1992]
On the other hand, however, the transition alone gives specific impor-
tance to the present stage: a "code of behavior" of newly created and re-
structured agents, including private and privatized firms, trade unions, and
government authorities, is being forged and "built in." The alternative op-
tions of the exchange rate regime evidently differ in the requirements and
signals sent to economic agents. And given that the Czech Republic is a
78 Miroslav Hrncff
small economy, increasingly open to the outside world, the impact of the
foreign exchange rate regime adopted at present is likely to co-determine the
type of expectations and behavior of economic agents at least in the medium
run.
Arguments in the choice of exchange rate regime
Though the literature on optimum currency area cannot give any definite
answer as to the concrete type of the foreign exchange regime, it does provide
a number of relevant arguments and discussions on the issue (e.g., Wihlborg
and Willett, 1992).
The literature suggests that there is often a trade-off between the
macroeconomic advantages of flexible exchange rates and the microeconomic
advantages of fixed rates. The relative costs and benefits of fixed versus
flexible exchange rates vary from country to country, depending on the size,
structural and institutional characteristics, the nature and source of shocks,
the objectives, and the current economic situation. Other dimensions given,
the case for a fixed exchange rate regime in a transition economy is evidently
strong for a small country with a high share of export and import flows. (In
an extreme case, with only a few non-traded goods and services, the impact
of exchange rate changes would be more or less confined to the changes in
domestic price level.)
"Simple rules" or "managed" types of exchange rates
The "simple rule" alternative comprises two extreme options: freely floating
rate or firmly fixed rate. This type of solution, however, does not appear
smoothly applicable. In contemporary economies more objectives are as
a rule simultaneously aimed at, with different weights attached to them
across countries and periods. Moreover, various shocks, external as well as
domestic, must be treated.
The experience suggests that exchange rates tend to be mostly more-or-
less managed in the present world economy. After the collapse of the gold
standard there were only a few cases of entirely fixed rates in the long run,
while, on the other hand, free floating was also mostly confined to several
episodes.
Under the conditions in transition economies the free-floating option
has been suggested as a reasonable approach to establish a proper initial
value of the currency after the breakdown of the former centrally planned
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economy framework. There are, however, severe constraints on its poten-
tial merits in the environment of the transition economies: rather thin cur-
rency markets, underdeveloped institutions, lack of forward foreign exchange
markets and of short-term "arbitrage," and speculative capital flows which
could under certain conditions work toward destabilizing the exchange rate
(Williamson, 1991).
Consequently, the extent of misalignments and exchange rate volatility
would evidently be much greater in these countries than in consolidated mar-
ket economies of a similar type. And even in the stabilized economies the
experience with free floating has not been particularly encouraging. This
type of solution seems therefore unsuitable for the environment and objec-
tives aimed at in the former CSFR.
With regard to irrevocably fixed exchange rates the comparison with
developed open market economies seems again to suggest that this solution
is nonviable for transition economies. Given the profound changes, including
institutional uncertainties and shocks involved in the transition process, any
attempt to fix an "equilibrium rate" for the long-term appears unrealistic.
Moreover, apart from the issue of deciding at what level to set the original
fixing, even more controversial appears to be the adoption of a reasonably
sustainable rate in the long run, without inflicting unbearable costs on the
economy.
It follows that neither free-floating options nor irrevocably fixed rate
options seem to be realistic for the transition economies, however attractive
the simple rule approach might be. Some type of a compromise "managed"
solution, involving some discretion, appears therefore the justified way out.
The "managed" option as applied in transition economies
In the former CSFR, a version of the adjustable peg system seemed to be
applied. While maintaining a fixed rate pegged to the basket, the authorities
made no commitments as to its duration, not excluding thus its possible
adjustment.
Hungary has adopted a similar solution: discrete adjustments of the
forint's exchange rate aimed at keeping the real rate more or less stabilized.
Over the course of time they have become smaller and have happened more
often.
In the Polish case, on the other hand, a crawling peg system was adopted
in 1991 to cope with the inflation differential. A crawling peg implies that
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the exchange rate is adjusted by small changes at regular intervals (daily,
weekly, or monthly); in the case of Polish zloty, a daily base was chosen.
The apparent advantage of this type of solution is to avoid abrupt
changes in the real exchange rate's level, which has certainly some merits
in the still relatively inflationary Polish economy. On the other hand, there
is the danger of embedded inflationary expectations. The crawling peg ar-
rangement may then become an additional source of inflation differential
rather than the way of coping with it.
Though in a different way, the "managed" alternatives of exchange rates
in Hungary and Poland recently tended, by and large, to adjust for the
differences in relative price performance vis-a-vis their partners. The policy
was thus - at least to some extent - developing along the real exchange rate
anchor concept suggested for transition economies by Nuti (1990) and Fry
and Nuti (1992).
The concept of real exchange rate anchor certainly has some advan-
tages, given the environment of the transition economies with "positive"
inflation differential. It tends to provide relatively stabilized conditions vis-
a-vis the outside world for investors and traders, which may positively affect
their activities and expectations. Assuming that the starting point is cho-
sen correctly, it could be expected to yield a medium-term balanced current
account.
However, there are some constraints implied as well. Data on price level
developments are available with some lags only. Applying them means that
the real exchange rate is only ex post accommodating the price differential,
without exercising any disciplining effect on economic agents. To establish
instead a real "anchor" ex ante would require some kind of forecasted or tar-
geted data on relative inflation rates, which is by itself open to a considerable
margin of misassessment.
To conclude, the managed types of exchange rates appeared as the only
feasible alternative in the first stage of the transition. The policy of a sta-
bilized real rate, while accommodating for ensuing inflation differential, was
likely to work toward balancing foreign exchange accounts and at the same
time to provide a stable parameter in real terms for investment and trade
activities.
On the other hand, however, this type of solution is not particularly
helpful to restructuring in microsphere and to exercising a disciplining role on
the behavior and performance of economic agents. Without doubt, just these
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microeconomic dimensions are of key importance, conditioning any economic
recovery and revival of sustainable growth in the transition economies.
Structural Defect of Czechoslovak Exports and
"Soft" Exchange Rate Regime
As discussed above, a common feature of the centrally planned economies,
including the former the CSFR, was a wide gap between the domestic and
external values of their currencies. The mentioned dispartity was not only
due to technical and technological gaps with respect to developed market
economies as elsewhere, but also due to the institutional, systemic, and
policy peculiarities of centrally planned economies. 7
Legacy of the centrally planned economy
The CSFR (Czech lands in particular) was one of the top 10 industrial coun-
tries before World War II and in the early postwar period. Since then it has
lost its position in a dramatic way. The gap is particularly large in manu-
facturing branches, where the productivity level is estimated at between 25
percent and 30 percent of the German standard.
The manifold reasons for this rather unfavorable trend have a common
denominator: the almost "perfect" shelter provided to enterprises both do-
mestically, within the framework of a centrally planned economy, and from
the outside, by CMEA institutions.s
As a consequence, Czechoslovak manufacturing firms did not experience
for decades any real competitive pressure, either domestically or from the
7The existence of such gaps is hardly an exceptional case in the world economy. The
countries at a relatively lower level of development inevitably face productivity and effi-
ciency gaps with respect to their more developed partners. Balassa (1964) developed an
argument on "productivity bias" to PPP, implying that divergent productivity levels lead
to systematic trend deviations from PPP. Nonetheless, the extent of the mentioned gap
in the former centrally planned economies tended to be significantly wider than in other
countries at a similar level of development, suggesting the existence of "specific" causal
factors.
8The CSFR maintained the second largest share of CMEA trade among the CMEA
members and, unlike Hungary and Poland, started to reallocate its trade only in the
early 1990s. The detrimental impact of the CMEA "shelter" was thus rather high also in
comparative terms.
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world market. Along with the resulting gap in technical and quality stan-
dards, their products were losing Western markets and/or experiencing rel-
atively declining prices because of lacks in marketing, distribution networks,
business contacts, and expertise; deficient financial payment; and inadequate
insurance, telecommunication infrastructure, and services. These flaws ap-
peared even more detrimental to the competitiveness of the Czechoslovak
manufacturing products than its technical and technological shortcomings.
According to a survey, in 342 cases out of a total of 866 firms surveyed,
exports to market economies did not exceed 1 percent of total deliveries
(Kolanda and Kubista, 1990). This implies that four out of every ten firms
had almost no contact with the world market and had no grasp of what real
competition actually meant and required.
The phenomena, which were developing under the given institutional
and incentive framework, would be entirely paradoxical within the logic of
an open market economy:
• Various industries and branches as well as individual firms could go on
extending their activities at a widely differentiated efficiency level in
terms of the world market's criteria. The cases of entire branches with
negative value added at world market 'prices were not exceptional ones
(Hughes and Hare, 1992).
• The relative efficiency of individual firms within the same industry, Le.,
under the same institutional and incentive regime, was estimated to be
dispersed up to 10 times more compared with the standard in developed
market economies (Kolanda, 1989).
As the "soft budget constraint" was claimed responsible (Kornai,
1986), its important component was "soft" exchange rate regime. The
implied exchange ratio adjusted ex post in a freely floating way, without
exercising any significant impact on changing the behavior of domestic
firms.
• The number of manufacturing stages was as a rule negatively correlated
with the profitability of sales in the world market. It means, the higher
the level of processing, the lower the gains from trade appeared.9
This paradox in terms of a manufacturing economy (which was, however,
not confined to the CSFR) can be explained as a result of a cumulative
impact of both "real" and "valuation" factors:
9However anecdotical it may seem, exporting furniture appeared as a rule less favorable
than prefabricated parts; these intermediate products were in turn less profitable than
timber, and timber less profitable than selling just trees.
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• An increasing gap in productivity and technical and quality standards
with respect to the competitors.
• Depressed prices of CSFR manufactures in the world market because of
marketing and institutional flaws.
• Biased ratios of foreign to domestic prices due to the deficiencies of
domestic price setting (lacking, e.g., a proper evaluation of natural re-
sources) and due to the distortive impact of widely differentiated tax
and subsidies schemes.
The institutional peculiarities of the centrally planned economy frame-
work resulted in the CSFR's long-run declining share of the world's exports
coupled with the increasing replacement of higher value-added products by
lower value-added ones, such as raw materials, intermediate products, and
standard consumer goods in its exports to the convertible currency markets.
In the period from 1975 to 1989 the CSFR's share in imports of OECD
countries fell from 0.28 percent to 0.18 percent. Its share of machinery
imports fell even more drastically, from 0.21 percent to 0.07 percent (OECD
trade statistics).
Simultaneously, a tendency toward a "dual" structure of export flows to
the former "socialist" and developed market economies became increasingly
pronounced. Manufactures (SITC 6-8) accounted for 87 pe,rcent of exports
to former socialist countries in 1990, but for only 66 percent in exports to
market economies (Facts on Czechoslovak Foreign Trade, 1991).
This legacy inevitably affected the initial conditions for transition and,
consequently, constrained the rationality of conventional policy schemes and
instruments.
Trade and balance of payments in the period
from 1989 to 1992
The previous inertia of both the domestic and external environments ended
abruptly in the early 1990s. The impact of external shocks interacted with
institutional changes initiated in the domestic economy and with a parallel
severe contraction of domestic demand. lO
The volume of foreign trade decreased in absolute terms throughout the
transition period, thus accelerating a long-term decline in the CSFR's share
10According to Landesmann (1991), the CSFR may have been hardest hit by the trade
shocks (due to the collapse of CMEA trade and institutions, in particular) of all the Central
and Eastern European countries.
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Table 3.5. Distribution of the CSFR trade, percent shares, derived from
values in CSK, current prices, and foreign exchange rates.
Exports Imports
---'-------------1989 1990 1991 1992a 1989 1990
Former CPEs 60.8 49.0 39.3 24.7 62.3 51.2
Former CMEA 54.9 43.4 32.8 23.9 56.1 44.4
Former USSR 30.5 25.2 19.4 10.4 29.7 21.6
Market economies 39.2 51.0 60.6 75.3 37.7 48.8
Developed 31.2 42.4 51.9 64.5 31.1 42.6
EC 18.2 26.5 40.7 50.2 17.8 23.8
Developing 8.0 8.6 8.7 10.8 6.6 6.2
a January-September 1992.
Source: Facts on Czechoslovak Foreign Trade.
42.8
39.5
31.8
57.1
48.9
33.0
8.2
35.2
34.6
27.8
64.8
59.3
41.0
5.5
in the world market. Between 1989 and 1991 its share in world exports
dropped from 0.46 percent to 0.33 percent.
In 1991 imports were 20 percent lower than in 1990 (reflecting a deep
domestic recession), while exports declined by 7 percent, recovering in the
second half of the year. The level of exports remained stabilized in the first
half of 1992 compared with the same period in 1991 (index 99.2), while
imports continued to decrease (index 87.8). A reversal of this trend, i.e., a
recovery of imports, has taken place since the second half of 1992.
With regard to changes in the territorial distribution, up to 1989 the
share of former centrally planned economies was dominant in Czechoslovak
foreign trade. Since then substantial shifts have taken place (Table 3.5).
Discontinuities experienced in both the domestic and external environ-
ments have substantially affected the commodity composition of trade flows
between 1989 and 1992. According to the data in Table 3.6, the implied
changes in the export pattern (as reflected in the aggregate product groups)
were unfavorable. The share of machinery and transport equipment (SITe
7) decreased dramatically during this period: from 44.4 percent in 1989 to
27.9 percent in 1991 and to a mere 22.1 percent in the period from January to
September 1992. On the other hand, the role of raw materials, intermediate
products, and foodstuffs in total exports has been increasing.
It may be argued that the recent shift to a higher share of raw materials
and intermediate products in total exports only reflects the legacy of the
"dual" structure of Czechoslovak trade in the past. As the role of lower
value-added products was higher in the trade with market economies, given
the materialized substantial reallocation of exports to them, the share of
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Table 3.6. Product composition of the CSFR foreign trade, percent shares,
SITC classification in parentheses.
Exports
1989 1991
Imports
1989 1991
5.0 8.6 7.6 6.9Food and beverages (0+1)
Crude materials, excluding
Fuels (2+4)
Fuels (3)
Chemicals (5)
Products classified according
to the material (6)
Machinery and transport (7)
Manufactures (8)
3.8
5.2
7.6
23.4
44.4
9.7
5.5
4.2
10.6
30.4
27.9
12.7
8.7
6.5
4.3
10.0
36.1
22.1
12.4
9.1
17.3
9.3
10.4
37.0
6.2
9.5
29.8
9.8
9.0
28.1
7.0
7.3
7.1
24.3
10.4
9.8
32.6
8.6
a January-September 1992.
Source: Facts on Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Bulletin, Federal Statistical Office, Prague.
materials and intermediate products in total exports was likely to increase
accordingly.
It is true that the collapse of CMEA trade, with the former USSR in
particular, was the main cause of the dramatically decreasing share of ma-
chinery and transport equipment in total exports. Its increasing role in
exports to market economies in 1990-1991 (the share of SITC 7 on exports
to the EC countries increased from 13.9 percent in 1989 to 18.1 percent in
1991) could not compensate for the losses in CMEA markets, and therefore
remained rather low.
The shifts in the composition of imports we.re not particularly encourag-
ing either, when viewed from the point of the future prospects. In imports
from both the EC and EFTA countries the share of machinery imports di-
minished while that of foodstuffs and consumer goods increased in the first
half of 1992 compared to 1991.
Unlike the volume of trade flows, the current account balance in con-
vertible currencies has recovered after a sharp deterioration in 1990, with
surpluses steadily increasing in the course of 1991 and the first half of 1992
as well. Correspondingly, the foreign exchange reserves also recovered and
in mid-1992 reached the highest level in the entire postwar period.
Compared to the past when merchandise trade flows were dominant, a
tendency to an increased share of various services, tourist trade, and income
transfers was clearly surfacing and contributing to favorable changes in the
current account (see Table 3.7). While trade balance is likely to deteriorate
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Table 3.7. Balance of payments in convertible currencies, in million dollars.
1989 1990 1991 1992a
Current account 439 -1,105 356.5 895.3
Trade balance 419 -785 -447.4 -441.4
Service balance 218 37 827.4 1,128.4
Income balance -163 -316 -65.4 58.3
Transfers -35 -40 41.8 150.0
Capital account 326 326 47.0 -259.2
Direct foreign investment 256 181 592.4 968.0
Other long-term capital -53 718 1,731.7 658.3
Short-term capital 123 -573 -2,277.1 -1,886.6
Errors and omissions -197 -324 494.4 73.1
Changes in reservesb -569 1,102 -897.9 -709.2
a January-September 1992.
bNegative value means increase of reserves.
Source: State Bank of Czechoslovakia.
once the domestic recovery is under way, the surplus on non-trade flows can
be expected to continue to balance the current account at least for a while.
Possibilities of a foreign trade-led recovery
During the period from 1990 to 1992, the inflation and balance of payments
records were two domains where the results achieved in the former CSFR
were highly satisfactory. In the trade sphere, a major reorientation of trade
toward the OECD (to the EC countries, in particular) had been accom-
plished, with exports to the OECD rising in 1990 and 1991 by 18 percent
and 35 percent, respectively. Since 1991 export demand and export flows
have been developing more favorably than domestic sales, contributing thus
to lessening the implied fall in the GDP.
Viewed from the demand side, the recovery of transition economies could
be fostered through the expansion of either domestic-demand components
or foreign demand. While the possibilities of an across-the-board promotion
of domestic demand appear to be rather constrained under current terms,
the prospects of foreign-demand expansion seem to be more promising.
In the case of the Czech Republic there is certainly an opportunity for
revival of trade in the former CMEA area, with neighboring Hungary and
Poland in particular. At the same time there are still unused opportunities
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to expand also "non-sensitive" exports to the DECD area, especially when
the present recession in the main DECD countries is over.
"Wrong" type of exports
The developmental impact of export flows appears, however, in reality rather
"devalued" due to its composition. As discussed above, Czechoslovak exports
to the world market were increasingly shifted toward relatively lower value-
added products.
As shown in a study by Bohata and Fischer (1992), although the total
export volume fell in 1990 and 1991, the stabilized and even increasing ex-
ports were those of iron metallurgy and of basic chemicals. This occurred
despite their rather high energy and material inputs, the supply of which,
moreover, was subject to increasing uncertainties and constraints.
These industries were also at the top in relative export performance
expressed as the volume of exports per employee and/or firm.
The Role of Foreign Exchange Rate Regime
The strategy that the CSFR government followed in the trade sphere ini-
tially relied almost entirely on the exchange rate adjustment only, leaving
aside policies of export promotion, the instruments of commercial and in-
dustrial policies in particular. The reasoning behind this strategy was to put
everybody on "equal footing" and to avoid any "administrative" interference
in the production and trade patterns.
The three consecutive devaluations of CSK in 1990 were in accordance
with this reasoning; they aimed at creating conditions for sustainable trade
liberalization and limited currency convertibility by providing a "flat" basis
for export expansion.
The devaluation-type approach is expected to lead to an improvement
in price and cost competitiveness, given satisfactory price elasticities and
provided that the effects of devaluation are not quickly eroded by the follow-
up increases in incomes.
Apart from the qualification that these conditions need not be a priori
satisfied, the export stimulus of devaluation applies to those items where
the cost and price dimensions of competition are substantial, if not domi-
nant. The non-price factors, on the other hand, tend to be more important
with nonhomogeneous products, more sophisticated and higher value-added
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ones, where goodwill, reliability, advertising and marketing, prompt delivery,
after-sales service, and meeting of individualized demands are crucial.
This qualification to the devaluation's export stimulus are relevant under
the conditions of the transition economies. The legacy of the past develop-
ment and the rigidities of the existing markets, of labor and financial markets
in particular, severely constrain the reallocation of resources and the supply
response to changing price and exchange rate ratios. Even more important,
the lack of established contacts with the world markets, the lack of distri-
bution networks, underdeveloped marketing, and deficient related services
substantially diminish the impact of price advantages implied by a deval-
uation, in particular in the sphere of nonhomogeneous, higher value-added
products.
Consequently, as could be expected, the response to the devaluations
effected in the CSFR in 1990 was rather unequal across individual branches.
As a rule, with some notable exceptions, raw materials, intermediate prod-
ucts, and construction materials could find new export markets relatively
more easily. I I
Short-term Gains Versus Medium- and Long-term Costs
of the Devaluation- Type Approach
Under the environment created by the devaluations at the start of transi-
tion, the implied comparative advantages of Czechoslovak exporters were
increasingly based on cost advantages, conditioned particularly by the de-
preciated labor costs in foreign exchange terms. I2
The impact of this type of development appears rather controversial. To
its credit could be claimed that it secured the following:
• Trade balance and current account surplus at a time when the inter-
nal convertibility on current account transaction and trade liberaliza-
tion were implemented; foreign exchange reserves were rather low; and
sustained export growth to convertible-currency markets was crucial to
11 An export "boom" in steel and rolled material on the EC markets has already led to
countermeasures by the EC countries, involving antidumping procedure.
12Though the former rather equalized level of wages and salaries have begun to differ-
entiate substantially recently, the "average" wage of a qualified worker - when expressed
in foreign exchange terms - still amounted to less than US$200 per month in early 1992,
a rather low level among comparable countries in Western Europe and apparently even
lower than in neighboring Hungary and Poland.
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offset, at least partially, the sharp contraction of trade to the former
CMEA.
• More attractive conditions for foreign investors who were ready to ex-
ploit the opportunities provided by low labor costs (particularly since
the labor force is relatively well educated and qualified), along with
prospective capital gains.
On the other hand, the consequences in the medium and long run are
hardly favorable:
• Data on recent trends seem to confirm that the incentives derived from
an undervalued currency and "cheap labor," accentuated the long-run
trends to "regressive specialization."
• The negative implications of moving to lower value-added products in-
clude the risk of a brain-drain and an increasing gap in the technological
standards in the world economy. By contrast, the successful examples
of revitalization elsewhere in the world were based on narrowing this
gap. In addition, a cost -disadvantage compared to the parallel prod-
ucts of low-income countries and the continued clashes of interest in the
"sensitive sectors" with the EC countries make the "devaluation-type"
approach risky,13
• Under the conditions in the transition economies the "soft" exchange
rate regime is fostering the already strong traditional pattern of char-
acterizing decision making in the enterprises. To reverse inertia of past
trends, enterprises must be induced to make all possible effort to in-
novate, to develop, and to market new products of a higher quality
and technical standard, to catch up in the marketing and sale services.
"Devaluation-type" policies, however, provide for a continuation in the
"traditional" behavior pattern and expectations. Given the underde-
veloped financial and labor markets and existing institutional rigidi-
ties, there is an implied inertia in the "given" allocation of resources.
While in the past the preferences were mostly given to heavy industry
branches, the devaluation-type policies gave a further impetus to their
comparatively high "profitability" and "export orientation." As a re-
sult, the comparative advantages are distorted, Le., favoring material-
and energy-intensive branches, in the course of resource allocation.
13Their share was estimated at over 50 percent of total Czechoslovak exports to the EC
markets in 1990, including agricultural products 8.1 percent, textiles 11.5 percent, iron
and steel 16.3 percent, coal 2.5 percent, and products with tariff ceilings and quotas 19.2
percent (Rollo and Stern, 1992).
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A conclusion follows that the "devaluation-type" approach was able to
secure competitiveness of the Czechoslovak exports in the short run. At the
same time, however, due both to the type of signals to economic agents and
to the generated pattern of resource allocation it worked in fact against their
competitiveness in the medium and long run.
An Alternative Exchange Rate Regime
for the Czech Republic
Taking into account the special institutional arrangement in the first stage
of the transition, the question arises whether there is another option of an
exchange rate regime that would be more conducive to restructuring in the
microsphere without, however, imposing intolerable macroeconomic costs?
And if the answer is positive, under what conditions?
The challenge of the Czech Republic's development in the medium run
is to reverse the downgrading trends of its production and export structures
which dominated in the past. Increasing shares of low value-added branches
and products produced and traded depressed the economic potential of the
country relative to the outside world, constraining the scope for productivity
increases. Consequently, real incomes were doomed to fall in relative terms,
which really materialized in the long run.
If this trend continues in the medium and long run, a kind of vicious
circle would develop. Under the terms of an open economy, the increasing
productivity gap with respect to the trade partners would further diminish
gains from trade and feed the repeated waves of inflation and devaluation.
Such an outcome, widening - instead of narrowing - productivity and income
gaps, would imply a further peripherization of the Czech Republic, and not
only in the European context. Instead, any sustained recovery and revival
of economic growth requires moving upward on the value-added scale.
Policies to cope with microeconomic and structural defects
An alternative to exchange rate policies accommodating ex post to domestic
cost and price increases via repeated devaluations is the "hard currency"
option. It implies nominal exchange rate being a policy target. Its most
demanding version is an irrevocably fixed nominal rate, pegged to a low-
inflation "pilot" national or composite (ECU) currency.
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The main argument for such an approach to fixing the nominal exchange
rate is the traditional one: disciplining effects on economic agents. In the
case of the Czech Republic as an economy undergoing transition, these effects
should contribute to the entire overhaul and reorientation of their behavioral
pattern and expectations.
In the Czech case, a wide margin for productivity increases is available,
provided the changed regime and reoriented incentives and expectations be-
gin to bite. As a legacy of the past, there is still an accumulated potential of
efficiency gains in the existing wasteful methods of using inputs and equip-
ment, "organizational slack," overstaffing, outmoded routines. Even more
important are potential gains in a dynamic setting, as the centralized frame-
work failed particularly in introducing new products and technologies.
Once the policy of nominal exchange rate target is made credible (i.e.,
after the authorities pass several "tests" of their policies and proceed differ-
ently from what could otherwise be expected), and the enterprises learn that
they could not rely any more on "traditional" depreciations of the domestic
currency as a way out from reoccurring pressures of inflating domestic costs,
the microeconomic advantages of the fixed exchange rate approach should
begin to materialize. The experience from elsewhere, notably from Austrian
development, seems to support this assumption (Marin, 1985).
It does not follow, however, that the nominal exchange rate anchor could
be powerful enough to do "the job"; other instruments must be applied
in a consistent and comprehensive way to make the regime change in the
microsphere effective (Portes, 1990).
Along with the microeconomic impact, the policies adopted should be
capable of coping with the structural defects of the Czech economy. As
argued above, rather unequal starting conditions across branches and indus-
tries resulted from the past development. Consequently, the policy relying
on unified exchange rate only and on its changes, aiming at "equal footing,"
worked in reality in a discriminatory way. It favored heavy industry branches
that were preferred in the past, at the cost of most manufacturing sectors.
To correct this trend and to achieve a real "leveling of the grounds"
would require a transitional arrangement, combining exchange rate policies
with promotion schemes for those "disfavored," i.e., mostly for industries
with higher value-added products.
There seems to be a legitimate case for such forms of "industrial policies"
which - not attempting to pick up winners and losers - would contribute to
the development of infrastructure, telecommunications, business, trade, and
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banking services, to the increased mobility of labor, and to the upgrading of
human capital. The flaws just in these spheres placed firms in sophisticated
manufacturing branches to rather less favorable conditions with respect to
both foreign competitors and domestic producers of basic, low value-added
products as well.
At the same time the export promotion schemes appear to be warranted
to correct for the implied disadvantages of domestic exporters of higher value-
added products. These schemes should:
• Enable enterprises to carry the costs of export reallocation and of pen-
etration to the world market (the extra cost of developing marketing,
goodwill, distributional networks, and the additional risk implied).
• Provide "breathing space" for adjustment and restructuring to those
which are likely to be viable producers and exporters in the medium
run.
These arguments, developing along the infant-industry reasoning, could
be baptized "revitalizing industries" arguments.
There are, of course, well-known qualifications and difficulties with the
infant-industry argument for protection (Baldwin, 1969; and Hillman, 1991).
In the context of transition economies, several issues appear to be especially
relevant:
• The protection once extended may be only temporary.
• Even if only temporary, protection incurs costs.
• As the whole manufacturing sector cannot be assisted, the selection im-
plies moral hazard problems.
• Infant-industry protection may more or less eliminate foreign competi-
tion which, given the absence of workable domestic competition, is the
only factor capable of providing effective incentives for restructuring.
The "revitalizing" protection may work in just the opposite direction of
the hoped-for disciplining effects of a fixed exchange rate.
Nevertheless, unlike in the "traditional" infant-industry reasoning, the
core of this approach is not in the protective measures against foreign com-
petition. Rather, it addresses the constraining factors and disadvantages
experienced by the domestic producers, due mostly to the legacy of the cen-
trally planned economy.
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The potential role of foreign competition
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In the transition scenarios, the incentive and disciplining impact of foreign
competition has been attributed a key role in developing a competitive en-
vironment. It was recognized that the reforming countries of Central and
Eastern Europe - unlike, e.g., Japan - cannot rely on "workable" and "con-
testable" competition to be created within the domestic economy only.
However persuasive and unambiguous this claim may appear, judging
from the Czechoslovak experience the "revitalizing" impact of foreign com-
petition on domestic firms in the first stage of the transition has been far
less than expected and, moreover, it was also controversial (HrnCir, 1993).
Along with the still mostly lacking capacity of the domestic producers
to adjust, the main causal factors for this disappointment were related to
the adopted policies. These policies relied on "nondiscriminatory" exchange
rate's changes only, despite the inherently unequal conditions for individual
industries and branches.
At the start of the transition, the substantial devaluations effectively
eliminated foreign competition to most industries. The exceptions were only
the least efficient ones, including Czechoslovak consumer electronics.
The existing conditions present a dilemma. On the one hand, a more
intensive impact of foreign competition would be highly desirable as a driv-
ing force for restructuring of domestic firms. On the other hand, however,
any profound flat increase in exposure to foreign competition is likely to
threaten the very existence of more sophisticated, relatively high value-added
branches, while leaving mostly unaffected the material- and energy-intensive
basic industries.
Unlike the policies adopted at the start of transition, the strategy com-
bining the fixed exchange rate target concept with the schemes of industrial
and export promotion policies could also allow for a more intensive role of
foreign competition.
Under the hard currency approach, the pressure of foreign competition
would squeeze the profits across all industries. Contrary to the past, however,
the support via the industrial policy and an export promotion scheme would
compensate manufacturing firms for their relative disadvantages, enabling
those viable in the medium run to survive and to expand.
The export promotion schemes should be based on ex ante established
rules to avoid administrative discretion and moral hazard problem as much
as possible: the support should be extended only to those who qualify. Ex-
perience from elsewhere (including Far East Asian countries) suggests the
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feasibility of such schemes, rewarding volume and/or increasing rates of ex-
port sales. Unlike the schemes in the past, in this type of promotion scheme
the support is oriented to the relatively successful and prospective ones.
Consequently, the success in keeping it as a temporary device only is more
likely.
In summary, while the case for a unified exchange rate is preferred to
trade policy measures, under the given distorted conditions a transitory "cor-
rective" departure appears to be desirable. Along this reasoning McKinnon
(1991) argued for "cascading" tariffs rather than lowering the exchange rate.
Our approach, however, is not based on a differentiated protection. Rather,
it aims at improving the general business environment and at providing selec-
tive assistance to those who qualify, demonstrating their capacity to survive,
to expand, and to export.
Conditions for fixed exchange rate regime to be viable
The microeconomic advantages of the fixed nominal exchange rate policy
must, however, be compared with the macroeconomic constraints and costs
implied. However attractive its disciplining and behavior effects might be in
the environment of transition economies, it does not follow that the "hard
currency" policy of fixed exchange rate could be reasonably resorted to under
any conditions and at any time. It would be neither viable nor sensible, if its
costs in terms of lost output, increased unemployment, and social hardship
were likely to outweigh microeconomic and structural benefits.
In the postwar period, a number of European economies (e.g., Nordic
countries) adopted a different strategy: promoting macroeconomic develop-
ments via low interest rates, while repeated adjustments of exchange rates
were used to accommodate for domestic costs pressures and to reestablish a
strong competitive position. They mostly shifted to the policy of fixed rates
only at a more mature and stabilized phase.
If in a "strict" version, Le., when irrevocably fixed, the exchange rate
is "lost" as a policy instrument. It implies, the other instruments must be
used, and must be capable of securing competitiveness.
In the course of development, however, cyclical changes and various ex-
ternal and domestic shocks are arising which must be accommodated as well.
It follows then that the policy of fixed exchange rate is highly demanding of
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the mechanisms of domestic adjustment: they must be sufficiently effective
and flexible as for both trends and short-run developments.
When assessing the chances of fixed exchange rate policy in a transi-
tion economy, what matters most is the potential development of the real
exchange rate. Providing that the prospective inflation differential with re-
spect to the anchor country would be either zero or negative, the given
nominal exchange rate is likely to be sustained.
The changes in the real exchange rate are related to the change in the
nominal exchange rate and to relative changes in wage levels, profit rate,
and productivity with respect to the anchor countries. The key variable
appears to be relative change in productivity. If favorable, Le., higher or
at least matching the increases in the partner countries, wages and profits
may rise accordingly, without causing the appreciation of the real rate. This
type of favorable constellation materialized, e.g., in postwar Germany. It
may be also a challenge for transition economies: Can they use the chance
of starting at a rather low level and achieve relatively higher productivity
increases while catching up?
The structural and institutional properties of the given economy are
evidently decisive in this respect, in particular the degree of effectiveness
and flexibility in the functioning of labor and financial markets. It matters
whether the disposable savings are increasingly channeled to the "right"
users. In a parallel way, a flexible functioning of the labor market is ap-
parently crucial, if the competitiveness is to be maintained via domestic
adjustments instead of nominal exchange rate changes. The positive expe-
rience of social corporatism and voluntary incomes policies in a number of
small European economies at the early stage of their development could be
good examples for the Czech Republic to follow (Pekkarinen et ai., 1992).
Even with appreciating real exchange rate, however, the given nominal
rate could successfully be maintained, provided that the counterbalancing
effects of the improving non-price factors of competition exist. Particularly
it is hoped that these effects will result from the hard currency policy. The
Austrian example suggests their feasibility:
Austria has increased her real market share in the OECD area from 0.9
percent in 1970 to 1.08 percent in 1980. This 20 percent increase in Aus-
trian market share took place despite an 18 percent revaluation of the real
exchange rate of the schilling vis-a.-vis her trading partners in the same
period. [Marin, 1985, p. 479]
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However unrealistic the fixed exchange rate regime may appear under present
conditions of the transition economies, we suggest that its benefits and costs
should be seriously scrutinized, taking into account the specific conditions
of each country. In the case of the Czech economy, we believe, it could be a
desirable option in the future.
The timing of its possible adoption is, however, a controversial issue.
Referring to our earlier arguments in this paper, it is evidently not viable
in the next one to two years, taking into account all the institutional and
systemic changes under way and the uncertainties involved.
On the other hand, a number of factors would call for avoiding any
unnecessary delay in the policy shift mentioned:
• One of the lessons from the development of open market economies is
that it takes time to build the credibility of the strategy, and it must
be "earned" (Hochreiter and Knobl, 1991). Implementing the change
discussed becomes increasingly demanding, the more embedded the ex-
isting expectations are in the behavior of firms, trade unions, and various
pressure groups. A comparison between Austria and the Nordic coun-
tries is of particular interest in this respect. Along this reasoning, there
is a difference between forward- and backward-looking expectations in
inflationary tendencies (Barro and Gordon, 1983), and in the resulting
conditions to be coped with by fixed exchange rate regime.
• While the capital account flows remain mostly regulated, the "compli-
cating" role of interest rate parity and of speculative capital flows is
diminished compared with open market economies of Western Europe.
It seems, therefore, advantageous to go through the process of learning
under the conditions when the "fundamentals matter."
A reasonably early move to the policy of nominal exchange rate anchor
could, therefore, create a more favorable environment for the future devel-
opment stages.
Despite all the barriers, the Czech Republic has relatively good prospects
of succeeding with the fixed exchange rate strategy. Along with the compre-
hensive privatization program and inflow of foreign direct investment, there
is a tradition of industrial development and, moreover, of prudent monetary
and fiscal policies in this country aiming at a stabilized currency. This tra-
dition dates back to the period after World War I, when the newly created
Czechoslovak Republic adopted conservative fiscal and monetary policies
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and, as a result, avoided the hyperinflation experienced by all its neighbors,
including Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Poland (Sargent, 1986).
The hypothesis is that under the given conditions, the policy of the hard
currency - instead of devaluations as implied in the conventional wisdom
- should contribute to a sustained recovery of the Czech economy in the
medium run.
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Chapter 4
The Birth and Childhood of
a Currency: The Experience
of Slovenia
Joie Mencinger*
Introduction
On June 26, 1991, Slovenia proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia.
The proclamation coincided with unresolved disputes over customs duties.
When the Yugoslav federal authorities attempted to grab control of the
borders, they were extremely surprised by the resistance. They gave up
within a week, and an agreement was reached: the army would withdraw if
Slovenia postponed the implementation of independence for three months.
On 8 October 1991 Slovenia became "fully independent" and introduced its
own currency - the Slovene tolar. In early 1992, the country was recognized
as an independent state by the EC. In May 1992, it became a member of
the UN.
The events described above put an end to the tense and uncertain polit-
ical and economic developments of the 1980s and early 1990s. This chapter
begins by highlighting the economic and political environment that inspired
*This paper was prepared at the International Center for Economic Research in Torino,
Italy. The financial support provided is gratefully acknowledged. I would like to thank
Enrico Colombatto for helpful comments on a previous draft.
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the de-coupling of Slovenia. An overview of the debates that preceded the
creation of the new monetary system, dealing with the conversion process,
the proper starting exchange rate, and the dilemmas of fixed versus flexible
exchange rate systems, follows. The paper then describes the creation of
the system that was at odds with the advice of foreign financial experts.
The chapter ends with a description of the foreign exchange market and an
explanation of the developments that appear to diverge from forecasts and
from what is in the literature.
The Failure of Transition and Stabilization
in Yugoslavia
The political vacuum after Tito's death, the rise of oil prices, the tight-
ening of the world financial markets, and the breakdown of the so-called
contractual socialism} had given first impulses for what, in the early 1980s,
developed into deep economic, social, and political crises. This prompted
attempts at new economic reform. However, for the first time, and de-
spite the proven ability to adapt systems, revaluate Marxism, and redefine
socialism to daily needs, Yugoslavia found it difficult to move in any new
direction. The country had apparently reached the point at which an eco-
nomic reform, unaccompanied by a political reform, could only increase the
inconsistencies between the economic system and the political system. A
radical economic reform would have required, above all, a separation of the
political and the economic power, while political considerations permitted
only modest changes. The reform attempt in 1982, therefore, produced a
long-lasting stalemate.
lSince 1945, four distinct socialisms, related to the changes in the formal allocation of
decision making in the economy, could be distinguished: administrative socialism (1945-
1952), administrative market socialism (1953-1962), market socialism (1963-1973), and
contractual socialism (1974-1988). Contractual socialism rejected the market as the basic
mechanism for resource allocation, and macroeconomic policy as the means of indirect
regulation of economic activities. Instead, it insisted that these were to be replaced, to the
greatest extent possible, by mechanisms of social contracts, self-management agreements,
and social planning. However, the concept was never operative; the statutes regulating
the behavior of economic units in accordance with the concept were explicitly or implicitly
abolished soon after they appeared or remained irrelevant to the actual functioning of the
economy.
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Finally, in 1988, when party ideologists and economists persisted in
speculating on new types of socialism, the federal government, realizing
that it was impossible to solve economic problems within the existing sys-
tem, launched a new reform. It began with the premise that the system
of property rights was the basic cause of economic problems, and urged
abandonment of the so-called non-property philosophy of social property.
The Enterprise Act passed in December 1988 also formally abrogated so-
cialism; the self-management relationships were replaced by capital relation-
ships. A year later, in December 1989, the federal government launched a
shock-therapy stabilization program. A fixed exchange rate, tight monetary
policy, and wage controls were to be the pillars. However, an overvaluation
of the dinar, weak wage controls, and fiscal overhang existed from the very
beginning.
In the first two quarters of 1990 economic performance was satisfactory;
in April 1990 the rate of inflation was even negative. In June, fatal mistakes
were added to those of December 1989. Policy makers started to pump
money through selective credits to the agricultural sector and nearly doubled
the salaries offederal employees. This triggered a general race of wages. The
program was thus left without nominal anchors in the middle of 1990; the
burden remained solely on a fixed exchange rate. Private- and public-sector
spending increased dramatically during the summer and stayed high, while
economic activity plummeted. This made price stability unsustainable; in
the third quarter of 1990 prices escalated. Severe monetary restrictions
imposed during the last quarter pushed the economy into critical illiquidity,
large-scale bartering, and a recession without deflation. Exports dropped,
imports grew, and the trade deficit soared. In October, the run on banks to
withdraw deposits in foreign exchange began, and foreign exchange reserves
- the last resort of the stabilization program - decreased dramatically.
In autumn 1990, the country began to disintegrate. All attempts by
the federal government to halt the deterioration of the economy and halt
political developments were blocked by the republics. Yugoslavia ceased to
exist as a functioning economic entity; taxes were not collected; money was
"printed" elsewhere; special duties were charged for "imports" from other
republics. In addition, the republics framed their own economic systems that
differed considerably.
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Table 4.1.
General data
Joze Mencinger
The Slovene economy at the outset of independence.a
Output and demand in 1990
In US$ million
20.2
1,996
823
85
5,900
Area (in 1,000 km2)
Population (in 1,000s)
Employment (in 1,000s)
Unemployment (in 1,000s)
GPD/capita (in US$)
External debt
Long term (in US$l,OOO) 1,814
Short term (in US$l,OOO) 141
Debt/Export ratio 0.31
Debt/GDP ratio 0.15
GDP at market prices
Exportsb
Importsb
Total consumption
Private
General government
Gross domestic investments
Fixed assets
Change in inventories
11,778
5,826
5,269
7,562
6,019
1,543
2,992
2,238
754
GExport and import data refer to trade with the world outside the former Yugoslavia.
bGoods and nonfactor services.
Source: Statisticni Letopis Slovenije, 1991.
The Creation of the Tolar
Uncertainties and disputes
The economic policy of the Slovene government installed after general elec-
tions in May 1990 has been described elsewhere (Mencinger, 1991). In short,
the Slovene government believed that the prospects of transition to a mar-
ket economy within Yugoslavia were worsening; the economic policies of the
federal government were full of mistakes; the existing economic system was
unsuitable; and the federation was facing political turmoil. Consequently,
the government focused on pragmatic adjustments to unknown future po-
litical decisions and policy measures of the federal government. These were
accompanied by a gradual construction of a normal economic system and
acquisitions of policy tools. This policy proved successful; in a year, Slovenia
increased its relative competitiveness to the rest of Yugoslavia, established
sovereignity in the fiscal and foreign exchange systems, and prepared insti-
tutional settings for a new country (Table 4.1).
The search for monetary independence began in mid-1990 and concen-
trated on three issues: the consequences of unilateral decisions for the func-
tioning of the financial system and for the relations with other countries
and international institutions; the possibilities of a monetary system in a
confederation that was at a time still considered a viable solution; and the
prospects of eventual monetary independence. After the Serbian raid on the
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monetary system in December 1990, the discussions shifted to the name,
the pattern, and the mr ;t appropriate moment for the introduction of the
Slovene currency.2
Establishing a monetary system involved a choice between a fixed ex-
change rate and a floating exchange rate: the former surrenders the control
of money supply and the latter surrenders the control of the exchange rate.
Economic theory does not provide an answer as to which is preferable; how-
ever, most experts support the view that the fixed exchange rate system suits
countries in transition better (Meltzer, 1992) or propose a crawling peg as
a possibility (Bomhoff, 1992). Following an abrupt drop of foreign exchange
reserves in October 1990, Slovenia, contrary to these beliefs, opted for the
floating rate system. The drop simply revealed that the fixed exchange rate
could not be defended in the future. The debates on the proper exchange
rate system nevertheless continued, encompassing major theoretical quan-
daries known from the debates on the optimum currency area (Ishijama,
1975). Two issues - the relationship between the real exchange rate and
macroeconomic stability and· the anchoring role of the nominal exchange
rate - divided the participants. Theoretical pros and cons were used to de-
fend different positions, while much less attention was given to arrangements
in other countries (Aghevli et al., 1991).
Practical preparations continued as well; before the end of 1990, for
example, provisional notes were printed. At the same time, temporary so-
lutions to handle the repercussions of a fixed overvalued dinar and to cope
with advancing hyperinflation were explored and introduced if found suit-
able. These efforts are best illustrated by the Law on the Introduction of a
Parallel Currency drafted on February 4, 1991. It envisaged a parallel mon-
etary unit pegged to the Austrian schilling; the new unit would have entered
circulation through foreign transactions and would have floated against the
dinar. However, the concept of parallel currency was abandoned in favor of
"the certificate of import privileges" that was much simpler and less risky;
it did not expose Slovene banks to the likely angry reactions of the federal
authorities. The system functioned in the following manner: an exporter
who, for example, sold foreign exchange to a bank at the official exchange
rate, acquired a certificate that was salable and would allow its buyer access
to foreign exchange. The fixed rate plus the price of the certificate made up
2In the beginning of 1991, similar ideas appeared in other Yugoslav republics, notably
Croatia which, at that time, favored a monetary union of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia,
and Slovenia. The ideas of establishing a Yugoslav currency board also circulated (Hanke
and Schuler, 1991).
106 Joze Mencinger
the flexible rate. The black market for foreign exchange in fact disappeared
by its de facto legalization. Finally, the Slovene ECU, a measure of account
to which the parties in economic transactions could adhere, was introduced
in May 1991, less than two months before the proclamation of independence.
Its value was to be determined by the average weekly price of the certificate
on the Ljubljana stock exchange. Slovenia thus indirectly established an in-
dependent currency area with a floating exchange rate within the Yugoslav
monetary system based on the fixed exchange rate.
Government document P2, dated April 15, 1991, treated the macro-
economic issues of independence and was the breaking point in the creation
of the new currency. It had contemplated most of the settings that were later
applied: a rapid conversion (three to five days) of dinars to the new currency,
a one-to-one conversion rate, and a floating rate.3 Different solutions were
later proposed in the documents that were prepared during the summer of
1991.4 They proposed a ten-to-one conversion rate of the dinar to a new
currency and a pegged exchange rate regime. The changes were described in
a document entitled A Program for Economic Sovereignty and Restructuring
of Slovenia, dated March 21, 1991. This document, drawn up by the Sachs
group, proposed pegging to the German mark, ECU, or a basket to assure
a nominal anchor for a shock-therapy stabilization program.5
The pegging-versus-floating issue reflected two opposite general ap-
proaches to the transition in Slovenia: a radical approach and a gradual
approach. The former suggested a formal shock-therapy macroeconomic sta-
bilization program encompassing the fixed exchange rate as an anchor, the
monetary policy that would support it, a balanced budget, foreign financial
assistance, and restructuring of manufacturing and banking by the govern-
ment. The latter approach suggested that economic policy remains founded
on a gradual construction of market institutions. There would be no formal
stabilization program and the government would have only an indirect role
in the restructuring of the economy. The economic policy instruments of
this approach should include a firm but flexible wage policy; very restrictive
government spending enhanced by the fiscal deficit, if required; monetary
3The possibility of future pegging would, according to the document, depend upon the
existence of foreign exchange reserves and the settlement of Yugoslav foreign and domestic
debt issues.
41 wrote document P2 while 1 was the deputy prime minister. 1 resigned from that post
in May 1991.
5The Sachs group changed its views in favor of unrestricted floating in a memorandum
on October 8, 1991, when the floating exchange rate system was already introduced.
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policy enabling tolerable liquidity; a flexible exchange rate; reliance on for-
eign equity capital; and concessions for investments in infrastructure.
The linkage between the monetary and the exchange rate system was
ultimately defined by the Law on the Foreign Exchange System and by the
Law on the Bank of Slovenia. These laws instituted the independence of the
monetary authorities and envisaged the supply of money as an exogenous
variable determined by the central bank. The exchange rate would conse-
quently be endogenous. Slovenia thus established a managed floating system
exercised mainly by the developed market economies. The experiences that
followed proved that floating was the right solution. Fixing the new mon-
etary unit to a monetary unit of a country with low inflation would have
ensured financial discipline only if this exchange rate had "never" changed.
This would have turned out to be illusionary because the basic conditions
for the exchange rate stability were not met. They simply didn't exist.
First, the central bank had no foreign exchange reserves to defend the
fixed rate.
Second, monthly (not annual) inflation in October 1991 was 21.5 per-
cent. A moderate initial devaluation would therefore have been overridden
by inflation immediately, while a large devaluation would have stimulated
inflation and again endangered the fixed rate. By sticking to it, prices of
nontradables could only have been adjusted to prices of tradables through
an unrealistic fiscal contraction mechanism prolonging and deepening reces-
sion. Successive devaluations and/or restrictions on exchange rate transac-
tions and imports would have been the most likely outcome. The presumed
advantage of the fixed exchange rate - enhancing confidence - would have
become the disadvantage of a crawling peg approach; Slovenia would have
found itself in the worst of both worlds (Walters 1 19901 p. 15).
Third, the question emerged: What would be the nominal fixed rate
that assured equilibrium real exchange rate? Would it be 27, 321 42, 50,
or 65 tolars per German mark? The experiences of different shock-therapy
programs, the one in the former Yugoslavia included, have proved that ex
ante determination of the equilibrium exchange rate is impossible. It would
be even more futile to determine such an equilibrium exchange rate in a
new country; the calculations based on past developments would soon prove
to be misleading because structural features of a new country have differed
from those in the past.
Fourth, the transition and, particularly, the loss of the traditional mar-
ket in former Yugoslavia have most strongly affected the volume of trade
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and trade patterns. As a small country, Slovenia should in a short period
more than double its share of foreign trade in GDP. Pegging would, in such
circumstances, hinder accommodations of the equilibrium real exchange rate
to a newly required volume of trade and trade patterns.
The creation of the monetary system
The Bank of Slovenia (BS) was formally created on June 25, 1991, when
the Law on the Bank of Slovenia was passed. The BS that was to replace
the National Bank of Slovenia (NBS), a subsidiary of the National Bank of
Yugoslavia (NBY), declared that it would continue to operate within the
uniform Yugoslav monetary system. The NBY, however, excluded Slovenia
from the Yugoslav monetary system by halting the supply of notes and coins
to Slovenia, denying refinancing facilities and purchases of foreign exchange
from the NBY, and prohibiting new borrowing arrangements abroad. On
October 8, 1991, when the three months' moratorium on all actions toward
independence agreed upon in the Brioni agreement had passed, the Slovene
monetary system was also functionally established.
The BS assumed the functions of a central bank determined by law: reg-
ulation of the money supply, issuing of notes and coins, prudential regulation
and supervision of financial institutions, and control of payments to the rest
of the world. To separate and insulate the new monetary system from the
rest of Yugoslavia, the BS substituted the National Bank of Yugoslavia for
the bankers' bank by assuming existing liabilities and claims and transfer-
ring them to its own balance sheet. It also immediately adopted a series of
measures to wipe out excess liquidity of the banks and to normalize reserve
requirements. These measures included: a mutual cancellation of selective
credits to commercial banks and their mandatory deposits, a reduction of
minimum reserve requirements from 20 percent to 7 percent, revocation of
automatic availability of rediscount facility, fixation of rediscount rate at 25
percent per annum, reduction of the rediscount quota, and a credit freeze
from October 8 to October 31. While interest rates for new loan commit-
ments were left free, the BS requested that for one month banks linearly
align interests on existing loans and deposits to the new rediscount rate, ac-
cording to the given conversion table. This was hoped to be a shock device
for lowering inflationary expectations. It failed.
A new monetary unit - the Slovene tolar - was created by converting
dinars to tolars at the one-to-one conversion rate, to minimize technical
problems. All balances on the accounts were automatically converted; the
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existing dinar notes and coins were to be physically converted in three days
at all banks and Social Accounting Service (SDK) offices. The conversion
process took place very smoothly; few people came to a bank. Instead, they
spent cash balances through routine purchases of goods and services. The
uncertain future of the tolar deterred speculative inflows of dinars from other
parts of Yugoslavia. Some controls on conversions were nevertheless stipu-
lated to prevent abuses. Conversions up to 20,000 dinars (approximately
twice the average monthly salary) were unconstrained, the amounts between
20,000 and 100,000 dinars had to be transferred to the owners' accounts, and
the amounts exceeding 100,000 dinars could only be converted at a major
SDK office. Very few cases of conversions exceeding the 20,000 dinars limit
were reported.
The one-to-one conversion was also meant to prevent a rounding up
of prices that would have most likely occurred if another conversion rate
were chosen. More important, the one-to-one conversion was to abate the
suspicion of the population recalling previous conversions (after World War I
and at the beginning and after World War II), when many lost their financial
wealth. The existing structure and the rather bad quality of the new notes
that had been printed nearly a year earlier also decisively inspired the one-
to-one conversion.6 A small purchasing power of even the most valuable
note was meant to moderate appetites for counterfeiting. The arguments
that a ten-to-one rate would strengthen the faith of the population in a
new monetary unit and lessen inflationary expectations were rejected as
irrelevant. So were the arguments that a proper currency reform includes
different conversion rates depending on the owner, form, and value of an
asset converted.
Only 8.57 billion dinars were converted in cash, less than anticipated by
the BS (which had projected up to 13 billions), and far less than the amount
of cash that had entered circulation through the National Bank of Slovenia
(27 billions). The difference can be explained by a steady outflow of cash
from Slovenia; by guest workers from other republics of former Yugoslavia
supporting their families at home; by tourists buying dinars at the borders
and spending them on the Adriatic coast; and by the legalization of the
6The provisional notes-coupons were secretly printed during the last months of 1990
by the Ministry of Finance. Their value structure resembled the structure of dinars in
circulation. They were nameless; the name was chosen by the parliament from among
competitive alternatives (lipa, krona, klas, karant, slovenski dinar) the very last night
before conversion.
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black market in the spring of 1991, attracting foreign exchange from other
republics.
The German mark was chosen as the currency of reference, and the rate
of 32 tolars to the mark was the starting exchange rate for assets and liabil-
ities in foreign currencies. Frankfurt cross exchange rates determined other
rates. The tolar was to float on two separate markets: one for current ac-
count transactions and one for capital account transactions. Consequently,
there had to be two different market rates: the current account transactions
exchange rate (CUREX) and the capital account transactions exchange rate
(CAPEX). In fact, the delineation of the two markets went along with the
distinction between the market for the business sector, the participants being
companies, banks, and the BS, on the one hand, and the market for indi-
viduals, the participants being individuals, banks, and new private foreign
exchange offices, on the other.
Exchange controls were few. There were no repatriation requirements
and no restrictions regarding purposes for which foreign exchange might be
bought by residents, both individuals and firms. The foreign exchange ac-
counts of the firms were abolished. Firms that repatriated foreign exchange
were free to dispose of it within two days, but had to sell the rest to a
commercial bank afterward at an agreed upon rate, with the exception of
30 percent of the foreign exchange that had to be surrendered for the so-
called common needs (servicing the external debt, payments for essential
imports such as medical supplies and oil) at the official exchange rate. This
requirement was abolished in December 1991.
The frozen foreign exchange deposits with the banks (the so-called old
foreign currency accounts) were the main reason for a separate market for
capital account transactions. The BS would not intervene on this market and
participating banks were obliged to equalize demand and supply each month,
a restriction abolished in April, 1992. The reason for a few restrictions on
the amount of tolars in cash transferable to foreign countries was to lessen
the danger of counterfeiting.
The official exchange rate (OEX) was devised as a moving-parity rate
obtained from CUREX by moving averages over a span of 60 days with
descending daily weights. The speed of descent would depend on the rate of
inflation: the higher the inflation rate, the faster the descent. At 0 inflation,
all 60 days would have equal weight. The OEX had been used for settling
customs duty payments, and was, until December 1991, also used for the
surrender of 30 percent of foreign exchange for common needs and for the
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conversion of the frozen deposits in foreign exchange held by individuals to
tolars.
The "Miraculous" Strength of the Tolar
The foreign exchange market
The initial nominal exchange rate of 32 tolars per mark was set rather arbi-
trarily. It was intended to match its real exchange rate to the real exchange
rate of the dinar back in April 1988, that is, the rate that had enabled par-
tial convertibility of the dinar as well as the growth of the foreign exchange
reserves of Yugoslavia during 1988 and 1989. It implied a 16 percent real
depreciation if compared to the rate in December, 1989, when Markovic's
shock-therapy stabilization program was enacted, and a 15 percent real de-
preciation of the existing flexible exchange rate determined by the price of
the certificates. Despite the real depreciation embodied in the initial ex-
change rate of 32 tolars per mark, the nominal exchange rate immediately
jumped to about 42 tolars per mark on both markets, the main causes being
expectations and high liquidity of the banks. The BS did not possess re-
serves to intervene/ while tightening liquidity of the banks was a matter of
trial and error; behavioral relations in the new Slovene economy were simply
unknown.
Three months of stability followed. In mid-January 1992, rumors of an
"inevitable devaluation," combined with speculations related to the priva-
tization of apartments, pushed CAPEX to 52 tolars per mark. CUREX
followed. The BS decided not to intervene, though it would have been possi-
ble, as it had already accumulated sufficient reserves. The tolar was already
overly strong, given the high inflation rates at the end of 1991. In February,
1992, the rates stabilized again, at a level slightly over 50 tolars per mark.
In mid-April, CAPEX suddenly rose to 62 tolars per mark; CUREX did not
follow and CAPEX dropped back to 52. The BS used the opportunity to
abandon the provision that banks should equalize demand and supply on
the capital account market each month; thus the two markets colluded. The
forward market transactions remained banned.
In the period observed, the average of CAPEX exceeded the average of
CUREX by 3 percent, while the difference fluctuated between -5 percent (in
7Upon the assumption of independence , foreign exchange reserves consisted of operating
balances of commercial banks only, and amounted to $190 millions.
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Table 4.2. The daily foreign exchange market, current account transac-
tions, 1 December 1991 to 31 August 1992.
Bank --> Bank (BB)
Bank --> Enterprise (BP)
Enterprise --> Bank (PB)
Enterprise --> Enterprise (PP)
All transactions
Source: The Bank of Slovenia.
Number Value
of trans- III
actions DM 1,000
2 2,016
130 8,170
142 12,751
51 1,741
325 24,679
Average
transactions
in DM
1,080,000
109,558
94,683
34,790
82,999
Exchange
rate
tolar/mark
49.55
50.76
49.95
50.30
50.23
the first week of December 1991) and +18 percent (in mid-April 1992) and
then gradually narrowed.
There are four different types of transactions on the current account
transactions market: direct sales and purchases of foreign exchange between
enterprises, exporters and importers (PP); sales of foreign exchange by ex-
porters to banks (PB)j purchases of importers from banks (BP); and sales
and purchases among banks (BB). The number of transactions per trading
day (there were 188 trading days between December 1, 1991, and August
31, 1992), the value, the average value of a transaction, and the average
exchange rate are presented in Table 4.2.
Two major changes characterized the foreign exchange market structure
during the period from December 1991 to August 1992; PP transactions
that had amounted to 17 percent in December 1991 nearly disappeared and
the differences between the average exchange rates of different transactions
narrowed considerably.
The data enable us to determine supply and demand. The quantity sup-
plied consists of sales of foreign exchange by enterprises to banks, enterprises
to enterprises, and banks to banks, while the quantity demanded equals the
purchases of foreign exchange by enterprises from enterprises and banks and
by banks from banks. Thus, the foreign exchange supply (S) equals
S = PB + PP + BB ,
the foreign exchange demand (D) equals
D = BP + PP + BB ,
(4.1)
(4.2)
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Table 4.3. Weekly supply and demand for foreign exchange, in millions of
German marks, 1 December 1991 to 31 August 1992.
Demand
Supply
Excess supply
Relative excess supply
Source: Bank of Slovenia.
Average
57.2
79.3
22.1
1.41
Standard
deviation
14.8
24.6
20.0
0.38
Minimum
23.7
25.7
-20.7
0.61
Maximum
90.1
136.1
71.7
2.16
and the excess supply (88) equals
88 = 8 - D = PB - BP . (4.3)
The basic characteristics of the weekly market are presented in Table 4-3
and Figure 4.1.
With regard to the evolution of the exchange rate, the first events were
the two sharp rises ofthe nominal rates, in October 1991 (from 32 to 42 tolars
per mark) and in January 1992 (up to slightly above 52 tolars per mark) that
had pushed the real exchange rate above the initial real exchange rate (real
depreciation). This was followed by a very slow growth of the nominal rate.
Consequently, the real exchange rate, given the growth of prices, fell by a
third of its initial value until June (real appreciation) though at a decreasing
rate. During the whole period, the tolar was overvalued on the average by 18
percent. The overvalued tolar was accompanied by a surplus in foreign trade
and a constant growth of foreign exchange reserves. These reserves reached
$1.25 billion (120 billion tolars) at the end of August 1992, a high figure given
the size of the economy and the corresponding transaction money, M} (56
billion tolars). The strength of the tolar, coupled with the gradual abolition
of foreign exchange restrictions and the growth of foreign exchange reserves,
increasingly appeared to be a "miracle" that repudiated forecasts of experts
and contradicted theoretical findings. The miracle can, however, be rather
easily explained by the lags in responses to the real exchange rate changes,
shifts in the conditions of supply and demand, and the monetary policy.
Figure 4.2 presents the movements of the real exchange rate of the tolar
around its "equilibrium" real exchange rate of 8 October 1991. It is calcu-
lated by dividing the ratios of the daily CUREX and the initial exchange
rate by the ratios of the daily retail sale price index and retail sale price
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Figure 4.1. The foreign exchange market, December 1991 to August 1992,
weekly values.
index on October 8, 1991.8 The daily price indices are linear interpolations
of monthly price indices reported on the 20th of each month.
Lags in responses to the changes of the real exchange rate offer an ex-
planation for the trade surplus; considerable real depreciations during the
period of certificates were augmented by the additional initial real depreci-
ation of the tolar. This might have contributed to favorable trade flows in
1992; a too strong tolar would correspondingly bite in 1993.
Changes in the characteristics of demand and supply of foreign exchange
seem to be the best explanation for the coexistence of the overvalued tolar
and excess supply offoreign exchange. These changes shifted the equilibrium
real exchange rate downward by increasing supply, reducing demand, or
moving both. Some of these changes might be considered permanent, others
temporary. Most of these changes can be derived from the secession of
Slovenia and from the economic collapse of the rest of Yugoslavia. Some are
8This calculation does not take into account inflation in Slovenia's trading partners;
accordingly, the result is not a conventional real exchange rate. Nevertheless, given the
great difference between inflation in Slovenia and in its trading partners (dominated by
Germany), the simplified calculation should not cause too much distortion.
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Figure 4.2. The real exchange rate, December 1991 to August 1992 (a
downward movement indicates a real appreciation).
related to transition: the privatization of the apartments9 and, to a limited
extent, the sales of a few enterprises to foreign owners. The supply of foreign
exchange increased because producers tried to substitute exports for sales in
the former Yugoslav market (in 1990, sales in the rest of Yugoslavia surpassed
sales in foreign market "proper" by 33 percent). The supply also increased
because the Slovene population sold much of its' foreign exchange balances to
moderate the drop in the standard of living. At the same time, the demand
for foreign exchange plummeted with the contraction in domestic demand
and vanishing links with the rest of Yugoslavia, both reducing imports of
raw materials. Finally, the drop in real incomes also reduced savings and
demand for foreign exchange, a traditional form of financial assets.
The shifts in demand and supply also indicate that the former highly
protected Yugoslav market provided Slovenia with an equilibrium real ex-
change rate that a small domestic market cannot assure. This is particularly
9The privatization started in November 1991, with approximately 100,000 apartments
privatized at very low prices; additional high discounts were extended to those who paid
in cash. The privatization brought $200-300 million in foreign exchange, heretofore kept
in foreign banks in neighboring countries or under mattresses.
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so because the demand patterns on the domestic market differ substantially
from the supply patterns fitted to the Yugoslav market. Consequently, the
sales to the former Yugoslav market can only be replaced by exports, how-
ever, at prices much lower than the prices on the protected Yugoslav market.
This implies lower real wages, both in the sector producing tradables and in
the sector producing nontradables.
The monetary policy
Through the option for the floating exchange rate system, the supply of
money became an exogenous variable and the exchange rate endogenous.
The role of the monetary authorities in the miracle cannot, thus, be over-
looked. The BS, despite being constantly urged to remove all foreign ex-
change restrictions and to devalue, reacted sensibly by removing restrictions
only when appropriate conditions prevailed, and intervened only to prevent
substantial nominal appreciations. Only in July and August 1992, when
inflation fell to 2 and 1.4 percent per month, respectively, did the BS delib-
erately weaken the tolar by slowly pushing its nominal rate to 60 tolars per
mark.
The potentials of the BS to regulate the exchange rate at will by sales
and purchases of foreign exchange, through supply and demand, should not
be overstated. An asset market model of foreign exchange determination
used to simulate the links between the monetary policy and exchange rate
(Mencinger, 1992) illustrates convincingly the detrimental but, at the same
time, limited scope of the monetary policy; realistic changes of the monetary
policy could lower or raise the exchange rate by as much as 10 percent. Large-
scale monetization of foreign exchange would produce monetary overhang
and speed inflation back to hyperinflationary levels, due particularly to the
small currency area (Bole, 1992).
A summary of monetary policy presented in Table 4.4 indicates that
monetary policy was highly restrictive in the first half of 1992; real money
supply decreased by 40 percent between October 1991 and June 1992. For-
eign currency transactions became the only channel of money creation; the
ratio of foreign exchange reserves of the BS and high-powered money in-
creased from 0.04 to 1.70; and the ratio of total reserves and M1 increased
from 0.31 to 1.35. The regulation of money supply and the banks' liquidity
shifted from the manipulation of reserve requirements to open market oper-
ations and prudential regulations; the share of required reserves in the total
banks' reserves decreased from 0.71 to 0.08. The money multiplier that rose
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Table 4.4. Monetary policy between October 1991 and August 1992, at
the end of the period, in millions of tolars.
Oct. 91 Dec. 91 Mar. 92 May 92 Aug. 92
(1) High-powered money 18,489 16,463 19,374 27,600 30,175
(2) Notes in circulation 8,117 9,026 10,587 16,474 18,101
(3) Banks' reserves 10,372 6,669 6,596 9,004 8,238
(3a) Banks' cash in vaults 476 617 668 1,200 1,084
(3b) Banks' deposits 2,472 583 832 4,002 6,515
(3c) Banks' obligatory 7,411 5,494 5,096 3,669 639
reserves
(3d) Non-bank deposits 13 0 2,191 2,256 3,837
with BS
(4) Money M1 36,104 38,912 44,153 52,131 62,976
(5) Demand deposits 27,987 29,760 33,566 35,657 43,046
(6) Passbook savings 6,812 15,952 14,649 19,136 23,382
deposits
(6a) Time and restricted 18,587 21,898 43,344 52,740 65,260
deposits
(7) Foreign exchange 47,751 55,398 77,787 83,888 95,404
deposits
(8) Foreign currency 237 401 548 703 1,065
reserves in US$
(9) Banks' operating 221 282 341 423 435
reserves
(10) BS reserves 16 119 207 280 659
752 6,867 17,016 23,380 51,271
(11) Prices 1.06 1.53 2.11 2.36 2.61
(Oct. 8, 1991) = 1
(12) Exchange rate 1.20 1.32 1.64 1.66 1.89
(Oct. 8, 1991) = 1
(4)/(1) 1.95 2.36 2.27 1.88 2.09
(2)/(5) 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.46 0.42
(6)/(4) 0.19 0.41 0.33 0.37 0.37
(8)/(4) 0.31 0.59 1.02 1.13 1.35
(10)/(1) 0.04 0.42 0.88 0.85 1.70
(3c)/(3) 0.71 0.82 0.77 0.41 0.08
(12)/(11) Real exchange rate 1.13 0.86 0.78 0.70 0.72
(4)/(( 11)/36,104) 1.00 0.71 0.58 0.61 0.67
Real money supply
Source: Bank of Slovenia.
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between October 1991 and March 1992 was later blocked by the increased
ratio of currency to deposits.
The miracle cannot persist. The responses to real depreciations of the
currency that prevailed in 1991 will eventually be followed by responses to
real appreciations prevailing in 1992. The effects of the temporary shifts in
supply and demand that preserved the mixture of a strong tolar and the
growth of foreign exchange reserves with a mixture of inflation, plummeting
production, and rising unemployment will disappear. Monetary policy that
was conceived to first lower and then keep inflation under control and to
preserve a real exchange rate at a level that makes exports competitive will
also be trapped in conflicting goals. The only result of future large nominal
depreciations, if not supported by measures to reduce real wages and budget
expenditures, would be the pushing up of inflation while doing nothing to
increase competitiveness except in the very short run. When currency de-
preciates, import prices rise, followed by domestic prices and wages. Only
a sluggish adjustment of these domestic rates could temporarily help the
exporting sector. But, after many years of experiencing high inflation, the
illusion concerning a longer time lag has disappeared and adjustments have
become quick, preventing gains from depreciation to last. A more lasting
miracle requires the reduction of costs per unit of output, including modest
public expenditures, wage restraints, and administrative price controls of
nontradables provided by monopolies.
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Part II
Trade Liberalization
and Emerging Trade Patterns

Chapter 5
Trade Liberalization in the
CSFR, Hungary, and
Poland: Rush and
Reconsideration
Janos Gacs
Introduction
In the rich literature on attempts at liberalizing trade there is ample ev-
idence that for less developed economies trade liberalization usually takes
a long period of time. The opening up of economies has successive phases
of progress, reversals, and even serious regressions. Taking an overly re-
strictive trade regime as a starting point, the whole process of liberalization
may last for two to three decades on average.! The chance of success of a
zealous move for trade liberalization depends on many factors: the position
of the economy in the international distribution of labor; the tendency of
balance of payments, external indebtedness, and foreign aid; the accompa-
nying package of macroeconomic policies; the stage the economy achieved in
lCompare the analyses in the latest extensive project of the World Bank (Michaely et
al., 1991) and the project of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Bhagwati, 1978;
and Krueger, 1978).
124
20.---------------....,
Israel, 1950-1978
18
)( 16~ 14
c:
o 12~ 10
e 8g 6
Ql
~ 4
I- 2
o
1950 1955196019651970197519801985
20.----------------,
Turkey, 1950-1985)( 18
~ 16 .
c: 14
.12iii 12
N
~ 10······················ .
g 8
Ql 6
~ 4
I-
2
o
1950 1955196019651970197519801985
Janos Gacs
20.------------------,
18 Argentina, 1950-1983
16
14
12
10 _ .
8
6
4
2
o
1950 1955196019651970197519801985
20.------------Chile, 1950-1985
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
o
19501955196019651970197519801985
Figure 5.1. Characteristic patterns of trade liberalization in Israel, Ar-
gentina, Turkey, and Chile. Source: Michaely et al., 1991.
establishing modern institutions of a market economy; the efficiency of its
political institutions; the power of pressure groups, and so on.
In Figure 5.1 the graphic presentation of progress of trade liberaliza-
tion in some representative countries are reproduced from the latest World
Bank comparative analysis of trade liberalization. The index of trade lib-
eralization used by the authors of that project is a composite index of a
diversity of measures concerning tariff and nontariff barriers, interventions
in trade, and general economic activity, such as export subsidies and price
control. It is also an ordinal index that varies from 1 (the theoretically most
restrictive, interventionist regime) to 20 (the theoretically most liberalized
one). Different patterns of trade liberalization are well exemplified by the
economies in the following four countries: Israel, slow and gradual progress
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Figure 5.2. Trade liberalization indices for the CSFR, Hungary, and
Poland, 1955-1992. Source: Author's calculations.
of liberalization; Argentina, periods of gradual progress followed by gradual
reversals; Turkey, jumps and ensuing reversals; Chile, the champion in terms
of the speed to achieve and maintain a high level of liberalization.
In the light of the experiences of developing countries, trade liberaliza-
tion in Eastern Europe was of a unique kind. 2 After 1989 a nearly complete
trade liberalization was accomplished in Eastern Europe at an unprecedented
2In this case the phrase "trade liberalization" means a significant reduction of nontariff
trade barriers, including the easier acquisition of foreign exchange for import purposes, the
reduction of the average rate and the variation of tariffs, the reduction of export-related
subsidies and taxes, and the reduction of the influence of central authorities in controlling
microeconomic decisions of enterprises related to trade. Liberalization of trading activity
(i.e., providing the opportunity to conduct trade for all business units) is considered part
of trade liberalization.
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speed. Figure 5.2 illustrates the stylized patterns of trade liberalization in
the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland.3
Naturally, there are differences among the three countries in terms of
the speed of liberalization. Hungary's progress was more gradual than the
other two in two respects: it had already gradually liberalized trade to some
extent even before 1989, and the program of trade liberalization commenced
in 1989 followed a four-year schedule. It is remarkable that even in the case
of Hungary an extremely fast pace of liberalization was accomplished. The
speediest among the three was the CSFR.
One can appraise the rapid pace of liberalization in the region either
as promising or as risky. On the one hand, we can take into account that
the unique opportunity of systemic change in policy making and the econ-
omy helped policy makers in these countries to evade the series of stumbling
blocks that usually halt the introduction and extension of liberalization mea-
sures in traditionally protected economies. In this respect the great leap
forward may payoff. On the other hand, the unparalleled breakthrough
may bring about tensions and counterattacks of equal strength. A serious
reversal of liberalization would impede the evolution of further liberalization
for a long time. In the latter scenario the record speed is not going to be
seen as an accomplishment. Trade liberalization is beneficial in the course of
transition for several reasons (enhancing adjustment, calibrating prices, and
encouraging competition); but if import competition were to magnify the im-
pact of other shocks (like the loss of traditional CMEA markets, contraction
of domestic demand), its drawbacks may outweigh its benefits.
Major questions are emerging from the process of trade liberalization:
Will the expected favorable impacts evolve? Will imbalances, like an unex-
pected trade deficit due to a rapid growth of imports or domestic shortages
due to an unexpected outflow of exports, accompany trade liberalization?
Can domestic production respond to the challenge of import competition?
Can the process of liberalization (in the light of these or unrelated factors)
be sustained?
The following review of trade liberalization in Eastern Europe gives early
answers to these questions using available evidence. More data are cited for
3Since I did not have the opportunity to attune the rules of constructing the index
with the authors of the World Bank book series, I made my estimations based on my
own intuitive weights. In fact, even the participants of that project had to rely on ad hoc
approaches and intuition to make assessments for the values of the index of liberalization
in their respective studies. The authors of the World Bank project did not intend to use
the index of liberalization for socialist economies (Michaely et al., 1991, p. 18, footnote 8).
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Hungary, the country I am most familiar with and where experiences and
analyses are relatively more abundant.
Conditions and Timing of Liberalization
in Eastern Europe
Trade liberalization is not a completely new phenomenon for Eastern Eu-
rope's formerly centrally planned economies. For instance, the long history
of gradual reforms in the Hungarian economy since 1968 is also the history
of sometimes ill-fated, but not completely unsuccessful, attempts at reform-
ing and liberalizing trade (see Gacs, 1990 and 1991). However, the scope
of trade liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Eastern Europe
is incomparable to the earlier attempts. The immanent autark nature of
centrally planned economies, the rigid system of distribution of labor in the
framework of the CMEA, the lack of means to deal with competition, as
well as the political constraints, all had impeded any bold attempt at trade
liberalization.
Transition in each of the formerly centrally planned economies entails
three major interrelated economic processes: stabilization, marketization,
and restructuring. In the economies of Eastern Europe, trade liberalization
has been assigned a prominent role in the processes of both marketization
and restructuring; in Poland it has also been assigned a crucial function in
the process of macroeconomic stabilization. Trade liberalization and estab-
lishing de jure currency convertibility have been related to stabilization less
in the CSFR and even less in Hungary.
In late 1989 Poland's inflation reached hyperinflational dimensions. The
stabilization package introduced on 1 January 1990 used the establishment
of currency convertibility of the zloty and its pegged rate to the US dollar
as major instruments to curb further increases in prices. The introduction
of currency convertibility and the role of the exchange rate as a nominal an-
chor made sense only if foreign trade flows were to be permitted to change
relatively freely and to help in restoring balance on product markets. Accord-
ingly, the Polish government had virtually abolished all its licensing activity
in non-ruble-accounted trade. As for exports, in early 1990 temporary ex-
port restrictions were introduced on 24 items with the aim of preventing an
outflow of essential goods in the time of widespread shortages. As a conse-
quence of the excessive devaluation of the zloty, the worry about an outflow
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of goods was so pronounced that other administrative methods were also
used to keep the level of exports under control.
In the CSFR most of the reform measures were introduced in January
1991; this was also the starting point of trade liberalization. In 1990 the
domestic currency experienced three substantial devaluations, and in Jan-
uary 1991 it became - although with limitations - internally convertible (for
current account transactions and for registered business units).
While inflation increased in 1990 (from 1.4 percent in 1989 to 10.1 per-
cent in 1990), this acceleration was not very rapid and was under control.
Also there was neither an excessive monetary overhang nor a serious disequi-
librium on the market of consumer or industrial goods. Accordingly, price
liberalization and trade liberalization were not needed to overcome these
types of disequilibria. The purpose of early trade liberalization cum estab-
lishing internal convertibility was more closely related to the evolution of a
new structure of prices and incentives and "importing" competition than to
stabilizing existing imbalances.4
The architects of the reform in the CSFR also realized that the
Czechoslovak economy was more separated from the changes in the world
market than other small centrally planned economies, like the Polish and
Hungarian economies. Trade liberalization seemed an appropriate tool to
facilitate catching up with competitors and to enhance adjustment to the
price as well as demand and supply relations in the world market.
In January 1991 only four categories of products in the CSFR remained
subject to import licensing (crude oil, natural gas, narcotics, and arms and
ammunition), while 20 percent of merchandise exports remained to be con-
trolled by licensing.
Of the three countries, Hungary was the first to make the political de-
cision to start trade liberalization, in the summer of 1988. The program
entailed a schedule of fast, but gradual liberalization. Non-ruble-accounted
imports were planned to be liberalized in the course offour years, from 1989
to 1992, in steps ranging from 20 to 35 percent, and there were no plans to
declare any kind of convertibility of the domestic currency as a part of the
liberalization package. Partly under pressure from the IMF and the World
Bank, and partly based on early favorable experiences, the program was
4See Hrncir and Kla.cek (1991). However, after Czechoslovak reformers decided to
introduce currency convertibility and emba.rk on a policy of bold trade liberalization, the
extent of devaluation of the koruna reflected the will to prevent an anticipated dangerous
trade deficit. See Williamson (1991).
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sped up and implemented in three years. In 1992 about 90 percent of im-
ports were liberalized, and about 70 percent of domestic production had to
face import competition. The remaining restricted items were mostly food
products and consumer goods.
In Hungary the state of imbalances provided a mixed picture on the eve
of trade liberalization. There were no serious disequilibria on product mar-
kets; however, increasing budget deficits, external indebtedness, and trade
deficits were subject to serious concern. Inflation, while accelerating in the
late 1980s, did not necessitate the "big bang" approach, like the one ap-
plied in Poland in 1990. While stabilization measures were at the center of
government's policy since 1988, after much debate it was decided that the in-
troduction of the convertibIlity of the Hungarian currency and the use of the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor for curbing inflation would not be used
as a means of anti-inflationary policy. As a matter of fact, the government
adhered to this rule to the extent that the package of trade liberalization
was not accompanied by any serious concept of devaluation or exchange rate
management. Despite the lack of actions for deliberately establishing de
jure currency convertibility, through the progress of liberalization and other
seemingly unrelated measures, the de facto current account convertibility of
the forint, however, has essentially been achieved in the last fouf years.
First Experiences
Trade liberalization was not the only or the main element of economic reform
in any of the countries at the time liberalization was introduced. Liberal-
ization was part of a package for stabilization and reform.s The well-known
elements of these packages - liberalization of prices, reduction of subsidies,
introduction of restrictive macropolicies, and institutional changes to en-
hance private ownership and competition - had far-reaching consequences
on the development of the economy and trade. These changes were accompa-
nied by other impacts, exogenous from the point of view of national reforms,
like the demise of the CMEA, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and reces-
sion in the world economy. It is extremely difficult to distinguish between
consequences of trade liberalization and other simultaneous changes. The
complication of separating the effects of different impacts might have been
the cause for the astounding lack of analyses concerning the effects of trade
liberalization in these three countries. As of this writing, the end of 1992,
bThis was less obvious, though, in Hungary than in the CSFR and Poland.
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we still have only a limited amount of information on the experience of trade
liberalization in these three countries and most of the evidence is fractional
or anecdotal.
The expected positive impacts of trade liberalization were the following:
the incentive system would be more neutral than before in respect to im-
port substitution and exports; enterprises would familiarize themselves with
foreign markets, prices, demand, and standards (this would both force and
enable them to make adjustments); domestic competition would be induced
by import competition (less state intervention would be needed for antitrust
purposes); the prices that had been liberalized would follow the pattern of
world market prices, rather than the pattern dictated by domestic monopo-
lies; production would have access to cheap imports and efficiency would be
enhanced, while consumer access to a wide range of imported goods, many of
them relatively cheaper than domestic ones, would give additional incentives
to contain inflation; through export liberalization and access to imports, ex-
ports would be enhanced and scale efficiency could be better utilized.
The most spectacular reaction on measures of trade liberalization was
the explosive increase in the number of business units engaged in foreign
trade. Earlier the number of enterprises having licenses to carry out ex-
ports and imports was in the hundreds, but for the overwhelming majority
of these firms the scope of activity was strictly limited. After liberalization
this number jumped to tens of thousands in each country. This development
was a reflection of several factors: the serious distrust in the efficiency of tra-
ditional foreign trade enterprises; the growing interest in discovering foreign
markets and carrying out international transactions; the determination of
earning windfall profits in connection with the still prevailing shortages and
price differentials; the utilization of legal or illegal personal benefits for those
directly involved in this business (exchange and transfer of foreign exchange,
under- and over-invoicing, organizing trips abroad, and so on).
Producers in Eastern European economies had been isolated from West-
ern markets for a long time because access to foreign exchange was blocked.
The eventual decision to select the direction of purchase (and in some coun-
tries that of the sale) was not delegated to them, and even access to in-
formation about foreign markets, suppliers, prices, and other parameters
were only accessible to a limited extent. Consumers were isolated in a
similar manner; their chances to choose imported products for purchase
were determined eventually by central bureaucracies. There were signifi-
cant differences, however, between the three countries concerned. Through
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a sophisticated systems of regulation, Hungarian and Polish producers had
more access to Western markets, at least in the 1980s, than CSFR producers;
in addition, the more mobile Polish and Hungarian citizens had more chances
than their Czechoslovak counterparts to learn about the characteristics of
supply of Western goods through tourism or business trips.
After this long isolation and with the enterprise budget constraint still
not hard enough, it seemed obvious that easy access to the "forbidden fruit"
would tempt Eastern European firms and consumers to taste them. Au-
thorities in the three countries feared an attack on imports and purposefully
introduced new barriers or brakes to curb the growth of imports. The im-
port surcharge on a wide range of goods in the CSFR, the requirement to
use trade credits for payments of certain categories of imports also in the
CSFR, the gradual approach followed in Hungary, the substantial devalu-
ations in Poland and the CSFR, the introduction of import deposit (or in
other words, 100 percent prefinancing requirement) in Hungary all served
this target, as others too, like restrictive monetary and fiscal policies carried
out at the time when trade liberalizations commenced.
Foreign trade data indicate that none of the three countries experienced
a surge in their aggregate imports in the first year of import liberalization.
Total imports changed by -20 percent, 1 percent, and -27 percent in the
CSFR, Hungary, and Poland, respectively, in the first year following trade
liberalization (Mladek, 1992; Central Statistical Office, 1992; and Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, No.9, 1992). Naturally, there was a large vari-
ance among the growth rates of different products and different categories
of goods.
Pent-up consumer demand was high in each country. This was the case
even in Hungary, the best-supplied centrally planned economy, following a
year in which Hungarian tourists could import duty-free an enormous volume
of consumer goods for their own purpose. In the first year of the liberalized
regime in Hungary, the import of some products rocketed in as high as 2- to
12-fold of their previous leve1.6
In some cases, the saturation of the market was achieved in the very first
year: in Hungary the imports of building materials increased 6-fold in 1989,
while the value of imports of the next year was hardly more than half the
1989 value. The demand for many other kinds of imported consumer goods,
however, continued to be high.
6The favorite items purchased were deep freezers (12-fold growth), tiles and floor tiles
(4- to 7-fold growth), and color TV sets (60 percent growth).
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Table 5.1. Distribution of manufactured industrial products imported from
the EC, in percent.
1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991
Czechoslovakia
Materials 46.75 41.19 33.78 33.99 30.49 28.31
Machinery 40.93 43.48 50.26 49.50 53.19 53.53
Consumer goods 5.81 5.53 5.40 5.18 7.40 9.81
Food products 5.23 6.68 7.21 7.53 5.37 5.25
Other products 1.27 3.12 3.35 3.80 3.56 3.10
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Consumer goods+vehicles 7.07 6.61 6.53 6.53 9.38 13.97
Hungary
Materials 55.37 50.44 47.69 42.95 40.26 38.51
Machinery 33.18 34.63 35.82 39.01 39.35 40.53
Consumer goods 5.66 7.73 8.78 10.30 13.13 14.18
Food products 4.07 3.78 3.76 3.34 3.07 3.03
Other products 1.72 3.42 3.95 4.40 4.20 3.76
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Consumer goods+vehicles 6.28 8.91 10.67 14.08 16.68 20.63
Poland
Materials 48.82 45.47 42.97 37.27 33.32 29.19
Machinery 39.05 34.04 35.92 37.22 40.80 40.42
Consumer goods 4.55 8.48 7.76 9.24 13.89 15.24
Food products 6.21 9.23 9.60 12.44 8.70 11.36
Other products 1.37 2.78 3.75 3.83 3.29 3.79
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Consumer goods+vehicles 6.10 11.03 9.45 11.23 16.33 21.53
Source: Gacs, 1992.
As Table 5.1 indicates (on the example of imports from EC economies),
consumers have continuously shown an increasing preference for goods im-
ported from the West. The share of consumer goods has steadily grown
in all three countries in recent years, no doubt partly as a consequence of
trade liberalization that brought the opportunity of free choice. We list the
share of consumer goods and motor vehicles separately because a significant
and growing ratio of vehicle imports were passenger cars imports, the fa-
vorite target of consumer purchases in these years. The consolidated share
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of consumer goods and vehicle imports is showing an even more spectacular
growth.
As far as license-free importation and exportation by business units is
concerned, enterprises, when acting as buyers, realized almost all the advan-
tages of liberalization that were previously envisaged. In fact they adjusted
to the changes as easily as households do after an automatic washing ma-
chine is put into use, or as university professors adapt to the use of copying
machines and transparencies: no doubt these devices make life much easier
and without them normal operation would be unimaginable, but after a very
short period of time one tends to forget the enormous advantages brought
about by these changes.
Industrial case studies about the impact of trade liberalization in Hun-
gary give numerous examples for the most visible general effect of liberal-
ization - that is, as a consequence of a better supply of goods from imports,
domestic producers started to pay more attention to their customers, im-
proved conditions of supply, and gave up their earlier practice of raising
prices mechanically in line with the inflation (Nagy, 1991).
In all three countries import liberalization contributed the most to the
containment and even reduction of prices of passenger cars and consumer
electronics. Liberalization and/or increasing of import quotas for these goods
lead to enthusiastic consumers, who spent much of their savings on better
and cheaper electronic products and (mostly used) Western cars. In a later
section we discuss how respective domestic producers reacted to this event.
How Much Crowding Out of Domestic
Production?
The less attractive side of trade liberalization is the impact of competing
imports on the sustainability of domestic production. Before the act of lib-
eralization, there were already major concerns about whether the allegedly
rigid, unresponsive state enterprises would be able to meet the challenge of
import competition. We have seen that, at the outset of liberalization, each
government took measures to curb imports, and through this gave some pro-
tection to domestic industries. The radical devaluations of the domestic cur-
rency and some complementary measures (import surcharge) or substitutes
(import deposit, financing requirements) were operational in this respect.
Note again that in Hungary trade liberalization was not accompanied by
any substantial devaluation of the currency.
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Data on real effective exchange rates (see, for instance, the figures pre-
sented in Chapter 1 by Oblath) show, however, that in all three countries
the start of the liberalization was followed by a long period of apprecia-
tion of the domestic currency. In the CSFR and in Poland experts found
this development mostly justified, partly because the magnitude of the initial
devaluations counted with the inflationary effects of price liberalization (and
the ensuing real appreciation) and partly because, according to many ana-
lysts, the initial devaluation in fact implied an overshooting. Without going
into details we must note that the pursuance of the policy of real appreci-
ation of the domestic currency has been strongly criticized in Hungary for
several years, and became the subject of disputes in the CSFR and Poland
recently.
One of the arguments against the current pro-appreciation policies of
Eastern European governments is strongly supported by the author: in the
peculiar position of Eastern European producers in 1989-1992, neither the
good export performance nor acceptable balance of payments position is a
good measure for the evaluation of the level of real exchange rate. Industries
with exceptionally good export performance may export at a loss and as a
result may accrue high debts and face a series of bankruptcy procedures as
well as the liquidation of their leading enterprises. Because of the extreme
vulnerability of Eastern European industries, governments must provide a
cushion for the most viable ones in different ways during the period of re-
structuring. One policy option that should not be excluded, and this is the
experience of almost all successful liberalizations in developing economies, is
depreciating the exchange rate.
It is a peculiar feature of trade liberalization in the three countries that,
contrary to international experiences, the abolishment of quantitative re-
strictions on imports was not combined with an increase in tariff protection.
None of the governments realized the importance of tariff protection at the
time of dismantling nontariff barriers, or, if realized, they overemphasized
the reluctance of international organizations, like GATT and the EC, to
accept tariff increases that would replace the quantitative restrictions.
In the special Hungarian case the new, democratically elected govern-
ment did not realize the chance to dissociate itself from the lies of previous
Hungarian governments concerning alleged automatic licensing of imports in
Hungary since 1968. Accordingly, the breakthrough of import liberalization,
which commenced in 1989, was played down and was not used as grounds
for renegotiating tariffs with trade partners (Oblath, 1991a).
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While in Hungary the free flow of imports met with an average tariff
level of 16 percent, at the start of liberalization the average Polish tariff was
about 12 percent, and tariffs in the CSFR averaged at a paltry 5 percent.
In the first year of liberalization, in each of the three countries domestic
enterprises usually enjoyed the benefits of trade liberalization and, except
for some producers of consumer goods, did not express any difficulties in
meeting the challenge of import competition. One reason for this was the
shelter that the devalued currencies in the CSFR and Poland provided for
domestic producers. Another explanation is related to the phenomenon that
can be called "the dominant effect."
Enterprises clearly sense if after a long period of strong protection they
are being forced to face competition. However, for enterprises in Eastern Eu-
rope the hardships of import competition were hardly noticeable compared
to the impact of other more dominant shocks. In this respect one has to
refer to the collapse of trade with the economies of the CMEA, the effects
of restrictive policies resulting in, inter alia, the decline of domestic demand
and in the difficulties in obtaining credits for financing everyday operation,
the hardships of adjustment to liberalized prices, and the threat of privatiza-
tion to the old management of the enterprises. Under the conditions of these
shocks, the challenge of import competition was comparatively negligible for
the enterprises, at least at the outset of trade liberalization.
Responses to the detrimental effects of trade liberalization became laud-
able usually one year after the liberalization started. One complaint was
concerned with the rapid penetration of cheap Western imports into the do-
mestic markets, the danger of crowding out indigenous producers from their
traditional markets.
Unfortunately problems of collecting the necessary statistical data for
trade and production do not make it easy to check the validity of these
complaints. Still, a calculation was made for Hungary to analyze the shifts in
the sources of domestic supply in 1988-1990, and through this one can follow
the pattern of import penetration in the first two years of liberalization.7
Table 5.2 shows the results of this calculation for the sectors that showed
the most rapid pace of import penetration.
7 Unfortunately, because of the changes in the accounting of foreign trade flows in
Hungarian statistics in 1991, the calculations could not be carried out for 1991 and 1992.
Calculations on penetration are usually rudimentary means of analysis because they are
subject to strong and sometimes unrealistic assumptions. Therefore, the reader should
consider these results with caution.
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Table 5.2. Sources of domestic supply in Hungary for selected product
groups from 1988 to 1990, in percent.
1988 1989 1990
Telecommunication and vacuum engineering
Imports from CMEA (former CMEA) 16.89 13.11 6.84
Imports from market economies 17.45 26.61 36.45
Domestic production 65.65 60.28 56.71
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Electric engineering machinery
Imports from CMEA (former CMEA) 9.12 8.27 7.10
Imports from market economies 12.28 18.44 20.65
Domestic production 78.59 73.29 72.25
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Fine ceramics production
Imports from CMEA (former CMEA) 9.83 6.23 4.62
Imports from market economies 12.85 30.43 22.99
Domestic production 77.32 63.34 72.39
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Hosiery
Imports from CMEA (former CMEA) 14.59 13.49 10.84
Imports from market economies 23.01 33.60 48.98
Domestic production 62.40 52.91 40.18
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Footwear production
Imports from CMEA (former CMEA) 7.61 12.32 8.30
Imports from market economies 19.48 53.64 44.82
Domestic production 72.91 34.05 46.87
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources: KOPINT-DATORG data base; Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv (Statistical Year-
book of Hun~a.ry), Central Statistical Office, Budapest, various issues; Kulkereskede1mi
Statisztikai Evkonyv (Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade), Central Statistical Office,
Budapest, various issues.
The first conclusion one can draw from the table is that Western imports
have penetrated the market; they have replaced not only domestic produc-
tion, but also former CMEA imports. Another interesting finding is that, of
the five product groups listed in Table 5.2, hosiery and footwear products
had the fastest penetration; these imports were hardly liberalized between
1989 and 1990. In fact, the faster inflow of certain goods was not necessarily
the consequence of liberalization (or geographical reorientation). As one can
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see in Table 5.1, in both the CSFR and Poland the sharp increase in the
share of consumer goods imports started one year before trade liberalization
commenced.
None ofthe above-mentioned remarks are intended to belittle the impor-
tance of penetration of imports in Hungary or in Eastern Europe. In fact,
domestic production could have been further reduced in 1991 and 1992, since
the level of protection of the domestic market and the ability of many enter-
prises to face the challenge of imports must have diminished over the course
of this time.8 It is also fully understandable that for industries that have
suffered a 30 to 60 percent decline of output in the past four years - and this
is the case with almost all the industries in the three countries - a further
loss of even a small part of the domestic market is increasingly painful.
The Lack of Strong Pressure Groups
According to the literature of comparative trade liberalization in developing
economies, the success and sustainability of liberalization are usually jeopar-
dized the most by pressure groups. Organizations of employers or employees
try to block the evolution of the process of liberalization when they feel they
will lose much from dismantling old trade barriers. Many successful episodes
of liberalization benefited from the fact that a major move to liberalization
was carried out in a period when the respective pressure groups were emas-
culated and old connections of lobbying and rent-seeking groups were cut.
The successful moves toward liberalization in Korea in the mid-1960s, in
Indonesia after 1965, in Chile after 1973, and in Turkey after 1980 were con-
nected with this kind of political shift. In all these cases, however, the shift
could clearly be identified with a turn to an authoritarian, mostly dictatorial
political system, following the events of terror.
In contrast to the political shifts in these countries, the systemic changes
in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland between 1989 and 1990 involved dis-
mantling the authoritarian regimes, embarkation on the road to democracy,
carried out in a peaceful way. As evidence of the acceptance of the ensuing
economic hardships in these societies, the usual pressure groups resisting
economic reforms were either nonexistent or virtually ineffective.
In these centrally planned economies the functions of the employer were
distributed among the party, the state, the managers, and different - mostly
puppet - organizations of the employees. After the changes in 1989, the
8This is, in fact, testified by KOPINT-DATORG (1993, pp. 113 and 117).
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party-state did not exist and the behavior of the state (including the branch
ministries) was dominated by pro-liberalization policies of the government.
Earlier managers had traditionally derived their power from their close rela-
tion to the communist party. With the disappearance of this situation, most
managers felt themselves discredited and, for the sake of their survival in
their old positions, they did not make any noise, even when the interest of
their enterprises was seriously endangered. Old trade unions were also dis-
credited, and the new ones were either supporters of the new governments
(like the Solidarity in Poland in 1990) or were too new to act effectively.
The Emergence of Resistance
The first reaction to liberalization of trade was unanimous satisfaction both
in businesses and in the civil society. The universal welcome of consumers to
the long-awaited inflow of import products and the disappearance of chronic
shortages also determined the general positive mood of the society toward
trade liberalization.
The enterprises awaking the earliest were newly established joint ven-
tures. Investing with concrete business targets, more skilled in lobbying, and
possessing the means for blackmailing domestic authorities, they were fast,
aggressive, and efficient. Many foreign investors targeted their sales neither
to Western markets nor to Eastern countries, but to capture domestic de-
mand. They also wanted to make use of the monopolistic structures inherited
from the period of central planning. For instance, the Hungarian industries
that were most quickly and completely privatized (and almost exclusively
by foreign investors) were the sugar, distilled spirits, tobacco, brewing, and
paper and pulp industries; none of them being especially export oriented.
Apart from foreign investors, the most responsive to the risks of liber-
alization were producers of farm products. Losing many kinds of subsidies
and still facing high protection policies in Western countries, they were not
enthusiastic about trade liberalization, even if a substantial part of the items
still under import control were food and agricultural products. In September
1991 farmers in the CSFR agreed with their government to put some cru-
cial agricultural and food products under quantitative control again. Polish
farmers pushed their government to achieve a faster liberalization in order
for their produce to penetrate the EC and other Western markets, and, at
the same time, they pleaded for extra duties on "well advertised, attractively
packaged products" pouring into Poland (Marsh, 1992).
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The voices concerning the willingness of governments to assist domestic
producers by locking out competition of foreign imports come from very dif-
ferent levels of the administration. It is never clear whether alleged support
against imports is taken seriously or is simply used to pacify producers and
employees endangered by the decline of domestic production.
President Walesa continuously attacks Western firms that, instead of
investing into Poland, take advantage of the low custom duties and flood
his country with cheap mass-produced merchandise.9 The state secretary
of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance asserts that more emphasis should be
put on the protection of domestic market and calls upon Hungarian con-
sumers to consume primarily Hungarian goods rather than purchase foreign
products. lO The Hungarian state secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture
has initiated the elaboration of a law that would protect Hungarian agricul-
ture against cheap liberalized imports, even if the whole idea is contrary to
the stand of the rivaling Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. ll
These actions are not easy to evaluate. One could cite as many state-
ments in praise of the process of liberalization as warnings against hasty
interventions. Also pro-protectionist statements may serve as substitutes
for protectionist actions. While a general turn against trade liberalization
cannot yet be seen in the three countries, there are numerous signs of a
recent reconsideration of the virtues of record-fast liberalization.
New quotas
In the case of simple, homogeneous products, and where visible demon-
stration of the arresting of inflow of imports is needed, the reintroduction
of quotas is the most popular method. Endangered Hungarian coal miners
successfully pressed their government to introduce an annual quota of 14 mil-
lion metric tons of domestic coal that should be purchased by the national
electricity trust for use in the power stations. Imported coal that is usually
cheaper and of better quality can be purchased only after the Hungarian
quota is exhausted. We have seen above that the CSFR government used
quotas to limit the imports of some important agricultural products. The
Association of Hungarian Light Industry urged the Hungarian government
to introduce new quotas for the protection of domestic textile and clothing
g"Cautious investors in Poland," Napi (Daily) 23 April 1992.
10"Buy Hungarian!" Napi (Daily) 19 October 1992.
11 "The law for protection against agrarian imports is in preparation," Napi (Daily) 15
May 1992.
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markets from imports. As a result, the number of quotas used in textile and
clothing increased from three to six. In many cases the reference of proposals
for quotas is either Southeast Asia or the EC, where many quotas are still
in use in respect to sensitive industries.12
A special feature of new protectionism in Eastern Europe is that many of
the protectionist barriers are erected against the allegedly damaging trade
flows coming from former allies in ex-CMEA. Transition is simultaneous
in these countries, although not completely similar. Soon after the bold
measures of trade liberalization were put into force, accusations of market
disruption and dumping were made in the Eastern European countries. A
telling example was Hungary's move in which beginning in March 1992 an-
nual quotas were introduced for the importation of 15 different steel products
from the CSFR and the successor states of the USSR. The process was ini-
tiated in early 1991, not long after the main reforms were introduced in the
CSFR and much before the reforms were introduced in the successor states
of the USSR. Protective measures were made at the request of the employers'
association of the Hungarian iron and steel industry, which substantiated its
request by referring to the sustained subsidization of the price of energy (one
of the basic inputs of metallurgy) in the countries concerned and the fast
growth of metallurgical imports in HungaryP
A similar process was initiated by the association of the Hungarian ce-
ment producers' association which resulted in a 9 percent supplementary
tariff on cement imports from the same countries.
According to market disruption processes initiated in Western Europe
at the same time, not only Hungarian producers were sensitive to Eastern
European steel and cement exports. Following the cry of alarm from French,
Italian, and other Western steel producers EUROFER (the European steel
producers' association) initiated antidumping penalties and quotas against
CSFR steel exports to Western Europe.14 Similar complaints of Austrian
12For example, "The wreck-lobby won of," Napi (Daily) 11 February 1992.
13 "Import quotas for 15 steel products," Napi (Daily) 3 March 1992; and
Kiilkereskedelmi Tajekoztat6 (Bulletin of Foreign Trade) 7 April 1992. In Hungary the
import of metallurgical products was liberalized in 1990. Domestic demand for metallur-
gical products declined by 12 percent in that year; imports, however, surged by 12 percent.
As a consequence, penetration of the imports increased from previous year's 25 percent to
32 percent. See Ar-piac (Price-market), Hungarian Ministry of Finance, December 1991.
HThe complaint followed a 126 percent rise in CSFR steel exports to Western Europe
in the first four months of 1992 ("Slovak steel-makers find success has a price," Financial
Times, 16 June 1992).
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cement producers prompted the Austrian government to introduce quotas
for CSFR cement imports in August 1991.
The behavior of foreign investors
Eastern European governments and businessmen are docile students of the
market economy. When setting up market institutions, wording new legis-
lation, and elaborating government policies, they tend to believe textbooks,
foreign advisers, and respectable international organizations. It did not take
much time, though, for them to become disillusioned, if not with the idea
of free market, then with their "professors." One lesson they learned fast is
that the rapid opening of their markets is not followed by a comparable pace
of getting access to Western markets, which are really crucial from the point
of view of their exports (Kupka et at., 1992). Another bitter experience is
connected with the behavior of Western investors. These businessmen, after
setting up their business (mostly joint venture) or having taken over some
existing state enterprise in the course of privatization, immediately forgot
the sermon they had preached about the virtues of free trade and the evils of
government intervention. They soon became stronger and more innovative
lobbyists of trade protection than experienced managers of the old regime
could have ever become.
It is clear that their sensitivity to fluctuations to expected profitability
is high (orin other words, their budget constraint is harder than the aver-
age domestic business). After all this is why experts of trade liberalization
could not imagine a successful liberalization in Eastern Europe without a
fast process of privatization (Havrylyshyn and Tarr, 1991). Western busi-
nessmen, however, are also extremely experienced in presenting their case,
and in finding ways to blackmail host governments. Each Eastern Euro-
pean country has stories of aggressive or invisible interventions by Western
investors trying to erect specific trade barriers for their own purpose.
The Korean Samsung company, even before signing the contract for its
joint venture in Hungary for manufacturing television sets, started lobbying
for higher tariff barriers for color TVs (from 15 percent to 25 percent tariff
rate) and zero tariff rate for components of color TV sets. The Hungarian
authorities were very flexible, and tariffs on components were cut back to 5
percent. After several months, Samsung started its fight again for zero tariff
on components, and now for a 30 percent tariff on the import of the final
product. The Korean businessmen even organized all the other Hungarian
producers of TV sets to lobby jointly and to threaten the authorities with the
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closing of TV manufacturing plants in Hungary unless the demanded changes
were implemented. The authorities first granted specific tariff exemptions
on components to Samsung, then, after some negotiations, tariff rates on
TV sets were raised to 25 percent. A few days after this tariff increase was
accepted by GATT, a domestic price rise of domestically manufactured TV
sets was announced (Borszeki, 1991).
Another example is the current case of an Austrian businessman who
has invested about US$lO million in three Hungarian enterprises producing
paper sheets for printing and copying. In 1992, two years after his initial
investment, he started to complain about the anomalies of paper tariffs: for
the importation of the raw materials for paper production one has to pay
tariffs of 5 to 10 percent, while the import of processed paper products enjoys
a 0 percent tariff rate. In addition, raw materials for paper products have
to be imported because they are not available in Hungary. After realizing
his failure with tardy Hungarian authorities to achieve an adjustment in
tariffs, the businessman turned extremely aggressive. He started to give
critical interviews in international newspapers on the worsening Hungarian
business environment and irresponsible government policies. He explicitly
dissuaded foreign investors from starting businesses in Hungary. He also
threatened to close down his Hungarian factories, unless his demand for tariff
adjustments or introduction of quotas for processed paper products were
seriously considered. Hungarian authorities were reluctant to change tariffs,
but at last they offered a market disruption case. It had some ground, since
the import of processed paper products (with 0 percent tariff) increased 2- to
4-fold in 1992. In November 1992 the respective ministry introduced annual
quotas for imports of five groups of processed papers from all countries except
Finland and the EC. This decision does not seem to have been satisfactory
for the businessman; since the introduction of the new quotas (in fact, most
of additional imports come from Finland), he has closed down one of his
paper factories. IS
Of all the foreign investors in Eastern Europe, carmakers are the most
aggressive ones in pushing host governments to introduce or reintroduce
protective measures. Table 5.3 gives an overview of some recent results
of car lobbyists in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland. One reason for their
15prinzhorn, "Hungary was the No.1 favorite," Napi (Daily), 28 September and 22
October 1992; HVG (World Economy Weekly) 7 November 1992.
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Table 5.3. Major car lobbyists in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland.
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Country
CSFR
Hungary
Poland
Company
Volkswagen-Skoda
Suzuki, GM-Opel
GM-FSO, FIAT-FSM
Volkswagen-Tarpan
Results achieved
Increased import duty on imported cars.
Slashed turnover taxes on cars manufactured
domestically.
For passenger cars an annual import quota
introduced to replace licensing. Licensed
imports slashed from 200,000 to 140,000 in
1992. Restrictions most effective for
commercial importers of used cars. Stricter
restrictions planned for used cars in 1993.
The quota of 30,000 duty-free cars and 100
trucks to be imported a year allotted to the
new joint ventures (normal duty is 35
percent). Tariffs and turnover taxes for cars
increased several times in the course of the
last three years.
Source: Various newspaper reports.
strength is the sheer magnitude of their investments and the promises they
make for further investments.16
Active tariff policy: The new tool
As referred to in a previous section, the three countries did not start their
trade liberalization with a conscious adjustment of their tariff rates.
For most governments it took some time to realize that, after the dis-
appearance of central planning and their formal and informal opportunities
for assigning quantitative restrictions, they were left with only a few tools
to control the inflow of imports - tools that had been sporadically used by
them in the past. Tariffs had been used earlier more as a means to centralize
revenue for the budget and to achieve tariff concessions from trade partners,
than as a way to protect the domestic market or some domestic industry.
At the outset of their transition most of the European centrally planned
economies considered it better if their tariff level and structure were closer
to the standard accepted by international organizations (GATT, EC), and
16The investments are usually in the order of hundreds of millions or billions of US
dollars.
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did not intend to use it as a tool of protection or some kind of an industrial
policy.
In the CSFR a new tariff bill and a new tariff table were introduced in
February 1991, but the new tariff could not be considered a protective one,
since its average 4.7 percent rate was extremely low, comparable with that
of most developed economies only. As a complement the CSFR government
temporarily introduced a special import surcharge of 20 percent for virtually
all goods excluding raw materials (Charap et al., 1992). The level of the
surcharge was in fact slashed five times in 1991 to the level of 10 percent
for legal persons and 15 percent for natural ones. Also the coverage of the
surcharge was reduced.
Realizing the importance of tariffs as a protective tool, the CSFR gov-
ernment prepared a major modification in the structure of tariffs for 1992.
The changes covered 23 percent of all tariff items and involved both a per-
spective restructuring (like establishing a vertical progression of tariffs) and
obvious protective intents (like higher protection for food, agriculture and
sensitive products, textiles and clothing, electric equipments, and machin-
ery). While the average tariff rate did not increase by more than 1 percent,
if calculated on more recent structure of trade (and not for 1988), tariff pro-
tection was much higher than that. I7 GATT was notified that most of the
tariff increases would only be temporary.I8
The pre-reform average tariff rate in Hungary was 16 percent, and the 1
percent cut in the year 1989 had nothing to do with the adjustment to the
liberalization measures. I9 Currently a new customs law is being prepared
with the aim of replacing the obsolete one. This is why the Hungarian au-
thorities did not make any serious conceptual modifications in the system
of tariffs in recent years. The pressure of domestic enterprises (and some-
times of the organizations and/or ministries representing them) has built
up since the start of trade liberalization. They have aimed for corrections
of unreasonable relative tariff rates and for apparent protection of domestic
production. These moves for increasing tariff protection did not result in
17This note, however, implies that numbers for the CSFR average tariff protection are
most probably weighted averages, while those usua.lly quoted for Hungary are unweighted
ones. The weighted average for Hungary for 1992 should be about 6 percent. See "The
system of market cannot be disrupted in a one-sided way," Napi (Daily) 13 February 1992.
18«New tariff rates in Czechoslovakia," Napi (Daily) 29 January 1992; and personal
communication with Vit Barta.
19It was a cut accomplished in compliance with a schedule Hungary had to keep accord-
ing to agreements based on the Tokyo Round.
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a substantial increase of the average rate of protection, but have achieved
some increase in the tariff protection of specific products like color TV sets,
passenger cars, lysine, and aniline oil (Borszeki, 1991).
In fact, domestic producers did not intend to increase tariff rates on
competing imports only, but many times they demanded tariff reductions
on their own inputs. The reasons for this were that comparative tariff rates
of their inputs in other countries were allegedly much lower or simply that
actual hardships in their activity should have been compensated by cheaper
imported inputs. Examples of this kind of tariff reductions are raw materials
used for the production of artificial fibers, tinned steel plate, and components
of TV sets and of passenger cars.
Since the actual Hungarian tariff code is very much outdated, one can-
not exclude the possibility that many applications for tariff modifications
were justified. What is important here is that in recent years producers in
Hungary and in the other two countries have habitually prepared a case for
tariff modification for their own benefit and have applied and lobbied for
it with increasing strength. In many cases the sentiments of the public are
also put into motion to protect viable industries, technological cultures, and,
what is most important, domestic employment.
In Poland the average tariff rate was 12 percent when the main reforms
were introduced. Contrary to expectations, after the first months of trade
liberalization the Polish government started to cut back or suspend many of
its tariff rates. The intention was to correct the combined excessive effect of
a radically devalued currency and other instruments (a 20 percent turnover
tax and a 10 percent import deposit). The amendments introduced in the
first six months of 1990 covered about half of all tariff positions. These
suspensions of tariff rates were carried into the first half of 1991. As an
outcome of the reduction of tariff rates, imports to Poland had a 10.9 percent
average tariff in the first half of 1990, an 8.1 percent average tariff in the
third quarter, and a 5.2 percent average tariff in the fourth quarter (Foreign
Trade Research Institute, 1991).
With the gradual appreciation of the zloty in 1990 and in 1991, the ne-
cessity to raise the level of existing tariff protection emerged as an imminent
task for Polish policy makers. In 1991 the Polish government issued 15 reg-
ulations concerning changes in tariff rates or customs duties. An important
additional tool in the hands of the authorities was the turnover tax that was
collected at the border beginning on 2 March 1991. Total protection rate in
Poland (including tariffs and turnover taxes) in the period between January
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and April 1991 was 19 percent as opposed to 7.7 percent in the same period
in 1990 (Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1992). In many cases additional
protection was achieved by altering turnover taxes (characteristic examples
are imported cars and consumer electronics) (Rosati, 1991).
The importance attached to tariffs as a tool of trade policy and a more
systematic move to tariff protection in Poland became manifested by the
amendments to the customs law introduced in mid-1991. These amend-
ments included, among others, clauses to protect the domestic market from
importation of goods posing a threat to the economic interests of domes-
tic manufacturers. As a consequence of the introduction of new tariff rates
and the reduction of earlier suspensions, average tariff rates in Poland were
raised to 13.6 percent in 1991 from the average rate of 8.6 percent in 1990.
The continuing pressure from domestic producers to raise tariffs for pro-
tective purposes was reflected by the fact that at the beginning of 1992 the
Polish government decided to raise the tariff of a series of important manu-
factures again; examples include personal computers (from 5 percent to 20
percent), televisions and audio and video equipment (from 20 percent to 30
percent), and motor vehicles (including passenger cars, trucks, and buses
from 10 percent to 35 percent ).20 Additional protection was provided for
domestically produced passenger cars in the course of turnover tax mod-
ifications in May 1992. The changes implied that the sale of any car over
the value of 120 million zlotys (approximately US$8,300) would be penalized
with a 50 percent turnover tax.21
One could not close a survey of renewed Polish efforts for using tariffs
better than by referring to a recent move of the Polish parliament to tem-
porarily introduce a 6 percent import surcharge on all imports. While the
initiators of the proposal intended to provide relief for the national budget,
experts of the Polish economy tend to think that this measure was equally
supported by those who were dissatisfied by the "too weak" protection of
domestic producers in Poland.22
20 According to the plans, the tariff rates on motor vehicles will be reduced to 0 percent
in the course of the next 10 years. See "Higher tariff also in Poland," Napi (Daily) 10
February 1992.
21 "Warsaw: Tax increase for traders only?" Napi (Daily), 4 May 1992.
22 And the process continues in other areas. In a similar vein as in Poland, the newly
established Slovak Republic introduced an across-the-board 20 percent tariff surcharge on
imports in early 1993.
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The need for more intricate methods of protection
In the absence of the opportunity to use the traditional means of protec-
tion, more and more emphasis is being given to the more sophisticated
kinds of protection. These are usually applied after the goods have crossed
the border. Some call them procedural or administrative protection, others
prefer to speak about the third and fourth line of protection of industries
(Torok, 1992).
The most customary of these methods are antidumping and market dis-
ruption procedures. Each country has set up its own agency to deal with
well-prepared complaints of domestic enterprises against the flow of foreign
goods that cause damage to domestic firms. Governments encourage domes-
tic enterprises to start such procedures, rather than to lobby authorities for
traditional measures of protection, like quotas and higher tariffs. To launch
procedures like these, however, special expertise, requiring much prepara-
tion, is needed, and the process is time consuming. In addition, proving
the damage is extremely difficult. The complaint of Hungarian metallurgi-
cal firms that imports from the CSFR and the former USSR are too cheap
(referred to above) resulted in a decision after more than a year. In Poland,
in 1991 only two such cases were initiated (one against butter and vegetable
oils imports, the other against beef imports from EC economies). Both cases
were discontinued because of the difficulties in proving the damage to Polish
producers (Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1992). Polish and Hungarian
analysts alike refer to the lack of experience in preparing and carrying out
such procedures in Eastern European countries.
Other kinds of procedural protection recommended as new measures of
protection are the enforcement of special quality requirements and health
and environmental standards. In Hungary this idea was supported by both
scholars (Torok, 1992) and responsible officials of the administration.23
Summary and Conclusions
Trade liberalization in Eastern Europe has been accomplished with record
speed in comparative perspective; this is true even in Hungary, which applied
23 "Quotas based on quality in the imports? - The market should not be broken," Napi
(Daily), 20 February 1992.
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a more gradual approach. Liberalization offoreign trade has been an integral
part of the comprehensive reform packages: the targets of rapid marketiza-
tion, stabilization, and structural adjustment could not be consistently pur-
sued without the bold steps to open the closed economies of Eastern Europe.
It has been justifiably accepted that benefits of trade liberalization will be
greater in European transition economies than in other countries around the
world (c.f. Havrylyshyn and Tarr, 1991).
The usual stumbling blocks of social resistance to liberalize trade were
absent in Eastern Europe partly because of the legacy of the shortage econ-
omy, and partly due to the complete disorganization of traditional pressure
groups of earlier political and economic structures. While the reorganization
of new interest groups has not been prevented by authoritarian forces, it has
proceeded at a relatively slow speed.
In the first month and even in the first year of change, the impact of
liberalization was either contained or was dominated by its advantages. Tar-
geted temporary brakes and restrictive macroeconomic policies prevented
an expected attack on imports and were successful in moderating abrupt
oscillations of trade flows. The impact of trade liberalization was also over-
shadowed by the effect of a multitude of other shocks, like the collapse of
trade with the economies of CMEA, the decline of domestic demand, the
difficulties of financing current operations, and the economic and personal
uncertainties related to privatization.
Recent experiences indicate that the honeymoon of trade liberalization
is over. It has become apparent that liberalizations were not well prepared.
The lack of tariff adjustments to compensate for the abandonment of quan-
titative restrictions turned out to be not a virtue but a deficiency. Currently
each country is attempting to fill in the gaps of a system that lacks moderate
and reasonable tariff protection. The international conditions, however, are
less favorable for this task today than they were several years ago. The com-
mitments of Eastern European countries to GATT and to the EC are more
binding than before, and Western countries are more sensitive to changes in
the level of protection in Eastern European economies.
Another deficiency of liberalization policies is that exchange rate man-
agement was not planned for the medium and long term. Too little atten-
tion was paid to the role the exchange rate can play in cushioning domestic
producers in an intermediate period of restructuring. The protection of
domestic markets has become more pronounced recently as crucial CMEA
markets disappeared and the enterprises lost most of their strength in the
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transition shocks. With their domestic currency continuously appreciating
(in real terms), enterprises are unable to achieve adequate profitability in
their exports to Western markets and, as a consequence, they lose prospects
in each of their three markets (ex-CMEA, domestic, and Western).
None of the three governments embarked on trade liberalization with a
well-elaborated industrial policy. It is peculiar, however, that after years of
experience, governments still do not dare (or are unable) to draw up even
the outline of an industrial policy. Their activity in this respect is limited to
easing the most acute tensions. They either temporarily rescue the largest
enterprises from going under (the recent "industrial policy" of Hungary) or
help to defer the unraveling of the collapse of a large number of business (for
example, the decisions of the former CSFR government to postpone, in fact
several times, putting into force the adopted bankruptcy regulations).
Public disappointment with unfavorable effects of trade liberalization is
slowly, but continuously growing. The fractional account about the resis-
tance to current forms of trade regulations given in this chapter has not
brought extremely bad news. Attempts at modifying the existing rules for
the protection or benefit of particular groups are normal events in a civil
society. The interest groups involved are so far not very strong (excluding
the largest foreign investors), and governments in the three countries are
committed to supporting free trade. However, the number of signs of resis-
tance is growing; populist and protectionist slogans may be welcomed by a
broader group of the disappointed population. And governments in Eastern
Europe are becoming vulnerable too. It seems better to reconsider the struc-
ture of policies related to trade liberalization now, and make the necessary
corrections to achieve an endurable pace of restructuring, than to face the
threat of major reversals in the process of liberalization later.
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Comments on Janos Gacs's Paper
Giovanni Graziani
Giovanni Graziani
The paper addresses a very interesting topic and highlights often neglected prob-
lems. The author does not deal with the much-debated question of the proper
sequencing of reforms and the correct place of it in trade liberalization. He seems
to imply that trade openness is a good thing and outward-oriented policies are in
the long run positively connected with growth.
The objective of the investigation is the process of trade liberalization per se,
its main features, and its effects on the domestic economy of the CSFR, Hungary,
and Poland. This last undertaking is particularly difficult, given the limited time
span since the inception of the process.
The gist of the argument is the following. The liberalization process was un-
dertaken at a much speedier pace in these countries than in many less developed
countries (LDCs). In the first year, positive effects seemed to prevail, although im-
port penetration caused a certain displacement of domestic production. Since then
a growing disappointment has started to set in, causing inter alia new requests from
domestic and foreign investors alike for protection. According to Gacs, the whole
process was not well planned. There was first a lack of tariff adjustment to com-
pensate for the abandonment of quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, exchange
rate management was planned only for the short term, not cushioning the effects
of the real. appreciation of the currencies in the ensuing period. Finally none of the
governments embarked with a well-elaborated industrial policy. Let me take briefly
each point in turn, before evaluating his conclusions.
As for the impact of trade liberalization and import penetration on domestic
production, it is certainly very hard to calculate exactly these effects, especially in
periods when other factors like restrictive policies and the collapse of the CMEA
market are at work. The author presents in Table 5.2 some calculations on the shifts
between the sources of domestic supply of five Hungarian industrial sectors which
showed the most rapid pace of import penetration. The results are contradictory.
In the first year (1989) the share of domestic production actually decreases together
with the share of imports from the former CMEA (with the exception of footwear
in the latter case). This does not happen for three of the sectors in the second
year (1990), but there is a generalized contraction of imports from former CMEA
countries. The evidence seems then to go beyond the author's own conclusions.
Import penetration from the West appears to have crowded out imports from the
former CMEA more than domestic production. Coupled with other available evi-
dence from the other two countries, one could conclude that trade liberalization and
import competition were only a concurrent cause, and probably not the main one,
in the drop of domestic production and its crowding out. One could also suppose
that the fall of production in the net importing sectors was compensated by the
expansion of the net exporting sectors. Paradoxically, however, import penetration
might become a more important factor in displacing industrial subsectors, now that
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some of the shocks at work, like the collapse of the CMEA, have elapsed and the
fall of GDP seems to have halted.
As for the lack of tariff adjustment, there is a point here. But there is even
more to it. Not only were the levels of tariffs right after the liberalization not
exceedingly high, taking into account the extremely fast process of dismantling
quantitative restrictions, but also there existed an inequality of protection between
the three countries and their main partner, the EC. Weighted average tariffs in 1991
were actually higher in the EC, in the case of both the CSFR (6.8 percent compared
with 4.7 percent) and Hungary (7.3 percent compared with 6 percent). Only Poland
presented an average tariff rate well above the EC one (13.6 percent compared with
6.3 percent). But even this gap is more than compensated by the huge weight of
nontariff measures (NTM) characterizing the EC at that time, especially in the most
sensitive sectors. Let us just recall that the share of imports into the EC covered
by NTM was 39.7 percent from Hungary, 32.5 percent from the CSFR, and 26.6
percent from Poland.
This missed opportunity for using import liberalization as grounds for renego-
tiating tariffs with trade partners, coupled with insufficient exchange rate manage--
ment in the light of the real appreciation of the currencies, is largely responsible,
according to the author, for the r.esurgence of activity of pressure groups demanding
increasing protection. Here many interesting examples are provided, coming from
both domestic and foreign producers operating in loco.
Some final words on the question of industrial policy, the lack of which, accord-
ing to the author, would also be responsible for the ill-preparedness of the trade
liberalization path. We all know that the phrase "industrial policy" has many mean-
ings, so the concept might become rather elusive. In the case of the transitional
economies, we are not talking very seemingly of picking up the strategic industries,
even admitting that this were possible. What is at stake is probably trying to save
those sectors which, for various reasons, are unprofitable at world prices, but still
produce a positive value added, while letting go bankrupt those that present a neg-
ative value added. One should, however, remember that even the picking-up of the
viable industries presents the well-known problems of arbitrariness, political inter-
vention, lobbyism, and the like. The only thing one can safely say is that, were a
support scheme decided upon, this should be preferred to nontariff measures. Nat-
urally this kind of temporary protection would not be effective if there was not an
active policy in the field of education, R&D, infrastructure, and worker retraining.
But on the whole it remains true, as the author says, that the governments should
think about these issues in a clearer and more attentive way now, instead of run-
ning after the wishes of the different pressure groups' in a chaotic way which might
endanger the very process of liberalization.

Chapter 6
Changing Trade Patterns
and Industrial Policy:
The Case of Poland
Dariusz K. Rosati*
Introduction
Transformation and reforms in East European countries in transition (CIT)
have brought about profound changes in the trade and industrial struc-
tures of these economies. Trade with traditional partners within the CMEA
grouping declined sharply, while trade with developed market economies ex-
panded. Many industrial sectors and branches, specializing for decades in
exports to the former Soviet Union and other socialist countries, have seen
their traditional markets shrinking rapidly. At the same time, reorientation
of trade toward the West appears to be more difficult and more painful than
initially expected. In this context, the governments in transition countries
have been faced by important policy dilemmas concerning ways and means
of intervention in the process of structural change, in order to minimize costs
of adjustment.
*The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments received on earlier drafts from Janos
Gacs, Miroslav HrncH, and Mario Nuti.
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This paper discusses four broad groups of issues. Firstly, it looks into
the changes in the trade pattern of Poland and presents early results of trade
and industrial restructuring over the period from 1989 to 1991. Secondly, it
discusses the limitations of liberal trade regimes in countries in transition.
Thirdly, the paper draws lessons from the Polish experience in rapid trade
liberalization. In the last section it offers some general observations on the
optimal pattern of trade policies in the transition from central planning to
a market system.
Change in the Trade Pattern
Internal and external shocks
European economies in transition have remained in deep recession since 1990,
with output levels falling steeply and unemployment levels rising. The re-
cession is generally considered to be an outcome of a confluence of many
external and internal factors, with stabilization programs, systemic reforms,
and various, mostly unfavorable international developments being responsi-
ble for most of the fall.
Economic reform programs undertaken in CIT in 1990 and 1991 included
two broad initiatives. First, and typically, a stabilization package was intro-
duced at the outset of the reform, aimed at stopping inflation and restoring
macroeconomic equilibrium, chiefly through drastic cuts in budget expendi-
tures, monetary and credit restraint, incomes controls, and devaluation of the
domestic currency. This was accompanied by institutional reforms, aimed at
replacing the central planning system by a market system, through sweep-
ing price and foreign trade liberalization, large-scale privatization, and the
revamping of legal frameworks for economic activities. Both initiatives had
strong contractionary effects, because they sharply reduced real incomes and
expenditures and changed domestic price structures, thus rendering many
economic activities unviable.
Among the external factors, the demise of CMEA trade and payments
arrangements and the collapse of the Soviet economy are commonly cited as
most important. The negative impact of the collapse of the CMEA foreign
trade of East European countries was certainly not unexpected, although
the magnitude of such a fall in trade had not been foreseen. It was widely
assumed that the change of the trade system would immediately result in
a sharp increase of the relative prices of commodities, such as energy, fuels,
and raw materials, and a sharp decline of trade in industrial goods within the
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CMEA. The Soviet Union, as the only large net exporter of commodities in
the region, was supposed to be the main gainer (and perhaps the only one),
while other countries were expected to incur large trade deficits vis-a.-vis the
Soviet Union. Of course, the economic rationale for the reform was that, in
the long run, all countries involved were to gain from a better allocation of
resources and mutually beneficial trade based on principles of comparative
advantage. In the short run, however, substantial transition costs were ex-
pected, raising serious concern about the ability of East European economies
to adjust to the new external environment.
The fall of Eastern trade resulting from the demise of the CMEA worked
through three main mechanisms. First, the deterioration of East European
terms-of-trade led to a decline of imports from the Soviet Union. Second,
the shift to convertible currencies and elimination of ruble-clearing reduced
sharply trade possibilities because of the acute shortage of convertible cur-
rencies in the region. Third, decentralization and liberalization of foreign
trade regimes opened much wider possibilities for trade diversion from East
to West.
But apparently even more important than the demise of the CMEA
have been the consequences of the economic and political disintegration of
the Soviet Union. The Soviet economy has been deteriorating for several
years, and the recession was accelerated by the precipitate dismantling of
central controls which were not replaced by any efficient market mechanism.
Inconsistent and hesitant reforms were unable to stop inflation and alleviate
massive shortages. The shift to convertible currency settlements in trade
with former CMEA members came at the time when Soviet foreign balance
worsened substantially, and the access of Soviet enterprises to hard currencies
became more and more difficult. Limited payments possibilities, a chaotic
system of foreign exchange allocation, falling output, and the opening up
of new trade opportunities with the West all produced a sharp decline of
imports from East European countries.
Because of numerous statistical and data problems, Eastern trade devel-
opments have always been a slippery area for trade analysts. The year 1992
was no exception in this respect: even though the elimination of the trans-
ferable ruble from mutual trade settlements and the shift to world market
prices in 1991 liquidated the most pervasive distortions which were charac-
teristic for previous periods, new problems have emerged, connected mainly
to the formation of new states and with changes in systems of statistical
reporting in transition countries. As a result, trade statistics for 1991 and
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1992 are incomplete and difficult to interpret. 1 Nevertheless, the massive
fall of trade appears unquestionable, and may range from 50 to 60 percent
in volume terms over 1991 and 1992 (UN ECE, 1992).
Structural change: Statistical evidence
Policy-induced and exogenous shocks experienced by CIT between 1990 and
1992 have had a strong impact, not only on the aggregate trade levels, but
also on the territorial and commodity composition of trade flows. Gener-
ally, domestic recession reduced import demand and contributed to export
expansion, as domestic producers sought new outlets abroad. Sharp devalu-
ations of domestic currencies against convertible currencies provided strong
incentives for increasing export sales to Western markets. The demise of
CMEA arrangements eliminated preferences for Eastern trade, and worked
as a customs union mechanism arebours, producing trade contraction within
the region and trade diversion to the outside world. The collapse of Soviet
markets further exacerbated the need for East European firms to restruc-
ture trade toward the West. In sum, one would expect a sharp fall of trade
among CIT, an expansion of trade with market economies, and an important
change in the commodity composition of trade.
Data on the territorial structure of Polish trade generally confirm this
observation. A pronounced shift in the territorial structure of Polish man-
ufactured trade in favor of Western countries has been documented. 2 The
share of OECD countries in Polish manufactured exports increased from 42.4
percent in 1988 to 73.9 percent in 1991, while the share of CMEA countries
diminished from 41.1 percent to 16.7 percent, respectively. The shift in the
territorial structure of manufactured imports was equally substantial: the
OEeD share in Polish imports rose from 50.5 percent in 1988 to 78.9 percent
in 1991, and the CMEA share declined from 35.6 percent to 10.8 percent.
1 Problems with aggregation of ruble- and dollar-trade flows plagued statistical anal-
ysis of intra-CMEA trade in 1991. In 1992, many countries stopped publishing data on
the territorial structure of trade, being unable, apparently, to cover appropriately trade
transactions carried out by the rapidly growing private sector. The introduction of SAD
(single administrative document) as the only source of statistical information on trade
has come only with great difficulties, and many errors in reporting have been signaled by
statistical services in the countries concerned (Poland, Czechoslovakia). More important,
the shifts in statistical reporting rules have inevitably reduced the comparability of 1992
figures with data from previous periods, while endless revisions and corrections made by
statistical services in transition countries in the course of 1991 and 1992 suggest that the
possibility of errors remains imminent.
2The following discussion concentrates on Polish trade in manufactures.
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Also, the share of the rest of world (ROW) diminished from 16.4 percent
to 9.5 percent in exports and from 13.9 percent to 10.3 percent in imports
between 1988 and 1991. The dominating position in Polish trade has now
been assumed by the EC countries, with their share in Polish exports having
increased from 28.1 percent to 55.2 percent, and in Polish imports from 32.7
percent to 57.9 percent between 1988 and 1991.
The pattern of change is, however, less clear in the case of commodity
structure. Data on the evolution of industrial structure of the Polish econ-
omy during the transition from central planning to a market system reveal
that a major structural adjustment has been under way. Changes in sectoral
shares of output and employment have been assessed at NACE 2-digit ag-
gregation level (21 sectors of manufacturing industry). (NACE is the system
of statistical classification of economic activities in the European Commu-
nity.) The main "losers" were electro-engineering, textile, clothing, leather,
and footwear industries (NACE groups 31-37,43-45), while the "winners"
included such sectors as metal-processing, food-processing, wood, and paper
industries (NACE groups 41/42, 21, 24-25). Generally, the shift away from
heavy and engineering industries to industries based on natural resources
could be observed.
The evolution of the industrial structure has largely been reflected by
the corresponding changes in the structure of trade with CMEA countries.
As shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, engineering products, which had accounted
for more than half of Polish exports to CMEA countries, were particularly
affected: the share of mechanical engineering (NACE 32) declined from 31.1
percent to 18.4 percent, the share of electrical engineering (NACE 34) de-
clined from 12.9 percent to 8.3 percent, the share of office machines and
data processing (NACE 33) declined from 6 percent to 3.6 percent, and that
of instrument engineering (NACE 37) declined from 4.1 percent to 1.7 per-
cent. Very similar was the pattern of change in manufactured imports: the
combined share of NACE groups 32-37 dropped from 58.5 percent to 42.5
percent, and if transport means are excluded (NACE 35), the fall was even
more dramatic (from 50 percent to 29.5 percent).
Among the sectors which significantly increased their shares in exports
to CMEA were mostly chemical industries (NACE 25, from 10 percent to
20.9 percent) and food processing (NACE 41/42, from 2.6 percent to 8.6
percent); but in absolute terms exports from these sectors also declined,
although at a slower pace than exports of electro-engineering products.
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Table 6.3. Poland: correlation coefficients between the industrial structure
and the export structure.
Exports to CMEA Exports to OECD
1988 1991 1988 1991
Output shares in 1988 0.2486 0.9014
Output shares in 1991 0.3608 0.7948
Source: Own calculation, based on data from the Central Statistical Office of Poland.
By contrast, the changes in the commodity structure of trade with the
OECD have largely been uncorrelated with the evolution of Polish industrial
structure. As can be seen from Table 6.3, the commodity composition of ex-
ports to the CMEA changed in the same direction as the output structure
(correlation coefficient between the two structures increased between 1988
and 1991), but the commodity composition of exports to the OECD seems
to have moved in the opposite direction (correlation coefficient declined).
An interesting observation which can be derived from Table 6.3 is that the
OECD export structure was much more similar to the Polish industrial out-
put structure than the CMEA export structure. This may suggest that
exports to the CMEA were coming primarily from a few specialized sectors
rather than from the economy as a whole, and that large areas of the Polish
industry were integrated with CMEA markets only to a small degree.
It is interesting to see how the trade pattern with OECD countries has
changed in recent years. A closer look at the statistics reveals that while
Polish export expansion was indeed remarkable, the growth was essentially
of an across-the-board character, with all industrial sectors increasing their
sales to the West at broadly similar rates. In fact, the commodity structure
of Polish exports to OECD countries changed only marginally during the pe-
riod from 1988 to 1991. Regression of trade structures for 1988 and 1991 for
particular trading areas revealed a much higher stability of OECD-oriented
exports than CMEA-oriented exports (see Table 6.4). As in the past, the
highest shares were taken by metal products, processed food, various chem-
icals, and timber and wood products, followed by textiles, clothing, and
footwear. This observation is interesting and somewhat puzzling, because
it suggests that neither the economic reforms nor external shocks have ex-
erted any significant impact on the commodity composition of Polish exports
to OECD countries. One possible explanation may be that trade with the
West, being based on competitive market rules, always reflected the "true"
comparative advantage of the Polish economy. At the same time, it may
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Table 6.4. Poland: correlation coefficients between the commodity struc-
tures of Polish exports in 1988 and in 1991, by trading areas.
Trading area
OECD, 1988/1991
EC, 1988/1991
CMEA, 1988/1991
USSR, 1988/1991
ROW, 1988/1991
Source: Own calculation.
Correlation coefficient
0.9510
0.9643
0.7831
0.7847
0.6880
also indicate that no significant trade diversion from the East to the West
has taken place so far.
The pattern of specialization in trade between Poland and GECD coun-
tries has been examined with the use of trade coverage ratios, defined as the
proportion of the country's imports of a given sector covered by the coun-
try's exports of the same sector (that is, the ratio of exports to imports).
Sectors with the highest trade coverage ratios are assumed to be the areas
of the country's revealed comparative advantage. The results of this exercise
are shown in Table 6.5.
In exports to CMEA markets, Poland's specialization has remained
strong in footwear and clothing, leather goods, and some branches of en-
gineering (electrical and office machinery, ships, and instruments), while it
has been further strengthened in mineral products. The pattern of special-
ization in trade with the GECD countries is clearly different; in fact, the two
patterns do not display any similarity (the correlation coefficients between
the two vectors of trade coverage ratios for 19B8 and 1991 are -0.0426 and
0.0836, respectively). Wide differences in coverage ratios for trade with the
CMEA and the GECD suggest that there have been significant departures
from Poland's pattern of comparative advantage in trade with CMEA, and
cases of wrong specialization may have been common.
In trade with GECD countries, Poland tends to specialize in two broad
categories of products: natural resource-based products, such as metals,
wood products, minerals, building materials, foodstuffs, and coke, on the
one hand, and low-technology manufactures, such as clothing, footwear,
and leather products, on the other. Both categories have some common
characteristics: their output is relatively unprocessed, they rely on tradi-
tional technologies, demand for their output is relatively income-inelastic,
and they face strong competition from developing countries. As a result, the
manufacture value-added potential of these sectors is limited. An important
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Table 6.5. Poland: trade coverage ratios, in trade with CMEA and OECD
countries, by industrial sectors, 1988 and 1991 (NACE-2 classification).
NACE-2
sector
21 Metalliferous ores
22 Production and processing of metals
23 Minerals (except fuel and metals)
24 Manufacture of nonmetallic minerals
25 Chemical industry
26 Synthetic fibers
31 Manufacture of metal articles
32 Mechanical engineering
33 Office machinery, data processing
34 Electrical engineering
35 Motor vehicles and parts
36 Other means of transport
37 Instrument engineering
41/42 Food, drinks, and tobacco
43 Textile industry
44 Leather and leather products
45 Footwear and clothing
46 Timber and wood
47 Paper products
48 Rubber and plastics
49 Other manufactures
CMEA
1988
0.05
0.75
2.82
0.68
1.58
0.25
0.84
1.33
2.78
2.10
0.62
1.44
1.38
0.96
0.69
2.44
13.22
0.97
0.22
0.47
0.92
1991
0.42
1.70
4.94
2.16
2.37
0.24
0.45
1.50
5.24
2.14
0.35
2.44
1.85
0.98
0.72
5.98
3.74
0.87
0.30
0.60
2.61
OECD
1988
1.39
2.08
2.70
3.19
0.42
0.16
1.60
0.16
0.07
0.62
1.25
1.94
0.15
1.41
1.07
27.18
2.42
137.73
0.37
0.31
0.49
1991
0.74
6.03
3.82
1.99
0.66
0.40
1.09
0.19
0.02
0.30
0.11
2.14
0.31
0.94
0.95
2.87
1.19
10.08
0.31
0.26
0.13
Source: Own calculations, based on data of the Central Statistical Office of Poland.
implication of this characteristic is that, ceteris paribus, growth based on
such an economic structure may be expected to be slower than in 0 ECD
countries. Moreover, the evolution of this pattern of exports may also be of
some concern, if one takes into account the gradual decline of exports of such
higher-technology goods as precision instruments, office and data-processing
machinery, transport vehicles, and electrical machinery.
Reorientation of trade from CMEA to OECD
Expanding shares oftrade with OECD countries and declining shares oftrade
with former CMEA countries would suggest that a strong trade diversion is
taking place. If this is the case, it could be assumed that the production and
skill potential accumulated in traditional CMEA-oriented sectors (mostly
electro-engineering) will not simply be lost, but rather will be adapted to new
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markets. Unfortunately, the available statistical evidence does not support
this hypothesis.
Empirical analysis of trade reorientation is an inherently difficult task,
not only because of aggregation problems, but also because a method must
be found to eliminate the "leakages" of exportables into the domestic market.
Dne possible approach is to apply the so-called similarity coefficients, defined
as the difference between unity and the sum of squared differences between
sectoral export shares on two export markets.3 The numerical values of trade
similarity coefficients are given in Table 6.6.
The results show a moderate increase of similarity between trade struc-
tures with the CMEA and the DECD countries between 1988 and 1991,
and a small decline of similarity between CMEA countries and the rest of
the world. However, the changes are small and the structural convergence
seems to be very limited. Moreover, it should be noted that trade similarity
coefficients are only indicators of structural convergence, not of the actual
diversion of trade. Even if in most cases the two phenomena are linked
together, there may be exceptions (if trade diversion takes place in sectors
with a low relative share in exports, the similarity coefficient would decline,
thus failing to reflect the actual diversion).
For this reason yet another measure of structural similarity has been
used. It could be assumed that if export diversion takes place, the share
in DECD-oriented exports of those sectors which dominated the commodity
structure of CMEA exports in the past should subsequently increase. A
correlation has been calculated between the vector of ratios of sectoral shares
of exports to CMEA and DECD in 1988 and the vector of ratios of sectoral
shares of exports to DEeD countries in 1991 and 1988.4
3 Analytically, the trade similarity index (TS) can be expressed as follows:
TS = 1 - L:;[e(i, k) - e(i, 1)]2
where e( i, k) and e( i, I) are shares of sector i in total exports to markets k and I, re-
spectively. The index takes values between -1 and 1, negative values only for extremely
disparate structures.
4 Analytically, the correlation between the following series has been computed:
where e[i(C), .], e[i(O),.] stand for export shares of sector i in total exports to the CMEA
and the OECD, respectively, for a given year.
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Table 6.6. Trade similarity coefficients for sectoral composition of exports,
by main trading areas, in 1988 and 1991.
Relationship 1988
CMEA and OECD 0.8425
CMEA and EC 0.8256
CMEA and ROW 0.9783
Source: Own calculations.
1991
0.9038
0.8979
0.9553
However, no correlation has been found (correlation coefficient of 0.0016)
between the two vectors, which may indicate that there is no "rapproche-
ment" of trade structures of exports to CMEA countries in 1988 and to
OECD countries in 1991. The results confirm that trade reorientation from
CMEA countries to OECD countries has been weak, if at all.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of structural
change. First, the change in industrial structure displays strong similarities
with changes in the trade structure with CMEA countries. Second, the
emerging comparative advantage of Poland seems to be located in the areas
of traditional industries and natural-resource-based industries. Third, higher
technology sectors, geared mostly to CMEA markets in the past, diminish
their exports, both because of the collapse of Eastern markets and because of
the lack of reorientation to Western markets. This pattern of "spontaneous"
structural change may be the result, to a large extent, of the absence of
stronger industrial and trade policies in the transition. This outcome does
not have to be considered optimal, if the market mechanism is distorted or
inefficient or externalities involved in vanishing sectors are large compared
with costs of restructuring. If this is true, then there is a case for more active
government policies.
Liberal Trade Policy and Its Limitations
The "New Liberal Orthodoxy" and its roots
A radical liberalization policy course adopted in Poland, as well as in some
other CIT, is a direct outcome of an important evolution in mainstream
economic thinking observed over the past 10 to 15 years. A new free market
orthodoxy emerged in the early 1980s, resulting from dissatisfaction and
critique of traditional economic policies, that for several decades were based
on fundamental Keynesian ideas.
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On the theoretical front, the new orthodoxy was buttressed by the revival
of monetarism, the theory of rational expectations and profit-maximizing
agents, and, above all, by the theory of the second-best and the theory of
domestic distortions. The last theory provided strong arguments against
clumsy interventionism of politically motivated governments and for liberal
economic policies.
The new ideas were quickly absorbed by international financial institu-
tions (which also actively contributed to the new intellectual trend). The in-
volvement of the IMF and the World Bank in supporting economic stabiliza-
tion and guiding reform programs in developing countries in the 1980s was
based essentially on three main pillars: macroeconomic discipline, microeco-
nomic deregulation and liberalization, and outward orientation. When asked
for assistance to combat internal and external imbalances, the IMF invariably
suggested drastic cuts in government spending in order to achieve fiscal and
monetary balance, extensive price decontrol, devaluation of domestic curren-
cies, and foreign trade liberalization (Williamson, 1992). These "orthodox"
programs were in some cases supplemented by less-orthodox measures, such
as wage controls or credit ceilings, if they were deemed to work in favor of
macroeconomic stabilization.
It is not the purpose of this paper to make a comprehensive evaluation
of the IMF-supported adjustment and stabilization programs. Suffice it to
say that they were based on a solid economic logic and, in principle, their
efficiency in bringing macroeconomic situations under control is undisputed.
But it should also be noted that they probably suffered from excessive "short-
termism" and from not paying enough attention to structural impediments
and sociopolitical conditions. Moreover, some crucial assumptions underly-
ing the standard model of financial programming are increasingly seen as
problematic (e.g., the constant velocity of money circulation or stable func-
tion of demand for money balances). This is probably why these programs,
although conceptually sound and internally consistent, were aborted or failed
in so many countries.
It was quite natural that essentially similar stabilization-cum-reform pro-
grams have been adopted in the CIT. Not only di.d the mainstream economic
policy thinking and the unquestionable reputation of the IMF play an im-
portant role, but the programs also fitted perfectly well into the social and
political reality of the East European countries. Disastrous experience with
central planning led to a generalized critique and wholesale rejection of gov-
ernment involvement in the economy, while high welfare levels achieved in
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developed Western economies provided a persuasive demonstration of the
efficiency of the market mechanism. Finally, there was not so much choice
after all: external financial assistance for CIT hinged on the adoption of the
IMF-supported reform programs by these countries.
Important qualifications
A liberal trade regime is not an aim in itself, but rather is considered an
important tool used to promote economic development. But should it be
taken for granted that trade liberalization is always and everywhere a good
thing? There seems to be a consensus among experts in economics that
higher and more equitable economic growth tends to be associated with a
higher growth of exports, and that more outward-oriented trade policy gives
better trade performance in terms of export expansion and external balance
(see, e.g., Krueger, 1978; and Edwards, 1989). There is also wide agreement
that transparent measures are generally more effective than administrative,
discretionary policies. But there are continuous controversies about whether
the neutrality of incentives should be achieved through import liberalization,
Le., reduction of protection measures, or be done instead via compensatory
export-promotion measures (Havrylyshyn and Tarr, 1991). Similarly, the
issues of the optimum sequencing of trade liberalization are not entirely
clear. While it is relatively simple to establish theoretical links between
liberal trade regimes and improved economic performance, it is more difficult
to support these links with consistent empirical evidence that demonstrates
beyond a doubt the causal relationship existing between trade liberalization
and economic growth.5
While the benefits of free trade have strong theoretical underpinnings,
empirical evidence is less sanguine. Extensive studies, made mainly under
the aegis of the World Bank, confirm many of the theoretical conclusions; and
yet, many countries which started liberal reforms, failed to improve economic
performance and eventually retreated from the reform track (Balassa, 1971;
Krueger, 1978; Papageorgiou et al., 1990). This may suggest that while
trade liberalization as a general policy orientation is most probably a good
thing, the ways and means of its implementation are not as universal as
5It should be noted, however, that a vast body of empirical literature supports the view
of the existence of a close causal relationship between trade liberalization and the rate of
economic development. But these conclusions are typically drawn on the basis of large
samples of liberalization episodes observed in various countries during various periods and
have a stochastic rather than a deterministic character.
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many believe, and should differ according to specific conditions in individual
countries.
The recognition of the significance of different local conditions means,
however, that the theoretical validity of the obtained conclusions may also
be limited. It is not the logic of the free-trade argument which comes into
question, but rather the standard assumptions underlying the theoretical
analysis of gains from trade, and especially the general equilibrium model,
which has been the main driving force behind normative thinking in the area
of economic policy. Three assumptions seem to be of special importance in
this regard, because they are very unlikely to be fulfilled in the context of
the economies of the CIT. First, the assumption of competitive markets with
profit-maximizing agents and perfect information is clearly much further
from reality in CIT than in Western countries. Second, externalities are
significant, and should not be ignored. Third, the income distribution aspect
is an important self-imposed constraint on the speed and scope of reforms
in CIT.
Perhaps the most important assumption is the competitive markets pos-
tulate. How does it affect the analysis of trade liberalization effects? Take
the simplest case of the removal of a tariff. The ensuing price effect reduces
profitability of import-substitution activities and drives out the least effi-
cient producers. Released resources are assumed to shift to export sectors,
where profitability increases. This is simply a structural adjustment, evoked
by a combination of demand and supply factors.
But for this adjustment to take place, several things have to happen.
First, output has to decrease and unemployment must increase in import-
substitution sectors. This should be accompanied by a fall of real factor
incomes in these sectors, which would induce factor owners to move to other
sectors. But the redeployment can be done, in principle, only through new
investment, which may be quite substantial if the reallocation is on a massive
scale. For the new investment to materialize, capital resources have to be
transferred because self-financing would be insufficient. For the capital to
be transferred, not only future prospects of profits have to be attractive
enough, Le., the net present value of new projects must be substantially
positive after allowing for the risk factor, but also reasonably efficient capital
markets have to be in operation. In the meantime, the work force would have
to be reallocated, which would require a reasonably flexible labor market.
Moreover, unemployment effects have to be contained through an efficient
social safety net. In short, for the adjustment mechanism to work efficiently
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three things are needed: time, money, and market institutions. But none of
them are in sufficient supply in CIT.
Specific conditions in the CIT
The scope of the transformation in Eastern Europe obviously goes above and
beyond any reform attempts in the postwar world history. Latin American
experience, so influential in shaping the new liberal orthodoxy, has been
limited mostly to macroeconomic stabilization, market deregulation, and
reduction of the public sector. Similarly, the celebrated German reform
of the late 1940s consisted essentially of removing widespread distortions
from the economy, but its institutional dimension was relatively limited.
Nevertheless, it took years for these changes to yield expected results.
Emerging from the socialist era, CIT differed from other reforming non-
socialist economies in many important respects. They differed even more
from developed market economies. Their most fundamental differences con-
cerned structural and institutional characteristics.
Unlike in the Western countries, the private sector in the CIT was almost
nonexistent. The share of the private sector in GDP in the mid-1980s varied
from some 20 percent in Poland (where the bulk of it was in agriculture)
to less than 3 percent in the USSR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, and its
share in industrial output was generally even lower. The domination of state
firms in industry resulted in a distorted structure of incentives and, subse-
quently, in a distorted and perverse pattern of responding to market signals
and macroeconomic policy measures. Specifically, state firms' behavior has
not been of a profit-maximizing character, but rather has been driven by
employment and wage considerations. Under such conditions, adjustment is
sluggish and not necessarily economically efficient.
Industrial structure in CIT was geared for many years to the needs of
the huge and uncompetitive Soviet market. It was also shaped by specific
priorities in economic policy, concentrated in military and heavy industry
sectors. At the same time, the service sector in CIT was weak and under-
developed. The key implication of this structural bias is that the scope of
required reallocation of physical and human resources is much larger than
in other reforming countries. This means that for the necessary adjustment
to take place in CIT more funds and more time are needed.
The well-known feature of Soviet-type economies is their high degree of
monopolization - a direct consequence of central planning. The response of
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monopolistic firms to market signals is typically perverse, and possibilities
of breaking up the monopolies and establishing competitive markets from
"within" are limited in the short run.
Finally, marketing and management skills, necessary to operate in a
market environment, are in short supply in the former centrally planned
economies; while they can eventually be acquired either through imports of
managers and/or foreign firms or by a "learning-by-doing" process, neither
can be done overnight. Coincidentally, once the economy opens up to inter-
national markets, a large part of the human capital accumulated in industrial
sectors becomes obsolete and needs to be retrained.
Institutional differences are no less important. Price structures in cen-
trally planned economies, being a result of widespread price controls and
continuous isolation from international markets, displayed many distortions
and differed considerably from relative prices prevailing in market economies.
The relative price shock, resulting from general price liberalization and re-
alignment, drastically changes patterns of profitability in the economy. A
legal framework for market mechanism is only in statu nascendi in such es-
sential areas as property rights, enforcement of private contracts, bankruptcy
laws, banking system, taxes, and customs control. Capital and labor mar-
kets are rudimentary and in most CIT have to be built from first principles.
This is a major impediment to resource mobility, which in turn is absolutely
necessary for structural adjustment. Important, too, are the different habits
and mentality of East European societies, which were, for decades, accus-
tomed to job security, egalitarian income structure, and generally slack work
discipline. The transformations, however, require exactly the opposite: jobs
may be lost, large income and wealth inequalities are inevitable, work effort
and productivity will have to increase. To change this "socialist" (or Homo
sovieticus) mentality will take some time, and the process of acquiring new
ethical and work standards may cause continuous social unrest.
This sketchy review is not meant to give the full characteristics of the
"distorted world of Soviet-type economies" (as expressed by J. Winiecki); it
simply intends to recall that the real situation in CIT is quite different from
those in market economies. The necessary adjustments may be expected
to assume considerably larger proportions because the change in relative
prices is indeed dramatic, and the structural distortions inherited from the
communist past must be considered significant.
New investments on the scale required will be difficult to obtain, because
of limited amounts of capital in those countries. Restrictive macroeconomic
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policies followed in CIT in 1990 and 1991 reduced the levels of domestic de-
mand, thus diminishing prospects for future profits and business confidence.
They also made domestic credit relatively expensive and difficult to obtain.
Furthermore, capital markets are underdeveloped and an efficient mecha-
nism for transferring even the limited savings to the production sector has
not yet been developed. Most important, however, is the risk factor: not
only are the economic prospects of these countries uncertain, but the social
and political situations are becoming less and less stable.6
This is clearly a market failure case: under such conditions, necessary
capital transfers would simply not materialize. Not only will the time span
needed for the adjustment have to be extended, but the adjustment costs
will be much higher. Sectors, which could potentially be viable under ef-
ficient markets, will probably disappear altogether. A large proportion of
physical and human capital resources, which otherwise would be effectively
redeployed, will be irrevocably lost. The costs will be particularly substan-
tial in manufacturing (and especially high-technology) industries, where the
need for restructuring is greatest and where massive and prolonged unem-
ployment may lead to an irreparable loss of skills through the "hysteresis"
effect. These are important externalities, which so far tend to be disregarded
or belittled in the designing of economic policies in CIT.
Implications for trade policy
Limitations of the traditional model of gains from trade and the specific,
unfavorable conditions of CIT call for a more careful application of liberal
policies in Eastern Europe. While these observations do not generally ques-
tion the need for transparency and neutrality of trade policies, they suggest
that the opening of the economy should perhaps not be too abrupt, be-
cause adjustment possibilities in CIT are much more limited than in market
economies. If this is the case, then active trade policies should not be to-
tally forsaken, but rather should be applied - in a limited scope - to achieve
a strengthening of the market mechanism wherever it is too weak and to
correct it wherever it is significantly distorted.
6Social instability and fragility of political structures have been repeatedly demon-
strated in such countries as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia. In Czechoslovakia,
where the transformation had started in a climate of remarkable national unity, the split
into two separate states was la.rgely prompted by unexpectedly high costs of economic
reforms and the uneven distribution of these costs between the two republics. Even in
Hungary the political situation deteriorated in 1992.
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Of course, the possibility of government failure cannot be excluded ei-
ther. With still-distorted prices in the CIT it is difficult to determine a pri-
ori the areas of comparative advantage and to pick up "winners" in terms
of sectors, branches, or individual firms; besides, the danger of favoritism,
corruption, and rent seeking is still considerable in CIT. At the same time,
however, democratically appointed governments may be assumed to be less
prone to these dangers than were totalitarian governments. A suggested
solution would be to avoid a highly differentiated, made-to-measure pro-
tection structure, and to start rather with a uniform, moderate tariff on
manufactures, lower (or zero) tariff on production inputs, and perhaps no
quantitative restrictions. Ideally, this tariff structure should be accompa-
nied by uniform export subsidies; but government budget constraints may
make this option unfeasible. In any case, a competitive exchange rate and
a large scope of current account convertibility are necessary conditions for a
successful trade reform.
It is important to note that the conditions of CIT call for a "specific"
package of trade liberalization measures. While enormous price distortions,
monopolization, and market shortages provide clear arguments for an early
opening to international trade, especially to imports, other factors such as
the required scope of structural adjustments, low competitiveness, lack of
market institutions, and high uncertainty provide arguments for temporary
protection. It is, however, essential for the adjustment mechanism to be
set in motion as early and as efficiently as possible; hence, market signals
should be strong and undistorted from the very beginning of transforma-
tion. But unrustorted prices and competition cannot be established in-
ternally overnight, because of high monopolization, weakness of domestic
markets, and sluggish response of the state sector. The only possibility is,
therefore, to "import" correct relative prices and competition from abroad.
This requires the replacement of quotas and administrative restrictions by
tariff measures, because the tariffs do not blunt the spur of competition,
and the removal of the notorious import-substitution bias in the structure of
protection. This also means the elimination of most binding restrictions on
currency convertibility and the introduction of a transparent (Le., market-
based) system of foreign exchange allocation, coupled with a neutral (Le.,
neither undervalued nor overvalued) exchange rate.
By contrast, the opening of the economy - in terms of lowering import
tariffs and export subsidies - will probably take some time. Large initial
price differentials as compared with international markets and inherently
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slow adjustment responses in CIT call for a gradual removal of protection.
A too-abrupt opening would result in a deep contraction and large-scale
unemployment, and whole (potentially viable) industrial sectors would be
wiped out of the economy.
Of course, the level of initial protection should not be too high either.
After starting with broadly uniform (Le., limited to a few rates) tariffs, 7
the rates should gradually be scaled down within a predetermined schedule,
which extends over five to seven years.8 Together with the competitive
real exchange rate, this policy would provide incentives for export-oriented
restructuring, and help in avoiding unnecessary adjustment costs.9
Possible Lessons from the Polish Experience
The analysis of the trade liberalization episode in Poland in 1990 and 1991
offers some interesting insights into the risks and benefits connected with
radical liberalization. The evidence generally supports the view that trade
liberalization is a necessary and important step in reforming the economies
and has to be carried out at an early stage. However, it also highlights the
risks if the wrong sequence of liberalization is instituted. The main lessons
stemming from the Polish experience are summarized below.
First, contrary to earlier beliefs, the post-socialist economy displays a
considerable degree of elasticity with regard to initial export expansion, if
incentives are strong enough and the deregulation sufficiently large. The
40 percent growth of convertible currency exports in the year 1990 is a
remarkable achievement by any standard. The export expansion continued
in 1991, although its pace was much slower due to the collapse of CMEA
markets and the appreciation of the zloty. Nevertheless, exports to non-
CMEA markets increased in 1991 by 13 percent at current dollar prices,
broadly offsetting the 60 percent drop of CMEA exports (in volume terms).
Data for 1992 indicate that exports increased by 10 percent.
Second, the Polish experience demonstrates how rapidly a sustainable
equilibrium can be achieved in the foreign exchange market after currency
7 A specific system of agricultural protection would also probably be put in place, de-
pending on local conditions.
BIt is important to make this scheme credible and independent from the changing
political environment. Corden (1992) speaks in this context about a "hard tariff path."
9This general scheme would have to include some exceptions. For social reasons, some
special "protecting" measures cannot be avoided in case of some big enterprises which are
the only employers for certain cities or regions.
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convertibility is introduced, provided the initial devaluation margin is large
enough and the macroeconomic policy sufficiently restrictive. This is one of
the most spectacular results of the early liberalization stage. It also suggests
that the apparent "dollar shortage," so characteristic for a centrally planned
economy, may have been rooted in administrative restrictions and inflation-
ary financial policies, which could be removed fairly quickly, albeit at some
cost.
Generally, the foreign trade sector has been one of the brightest points
in the otherwise somber picture of the Polish economy, even though it suf-
fered heavily from the CMEA shock in 1991. Official international reserves
increased from US$2.0 billion at the end of 1989 to US$5.1 billion at the end
of June 1992.
Other lessons highlight errors and mistakes made during the initial stage
of liberalization. Therefore, the third lesson is that it is tempting to "over-
shoot" the initial devaluation, if trade liberalization is introduced as part of
a broader stabilization-cum-reform program. The pervasive "shortage syn-
drome" inherited from the central planning era led policy makers to believe
that only a very sharp devaluation could be effective in dampening the ap-
parently unsaturated demand for foreign currencies. However, as soon as
monetary and fiscal restrictions are introduced in the form of a compre-
hensive and credible package, the inflationary expectations subdue and the
demand curve for foreign currency shifts downward. The real income effect
is thus further exacerbated by the portfolio (expectations) effect, and the
demand for convertible currencies falls faster than anticipated. To be sure,
some initial "overshooting" is probably necessary in order to achieve the re-
versal in expectations, and therefore the initial devaluation has to push up
the exchange rate over and above the level corresponding to the equilibrium
rate in a balanced economy. While it is difficult to determine the degree
required of the initial "overshooting," it seems that in the Polish case it
proved to be excessive.
Fourth, under the conditions of transition and price liberalization, the
"anchoring" of the nominal exchange rate may be a good anti-inflationary
measure only for a short period of time. Both the initial price liberalization
and the devaluation itself push up the general price level, and the result-
ing "corrective" inflation continues for some time. The initial depreciation
margin disappears quickly, and the domestic currency appreciates in real
terms. In Poland, the official exchange rate was kept constant from January
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1990 to May 1991, i.e., for more than 16 months, but consumer prices in-
creased over that period by 350 percent, i.e., the real zloty rate appreciated
more than four times. Moreover, when the exchange rate becomes clearly
overvalued, expectations of a new devaluation build up and economic pol-
icy loses its credibility. It is clear that maintaining the fixed rate for too
long had damaging effects on trade and output levels. In the end, inflation
cannot be controlled either, since unit costs of production tend to rise due
to lower capacity utilization, and expectations of future devaluation destroy
the confidence of business.
The Polish government devalued the zloty in May 1991 by 17 percent,
and pegged it to a basket of convertible currencies in an attempt to make
it less dependent on fluctuations of the dollar. Later, the crawling peg was
introduced. Once more a devaluation took place at the end of February, 1992
(for details see Chapter 2 by Jasinski). All these measures notwithstanding,
the real appreciation of the zloty continued, albeit at much slower pace.
Fifth, the Tinbergen principle in applying the most efficient economic
policy instruments to achieve specific policy goals should not be violated.
The exchange rate devaluation cannot bear the entire burden of adjustment
and competitiveness realignment. Not only would the required fall in real
wages be politically and socially unacceptable, but, in the case of indus-
tries yielding negative value added, devaluation cannot help. Thus, there is
a basis for transitory protection. Customs tariffs should be treated as an
instrument of structural policies and therefore should not be changed con-
stantly in pursuance of short-term policy goals, such as the current account
equilibrium, or budgetary equilibrium.
Sixth, the policy of trade liberalization should follow a clear course, and
erratic moves back and forth should be avoided. In Poland, the tariffs were
raised in January 1990, then they were partly reduced and partly suspended
as part of the government's efforts to stimulate economic recovery, and in
August 1991 they were raised again to levels generally much higher than
the initial rates. As a result, the Polish economy started with relatively
high protection, which quickly disappeared due to the real rate apprecia-
tion and various tariff reductions. Such sharp and erratic fluctuations of
nominal protection send misleading signals to economic agents and increase
uncertainty.
This leads us to the seventh lesson, and this is that political resistance
builds up quickly in the course of trade liberalization. Exposed to unre-
stricted foreign competition in late 1990 and in 1991, Polish industrial and
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agricultural lobbies put increasing pressure on the government to abandon
its liberal policy course and to restore some protection. They indeed man-
aged not only to reimpose high tariffs in August 1991, but also to obtain
additional protection in the form of minimum prices for selected agricultural
goods, additional tariffs and taxes for some industrial goods (cars, electron-
ics), and new import licenses (alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and
fuels ).
Finally, trade liberalization should not put too much competitive pres-
sure on too many. If, under a given exchange rate and tariff levels, one-third
of domestic industry operates at a loss and structural adjustment is hin-
dered by tight monetary policy and underdeveloped capital markets, social
and political problems, which inevitably emerge, may put the whole reform
process in jeopardy. Thus, if a massive structural adjustment is necessary,
the better policy would be to impose temporary protection, gradually scaled
down within the preannounced credible program.
The Optimum Pattern of Trade Policy
in Transition Economies
The preceding section should have made clear that, while trade liberalization
is both necessary and beneficial, it should be designed with care and due
attention to possible negative side effects during the transitional period.
In particular, the specific initial conditions in CIT should be taken into
consideration in trying to secure an optimal path of trade liberalization.
In principle, there is no argument against transparency and neutrality of
trade policies. They can and should be established right from the beginning
of the reform process. Replacing the old, administrative trade regime by
a tariff-based, transparent regime results in immediate efficiency gains, and
does not have to be in any way destructive to domestic producers (within
a transparent system, policy makers may choose the desired level of protec-
tion). An essential component of the transparent trade system is currency
convertibility for current account transactions. Similarly, broad neutrality
can best be achieved by establishing a competitive exchange rate, supple-
mented, if necessary, by moderate tariffs and export incentives.
On the basis of a transparent system, the main trade policy instrument
to be used during transition would be a tariff. Quotas are acceptable, and
sometimes even necessary, only insofar as they reflect external obligations
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connected with trade restrictions imposed by other countries. For domestic
policy reasons, quotas are, in all cases, inferior to tariffs. lO
In the former Soviet Union, the case of energy exports has sometimes
been used as an argument for quantitative restriction on exports. But in
this case also, an export tax is preferable for a number of reasons.
While an opening toward international markets is an essential element
of the transformation, it does not mean that tariffs should necessarily be
eliminated or drastically reduced, as was the case in Poland in 1990. There
are important reasons for the tariffs to be maintained at "moderate" levels
(i.e., not lower than levels of protection, including nontariff barriers, which
prevail in industrialized countries) for at least several years. There are several
arguments in favor of such a tariff policy.
The most controversial position is the argument in favor of the need for
transitional protection. Because the production sector in CIT is inefficient
and structurally distorted, it cannot compete internationally, and thus has
to be protected for some time in order to allow for necessary adjustments
to take place. Once the restructuring is made and industries of the CIT
become competitive, the protection can be removed. This is the core of the
argument for transitional tariff protection.
This reasoning has been attacked on many grounds. One argument is
that the exchange rate policy can be used instead: in principle, if the ex-
change rate is sufficiently devalued, it can make most of the loss-making
industries efficient. But this may not be feasible. Not only would it lead to
an excessive reduction of real wages throughout the economy, but, because
of large disparities in the profitability of individual enterprises, the currency
would have to be depreciated to absurdly low levels. It should be remem-
bered that prior to price liberalization and reform, enterprises in CIT had
a fairly uniform profitability distribution; after the reform the distribution
became much more irregular and differentiated.
But the most important argument against using the exchange rate to
deal with structural deficiencies is the presence of "value-added subtractors."
Under new relative prices some activities may yield negative value added,
especially in energy-intensive sectors (McKinnon, 1991). In such situations,
devaluation alone clearly cannot help, and these activities would have to be
discontinued.
IOExcept for situations where a total ban on trade is desirable (e.g., drugs and nuclear
armaments).
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Another argument against temporary protection draws on the experi-
ences of developing countries. Protection offered to infant industries in those
countries very rarely resulted in an increase of international competitiveness
and did not lead to the eventual removal of protection. As a result, the "in-
fant industries" have never matured. It should be added that the ability of
the government to determine a priori potentially efficient sectors and firms
is widely disputed.
Actually, the case of CIT is not protection of "infant industries" but
rather protection of "senile industries" (Williamson, 1992). These industries
exist already, but they have to be restructured if they are to survive. They
cannot receive credits for restructuring because of the weakness of capital
markets, general lack of capital, and the high sociopolitical risks in CIT.
These industries may, however, offer important externalities, which should
be taken into consideration - especially in manufacturing. Therefore, the
best policy would be a direct subsidy to production. However, subsidies ~ay
be unfeasible for budgetary reasons; they also are prone to rent-seeking. A
second best solution would therefore be a transitional tariff protection.
Transitional tariff protection has disadvantages which are well known;
protection of one industry is always at the expense of the other industries.
Moreover, it introduces a significant price distortion. These costs should be
weighted against current and future benefits.
One has to be skeptical, however, about the possibility of establishing
sector-specific or even product-specific protection structures, with tariff rates
varying according to the value-added contents (this approach has been sug-
gested by McKinnon, 1991). First, under distorted prices and costs it is
difficult to determine a priori areas of compar,ative advantage and to pick
up "winners" in terms of sectors or branches. Second, a widespread tariff
differentiation opens up practically unlimited possibilities for rent-seeking.
This solution would also be administratively cumbersome and rigid. One is
thus left with a less ambitious but probably more realistic option of imposing
a uniform, moderate tariff on all manufacturing industries. Together with
the competitive real exchange rate and a minimum number of quantitative
restrictions, the system can provide strong incentives for export-oriented
restructuring and avoid unnecessary adjustment costs.
Trade taxes are used sometimes to deal with externalities in consump-
tion. But, as in the case of production, trade policy offers only a second best
solution to this problem. An excessive consumption of luxuries should be
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countered rather with sales or consumer taxes, which attack the distortion
at the source and do not affect relative prices for producersY
Trade taxes are also very important sources of government revenues.
This aspect should not be forgotten, because the fiscal systems in CIT are
generally obsolete and inefficient, and sooner or later result, typically, in
a fiscal crisis. Since the traditional tax base shrinks because of the pro-
longed recession and widespread tax evasions, alternative sources of budget
revenues have to be sought. Trade taxes are easier to collect and to enforce
than income-based taxes, and for this reason should not be abandoned. The-
oretically, a tax on imports is an equivalent of a tax on exports (Lerner's
symmetry theorem); but in practice, export taxes should be used only in
special situations (e.g., exports of underpriced energy and fuels) because
they have a strong disincentive effect.
By contrast, tariffs (and other trade policy measures) should not be used
in order to ensure a targeted balance of payments. The external equilibrium
is better assured with a competitive exchange rate and prudent financial poli-
cies. Tariffs should remain instruments of structural policies, independent
of current stabilization goals.
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Chapter 7
Life Without CMEA:
Foreign Trade in Eastern
and Central Europe
Sandor Richter
Introduction
Since the fall of the Soviet Union the answer to the question, "What comes
after the CMEA?" has become even more complicated than it was in June
1991 when the CMEA officially ceased to exist.1 An analysis of economic
relations within and between major post-CMEA blocs (such as Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, and Poland often called the Visegrad Group; the latecomers
Bulgaria and Romania; the three Baltic states; the CIS states excluding
Russia; the regions in Russia; the separate Czech and Slovak republics) is
far beyond the scope of this paper. Its purpose is, first, to investigate the
recent development of the mutual economic relations of the five Eastern Eu-
ropean economies (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Roma-
nia, referred to as the EE5), with a special emphasis on the Visegrad Group
lCMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as Comecon, the eco-
nomic organization of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union) was set up in
1949 to enhance the development of the member countries on a complementary basis. In
the 1960s and 1970s other centrally planned economies, like Mongolia, Cuba, and North
Vietnam, joined the organization.
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economies,2 and, second, to deal with the motives for and viable forms of
intra-regional economic cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe.
The dissolution of the CMEA in the summer of 1991 meant no less than
recognition of the failure of the basic principles of economic cooperation
among the centrally planned economies in the last four decades. The intro-
duction of hard currency payments and of prices following the actual trends
in the world economy in January 1991 broke the back of the traditional
system of economic cooperation in the region.
Over the last decades external economic relations of the former CMEA
members were characterized by a peculiar duality: the "rules of the game,"
relevant to the trade among CMEA countries differed from those for the rest
of the world (OECD and developing countries).
Trade among the CMEA countries had traditionally been based on four
pillars: bilateral clearing and its accounting unit, namely, the transferable
ruble; a peculiar price formation system; a determining role for govern-
ment institutions in all respects of trade; and, finally, decision-making based
on predominantly political rather than economic considerations (Racz and
Richter, 1989; Richter, 1989, p. 49).
In the trading with the West, these peculiar features of CMEA cooper-
ation were missing: contract prices followed actual tendencies on the world
market and payments were in convertible currencies. Government interven-
tion was of a different nature; all foreign trade deals with Western firms
needed the approval and license of the respective Ministry of Foreign Trade.
Conducting foreign trade was the privilege of a couple of specialized firms
and a limited number of major producers. The trading firms' activity was
delimited by the so-called "profile monopoly" which strictly prohibited com-
petition among participants in foreign trade by designating exclusive rights
to trade with certain groups of commodities to individual foreign trade or-
ganizations. Licensing was the main instrument for the control of imports
whose allowed level was determined by the current account situation and
other considerations.
For the five Eastern European economies (Bulgaria, the CSFR, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania) not only did the duality in the external economic
relations (CMEA versus rest of the world) cease to exist in 1991, but the
transition from the planned to the market economy necessitated a new setup
2This is because there is a relatively abundant amount of data on these three countries,
contrary to Bulgaria and Romania, and also because the Visegni.d Group economies have
already taken steps to set up intra-regional economic cooperation.
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in trade with the non-CMEA economies. More or less simultaneously with
the replacement of the peculiar conditions in trade with the CMEA partners,
trade with the rest of the world underwent fundamental changes. Participa-
tion in trading activities was completely liberalized, allowing market entry
for thousands of firms. Strict administrative control of imports was either
abolished or confined to a small segment of the foreign trade in the Visegra,d
Group countries and Bulgaria, and partially liberalized in Romania.
The homogenization of the main features of external economic relations
in a principally market compatible framework put mutual trade of the EE5
countries into a new context. Prior to 1991, mutual economic relations
of the EE5 countries was one of the two subsystems within the CMEA,
where the bilateral relations of individual EE5 countries with the Soviet
Union had always been more important than their bilateral relations with
one another. With the fall of the CMEA, intra-Eastern European economic
cooperation is no longer a subsystem of secondary importance within the
"quasi-preferential" CMEA system.
1991: The Beginning of a New Era
Before beginning any discussion on the future of the mutual trade of the five
Eastern European economies a review of the situation in 1991 and 1992 must
be undertaken. The first year after the homogenization of external economic
relations in the countries concerned has seen important new developments
in intra-regional trade.
Declining trade volumes
Although many associate the collapse of intra-CMEA and intra-Visegra,d
Group trade with the shift to a hard currency settlement of payments in
January 1991, the decline of intra-CMEA trade in fact began much earlier.
According to the data presented in Table 7.1, in the period between 1985 and
1990, i.e., in the last five years of the old system, the trade of the Visegrad
Group countries at constant prices with non-CMEA economies grew sub-
stantially faster than that with CMEA countries.3 With respect to exports,
the difference between trade with East and West was the biggest in Hungary,
where exports to the CMEA dropped by one-quarter, while deliveries to the
rest of the world rose by nearly one-third. The tendency was similar in the
3The respective data for Romania and Bulgaria are not available.
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Table 7.1. Development of trade with centrally planned economies and
market economies between 1985 and 1990 at constant prices, in percent,
1985 = 100.
Partner region
Exports in 1990 Imports in 1990
CSFR Hungary Poland CSFR Hungary Poland
Centrally planned
economies and countries
in transition
Market economies
81.6
116.0
75.1
130.8
105.5
151.0
87.2
110.9
72.0 a
132.1 b
aTrade in nonconvertible currencies.
bTrade in convertible currencies.
Sources: Jahrbuch des Auflenhandels der Tschechoslowakei, 1991; Kiilkereskedelemi
Statisztikai EVkonyv, 1990; Rocznyk Statystyczny, 1991; and Handel Zagraniczny, 1991.
CSFR while in Poland the volume of exports to both regions increased in the
period concerned, but to the rest of the world expansion was substantially
stronger (7 percent and 65 percent, respectively).
In the case of Hungary and Poland imports from the CMEA declined
while imports from the rest of the world expanded. In the case of the CSFR,
imports increased from both regions, but by strikingly different amounts
(from CMEA 6 percent, from rest of the world 51 percent).
Changing geographical distribution of trade
The relative significance, i.e., the share of trade of the Visegrad economies
with (former) CMEA partners in their total trade over the period from 1985
to 1991 is presented in Tables 7.2 to 7.4. In 1985, in a still "peaceful"
year in the CMEA, trade with the CMEA made up nearly two-thirds of the
CSFR's total trade, and nearly half of Poland's and Hungary's total trade.
Compared with Hungary and Poland, the CSFR's relatively more intensive
engagement in trade with the CMEA partners prevailed until after the shift
to a hard currency settlement. In 1991 the CSFR's trade with former CMEA
countries amounted to more than one-third of total trade, while in Poland
and Hungary this share was approximately one-fifth. For the CSFR the
relative significance of the former CMEA is close to twice as large as for
Poland and Hungary.
The share of intra-Visegrad Group trade in the total trade of each
Visegrad country was not especially high in 1985. It was less than 10 percent
in both exports and imports for Poland and Hungary, and 12 percent and 14
~ .., (l) ~. ::;3 II> Q... (l) -.
T
ab
le
7.
2.
C
SF
R
:
sh
ar
e
o
fi
nd
iv
id
ua
l
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
gr
ou
ps
o
fc
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
to
ta
l
tr
ad
e.
i:::l ~
So
vi
et
II> til
G
ro
up
B
b
.
.
.
.
To
ta
l
c
s
r
R
Po
la
nd
H
un
ga
ry
R
om
an
ia
B
ul
ga
ria
U
ni
on
G
ro
up
Aa
G
ro
up
C
C
(l) .., i:::l
E
xp
or
ts
~
19
85
10
0
7.7
4.7
2.0
3.0
43
.7
12
.4
17
.4
61
.1
Q.
..
19
89
10
0
8.5
4.0
1.8
2.3
30
.5
12
.5
16
.6
47
.1
g
19
90
10
0
6.2
4.1
1.2
1.4
25
.2
10
.3
12
.9
38
.1
i:::l ...
.
19
91
10
0
7.3
4.4
1.0
0.6
19
.4
11
.7
13
.3
32
.7
~ -
Im
po
rt
s
t't
j
19
85
10
0
8.0
5.8
2.1
3.2
46
.0
13
.8
19
.1
65
.1
l: ..,
19
89
10
0
8.6
4.8
1.7
2.2
29
.7
13
.4
17
.3
47
.0
~ (l)
19
90
10
0
8.6
3.4
0.7
1.2
21
.6
12
.0
13
.9
35
.5
19
91
10
0
4.9
1.9
0.3
0.5
31
.8
6.8
7.6
39
.4
a
C
ze
ch
os
lo
va
ki
a,
Po
la
nd
,
H
un
ga
ry
.
bG
ro
up
A
+
B
ul
ga
ri
a,
R
om
an
ia
.
c
G
ro
up
B
+
So
vi
et
U
ni
on
.
So
ur
ce
s:
la
hr
bu
ch
de
s
Au
fle
nh
an
de
ls
de
r
Ts
ch
ec
ho
sl
ow
ak
ei
,1
98
5-
19
90
;
a
n
d
St
at
is
ti
ck
lP
re
hl
ed
y
19
92
N
o.
9.
I-
'
00 -.
J
T
ab
le
1.
3.
H
un
ga
ry
:
sh
ar
e
o
fi
nd
iv
id
ua
l
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
gr
ou
ps
o
fc
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
to
ta
lt
ra
de
.
So
vi
et
To
ta
l
C
SF
R
Po
la
nd
H
un
ga
ry
R
om
an
ia
B
ul
ga
ria
U
ni
on
G
ro
up
AB
G
ro
up
B
b
G
ro
up
CC
E
xp
or
ts
19
85
10
0
5.7
3.8
1.7
1.4
33
.6
9.5
12
.6
46
.2
19
89
10
0
5.1
3.2
1.5
0.7
25
.1
8.3
10
.5
35
.6
19
90
10
0
4.1
1.7
1.8
0.3
20
.2
5.8
7.9
28
.1
19
91
10
0
2.1
2.0
1.3
0.9
13
.0
4.1
6.3
19
.3
Im
po
rt
s
19
85
10
0
5.0
4.7
1.8
1.5
30
.0
9.7
13
.0
43
.0
19
89
10
0
5.2
3.3
1.6
0.9
22
.1
8.5
11
.0
33
.1
19
90
10
0
4.7
2.4
0.9
0.8
19
.1
7.1
8.8
27
.9
19
91
10
0
4.1
1.9
0.6
1.7
14
.4
6.0
8.3
22
.7
a
C
ze
ch
os
lo
va
ki
a,
Po
la
nd
,
H
un
ga
ry
.
bG
ra
up
A
+
B
ul
ga
ri
a,
R
om
an
ia
.
c
G
ro
up
B
+
So
vi
et
U
n
ia
n.
So
ur
ce
s:
K
ul
ke
re
sk
ed
el
em
iS
ta
tis
zt
ik
ai
Ev
ko
ny
v,
19
85
-1
99
0;
a
n
d
St
at
is
zt
ik
ai
H
av
i
K
oz
le
m
en
ye
k
19
92
N
o.
1.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
00 00 Ci:
l
!;
l,
;::
l §- ..., ~ ~ ..... C'l> ...,
~ .., ttl ~. i::l t? ~ c.. ttl ....
T
ab
le
7.
4.
Po
la
nd
:
sh
ar
e
o
fi
nd
iv
id
ua
l
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
n
d
gr
ou
ps
o
fc
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
to
ta
l
tr
ad
e.
i::l tr:l
So
vi
et
g;
G
ro
up
B
b
.
,..
,.
To
ta
l
C
SF
R
Po
la
nd
H
un
ga
ry
R
om
an
ia
B
ul
ga
ria
U
ni
on
G
ro
up
A
a
G
ro
up
CC
ttl .., i::l
E
xp
or
ts
~
19
85
10
0
6.2
3.2
2.6
2.7
28
.4
9.4
14
.7
43
.1
i::l c.
.
19
89
10
0
5.5
1.6
1.1
1.6
20
.8
7.1
9.8
30
.6
g
19
90
10
0
3.9
0.9
0.9
0.7
14
.5
4.8
6.4
20
.9
i::l .,..
,.
19
91
10
0
4.6
0.7
0.3
0.2
11
.0
5.3
5.8
16
.8
.
.
, ~ -
Im
po
rt
s
tr:l
19
85
10
0
6.0
3.0
2.6
2.0
34
.4
9.0
13
.6
48
.0
-
=
.
.
,
19
89
10
0
5.7
1.6
1.0
1.3
18
.1
7.3
9.6
27
.7
.
g ttl
19
90
10
0
3.1
0.8
0.3
0.5
17
.0
3.9
4.7
21
.7
19
91
10
0
3.3
0.9
0.1
0.6
14
.1
4.2
4.9
19
.0
a
C
ze
ch
os
lo
va
ki
a,
Po
la
nd
,
H
un
ga
ry
.
bG
ro
up
A
+
B
ul
ga
ri
a,
R
om
an
ia
.
c
G
ro
up
B
+
So
vi
et
U
ni
on
.
So
ur
ce
s:
R
oc
zn
yk
St
at
ys
ty
cz
ny
H
an
dl
u
Za
gr
an
ic
zn
eg
o,
19
85
-1
99
0;
a
n
d
In
fo
rm
ac
je
St
at
ys
ty
cz
ne
-
H
an
de
lZ
ag
ra
ni
cn
y
19
92
N
o.
S.
,.
..
..
00 Cl:
J
190 Sandor Richter
percent, for exports and imports for the CSFR. By 1991 the share of intra-
Visegra,d Group trade was approximately half of the 1985 level for Hungary
and Poland in total trade and for the CSFR in imports; the respective share
in CSFR's exports remained nearly as high as the 1985 level.
In the case of Poland and Hungary the share of the Soviet Union shrank
by nearly the same rate as the share of the Visegnid Group partners. Thus
trade shares with the Soviet Union, in both exports and imports, were two
to three times higher than the Visegrad Group partners combined in 1985
and in 1991. In the case of Czechoslovak imports, the Soviet share was more
than three times higher in 1985 and more than four times higher in 1991 than
the share of the Visegrad Group partners. In exports this relation changed
significantly over time. Whereas in 1985 the ratio of exports to the Soviet
Union to exports to the Visegrad Group was approximately four to one, by
1991 it had dropped to less than two to one.
Where was the decline of trade stronger: with the Soviet Union or with
the EE5 (i.e., the Visegnid Group plus Bulgaria and Romania)? A compari-
son of respective shares in exports and imports demonstrates that in Poland
nearly two-thirds of the 1985 shares were lost by 1991 in both directions. In
Hungary the shrinkage of shares was stronger with the EE5 than with the
Soviet Union in both exports and imports. For the CSFR's exports two-
thirds of the Soviet share was lost, while only one-quarter of the EE5 share
was lost. In imports it was just the contrary: with the Soviet Union less
than one-third of the 1985 share vanished by 1991; in trade with the EE5,
nearly two-thirds.
Within the Visegrad Group, Hungary has been a relative outsider.
Poland's trade share with the CSFR was nearly twice as big as its share
with Hungary, in both 1985 and 1991. The same pattern held for the CSFR,
whose share was also approximately twice as big with Poland than with
Hungary. For Hungary in 1985 the CSFR was a somewhat more important
trading partner than Poland. In 1991 this was still true for exports while in
imports the relative significance of trade with the CSFR was twice as high
as that with Poland.
The rearrangement of the geographical composition of foreign trade had
peculiar features in Bulgaria and Romania. Data for Bulgaria show that
in both, exports and imports, the Soviet Union preserved its dominating
position with close to half of the turnover, and this share is not much lower
than in 1985 and 1990. The share of the EE5 dropped from the 12 percent
level in 1985-1990 in both, exports and imports, to less than half by 1991.
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The trade share of the EE5 also decreased by half in Romania, amounting
to 6 percent to 7 percent of total trade in 1991. The drop of the Soviet
share, however, was much less dramatic in Romania than in the Visegrad
Group countries. True, the Soviet share was traditionally lower in Romania's
foreign trade than in that of the Visegrad Group countries.
Soviet statistics
Reviewing the rearrangement of the Soviet foreign trade from 1985 to 1991
(Table 7.5) we can see that the share of the EE5 economies in 1991 dropped
nearly to the half of the 1990 indicator in both exports and imports. In
imports this applies more or less to each EE5 economy except for Romania
where the shrinkage of the trade share was less strong, nevertheless it was
the lowest in trade with the EE5 countries. Concerning Romania the same
applies to the exports. The drop in trade shares of Soviet exports to other
EE5 countries was the smallest with the CSFR and the largest with Bulgaria.
Changing trade structure
Data on the change of commodity patterns following the shift to a hard cur-
rency settlement of payments are available only for the CSFR and Hungary.4
In Hungary's exports all "hard goods" to the CSFR increased, especially food
and livestock, raw materials, and chemicals. At the same time the share of
"soft goods" (machinery and industrial consumer goods) contracted sharply
(the former from 46 percent to 33 percent, the latter from 16 percent to 9
percent). In the CSFR's exports to Hungary the same tendency was ob-
served, with a much more drastic reduction of the share of machinery from
42 percent to 22 percent, and a milder contraction in the case of industrial
consumer goods, from 10 percent to 5 percent.
Poland is only a passive participant in this analysis as data on its trade
patterns with the Visegrad Group partners are available only from statis-
tics of the partner countries. In Hungary's exports to Poland the share of
machinery dropped from 37 percent to 14 percent, while the relative sig-
nificance of agricultural products doubled. In imports, the decrease of the
share of machinery was even more drastic, from 39 percent to 9 percent. The
4In trade between Hungary and the CSFR, where data were already reported by both
countries, the patterns in corresponding trade flows are not identical as they would be
if statistics were perfect, nevertheless they are quite similar. Here we refer to the data
collected from Hungarian statistics.
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Table 7.6. CSFR's trade with the Soviet Union by commodity groups,
1990 and 1991, in percent.
Commodity groups Exports Imports
SITC 1990 1991 1990 1991
o Food and livestock 1.3 4.3 0.7 0.3
1 Beverage and tobacco 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
2 Raw materials (except fuels) 2.6 0.4 7.7 10.8
3 Fuels and lubricants 2.3 1.5 56.3 76.5
4 Animal and vegetable fats and oils
5 Chemicals 4.1 8.3 3.0 2.6
6 Manufactured goods (classified by materials) 9.3 24.6 7.3 4.4
7 Machinery and transport equipment 60.8 43.8 22.0 4.6
8 Miscellaneous manufactures 17.5 16.9 1.2 0.6
9 Other commodities and transactions 2.0 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSFR in International Economy, Research Institute for Foreign Economic Rela-
tions, March 1992.
"winners" in Hungary's imports were fuels and semifinished products, with
respectively two and three times higher shares in 1991 than in 1990.
In exports from the CSFR to Poland, machinery made up two-thirds
of deliveries in 1990. After the introduction of the hard currency payments
in 1991 this share shrank dramatically, nevertheless it still remained by far
the most important individual commodity group in the CSFR's exports.
The relative significance of semifinished products and chemicals increased
substantially. The CSFR's imports of machinery from Poland dropped from
39 percent to 19 percent, that of the industrial consumer goods from 15
percent to 3 percent, while the share of fuels increased from 3 percent to 36
percent.
The change of the CSFR's and Hungary's patterns in exports to the
Soviet Union from 1990 to 1991 followed roughly the developments observed
in intra-Visegrad Group trade (Tables 7.6 and 7.7). The biggest "loser" was
the commodity group of machinery and transport equipment in both cases,
although its share remained very high in the exports from the CSFR (1990,
61 percent; 1991,44 percent). In case of Hungary machinery became the sec-
ond most important commodity group (1990,42 percent; 1991,31 percent)
after food and livestock. Industrial consumer goods (group 8) maintained
their 1990 position in the CSFR's exports but dropped to half of their share
in Hungary's exports. In case of the CSFR's exports the share of semifinished
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Table 7.7. Hungary's trade with the Soviet Union by commodity groups,
1990 and 1991, in percent.
Commodity groups
SITC
oFood and livestock
1 Beverage and tobacco
2 Raw materials (except fuels)
3 Fuels and lubricants
4 Animal and vegetable fats and oils
5 Chemicals
6 Manufactured goods (classified by materials)
7 Machinery and transport equipment
8 Miscellaneous manufactures
9 Other commodities and transactions
Total
Exports
1990
21.8
2.8
2.9
0.3
0.1
11.4
5.1
41.8
13.3
0.5
100.0
1991
35.9
1.1
8.5
0.1
7.7
9.1
30.5
6.9
0.2
100.0
Imports
1990
0.7
0.2
9.8
48.7
9.3
14.6
16.1
0.5
0.1
100.0
1991
1.1
0.3
8.1
66.3
6.3
10.4
6.8
0.5
0.2
100.0
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the Hungarian Foreign Trade, 1990; and Information from
the Central Statistical Office, 1991.
products (group 6) and chemicals grew substantially; that offood products,
modestly. In Hungary's export to the Soviet Union, the share of food and
livestock, raw materials, and semifinished products increased significantly.
In the change in the composition of imports from the Soviet Union,
the dominance of energy became stronger than ever, making up two-thirds
of Soviet deliveries to Hungary and no less than three-quarters of those to
the CSFR. The share of machinery, in 1990 still making up 22 percent for
the CSFR and 16 percent for Hungary, dropped to one-fifth and one-half,
respectively, of the 1985 level.
Although 1991 was the first year after the introduction of hard currency
payments and world market prices, the emerging trade patterns presented
above do not reflect the structural rearrangement to its full extent. In 1991
a part of the mutual trade of the former CMEA countries was still conducted
in transferable rubles. These deliveries were primarily designed to balance
the clearing payments system where trade imbalances had emerged in 1990.
Besides this, in the case of 1991 deliveries for contracts signed in 1990 trans-
ferable ruble payments were still allowed. Data on the share of the turnover
settled in transferable rubles are available only for the CSFR (Table 7.8).
All data reported in this paper also include that part of the trade which
was settled in transferable rubles. Therefore, trade pattern data are biased
to some extent. This has special significance since we intend to analyze the
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Table 7.8. Foreign trade of the CSFR with selected former CMEA countries
by currency of payments in 1990 and 1991, in percent.
In transferable In convertible
Total rubles currencies
Exports to
Poland 1990 100.0 95.5 4.5
1991 100.0 6.6 93.4
Hungary 1990 100.0 96.0 4.0
1991 100.0 14.6 85.4
Soviet Union 1990 100.0 96.7 3.3
1991 100.0 12.2 87.8
Imports from
Poland 1990 100.0 90.8 9.2
1991 100.0 7.2 92.8
Hungary 1990 100.0 98.0 2.0
1991 100.0 26.3 73.7
Soviet Union 1990 100.0 85.3 14.7
1991 100.0 4.1 95.9
Source: CSFR in International Economy, Research Institute for Foreign Economic Rela-
tions, March 1992.
effects of the shift to a hard currency settlement of payments by comparing
patterns of trade in 1990 and 1991. In addition, a part of intra-Visegrad
Group trade had already been settled in hard currency prior to the funda-
mental change in the payments system in 1991 (see again Table 7.8 for the
CSFR).
Nevertheless, it can safely be assumed that the shrinkage of the share
of machinery and industrial consumer goods in mutual trade would have
been even stronger if 1990 trade data net of deliveries settled in hard cur-
rencies and 1991 trade data net of deliveries in transferable rubles could be
compared.
The Future
The Visegrad Countries: Should they cooperate?
The future of economic relations between the CSFR (respectively its suc-
cessor states), Hungary, and Poland should be analyzed in economic and
political context. It is true that the three countries have many common fea-
tures in their history. It is also true that all three countries were forced to
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leave their path of social and economic development at the same time after
the Second World War, and had the same Soviet-type socioeconomic model
forced upon them, with similar consequences. Moreover, each country had
a more or less simultaneous opportunity for leaving the Soviet bloc.5 These
important facts, however, cannot alone provide the basis of future economic
cooperation. Future cooperation in the sense of unfettered flows of goods
and services, joint projects, can only be based on strong, identifiable common
interests. Once such interests are identified, supporting policy measures and
an appropriate framework are needed to derive advantage from intra-regional
cooperation.
Priority for relations with the EC
Do interests for intra-regional cooperation exist? The starting point when
trying to answer this question is that the main goal of each country, pushing
into the background any other considerations, is full membership in the Eu-
ropean Community as soon as possible. This vehement endeavor to achieve
full membership in the EC is perhaps not easily understandable for West-
ern Europeans. Besides the easily perceived mere economic reasons (such
as free access to a huge market, substantial contribution to the moderniza-
tion of the economy through transfers from the EC budget), one has to take
into consideration other, exclusively Eastern-Europe-specific psychological
motivation: the fear of a reversal of the Russian retreat from the region,
the population's (perhaps partly illusionary) identification of welfare, and
civilized public life with the "European values" where Europe means the
European Community. The Visegrad Group countries' endeavor to achieve
full membership is all the more remarkable as their intention has been re-
ceived by the EC with restraint and, according to the present state of affairs,
the probability of a quick accession of the three economies to the EC is very
low. The asymmetry is obvious: while the EC can easily imagine its future
without the Visegrad Group countries' membership, Poland, the successor
states of the CSFR, and Hungary are completely at the EC's mercy, since as
a long-term strategy these countries have no alternative to EC membership
(this is discussed later in this chapter in the section titled "Can future trade
5 For more on the historical precedent of the economic cooperation among the three
countries, sec Illes et al. (1991).
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flows be predicted?"). Neither a close cooperation of the three countries,
nor any kind of revitalization of the late CMEA, nor EFTA membership,
nor former President Bush's idea of a free-trade agreement with the USA is
considered an alternative.
Relations to the EC make up only one, albeit the most important, ele-
ment of the political and economic context in which the intra-Visegrad Group
relations are embedded. Another important element is the three countries'
controversial attitude toward Bulgaria, Romania, and the successor states
of the former Soviet Union. Their intention to emphasize the difference
between the state of affairs in the Visegrad Group countries and in Bul-
garia, Romania, and the former USSR is clear. Nevertheless the peculiar
mixture of mistrust of and superiority to the non-Visegrad Group former so-
cialist countries also appears, although with lower intensity, in each Visegrad
Group state vis-a.-vis the other two. Most probably the political elite in each
of the three countries is convinced that for various historical, political, and
economic reasons its country is predestinated to join "Europe" first, and
a coordinated approach toward negotiations with the other two countries
on the modalities of their "Europe" policy would only narrow its country's
options.
Taking into consideration these political aspects of intra-Visegrad Group
relations the question must again be raised, what are the interests on which
economic cooperation of the three countries can be based?
The image of maturity
First it is worth mentioning that each countr:(s fundamental interest is to
demonstrate that it is "mature" for EC membership. Maturity has certainly
various political and economic criteria, but - justified or not - some kind
of formalized political and economic cooperation among the three countries
seems to be a sine qua non of the "mature for Europe" image of these coun-
tries in the West. (If they cannot come to terms with each other, then how
can they participate in the sophisticated, interest-reconciliation processes
within the EC?) The bloc approach toward the West obviously survived
the blocs themselves, which, paradoxically, is inducing the Visegrad Group
countries to reconstruct (at least formally) a part of the former Eastern bloc
(see IDes et al., 1991, pp. 41-42).
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Trade diversion versus trade creation
Sandor Richter
It is relevant to ask, whether a recovery of intra-Visegrad Group trade would
be characterized by trade diversion or trade creation. Taking into consid-
eration the marginal position of the three countries in the world economy
and the low technological level of the manufactured products of the three
economies, any form of regional cooperation which might lead to artificially
induced trade diversion favoring intra-Visegrad Group trade and discrimi-
nating against trade with the rest ofthe world would result in a misallocation
of resources. This means that regional cooperation based on trade diversion
is not in the interest of the three countries (see Csaba, 1992, pp. 14-24).
Trade creation generated by regional economic cooperation, contrary to
cooperation characterized by trade diversion, would result in better resource
allocation in the participating countries with beneficial effects in the long
run. Trade can be created in a bilateral relation or in mutual trade of a group
)f countries by mutual elimination of the quantitative and tariff barriers of
trade. The process of the gradual elimination of trade barriers eventually
comes to an end: efforts to create more trade by this strategy make no sense
once all barriers are removed. This triviality has special significance, as
the Visegrad Group countries have agreements with the EC and the EFTA
to achieve free trade in industrial products in the course of a ten-year-Iong
transitional process. Therefore, the efforts to boost intra- Visegrad Group
trade by reducing barriers have a perspective of ten (better to say, already
only nine) years, since, if things work out according to plan, conditions of
trade for each country in the Visegrad Group vis-a.-vis the other two and with
Western Europe will be the same (except for agricultural products). The
intra-Visegrad Group cooperation may "compete" with its cooperation with
EC and EFTA countries first by envisaging a shorter period of transition
from the present state of affairs to free trade of industrial products and,
second, by including agricultural products in free trade.
Discrimination against neighboring countries
It may seem strange that the strongest motive for setting up intra-Visegrad
Group cooperation is a defensive one. Without establishing free trade within
the Visegrad Group, mutual negative discrimination of the Visegrad Group
partners vis-a.-vis trade with the EC will automatically emerge as the stipu-
lations of the agreements on free trade with the EC come into force. Mutual
negative discrimination against neighboring countries' trade would lead to
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misallocation of resources and unnecessary trade diversion, implying higher
import prices and lost opportunities for stepping up exports, especially of
commodities with high transport costs. Furthermore, once an agreement on
free trade between the Visegrad Group countries comes into force, the EC
probably applies a less restrictive regulation of origin for products containing
components produced in more than one Visegrad Group countries.
The launching of free trade in Central Eastern Europe
The multilateral agreement on establishing free trade among the Visegrad
Group countries was eventually signed on 21 December 1992 by the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
Why did the birth of the Central European Free Trade Association
(CEFTA) last so long? In 1992 the euphoria about the hastily concluded
bilateral agreements with the EC envisaging free trade was gone, and voices
from the Visegrad Group countries criticizing the quick liberalization of im-
ports and demanding more protection for domestic producers grew louder.
The governments concerned, after the conclusion of the EC agreements and
under increasing pressure from competing EC imports, needed great courage
to step up pressure on suppliers of the domestic market by allowing ad-
ditional competing imports when introducing free trade with the Visegrad
Group partners. True, each government concerned might have pointed to the
increasing export opportunities that would follow the conclusion of the free
trade arrangements. At the time of the negotiations with the EC, increased
export opportunities were the main concern of Visegrad Group negotiators.
But in view of the much deeper than expected recession in 1991, the delayed
recovery in 1992, and the rapid rise in unemployment, it seems that a more
protectionist attitude to intra-Visegrad Group trade was hardly avoidable.
In the free trade agreement the four countries undertook to abolish grad-
ually all tariffs and quantitative restrictions of industrial products in mutual
trade in the period from 1 March 1993 to 1 January 2001, in three stages.
In the first stage no tariffs are to be imposed for goods on List A. These
are commodities making up, for instance, 38 percent of the exports of the
Hungarian industrial products to the Czech Republic and Slovakia and 48
percent of those to Poland. Some 19 percent of Poland's industrial exports
to Hungary and from 23 percent to 24 percent of the Czech Republic's and
Slovakia's exports to Hungary are free of tariffs from March 1993. Com-
modities in List B can be delivered free of tariffs beginning in January 1997.
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Finally, free trade will apply to sensitive products (textiles, clothing, met-
allurgical products, and vehicles in List C) beginning in January 2001. For
agricultural products, free trade is not envisaged, but mutual concessions
will be made. In the first two years tariffs will be decreased by 20 percent,
and within five years by 50 percent [Figyelo (Spectator), 23 December 1992].
Can trade between the Visegrad Group countries recover?
The separation of the market into two segments may help in addressing
this question. The share of one segment of the pre-1991 mutual trade flows
comprising goods of low quality has already shrunk radically after the in-
troduction of hard currency payments and world market prices. These com-
modities were mainly machinery and industrial consumer goods, produced
primarily by big state-owned industries which had specialized in the CMEA
markets. Without the protective umbrella of the clearing system, the arti-
ficial prices, and strict administrative control to keep out Western imports,
these commodities are not competitive and thus have no future in intra-
Visegrad Group trade.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that mutual trade is doomed
to decline or even stagnate. In the three countries the transformation of the
economy is taking place relatively more quickly and with more success in the
foreign trade sector than in other sectors. Thousands of new participants
have entered the market. Recent successes in exports to the West indicate
that the products offered to the GECD markets are more competitive than
they were under the old trade regime. There is no reason for assuming that
the new (and after restructuring also the streamlined old) producers and
trading firms entering the external markets with new, competitive products
will not try to use every business opportunity provided by the Visegrad
Group partners. This as yet not well-defined group of products and busi-
nesses comprises the other more prospective segment of the the Visegrad
Group countries. Within a few years probably very few traditional partic-
ipants and traditionally traded manufactured products will remain in the
intra-Visegrad Group exchange of goods. A clear indication of fundamental
changes in this field is that in 1991 no less than half of the Hungarian exports
to Poland was supplied by private firms, while the respective share for the
Polish exports was 30 percent [Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian News), 11 April
1992].
Can anything be said about the likely future composition of the mutual
trade flows? Most probably high-technology products will be rather rare
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in the mutual trade of the three countries, since apart from exceptional
cases such products will be imported from the OECD region. Second, it
also seems likely that the commodities whose competitiveness is based on
cheap and relatively well-skilled labor will compete with each other on third
markets rather than make up a dynamic part of the intra-Visegrad Group
trade flows. Nevertheless intra-industry trade, characterizing the exchange
of goods among highly developed industrial nations, may increase in the
intra-Visegrad Group trade flows. This can easily occur if multinational
firms establish their outlets in more than one Visegrad Group country with
the intention of bringing about intensive cross-border cooperation.
Intra-regional trade in the light of other experiences
The question of whether the anticipated, mainly newly "created" mutual
trade will ever attain the relative importance (shares in total trade) of the
"good old" days of the CMEA can certainly not be answered today (T6th,
1992). Looking for references for regional cooperations in the world econ-
omy, one example is obvious from the past. The Austro-Hungarian monar-
chy embraced, among others, territories of the present-day Visegrad Group
economies, Le., Hungary, the former CSFR, and southern Poland. However,
this comparison may be misleading as the motivating force of that historical
cooperation, Austria, is not a member of the Visegrad Group. Furthermore,
it is important to note that in the monarchy the whole modernization and
industrialization process took off within what was practically a single econ-
omy; the economic relations among firms in different parts of the empire
were not then thought to be, and probably should not now be analyzed as,
foreign trade (Good, 1984, pp. 96-124).
Looking for comparable cases in today's world economy, where neighbor-
ing economies at medium levels of development maintain intensive mutual
trade relations, the findings are surprisingly disappointing. In the following
the result of the analysis of three cases are to be summarized: the intra-
regional trade of the four South Asian Tigers, the bilateral trade of the
two countries in the Iberian peninsula, and the intra-regional trade of four
member countries of the Latin American Integration Association.
In the case of the four South Asian Tigers (Taiwan, South Korea, Sin-
gapore, and Hong Kong) the share of the other three Tigers in total export
and import of each country was not especially significant (see Table 7.9). In
none of the selected years did the combined trade share of the other three
countries reach 20 percent, and, in two-thirds of the cases (years) analyzed,
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Table 7.9. The share of mutual trade flows in foreign trade of Taiwan,
South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, in selected years.
Three
South Singa- Hong countries
Taiwan Korea pore Kong together World
Share of individual countries (regions) of destination in total exports
Exporting countries
Taiwan 1960 x 3.7 2.3 12.6 18.6 100.0
1970 x 1.9 2.4 9.2 13.5 100.0
1980 x 1.3 2.8 7.8 11.9 100.0
1987 x 1.2 2.5 7.7 11.4 100.0
South Korea 1960 1.2 x 1.2 8.2 10.6 100.0
1970 1.8a x 1.3 3.3 6.4 100.0
1980 1.2a x 1.5 4.7 7.4 100.0
1987 1.1a X 2.0 4.7 7.8 100.0
Singapore 1960 0.2 0.7 x 1.7 2.6 100.0
1970 0.3a 0.7 x 4.1 5.1 100.0
1980 1.7 1.5 x 7.7 10.9 100.0
1987 2.7 1.7 x 6.3 10.7 100.0
Hong Kong 1960 1.9 0.9 4.3 a x 7.1 100.0
1970 1.1a 0.7 4.0 X 5.8 100.0
1980 1.3a 1.2 4.4 x 6.9 100.0
1987 3.2 2.6 2.7 x 8.5 100.0
Share of individual countries (regions) of origin in total imports
Importing countries
Taiwan 1960 x 0.1 0.4 1.6 2.1 100.0
1970 x 1.0 0.3 1.8 3.1 100.0
1980 x 1.1 1.1 1.3 3.5 100.0
1987 X 1.5 1.5 2.2 5.2 100.0
South Korea 1960 1.6 x 0.0 0.4 2.0 100.0
1970 1.4a x 0.7 0.8 2.9 100.0
1980 1.2a x 0.7 0.4 2.3 100.0
1987 1.3a x 0.9 0.8 3.0 100.0
Singapore 1960 0.5 0.0 x 2.2 2.7 100.0
1970 1.5a 0.5 x 2.5 4.5 100.0
1980 2.4 1.2 x 2.1 5.7 100.0
1987 4.6 2.7 x 3.7 11.0 100.0
Hong Kong 1960 2.1 0.3 1.9a x 4.3 100.0
1970 4.7a 0.9 2.0 x 7.6 100.0
1980 6.9a 3.5 5.0 x 15.4 100.0
1987 8.8 4.5 3.8 x 17.1 100.0
aCalculated from import and export data, respectively, of partner countries.
Sources: International Trade Statistical Yearbook, United Nationsj Yearbook of Statistics,
Singapore, 1989; Taiwan Trade Information.
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they did not reach even a 10 percent share. There is no unambiguous answer
to the question whether, parallel to the rapid export-led economic growth
experienced in these economies, the relative significance of mutual trade in-
creased or decreased. Of the 24 one-way bilateral trade relations (12 export
and 12 import relations) in the selected years, the share of the individual
partner countries increased unambiguously in nine cases, decreased in three
cases, and in the rest of the cases, i.e., in half of all cases, the changes had
no clear direction.
In the bilateral relations between Spain and Portugal the relative signif-
icance of mutual trade (measured by shares in total trade in selected years
in the period from 1960 to 1988) increased substantially, true, from an unbe-
lievably low base. Even so Portugal's share in the foreign trade of Spain was
still quite modest in 1987, 2 percent in imports and 6 percent in exports.
Spain's role in Portugal's foreign trade has been substantially larger; never-
theless in 1988 Spain's share of Portugal's export and import was under 15
percent.
In the third region analyzed (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile ),6
with the exception of Uruguay, the share of trade with the region's economies
was well under 20 percent in selected years between 1960 and 1987.7 Of the
24 bilateral relations in the selected years, 14 failed to show an unambiguous
direction in the change of the relati ve significance (share in total trade) of the
bilateral relation concerned. In nine cases the relative significance increased,
and in one case it decreased.
What could regional economic cooperation groupings and integration
blocs of the less developed countries achieve in enhancing intra-group trade?
As data in Table 7.10 demonstrate the share of intra-group trade was well
under or in a few cases close to 10 percent, except for the Central American
Common Market (CACM) and the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and, generally, it did not increase between 1981 and 1988 (UNC-
TAD, 1990, pp. 2-5). Reviewing the development of seven Third World
integration groupings with a history of at least 25 years, the researchers 0
UNCTAD point out that although trade liberalization has led to an initial
rapid growth in mutual trade, it did not prove to be sufficient to ensure that
the expansion in intra-group trade was sustained. In most integration blocs
6Each country is a member of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI),
successor of the Latin American Free Trade Association.
7Except for Chile's import in 1970.
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Table 7.10. Economic integration groupings of developing countries: intra-
group trade as a percentage of total exports of each group.
1981 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Africa
CEAO 10.1 7.1 6.5 8.4 10.5 n.a.
CEEAC 2.4 1.4 2.8 2.9 3.7 n.a.
CEPGL 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 n.a.
ECOWAS 4.6 2.5 3.2 4.0 4.9 n.a.
MRU 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 n.a.
PTA 9.0 7.5 6.9 8.9 8.0 7.8
SADCC 5.7 4.9 5.9 6.1 5.0 n.a.
UDEAC 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.2 3.6 n.a.
America
ALADI 12.6 9.6 11.5 10.9 10.7 10.6
Andean Group 3.4 3.1 3.3 5.5 5.2 3.9
CACM 20.7 15.9 17.7 13.2 14.4 n.a.
CARICOM 7.4 5.5 5.4 3.0 3.3 n.a.
Asia
ASEAN 18.9 17.9 16.7 17.6 17.5 n.a.
Bangkok Agreement 1.9 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.4 n.a.
ECO 4.2 10.0 9.1 6.1 4.5 n.a.
GCC 3.4 4.6 5.8 5.6 5.4 n.a.
Not all country groups have extended and implemented mutual trade preferences.
CEAO (West African Economic Community)
CEEAC (Economic Community of Central African States)
CEPGL (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)
MRU (Mano River Union)
PTA (Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States)
SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference)
UDEAC (Central African Customs and Economic Union)
ALADI (Latin American Integration Association)
CACM (Central American Common Market)
CARICOM (Caribbean Community)
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations)
ECO (Economic Co-operation Organization)
GCC (Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf)
Source: UNCTAD, 1990, p. 5.
the initial growth in mutual trade had soon reached a peak after which the
volume of mutual trade either stagnated or declined (UNCTAD, 1990, p. 3).
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Can future trade flows be predicted?
Under the peculiar conditions of CMEA trade the member countries were,
to a significant extent, isolated from the main stream world economy. It was
obvious to everyone that the introduction of hard currency payments and
world market prices, and the dissolution of the CMEA itself would bring
about a rearrangement in the geographical composition of the EE5 foreign
trade. It was also obvious that intra-CMEA trade, artificially inflated in the
last decades, would playa less important role after the changeover to the
new trade regime. Well-founded assumptions of future trade flows, however,
would be of vital importance for elaborating feasible foreign trade strategies
and applicable trade policy recommendations. A few recent publications
have made predictions on future trade flows.
In an article published in 1989, before the fundamental political changes
in Eastern Europe, Nagy (1989) calculated trade intensity indicators which
reflect the deviations of actual trade flows from hypothetical "normal" trade
flows. Nagy's trade intensity indicator shows the ratio between the share of
a given country's exports in total imports of a partner country and the share
of this country's total exports in world trade. For example, in 1980 the share
of the Soviet Union's exports to the CMEA made up no less than 39 percent
of total imports of the CMEA, while total Soviet exports amounted to only
3.6 percent of total world trade. The ratio, Le., the trade intensity, is 10.8,
implying that actual trade in that year was more than 10 times higher than
normal trade. The comparison of actual trade flows of the CMEA countries
with their hypothetical normal trade flows in selected years between 1960
and 1980 shows that actual trade between the six small European CMEA
countries and the Soviet Union was 9 to 13 times higher than it would have
been in the normal case defined by the share of the Soviet Union in the world
trade. The intensity of the mutual trade of the six small CMEA countries
was only half that of their trade with the Soviet Union; nevertheless the
actual trade flows were still five to six times higher than the normal ones.
Nagy's research on trade intensity of other regions and countries in the world
economy proved that trade between strongly integrated countries/regions
was characterized by an intensity two to three times higher than normal
trade. According to his calculations if the intensity in mutual trade of the
CMEA countries dropped, as a consequence of an opening toward the world
economy, from the earlier extremely high level to three times the normal
intensity, the share of mutual trade in total trade of these countries would
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Table 7.11. Geographical composition oftrade of the CSFR, Hungary, and
Poland in 1928, 1989, and predicted, percentages of total.
Imports Exports
Country and partner 1928 1989 Predicted 1928 1989 Predicted
CSFR
EC 54.79 15.37 55.02 43.92 16.46 46.28
United States 5.94 0.32 3.48 5.56 0.56 4.73
Japan 0.07 0.33 3.95 0.19 0.76 1.55
Eastern Europe 16.67 16.66 7.69 20.55 16.45 10.77
Soviet Union 1.04 45.58 10.20 1.32 43.14 14.28
Other 21.49 21.74 19.66 28.46 22.64 22.40
Hungary
EC 32.40 30.93 47.07 25.00 24.15 37.16
United States 3.63 1.60 2.78 0.82 2.83 2.77
Japan 0.00 1.21 3.72 0.00 1.15 1.40
Eastern Europe 40.22 14.25 12.47 33.61 14.41 15.03
Soviet Union 0.28 24.28 14.94 0.41 28.29 18.01
Other 23.46 27.74 19.02 40.16 29.17 25.62
Poland
EC 54.39 27.73 55.69 55.88 30.45 51.18
United States 13.95 1.78 5.43 0.84 2.73 2.94
Japan 0.00 1.41 3.99 0.29 0.97 1.59
Eastern Europe 9.09 13.46 6.00 16.60 14.13 9.31
Soviet Union 1.10 26.11 8.96 1.68 24.96 13.89
Other 21.47 29.50 19.93 24.71 26.77 21.09
Source: Collins and Rodrik, 1991, pp. 39-40.
fall to one-half or one-third of the 1986 level. Nagy proved to be prophetic:
exactly that happened between 1990 and 1991.
Recently further attempts have been made to predict future trade flows
of the former CMEA countries. In their model Collins and Rodrik worked
under the dual assumption that the Eastern European countries had never
become socialist and that their trade would have developed after 1928 in
parallel with the "average" pattern exhibited in six other countries - Austria,
Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Collins and Rodrik, 1991, p.
43). Their estimation also adjusted for the special position the Soviet Union
had in 1928. The authors implicitly assumed that the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe (SUEE) had generally unhindered access to the markets of
Western countries, and to those of the EC, in particular. Their predictions on
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Table 7.12. Developments of EE5 trade with the EC, between 1985 and
1992.
EC's share in total trade
1985 1990 1991 1992
Export
Bulgaria 6.4 5.0 15.7 30.8
CSFR 9.1 26.9 40.7 49.4
Hungary 15.8 32.2 46.8 49.8
Poland 22.4 47.2 55.6 58.0
Romania 25.4 31.5a 34.5 32.5
Import
Bulgaria 9.4 9.6 20.7 32.6
CSFR 8.6 24.0 34.6 42.1
Hungary 21.2 31.0 42.2 42.8
Poland 20.1 45.6 49.9 53.2
Romania 10.3 19.7a 25.2 37.5
alncluding trade with the former GDR.
Source: National statistics.
the geographical breakdown of SUEE foreign trade presented in Table 7.11
can be interpreted as a likely final outcome of foreign trade development and
reorientation following the transition of the countries to a market economy.
The authors predict, compared with 1989 actual trade flows, a dramatic
reorientation toward the West: first of all toward the EC and Germany
in particular. Their prediction coincides with actual developments after
1990 (see Table 7.12). Collins and Rodrik (1991, p. 67) finally come to
the conclusion that the natural trade partners of SUEE are the advanced
industrial countries of Europe, rather than one another.
In their gravity model Hamilton and Winters (1992) try to determine
how the SUEE economies may behave (concerning foreign trade flows) once
they become market economies. In their model the ultimate determinants of
potential trade flows are GNP, population of exporting and importing coun-
tries, and distance. The authors focused first of all on trade volumes. They
conclude that, taking into consideration actual trade flows of the year 1985,
"SUEE trade with market economies falls dramatically short of its poten-
tial" (Hamilton and Winters, 1992, p. 81). Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991,
cited by Steinherr, 1992) also use a gravity model to predict geographical
rearrangement in foreign trade of the SUEE. Their findings also suggest that
Eastern European countries will increase their trade with Western Europe
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dramatically. As a consequence, in most Eastern European countries, the
share of this trade will exceed 70 percent. In contrast, the share of trade
among themselves (including the former USSR) is expected to decline dra-
matically, to less than 25 percent for most Eastern European countries. The
results of their computations make it clear that very little is left over for
trade with non-European countries, suggesting that the economies of East-
ern Europe need to organize their foreign trade and financial systems in view
of their dominant trade relationship with Western Europe (Steinherr, 1992,
p.4).
Conclusions
The introduction of convertible currency payments and world market prices
in early 1991, coupled with the liberalization of imports from the rest of the
world and the growing chaos in the Soviet Union/CIS, accelerated the decline
of mutual trade among the former CMEA economies. The available data on
the composition of trade show a fundamental rearrangement. The share
of sophisticated manufactures, primarily machinery, decreased dramatically
in mutual trade of the Visegrad Group economies; the share of exports of
machinery from the CSFR and Hungary to the Soviet Union has, however,
remained high, despite the decline compared with the pre-1991 era.
The issue of regional economic cooperation among the former five East-
ern European economies is treated as being subordinate to their relations
with the EC. This attitude is a result of well-founded economic and politi-
cal considerations but also of illusions about the "European values" and of
mistrust of one another.
Various recently published research results suggest that the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries have huge potential for trade expansion with Western Eu-
rope while this potential in their mutual trade is fairly limited. An analysis
of development of intra-regional trade of neighboring countries in Southeast
Asia, Southern Europe, and Latin America and a review of experiences of
attempts to enhance economic integration in various groups of less developed
countries show that mutual trade of economies at medium or low levels of
economic development cannot replace trade with the highly industrialized
"core" of the world economy. This has a clear foreign trade strategy implica-
tion for Eastern Europe: there is no modernization and sustainable economic
growth without intensive trade with the aECD, particularly with the EC.
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This necessitates the greatest efforts for Eastern European governments to
create the optimal conditions for export expansion to Western Europe.
The EC, which has let more trade barriers prevail vis-a.-vis the Visegrad
countries than really justified, has to be aware that there is neither political
nor economic stability on its eastern borders without the reintegration of
Eastern Europe into "Europe."
Justified priority for relations with the EC, however, does not mean that
the potential, even if limited, for intra-regional cooperation in Central and
Eastern Europe should not be exploited. The low level of mutual trade in
1991 and 1992 surely lags behind this potential.
Since forced trade diversion to boost intra-regional relations would lead
to a similar misallocation of resources as it did in the former CMEA, and as
it would contradict valid and forthcoming trade agreements with the EC and
the EFTA, it should be avoided. Consequently there are basically three sce-
narios for a framework for mutual trade among the EE5 economies.8 First,
that mutual trade remains on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
Second, quantitative and tariff barriers in mutual trade are removed more or
less simultaneously with the gradual elimination of these barriers to imports
from the EC. The third option calls for the establishment offree trade with
one another substantially quicker than with the EC.
The first option leads to unnecessary trade diversion and to misallocation
of resources, thus it can be regarded as a worst case scenario. The second
and third scenarios create equal or better conditions for intra-regional trade
than for trade with the EC. But the third scenario gives Eastern European
producers a couple of years' lead in various groups of commodities.
The agreement on the establishment of free trade among the successor
states of the former CSFR, Hungary, and Poland makes it likely that the
second scenario will be implemented, at least for three of the former EE5
countries, while in the case of Bulgaria and Romania the worst case scenario
will prevail.
At present there are no plans for an extension of regional cooperation
with new members. It seems that any enlargement would need clear signals
from Brussels that the EC is ready to renounce the bloc approach and that
the Visegrad Group countries will have no reason to worry that an enlarge-
ment would have a negative impact on their bargaining position with the
EC in future negotiations about their accession.
8With the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia the category EE5 does not
apply any longer; here it is used for the sake of simplicity.
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Chapter 8
Trade Patterns and
Comparative Advantages
of Central Eastern Europe
with EC Countries*
Giovanni Graziani
Introduction
Good export performance in Western markets by Hungary, Poland, the
CSFR, and Bulgaria in 1990 and 1991, coupled with the new climate of
trade liberalization on both sides, is sometimes described as the bright spots
in an otherwise dim economic picture due to the mounting difficulties of
the transition process (UN ECE, 1991). At the same time, some see the
possibility of an export-led economic recovery for these Central and East-
ern European countries (CEECs). Predictions of huge, long-run increases in
trade with the West add to the optimism (Collins and Rodrik, 1991; Wang
and Winters, 1991; and Hamilton and Winters, 1992). However, the path
to recovery is not as smooth as it appears, even on the trade front. Some of
the obstacles can best be understood by making first a structural analysis
of the basic features of the EC-CEEC trade flows.
*Some sections are reprinted from Graziani (1993), by permission of the publisher.
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Table 8.1. Market shares in EC imports, in percent.
Giovanni Graziani
Countries
Bulgaria
CSFR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Total CEECs
Hong Kong
Korea, Republic of
Singapore
Taiwan
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Source: Calculated from UN, Comtrade.
1980
0.10
0.28
0.26
0.45
0.34
1.43
0.67
0.38
0.27
0.41
0.22
0.34
0.24
1991
0.06
0.35
0.32
0.53
0.13
1.38
0.72
0.68
0.49
0.96
0.30
0.41
0.43
Strong structural asymmetries characterize the EC-CEEC trade flows.
The first is the different relative importance of reciprocal trade. The EC
is by far more important to the CEECs than the CEECs are to the EC.
From the 1970s until 1985, the EC's share in the total CEECs' trade was
roughly 14 percent, while the CEECs' share in the EC's total trade was
just over 2 percent (Graziani, 1985, 1987). This asymmetry was enhanced
in the late 1980s, and there has been a real upsurge in the first two years
of the 1990s. By 1991, the shares of total exports from the CEECs to EC
countries were the following: Bulgaria (16 percent), the CSFR (41 percent),
Hungary (46 percent), Poland (56 percent), and Romania (36 percent). The
EC was also of paramount importance as a supplier of the CEECs' imports:
21 percent, 33 percent, 41 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent, respectively.
In addition, the EC constitutes a major outlet for Eastern European exports
to the OECD: roughly three-quarters since German unification took place.
Germany is by far the main outlet within the EC; Italy, France, and the UK
follow somewhat behind. On the other side, the CEECs accounted for only
1.38 percent of the EC's total imports in the same year (Table 8.1) and for
roughly the same amount of its exports. This enormous discrepancy, which
cannot be explained merely by the different relative sizes of the two regions,
is a basic fact that must be kept in mind when assessing the possible impact
of any EC trade liberalization process.
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In addition to being relatively low, the CEECs' total market shares in the
EC slowly declined up to 1980, followed by a slight increase and stabilization
until 1985, at which time a steady loss continued until the late 1980s. In this
last period, Hungary and Poland were the only countries which were able
to keep their position stable. Since 1990, a recovery of market shares has
taken place in all CEECs, except Romania. Altogether, the CEECs' market
share in the EC in 1991 was still lower than a decade before (1.38 percent
as compared with 1.43 percent); however, the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland
have slightly improved their positions (Table 8.1). By contrast, all the main
competitors from the Far East have substantially increased their shares in
the market - in the case of Taiwan more than doubling it. In 1991, the
combined share of the "Four Tigers" (Singapore, Hong Kong, the Republic
of Korea, and Taiwan) was 2.85 percent (up from 1.74 percent in 1980), i.e.,
just over twice the CEECs' value. Rapidly developing fast exporters, like
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, are now accounting for shares of the EC
market comparable to the better-performing CEECs.
The EC Import Structure with Regard
to the CEECs
Trends in global trade can be understood better by analyzing the commodity
structures and the relative balances by product groups.
The EC import structure in relation to the CEECs is rather diversified,
although for a long time primary products have accounted for the largest
relative share. Within the primary products sector the biggest role used to be
played by fuels, the leading single category in the early 1980s (here shares in
import ranged between 5 percent and 43 percent; see Table 8.2). Particularly
visible was the importance of this group in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland.
It should not be forgotten, however, that not all these mineral fuels are raw
materials. If one excludes Polish and possibly some Czech coal, the rest
consisted mainly of petroleum products that CEECs processed on the basis
of Soviet and OPEC oil. The generally cheaper Soviet oil, which was not paid
for in hard currency, represented for the CEECs substantial windfall gains,
which have vanished since the establishment in 1991 of world market prices
within the CMEA and the subsequent collapse of its trade. In 1991 fuels
represented only between 2 percent and 13 percent of CEECs' exports, the
latter share referring to Romania. Ores and metals accounted for between
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3 percent and 11 percent. Finally between 7 percent and 29 percent of the
CEECs' exports to the EC were foodstuffs, livestock, and agricultural raw
materials. This share was the highest in the case of Hungary (29 percent),
Bulgaria (29 percent), and Poland (21 percent). These three countries are
naturally bound to especially suffer from the Common Agricultural Policy.
All in all, food and raw materials (SITC 0-4) occupied a rather large place
in EC imports from the CEECs, certainly larger than in the equivalent flows
from the world or the newly industrialized countries (NICs). The overall
balance for primary products has always been negative for the EC.
Intermediate products represent another important category. Two-
thirds of them are accounted for by basic industrial goods (SITC 6 minus
SITC 68), iron and steel and textile yarns and fabrics make up almost half
(9 percent of total imports on average, but 16 percent for the CSFR). The
EC countries, more than other more industrialized countries which are ge-
ographically so far away, like the USA or Japan, are natural markets for
products which require high transport costs. However, their share for these
products has been decreasing since 1977 for two main reasons: EC import
restrictions, and growing competition from the NICs (Graziani, 1987). The
balance is negative for the EC in intermediate products at large, but always
positive for textiles.
The share of chemical products has generally been increasing since the
early 1970s, and reached 9 percent in 1991 on the average, with the CSFR,
Bulgaria, and Hungary having a slightly higher share. The industrial coop-
eration agreements as a trade promoter between the two areas seem to have
been particularly important in this sector. Here too, the balance has been
positive for the EC.
The sector of finished manufactured goods is composed of two broad cat-
egories which exhibit different weights and patterns. Machinery and equip-
ment, which has exhibited an increasingly negative balance for the CEECs,
represents a relatively small share in EC imports, much smaller than in EC
trade with the world (15 percent as compared with 34 percent). Its relative
weight follows more or less the ranking of development within the CEECs:
more important for the CSFR (21 percent) and Hungary (17 percent), at an
intermediate level for Bulgaria (13 percent) and Poland (11 percent), and
well under the average for Romania (9 percent). In some instances, these
trade flows are the by-products of past intra-CMEA specialization, which
made some of the CEECs able to exploit economies of scale: Le., the CSFR
in machine tools used for metal processing; Poland in ships, automobiles,
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and tractors; Hungary in buses and household appliances; Bulgaria in non-
electrical machinery; Romania in ball bearings and motor vehicle parts. The
loss of market shares up to 1990 and the present very low level (0.6 percent of
EC imports) seem to point to increasing difficulties in penetrating Western
European markets. Apart from international competition, a further element
of competition derives from the fact that the CEECs compete among them-
selves, especially in some manufactured products in the EC market. Some
examples are the CSFR's competition with Hungary in polyethylene and
PVC; with Poland in electric motors; and with Bulgaria in metal-working
machine tools. The fundamental reason for this competition is the heritage
of the so-called parallelism of the industrial structures, which results in the
tendency to export similar products (Graziani, 1982). Enterprises from the
CEECs are also increasingly competing for a globally reduced market share.
Other negative factors include weak marketing strategies, lack of spare parts
and after-sales services, poor infrastructure and financial services, apart from
the well-known technological lag.
There is, however, a bright spot: the miscellaneous manufactured goods
(SITC 8), which account for 22 percent of total exports from the CEECs
to the EC, the highest values being 45 percent for Romania and 21 percent
for Hungary (Graziani, 1993). Clothing, footwear, furniture, and tradition-
ally labor-intensive industries have positively contributed to the trade bal-
ance of the CEECs, although EC tariff and nontariff measures coupled with
increased competition from the developing countries seem to have limited
possible further expansion.
If we look at a more disaggregated level (3-digit SITC) of the manufac-
tures exported by each CEEC, only in a few instances is the share of total
exports carried out by a single sector higher than the 2 percent of EC im-
ports from the given country. Such is the case for manufactured fertilizers
(Bulgaria and Poland), iron and steel ingots and universals (Bulgaria and
the CSFR), mechanical-handling equipment and ships and boats (Bulgaria),
outer garments (all CEECs), undergarments, refined petroleum products,
and cement (Romania), polymerized products (the CSFR and Hungary),
glassware and passenger cars (the CSFR), furniture (all CEECs except Bul-
garia), and finally footwear (all except Bulgaria and Poland). In categories
pertaining to the same division, the share is often higher of those products
which are less refined or have less value added. Such is the case, for instance,
of organic versus inorganic chemicals and of plastics in primary rather than
in nonprimary forms.
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The importance of the EC trade policy with respect to CEECs can
indirectly be gauged by the weight of the so-called sensitive sectors in the
CEECs' export structures toward the EC. This is exactly where tariff and
especially nontariff barriers were, and still are, relatively stronger. Food and
agricultural materials, chemicals, iron and steel, and textiles and clothing
represent 58 percent of total exports for Bulgaria, 53 percent for Hungary, 45
percent for Poland, 41 percent for Romania, and 40 percent for the CSFR.
In the case of Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, this share has even grown
over the last decade (Table 8.2). In contrast, the same group of products
accounts for less than one-third of EC imports from the world.
In short, the place of primary products in the export structure of the
CEECs to the EC has been greatly reduced since the early 1980s, thanks
mainly to the decline of the supplies of fuels. Among the general advance of
manufactures, only iron and steel suffered substantial losses on the average,
with the exception of Poland.
Resource Dependence, Factor Intensity,
and Technological Level of the
CEECs' Manufacturing Exports
In this section we focus on the trade of manufacturing products. Following
a procedure adopted in Graziani (1989), we have distinguished "resource-
based" from "non-resource-based" manufacturing exports. Further distinc-
tions have been made for non-resource-based manufactures: whether they
were characterized by low- or high-skill-intensive processes, or by low or high
rates of development, or by labor- or capital-intensive processes. Finally, the
same products have also been classified according to technology intensity and
import demand growth. The analysis is based on UN Comtrade SITC data
at the 3-digit level.
The picture emerging from Table 8.3 indicates that by 1991 all the
CEECs had succeeded in reducing their share of resource-based exports to
much less than half of their exports to the EC, whereas in 1980 three of them
were well above 50 percent. This is a rather general phenomenon character-
izing countries which climb the ladder of economic development. However,
some of the main competitors of the CEECs seem to have done much better.
On average, the share of resource-based exports from the world declined
to 26 percent, as did the share of some of the newly emerging exporters
(NECs) like Thailand and Malaysia. The newly industrialized countries'
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Table 8.3. Share of EC imports of manufactures classified according to
resource dependence, in percent, rounded figures.
Non-resource-basedExporting Resource-based
countries 1980 1991
Bulgaria 67 41
CSFR 38 23
Hungary 42 35
Poland 52 38
Romania 72 34
Total CEECs 56 33
NECsa 69 26
NIC~ 8 3
World 38 26
1980
33
62
58
48
28
44
31
92
62
1991
59
77
65
62
66
67
74
97
74
Clndonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
bHong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Taiwan.
Source: Calculated from UN, Comtrade. For the methodology see Graziani, 1989.
(NICs') share, already extremely low, plummeted to a mere 3 percent. By
comparison, only the CSFR succeeded in reducing this amount to 23 per-
cent, just under the world average, while the shares for the other four CEECs
range between 34 percent and 41 percent. All in all, the CEECs' exports.
are still more concentrated in resource-based manufactures, if compared to
the world average and especially to their most important competitors in the
EC markets. Apart from the situation with regard to processed agricultural
products, such a bias is rather questionable for relatively resource-scarce
countries like the CEECs.
The analysis of non-resource-based manufactures adds new dimensions
to the present difficulties of CEECs' exports. First a distinction was made
between the low and high level of skill intensity characterizing the different
industries, as measured by the share of skilled labor employed. According
to the relevant version of the product-cycle concept, one could call those
industries that require low degrees of skill "mature" and those characterized
by a high degree of skill intensity "new." Table 8.4 clearly shows that exports
from CEECs are relatively much more concentrated in mature industries, as
compared with both the world average and their competitors. For all of
them, the share is equal to or higher than 65 percent. What is more, this
percentage has even increased over the last decade for Poland and Romania,
while remaining stable for Bulgaria. The importance of low-skill-intensive
exports to the EC has diminished only in the case of Hungary and the CSFR.
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If we apply another interpretation of the product cycle in international
trade, we can classify the industries according to their low or high rates
of product development (measured by the number of items that appear or
disappear over a period, as a share of the total number of items in the
SITC group). Manufactures will then be called "standardized" in the first
case, and "unstandardized" in the latter. From this point of view, quite a
few differences exist between the CEECs and the rest of the world. Table
8.4 shows that the majority of import flows into the EC is represented by
standardized products. However, the average share for the world (62 percent)
is lower than for any of the CEECs. The CSFR is the only CEEC that shows
a favorable ratio when compared with the world average (+4 percent) and
the NICs (-5 percent). Hungary and Poland, with roughly three-quarters of
standardized products, have a higher share than the NICs, while Bulgaria
and especially Romania come closer to the new Asian exporters (NECs),
which show, on average, the highest figure (89 percent). As in the case of
mature industries, Poland and Romania have increased their shares over the
decade, while the CSFR has maintained the same level and the others have
exhibited decreases. On the whole, then, standard manufactures appear to
be at the core of intensive present and potential competition between the
CEECs and their competitors on the EC market.
If, finally, non-resource- based manufactures are classified according to
the well-known concept of factor proportions, labor-intensive products, on
average, seem by far to dominate (67 percent, with peaks of 82 percent for
Romania and 75 percent for Hungary), as against 21 percent of capital-
intensive and 12 percent of nonclassified goods. By comparison, the shares
for the NICs are 89 percent, 7 percent, and 4 percent, respectively, while the
same for the other Asian exporters are 92 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent,
respectively. It is worth noting that the CEECs are, by consequence, rela-
tively more concentrated on capital-intensive exports than their competitors.
In addition, traditional labor-intensive industries like clothing, footwear, and
furniture prevail over nontraditional ones, such as engineering.
Looking at the results it is interesting to see what changes occurred over
the period from 1980 to 1991 within each homogeneous category. Consider-
ing the standardized, labor-intensive product groups, among the mature in-
dustries clothing, furniture, and glassware have increased their shares, while
the shares of footwear have decreased. Among the new industries, other
machinery, household equipment, and electrical machinery have improved
their positions. Within the unstandardized, but mature, industries only the
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Table 8.5. Share of EC imports classified according to technology level, in
percent, rounded figures.
Exporting
countries
Bulgaria
CSFR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
NECsa
NICsb
World
High technology
1980 1991
3 5
6 9
5 10
4 6
2 3
8 17
14 29
14 19
Medium technology
1980 1991
20 30
24 33
26 26
37 29
11 16
22 22
29 36
40 44
Low technology
1980 1991
77 65
70 58
69 64
59 65
87 81
70 61
57 35
46 37
alndonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
bHong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Taiwan.
Source: Calculated from UN, Comtrade. For the methodology see Graziani, 1989.
percent of textile articles has increased somewhat among the labor-intensive
products, and the percent of motor vehicles and plastic materials has in-
creased among the non-labor-intensive products.
Another interesting insight into the technological level of exports of
manufactures can be gained by ranking them according to their R&D con-
tent, although the usual caveats should be applied to such types of classi-
fications (Table 8.5). Low-technology sectors appear to dominate exports
from CEECs, although their share has decreased over the decade, with the
exception of Poland. What is striking, however, is that in all instances the
percentage of low-tech products appears to be much larger than in the case
of most Asian competitors (almost twice as much as in the exports of the
NICs, and well above that of Malaysia, for instance). As a mirror image,
the CEECs exhibit the lowest share of the high-technology sectors among all
competitors. As a share of the CEECs' exports to the EC, high-technology
sectors have grown substantially over the years, although the swift increase
in 1991 data may be partly due to the inclusion of the former GDR in the EC
total. Still, the gap between the CEECs and the NICs is considerably wide.
Hungary and the CSFR were clearly the leaders among the CEECs, followed
by Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. A common general feature for all the
CEECs seems to be the dominance of products in the lower end of the high-
technology spectrum (electrical and nonelectrical machinery and high-grade
chemicals), in contrast to their competitors' export, which is dominated by
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electronic components, telecom equipment, and scientific instruments. Hun-
gary is the only country in which these latter sectors have increased as a
share of its high-tech exports.
Finally, non-resource-based manufactures are mostly concentrated (69
percent) in sectors characterized by a slower than average import demand
growth into the EC. This is true also for the world exports to the EC at large;
however, the share in the world export (59 percent) is still lower (Graziani,
1993).
In summary, some general features seem to emerge from our analysis so
far. The CEECs' export structure toward the EC seems to be relatively bi-
ased in favor of resource-based products. Many ofthese productive processes
require substantial amounts of capital. If we add this fact to the share of
capital-intensive manufactures, one could argue that CEECs' exports seem
to be particularly biased for exports characterized by heavy use of natu-
ral resources and capital outlays. Given that the former is generally not
plentiful in the region and the latter is also relatively scarce, this pattern
could only be the result of the far-reaching misallocation of resources caused
by the well- known irrational system of prices and other features of the past
regime. Moreover, non-resource-based manufactures are concentrated in ma-
ture, standardized, labor-intensive, low-technology-intensive, and relatively
slowly expanding sectors, where the competition of NICs and EC protection
is strong.
Identifying the Competitive Sectors of
Central Eastern European Economies
Trying to identify the CEECs' products that are most suitable candidates
for competition in international markets is obviously a very difficult task in
a period of rapid redirection of trade flows and of sweeping internal trans-
formations. The best one can do is to show where the region's comparative
advantages with the EC seem to lie up to now, then discuss whether these
sectors are viable at all, and, finally, compare these results with the factor
endowments existing there.
For the analysis of revealed comparative advantages, in this section I
use the export specialization index calculated for EC-CEECs relations. The
index was calculated for each CEEC in the EC market at the SITC 3-digit
level, for both 1980 and 1991. The ratio indicates the weight of the product
in the EC import structure from the CEECs, relative to the weight of the
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same product in the EC imports from the world. A value higher than one
indicates a relative specialization. In Table 8.6, only the top 20 products
are shown for each CEEC, plus the total number of products for which each
country shows a value higher than one.
A first remark concerns the degree of concentration of the specializa-
tion pattern (memo item at the bottom of the table). The CSFR appears
specialized in the largest number of products and Romania in the smallest
number (half as much as the former). Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria are
ranked in between. Considering now only the top 20 products in 1991, it
should be noted that, on average, one-fifth of them had an index indicating,
in fact, despecialization (a value lower than one) a decade before. This share
is slightly lower in the case of Hungary, most likely reflecting the fact that
this country has tended to consolidate its already acquired well-performing
positions relatively more than the other CEECs.
The detailed analysis of the specialization indices broadly confirms some
of the previous findings. Raw materials, food, and agricultural products
are among the best performing sectors, together with resource-based man-
ufactured products. These three categories represent, generally, half of the
top 20 products. They are slightly less important for the CSFR and, for
different reasons, for Romania. As for the non-resource-based manufac-
tures, specialization is mostly concentrated in mature, standardized, and
labor-intensive industries. There are, however, some notable exceptions.
Examples of skill-intensive products can be found for all the CEECs. For
instance, mechanical-handling equipment and ships for Bulgaria; tractors,
power-generating machinery, and steam boilers for the CSFR; agricultural
machinery and equipment for electrical distribution for Hungary; steam boil-
ers for Poland; and, finally, rotating electrical plants and household equip-
ment for Romania. Examples of unstandardized products are represented
by leather manufactures (except the CSFR), textile articles (Bulgaria and
the CSFR), rubber articles (Bulgaria), rails (the CSFR and Poland), and
iron and steel bars (the CSFR).
The list would certainly be longer if we considered all the products in
which the CEECs exhibit a relative specialization index (not shown in the
table). It does not, however, include many products from the machinery and
equipment division (3 for Bulgaria; 13 for the CSFR and Hungary each; 6
for Poland; and 9 for Romania). Moreover, in these instances the indices
are often very low and are accompanied by particularly negative export-
import balances. One should also note that on average low specialization
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is characterizing this commodity group more than the other groups. No
CEEC shows a specialization index higher than one in the most dynamic
and high-tech sectors, like office and automatic data-processing machines,
telecom equipment, scientific instruments, photographic apparatuses, and
optical goods. In all these groups balances are generally negative.
All in all, the previous analysis shows that the apparent specialization
of the CEECs manifests itself mostly in those same types of goods that
constitute the bulk of their exports: resource-based products and standard
labor-intensive and low-skill manufactures. One can nevertheless detect a
few differences among individual CEECs. As expected, the CSFR is still
relatively more advanced in the higher-technology-intensive products among
the CEECs, followed by Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. The last
three countries are also relatively more specialized in resource-based goods;
Hungary is more specialized in labor-intensive manufactures and the CSFR
in capital-intensive manufactures.
Export specialization indices, as revealed by actual trade, cannot tell us
more about the underlying comparative advantages supposedly pertaining to
a country. Certainly, in the case of a substantial misallocation of resources,
the chance is that the two sets might differ in various cases. The question
is even more complicated as far as the future pattern of specialization is
concerned, since the very rapid and far-reaching transition process is bound
to have a notable impact on the general economic structure of the countries
involved. For example, a general redistribution of employment away from
agriculture and industry and toward the service sector, as well as an indus-
trial restructuring, foreseeable in the near future, might substantially also
change the trade structure.
Interesting insights into the matter can be derived from a study by
Hughes and Hare (1991). By calculating the value added by each industry at
world prices and thus the domestic resource costs of production, the authors
were able to identify the branches which make the greatest contribution
to national income relative to the capital and labor they require. They also
identified the sectors which, on the contrary, generate a negative value added
at world prices, because they actually reduce the net resources of the country
by using inputs the value of which exceeds the value of the output they
produce. In such a way they find that for the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland
20 percent to 25 percent of manufacturing output is produced by branches
that operate with negative value added, if measured at world prices. Among
these the food industry is first, followed by various energy-intensive branches.
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Placing these findings and our previous results on export specialization for
manufactured sectors side by side, we can see that for Bulgaria and the CSFR
the industries with negative value added at world prices do not include many
of the sectors that show an apparent export specialization. The contrary is
true in the case of Hungary, where parts of the food industry and iron and
steel, which show a negative value added, reveal a certain specialization. The
same can be said for some negative value-adding Polish industries, namely,
food and nonferrous metals production.
Current Versus Future Specialization Patterns:
The Question of Human Capital
What are the implications for future specialization in these CEECs? Here
one should distinguish between the short-medium term and the long term.
In the first instance, the CEECs apparently will have to cope with their
present factor endowment, the established pattern of specialization, and the
necessity to solve the problems encountered in the sectors indicated above.
Our previous analysis of the CEECs' trade commodity structure quite clearly
reveals that the export-oriented sectors in these countries consume much en-
ergy. It is well known that this is a general feature of CEECs. Energy
consumption per capita is, on average, the same as for Northern EC coun-
tries, while their consumption per unit of output is roughly double. Ac-
cordingly energy-intensive industries are certainly among the first to require
drastic restructuring. In many instances, this might imply a substantial
contraction of previous exports, as their profitability will fall even lower,
due to the ending of the epoch when cheap raw materials were supplied on
barter terms by the former USSR. Such is the case, for instance, of petrol
processing and the petrochemical and metallurgical industries, based essen-
tially on crude and high-grade iron ore. The choice now is between paying
world prices in convertible currencies (when bartering is not resumed) or
using lower-metal-content ores when they are available, thus inevitably rais-
ing production costs substantially. In some instances, however, it might be
rash to simply do away with entire sectors that could be viable. Such is
the case, for example, for Bulgarian oil-processing capacities, which have
undergone intensive renovation and might be used, on a compensation basis,
for processing petrol belonging to foreign companies and paying them back
with petroleum products. Or, even more likely, this might be the case of
Hungarian energy-intensive industries, which already in the last decade had
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to pay the full world market price for Soviet oil (the balance over the lower
price paid to the USSR went into the national budget). In general, however,
one could perhaps safely assume that the energy-intensive manufacturing ex-
ports are bound to start losing ground soon in the CEECs' export structures
toward the EC.
As for agriculture, the pressure to earn foreign currency might imme-
diately increase the exports of this sector. If this were the case export
potentials might rise also because of per capita productivity gains due to a
substantial release of the labor force and a swift positive reaction to liber-
alization measures in the countryside. Past experiences show that this is a
possible outcome (Anderson, 1992). As an example of the CEECs' produc-
tivity lag, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that
in 1990 the level of cereal production was roughly half ofthat in similar areas
in Western Europe (Senior Nello, 1991). The most suitable candidates for
an export boost could be gauged from the ratio of per capita production in
the CEECs and the same for the world. In this respect, cereals, sunflowers,
meat, milk, canned meat/fruits/vegetables, beer, and refined sugar would
seem to have, on the average, the greatest potentials (Collins and Rodrik,
1991).
Our results so far seem to point to a reshuffling of the CEECs' export
structure within the resource-based product groups in favor of agriculture
and against more energy-intensive goods. Whether resource-based exports
will contract as a whole as a share of global exports to the EC will very much
depend on the development of non-resource-based manufacturing products.
Among the latter, will the standardized labor-intensive goods continue to
prevail? According to some analysts (CEPR, 1990), data on factor endow-
ments in human capital point to a possible relatively higher growth of the
CEECs' exports of more sophisticated, skill-intensive products. In this sense,
they would not be competing with the EC-South.
The analysis of the data reveals, however, some problems. Such is the
case, for instance, of the occupational breakdown of employed labor force.
According to experts, the CEECs' average share of the work force engaged in
professional, technical, and related occupations is 15 percent, which would
put it somewhere in between the EC-North and the EC-South. However,
this average is heavily biased by Bulgaria's reported share of 26 percent.
Statistical foundations on this subject are very shaky. The 1991 International
Labor Organization's Yearbook of Labor Statistics shows data only for Poland
(ILO, 1991). On the basis of calculations from these data, Poland would be
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roughly on a par with the EC-North, while the low shares of administrative,
managerial, clerical, sales, and service workers would lag far behind even the
EC-South and NICs.
Possible hints at the future pattern of trade may be drawn from the
statistics on education and R&D, if we accept any reasonable relationship
between educational and R&D flows, on the one hand, and the availability
of skilled workers, on the other. For this purpose, we present a series of
country-by-country data taken or calculated from UNESCO (Table 8.7).
In addition to the CEECs and the EC countries, we have included a few
developing countries for comparison.
The picture that unfolds is quite composite and reveals some notable
differences among the individual CEECs. As for gross enrollment ratios, the
share of students reaching the second level of education is, on average, lower
for the CEECs than for the EC and comparable to the best-performing
LDCs. This feature is accentuated if we look at the third level of educa-
tion. Apart from Bulgaria, whose inflated data, although still lower than
the EC, seem to be dubious, Romania has a lower share than any of the
LDCs presented in the table, while the rest of the CEECs can only compare
with Portugal in the EC and with average LDCs, like Egypt, Mexico, or
Thailand. Countries like Argentina and Korea seem to fare much better.
But, even accepting these data at face value, how do we know that
the CEECs' educational standards are comparable to their Western coun-
terparts? Statistics on quality comparisons are almost nil. One of the few
studies of this problem was undertaken by the International Association for
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement in the mid-1980s (as reported
in Hamilton and Winters, 1992). The data collected for a certain range of
developed and developing countries, including Hungary and Poland, show
the scores obtained by students on a standardized science test. Hungary is
first in the secondal'y level (14- and 15-year-old students) and the third level
(final years of schooling), while Poland compares favorably with the less-
performing developed countries. On the basis of admittedly rough positive
correlations between scientific skills at the secondary level of education and
the comparative advantages in mid-tech goods in the West, Hamilton and
Winters conclude that Hungary is a particularly good candidate to become
an exporter of sophisticated goods.
Another often-considered input measure is total education expenditures
as a share of the GNP. The table shows that here the CEECs are roughly on
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a par with the EC countries and spend relatively more than most LDCs, indi-
cating very likely rather widespread inefficiencies in the educational systems
and/or differences in recording expenditures.
Some of the CEECs seem to have strong points in scientific and tech-
nical personnel. The fourth column shows the share of potential scientists,
engineers, and technicians in the total population. This is meant to be eco-
nomically active qualified labor either engaged or actively seeking work in
any branch of the economy. Here the data would suggest Poland is in a
leading position, followed by the EC-North; the CSFR and Hungary being
on a par with the EC-South and the Asian NICs. A similar picture emerges
from the analysis of the fifth column, where the share of scientists, engineers,
and technicians engaged in research and experimental development are cal-
culated, again within the total population. Bulgaria and the CSFR appear
to be leading, followed by the EC-North. Hungary and Romania would
be somewhere in the middle, with the NICs, EC-South, and finally Poland
following suit. Were the share calculated as a percentage of the total labor
force, most of the CEECs would compare favorably with the best-performing
Western countries.
If we look at column six, we can see that the CEECs seem to devote
a considerable share of their national incomes to R&D. Although the data
are not exactly comparable (because they are calculated as a share of net
material product, which is lower than GNP), the much higher figure obtained
in the case of the CSFR, Bulgaria, and Hungary than in the EC-North
appears to imply a substantial difference. Poland and Romania look more
like the better-performing EC-Southern countries.
A few factors, however, might reveal some doubts on the exact value
of R&D efforts of the CEECs relative to other countries. First, one should
not forget that in the West a substantial amount of research is conducted by
private firms. Consequently, official data underestimate the national research
efforts in the West. Second, Eastern European scientists and engineers are
much less concentrated than their Western counterparts in manufacturing
industry, which apparently does not bode well for the future of that sector
(column seven).
In summary, the situation does not seem to be uniform for the various
CEECs and among the different types of education, scientific and technical
personnel, and R&D efforts. Data on R&D should be taken with great
caution and most likely inflate the CEECs' real research effort. A certain
relative abundance of scientists, engineers, and technicians does seem to
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exist in some CEECs. Apart from the reliability of data, however, it is
not at all clear whether education, as well as the skills of the labor force,
can correspond in the near future to the new tasks of a full-fledged market
economy. For a long time researchers and technicians have been isolated in
their work from the international milieu and have rarely had access to the
most updated equipment. The same can be said about the labor force. At
present, many qualified workers are leaving industry to find better-paying
jobs in services and trade, if not migrating abroad. The remaining employees
need intensive retraining, but some evidence seems to point to a collapse of
training centers in the CEECs. Finally, even if the skill potentials are there,
a lot of capital to make these skills usable is needed, in this case in the form
of direct foreign investment.
All in all, the arguments presented above do not seem to indicate relevant
opportunities for the export potential of skill-intensive goods in the short
run. This seems also to be the perception of foreign investors. In a survey
of large firms in various Western countries, the 54 respondents, 36 percent
of which are primarily engaged in manufacturing, did not perceive the skills
of the labor force as a major attraction for investment in the former CMEA
countries (Collins and Rodrik, 1991). In fact, skills ranked only fifth, after
the perspective of new and expanding markets, the possibility of beating out
competitors, the proximity of the EC markets, and the low labor costs. Of
course, these principles do not imply that foreign investment and transfer
of technology in substantial amounts might not considerably change the
situation in the long term and help to fully utilize the potential existing
in the CEECs. In this respect Hungary seems for the moment the most
suitable candidate. Some examples already exist in this direction, such as the
Hungarian software company Graphisoft, which created a popular program
for computer-aided design and is a successful exporter.
Meanwhile, the CEECs will be obliged to go on concentrating on labor-
intensive manufactures. Cheap labor is still a reality of the CEECs. In 1989,
Poland, Hungary, and the CSFR still had very competitive wage levels. Their
average hourly earnings in manufacturing were, respectively, 1.5 percent, 7.3
percent, and 9.5 percent ofthe US level and, in the highest case (the CSFR)
just over 10 percent of the EC- North, 15 percent of Spain, and still behind
Latin American and Asian NICs (Graziani, 1993).
This low competitive level of wages in Eastern European countries may
not hold out forever. Recent macroeconomic policies characterized by strong
devaluations of the home currency and the ensuing surge of inflation have
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started to erode the competitive edge of these countries. By September
1991 Polish wages in dollars had increased by about five times with respect
to the 1989 level and the Hungarian wages had increased by 20 percent.
Apparently, the CSFR was the only successful CEEC, not only in keeping
wages in dollars under control, but even in lowering them.
In the first period of transition, there has been a realignment of wages
toward equalization of wage competitiveness in dollars for the three CEECs
involved. On the other side, it should be remembered that, for the future,
unemployment might exert a downward pressure at the wage level. As we
know, unemployment rates have already surpassed the 10 percent thresh-
old in many CEECs and will presumably go on increasing. Labor will be
relatively even more abundant because of less employment in agriculture,
widespread bankruptcies, and/or reduced employment in factories which for
a long time have practiced overemployment.
The second reason why data on wages have to be analyzed cautiously
when measuring competitiveness lies in the well-known fact that wages are
not synonymous to labor costs. Since reliable comparable statistics do not
exist even for Western countries, we can only give here a few qualitative
remarks. It has been a tradition of the Eastern European state enterprises
to generously provide their employees with food and other payments in kind,
like housing, social security, vocational training, welfare services, transport,
and work clothes. A reasonable guess is that these items played a much
larger role in the CEECs than in their Western counterparts. Moreover,
some of these benefits might not be provided any more in the near future,
especially if the privatization process proceeds rapidly. This would have a
wage-push effect, the consequences of which are not readily quantifiable.
Finally, labor cost is only one side of the coin related to competition.
Labor productivity has to be taken into account as well. Here too, we run
into the usual difficulties in international comparisons. It is a well-known fact
that productivity levels are very low in the economies of CEECs. A Polish
study has compared the output per employee for 16 products in Poland and
the EC in the late 1980s (Burzynski et al., 1991). In only three cases does
Polish productivity approach the level of EC productivity: in the production
of animal feed, leather, and railway rolling stock. The narrowest productivity
gaps were found for labor-intensive and resource-based industries. Moreover,
the higher the degree of processing, the larger the productivity gap appeared
to be. A more detailed comparison with Germany shows that the latter
has a productivity that is 13 times higher in certain industries, like wood
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and paper. Making a comparison of productivity and labor costs between
Poland and Germany in 28 industries, the authors conclude that in most
cases lower labor costs do not payoff for even lower labor productivity. The
only exceptions were found to be in the production of iron and steel, cable
and wire, synthetic plastics, ceramic, and pottery. As shown previously,
most of these revealed a specialization index higher than one for Poland.
This situation seems to indicate that substantial productivity gains could
be obtained by either letting firms go bankrupt or restructuring those that
are deemed viable. This process almost inevitably involves shedding exces-
sive labor force. How fast and far this process can be carried out without
engendering social tensions is still an open question.
Trade Liberalization and the Future International
Division of Labor Between the EC and the CEECs
The pattern of CEECs' specialization in the EC market is not likely to
witness a dramatic change among its main component parts in the near
future. Some rearrangement may take place within the resource-based ex-
ports, where agricultural products tend to a greater weight in comparison to
energy-intensive goods. Keeping in mind that labor is bound to be relatively
more abundant than natural resources, mature labor-intensive manufactures
will go on being the most viable export earner, especially if reinforced by a
favorable exchange rate policy. In the long term, the results of the restruc-
turing process and the expected inflow offoreign investment and technology
might allow these countries to concentrate on more sophisticated exports,
for which some countries seem to have the right factor endowments.
What type of international division of labor derives from such an
analysis? Commercial relations between the EC and the CEECs are clearly
relations between developed countries, on one side, and countries at an in-
termediate level of development, on the other. A trade structure, which is in
some sectors largely substitutive and not complementary, creates problems
of competition, when it cannot give way to intra-sectoral trade flows. To
this must be added the place of the EC in the world division oflabor. In the
1980s the USA and Japan underwent a process of specialization in sectors
characterized by strong and average international demand, while the EC did
not follow this path, but rather tended to specialize in the weak demand
products. As the previous analysis has shown in detail, the CEECs' relative
specialization often expresses itself in those very sectors where international
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demand is weaker; NICs' competition is stronger; competitive phenomena
appear among CEECs themselves; some of the EC countries tend also to
concentrate their exports on the other industrialized countries; an increas-
ing overproduction and/or unemployment exists in th~ EC; and pressures
are greater toward protection.
Until 1989 the EC's attitude was characterized by strong discrimina-
tion against the CEECs (Olechowski and Yeats, 1982; Messerlin, 1991; and
OECD, 1991). Since then, it has promoted a process of progressive trade
liberalization. In an earlier paper I have shown, however, that the CEECs
are still facing a disproportionate burden of EC trade protection (Graziani,
1992). The possible benefits of tariff lowering under the General System of
Preference Scheme (GSP) are limited by the exclusion of steel products and,
for Poland, fishery products. Moreover, they apply only to a very minor part
of the eligible goods. But above all, nontariff measures (NTMs) coverage,
although decreasing for the last few years, is still both very high absolutely
and relatively to other regions of the world.
A new step forward to better access to EC markets seems to be repre-
sented by the new Europe Agreements (or association agreements), which
regulate the future EC relations with Hungary, Poland, and the successor
states of the CSFR. In March 1992, all tariffs and quantitative restrictions
on EC imports were abolished, with the exception of the sensitive sectors.
In agriculture, liberalization is strictly limited to a few commodities and to
certain quantities within the boundaries of quotas that are allowed to grow
by 10 percent a year. Over a three-year period variable levies can reach a 60
percent decline at most. Naturally, all tariffs and levies beyond the quota
limits have to be paid. In textile and clothing that are covered by multi-fiber
agreements, tariffs should be reduced in six steps and eliminated by 1998,
while quantitative restrictions should disappear within a period of time equal
to half the period to be decided in the Uruguay Round but no sooner than
1998. For iron and steel products other than those covered by the European
Coal and Steel Community, nontariff protection should be eliminated im-
mediately and tariffs within six years. For other products, like wooden and
metal furniture, footwear, glass, cement, and polyvinyl chloride, protection
would be maintained for five to six years. All in all, tariff reductions are
lower and the period envisaged for their elimination longer, depending on
the degree of importance of the sensitive sectors in each country's exports.
Furthermore, the agreements offer new opportunities for the EC members
to initiate and carry out antidumping actions, by authorizing them to look
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outside of the exporting country for a fair-price calculation. Finally, they
add to the "grey" area of NTMs by allowing safeguard measures in those
cases in which increased imports "cause or threaten to cause serious injury"
to domestic producers (Schumacher and Mobius, 1992).
UN Comtrade data for 1990 and 1991 imports into EC countries show
that the liberalizing measures already taken have not succeeded in reversing
other negative factors at work for some of the sectors involved. In fact,
1991 was a worse year than 1990. On average, in all sensitive sectors the
export growth decelerated, despite an uplift of quotas and a lowering of tariff
barriers. Iron and steel imports even decreased absolutely from all CEECs,
except the CSFR. Poland fared the worst: the growth rate of exports of all
subsectors contracted and was negative for food as well. Absolute falls were
also recorded for textiles from Hungary and Romania and for clothing from
Romania. The sectors that increased their growth rates were chemicals for
the CSFR, Bulgaria, and Romania (from an earlier negative rate); food for
Hungary, the CSFR, and Romania (again from a negative rate); and clothing
for the CSFR. Clothing showed the fastest growth rate in both years: above
30 percent on average, with a peak of 88 percent from the CSFR and a trough
of -3 percent from Romania in 1991. It should be noted, however, that a
large part of the CEECs' clothing exports to the EC have been carried out
under the Outward Processing Traffic (OPT) scheme. Through this scheme
EC producers were exporting fabrics to the CEECs and reimporting clothing,
paying tariffs only on the value added by the processing country. In 1991,
the share of OPT in total imports of clothing was 75 percent for Poland, 74
percent for Hungary, 44 percent for the CSFR and Romania, and 33 percent
for Bulgaria. From this perspective, the very high growth rates exhibited by
these CEECs' exports are not to be regarded as much as a positive reaction
to trade liberalization, but are to be regarded largely as strategic imports,
Le., as part of a strategy of EC producers redeploying some of the productive
processes to lower-cost countries.
Finally, apart from the slow liberalization process in the sensitive sectors,
there is a danger that protectionist pressures might be mounting in the
CEECs themselves, as well as from foreign investors active in these countries,
thus reversing the very fast trade liberalization in the CEECs applied until
now.
All the foreseeable impediments notwithstanding, over the next few years
a rapid constant removal of EC trade restrictions would allow the countries
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of Central and Eastern Europe to reap the full benefits of a deeper integra-
tion into the world economy. But this, of course would imply also needed
structural adjustment policies in the EC countries which until now have been
delayed.
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Comments on Giovanni Graziani's Paper
Elhanan Helpman
Elhanan Helpman
This most interesting paper contains a wealth of information about a number of
newly emerging European economies: Bulgaria, the CSFR, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania. The author devotes much effort to the preparation of detailed data that
bear on these countries' trade and specialization patterns. And these data have
been organized in a convenient way that supports the analysis.
The main findings are that in these countries exports are mainly concentrated
on mature, low-skill labor-intensive products; some capital-intensive products (due
to the legacy of the past); and low-technology products for the most part, but
also some medium-technology products. The disaggregated analysis provides some
additional insights. It identifies, for example, some exports of high-skill labor-
intensive products, which have the potential to expand their market. And it also
identifies some negative value-added sectors whose elimination will not only raise
income but also may affect foreign trade in a major way. Not surprisingly, some of
these exports are energy intensive, mostly in resource-based industries. They too
are candidates for adjustment programs.
The data on factor endowments are also revealing. These countries have a
relatively well-educated labor force, and they have relatively large spending shares
on education and R&D and a large fraction of scientists and engineers in the labor
force. These data suggest that their comparative advantage is in high-skill, high-
tech products, rather than in the low-skill, low-technology products in which they
specialize. Looking at it in this way one would predict that with the integration of
these countries into the world economy their patterns of specialization and trade will
shift toward high-skill, high-tech products (it would be nice, in fact, to predict this
pattern from Leamer-type regressions, by placing the countries on the regression
line). There are good reasons for believing, however, that these simple predictions
require major qualifications.
First, the R&D data of these countries are probably not very reliable. The data
may also be contaminated to a larger degree for these countries than for OECD
countries because of the lack of a sharp distinction between civilian and military
R&D. Second, the education data tell only a partial story. On this one can learn
from the experience of Israel that has absorbed a large population of emigrants from
the former Soviet Union. This experience shows that many skills acquired in the
former Soviet Union are not readily applicable in a market economy. Some of these
skills are too specific to the type of planned economy in which they operated, and
they do not fit into the organization and manufacturing structure of a Western-style
economy.
It therefore appears that in order to form an opinion about the most likely
changes in the patterns of specialization and trade of these countries, we need to
take into account the following factors:
Comments 239
• Some of the capital stock is redundant, which requires an estimate of the size
of the viable capital stock.
• Some of the human capital is also redundant. But unlike plants and equipment,
humans can be retrained, and therefore some of the redundant skills can be
transformed into usable skills. This may require an explicit policy of retraining.
• Given the education level of the population and the composition of the la-
bor force, it seems that these countries have the capacity to learn and absorb
Western technologies and organizational methods. They are therefore capable
offollowing the lead of Japan and the NICs and use imitation as a development
strategy.
• Their current policy trend to integrate into the world economy, and especially
into Europe, will enhance the process described in the previous item.
One could conclude from these observations that predictions that are based
on currently measured factor endowments may not be very reliable, unless these
countries engage in explicit policies that will increase the survival value of their
resources, especially their human resources.

Chapter 9
The Export Performance
of the CSFR, Hungary,
and Poland: Reform,
Transformation, and
Competitiveness
Herman W. Hoen*
Introduction
During the first two decades after World War II, foreign trade of Eastern
European countries was characterized by national self-sufficiency and an ori-
entation toward the CMEA market. The economic systems of these countries
were coordinated by instruments fundamentally different from the regulated
markets of Western economies. The particular economic mechanism of the
CMEA countries led to a seclusion from the international division of labor.
In the 1960s the inward orientation of economic policy became a topic
of debate in these countries, because it proved to be an obstacle to economic
*Thanks are especially due to Elhanan Helpman for critical comments on an earlier draft
of this chapter. Helpful suggestions from Giovanni Graziani, Leslie Lipschitz, Gabor
Oblath, Thomas A. Wolf, and other participants ofthe IIASA conference are also gratefully
acknowledged.
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development. Hungary was the first country within the CMEA to intro-
duce a reform program that was clearly inspired by the requirements of the
international division of labor. The main elements of the New Economic
Mechanism inaugurated in 1968 were new institutional arrangements for
conducting foreign trade. Some Eastern European countries followed to a
certain extent, but others introduced few reforms that would lead to a re-
orientation of international trade. All of these countries, however, had one
characteristic in common: the state monopoly on foreign trade. This con-
stituent element of foreign trade was never abolished in the 1970s or in the
1980s (Haendcke-Hoppe, 1988). Political constraints significantly hindered
genuine liberalization.
In 1989 these political restrictions were eased. The system collapsed,
because it was not immediately supplemented by a well-functioning regulated
market economy. The legacy of the past thus became an important starting
point for the transformation. This meant that not all Central and Eastern
European countries were in the same boat. After the political revolution the
former communist countries adhered to different policies of transformation.
Strategies differed with respect to speed of transition and the sequence of
steps in the transition process. An analYsis of the importance of exports
to the West as an effective way of enlarging the international division of
labor leads to two interrelated questions. Firstly, was the development of
relative competitiveness of Eastern European countries' exports in the 1970s
and 1980s an inherited burden or a jumping board for the transformation?
Secondly, how did these countries perform during the early stages of the
transition period, as policies diverted? Both questions are discussed in this
chapter.
The analysis is restricted to the so-called Visegrad countries - the for-
mer CSFR, Hungary, and Poland - for these countries explicitly declared
cooperation in their efforts to become fully integrated with institutions of
Western Europe. l Moreover, they are closest to the EC market. The analy-
sis compares their manufacturing exports. Agricultural and mining products
are excluded, as these contain more homogeneous products and, therefore,
are considered less suitable for a test on competitiveness. In order to get
an indicator of changing competitiveness, a constant-market-shares (eMS)
IThe Visegr<id summit was held in February 1991. The presidents and the prime min-
isters of the former CSFR, Hungary, and Poland discussed possibilities for closer economic
and political cooperation, as well as their relations with the former Soviet Union. See
Senior Nella (1991) on the topic of tightening links between the Community and Central
and Eastern Europe.
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analysis is applied. First, the advantages and drawbacks of this decompo-
sition analysis are outlined; this is followed by a discussion on the choice of
the data used and the presentation and analysis of the results. As the CMS
analysis is not able to explain changes observed in exports, but only able
to perceive alterations in trade flows in different markets, in the concluding
section an attempt is made to evaluate the results, especially in the light of
differences in the reform paths.
Constant-Market-Shares Analysis
With respect to export performance of the traditional centrally planned
economies, supply constraints were effective. Internal factors severely hin-
dered competitiveness on the world market. Therefore, research on foreign
trade performance of the three Central European countries in transition
should focus on changing patterns of competitiveness. The philosophy be-
hind the CMS analysis is that to a certain extent demand and supply factors
can be identified, that is, exports may increase relatively fast because either
international demand is growing on specific markets which are favorable for
the exporting country or the country's export products are more competitive.
CMS analysis is a decomposition technique frequently applied to foreign
trade data. 2 Basically, this method ascribes ex post a country's favorable
or unfavorable export growth either to its export structure or to its "com-
petitiveness." Structural export growth is calculated on the assumption of
constant market shares within a certain reference group. Competitiveness
comes to the fore as the residue between actual and structural change in
exports. The basic identity of CMS analysis is~
dq {dQ } {dB}dt =s dt + dt Q , (9.1)
in which q and Q refer to the total value of exports of the country under
investigation and the reference group, s is the market share of the country
in total exports of the reference group (that is, s = q/Q), *,!Jjf, and ~~ are
time derivates.
The analysis is mostly applied to discrete time intervals. Hence a second-
order effect appears. This component implies a change in the exports of
the reference groups and in the market shares of the country investigated.
The second-order effect clearly disturbs interpretation possibilities, as CMS
2For an extensive treatment of eMS analysis see Leamer and Stern (1970); Richardson
(1971a, 1971b); and Jepma (1986).
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analysis, in principle, tries to keep one of them constant while the other
varies. The appearance of this second-order effect leads to the identity:
b.q == sob.Q + b.sQo +b.sb.Q . (9.2)
In equation (9.2) b. denotes discrete change and 0 refers to the starting year
of the discrete period. The second-order effect is to be allocated to the first
or second term in equation (9.2), which entails the following solutions:
b.q
b.q
S1 b.Q + b.sQo
sob.Q + b.sQ 1
(9.3)
(9.4)
in which subscript 1 refers to the end of the discrete time interval.
A priori there are no reasons for preferring equation (9.3) over equation
(9.4) or vice versa, but in this chapter identity (9.4) is used. It must be kept
in mind that the sensitivity of the analysis for the choice of the base year
remains unsolved, for this choice influences the magnitude of the second-
order effect.3
In many applications the structural effect is subdivided into commodity
and regional effects, for total exports can be thought of as a bundle of small
export flows that are characterized by the nature of the product as well as
by the nature of the region of destination. These effects can be examined
separately, taking into account the fact that exports may be concentrated
in commodities for which demand is growing relatively quickly (or slowly),
or may be flowing primarily to relatively flourishing (or stagnant) regions.
This analysis is referred to as a three-level analysis (Leamer and Stern, 1970,
p. 174), and is based on the following identity:
b.q == sob.Q + {~ sOib.Qi - sob.Q }
+ {L~SOijb.Qij - LSOib.Qi} +~Lb.sijQlij , (9.5)
, J , , J
in which subscripts i and j refer to commodities and regions of destination.
From equation (9.5) the aforementioned scale, structural, and competi-
tion effects can be disentangled. The first term in (9.5) is the scale effect. As
long as the market share in total exports of the reference group remains con-
stant, the countries' export will change by the multiplication of the market
share and change in total exports, that is, sob.Q.
3 For the index-number problem, see Richardson (1971a, pp. 234-236) and Jepma (1986,
pp. 25-32).
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The second (third) term between brackets shows the commodity (region)
effect, and will be positive if the countries' export structure is confronted
with commodities (destination regions) with a relatively large growth in
demand. For example, the commodity effect will be positive if Si > sand
!::J.Qi > O. This implies that the export growth will be larger than could
be expected in total market shares. Competitiveness is calculated as the
residue, that is, the difference between actual and structural export changes.
In equation (9.5) the competition effect is depicted in the last term.
Appealing as it may be, the CMS analysis has many methodological
problems. Except for the above-mentioned index-number problem, which
is related to the discrete time intervals, the frequently applied three-level
analysis suffers from asymmetrical specification. The equation could as well
be formulated such that the region effect is specified before the commodity
effect. The choice is absolutely arbitrary, but does have consequences for
the magnitude of both effects. The alternative equation is as follows:
!'!.q so!'!.Q + {~ So;!'!.Q; - so!'!.Q}
+{~L SOij!::J.Qij - L SOj!::J.Qj} +~ L !::J.SijQlij . (9.6)
t J J t J
The sum of the regional and commodity effects in equations (9.5) and
(9.6) appears, nevertheless, to be identical. Jepma (1986, p. 24) solves this
problem of asymmetry by introducing an inter~ction effect, which shows to
what extent the commodity package and regional dispersion influence each
other. Adding the interaction effect leads to the following identity:
!::J.q so!::J.Q +{~L SOij!::J.Qij - L SOi!::J.Qi}
t J t
+ {~LSOij!::J.Qij - LSOj!::J.Qj}
t J J
+ { [~ So;!'!.Q; - so!'!.Q] - [~~ so;;!'!.Q;; - ~ so;!'!.Q;] }
+L L !::J.SijQlij (9.7)
j
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In identity (9.7) the scale, region, and commodity effects are denoted in
the first two lines. The region effect coincides with the homonymic effect in
the asymmetric identity, in which it is specified after the commodity effect.
Thus it corresponds with the region effect in equation (9.5). The same holds
for the commodity effect, which stems from equation (9.6). Here the region
effect is specified first. In equation (9.7) the region and commodity effects are
purified from interactions. These are separately brought into the equation
as the term in the third line. In case of negative interactions it holds that
which entails a relatively positive influence of regional dispersion on the
commodity effect in comparison with the reference group. The last term in
equation (9.7) contains the residual competition effect which corresponds to
the last terms of both asymmetrical identities.
In this article identity (9.7) is applied in order to avoid the problem
of asymmetry. Nevertheless, the remaining drawbacks of the CMS analysis
have to be taken into account. One of these concerns the fact that the model
is based on identities and, therefore, does not give causal interrelations.
The empirical results obtained from the CMS approach do not suggest any
explanation for slackening or improving conditions of competitiveness. The
analysis is a useful tool in the numerical dissection of realized export change
into different components, but is not able to clarify why exports changed in a
certain manner. Hence, later attempts will have to be made to evaluate the
analysis from another perspective, as will be done in the following sections.
The eMS approach can be helpful in identifying the regions and commodities
for which an explanation has to be found.
A final remark on the pitfalls of eMS analysis concerns implicitly de-
fined competitiveness. The residue does not only contain aspects as quality,
prices, time of delivery, and other services vis-a.-vis competitors, as one would
expect, but it also comprises matters which are not related to supply factors
of the country under investigation such as nontariff barriers. In order to
disentangle aspects such as nontariff barriers it is important to choose the
proper destination market, as well as to split the effects into the separate
markets.
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The problems with CMS applications, as mentioned in the preceding section,
necessitate a well-considered choice of the data set. These complications may
be summarized with the notion that outcomes are very sensitive to opted
discrete years, reference group, commodity composition, and regional desti-
nations. This sensitivity may hinder useful interpretations (see Richardson,
1971b).
In the literature one can find several solutions to the sensitivity of CMS
analysis. For instance, Jepma (1986, pp. 158-160) suggests applying moving
averages of export data. In this chapter, it has been decided to stick to the
traditional discrete approach. Sensitivity of the analysis for the length of
the period over which trade flow changes are being observed is unavoidable,
of course, but in order to reduce the magnitude of disturbing second-order
effects one should, from a theoretical point of view, prefer a period of just
one year. Since one may be interested in structural developments of export
changes over a longer time span, it is essential to discern as exactly as pos-
sible the several components of the analysis in each year. This condition
is most closely to be met by choosing the base year as near as possible to
the period under consideration. It is necessary to decompose export changes
for a series of years, and subsequently cumulate the results, instead of just
splitting up export changes over a longer period of time, which may yield
enormous second-order effects. This procedure has been applied for the
following discrete periods, namely, 1968-1973,1973-1980,1980-1984,1984-
1989, and 1989-1991. On the one hand, the choice of these benchmark years
resembles periods of growth and stagnation in world trade: the first oil crisis
in 1973, negative nominal growth in world trade in the period 1980-1984,
after which a recovery took place. On the other hand, this choice also defines
periods in which policy changes took place in the countries under investi-
gation. Although the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland did not introduce their
transformation programs simultaneously, the year 1989 certainly meant the
end of communism. This implies that the period 1989-1991 takes into con-
sideration the export changes in 1990 and 1991. As far as the other periods
are concerned policy considerations are also taken into account. During the
period 1968-1973, Hungary experienced the first years of the New Economic
Mechanism, but institutional reform stagnated afterward approximately un-
til 1980. In the case of Poland, these were the years of an import-led growth
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policy. The CSFR, during the period 1968-1973, continued with normaliza-
tion and stabilization; this period, in contrast to the experiences of Poland
and Hungary, was not followed by an import-led growth policy. In the late
1980s Hungary was active in speeding up reform measures. Although to a
lesser extent, this was also true for Poland as far as foreign trade relations
were concerned.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify relative export performance of
the three Central Eastern European countries, in order to identify success or
failure of different reform and transition strategies. Theoretically, it would
make sense to take two of the countries as the standard, while investigating
the third (Leamer and Stern, 1970, pp. 176-177).4 Due to sensitivity prob-
lems the choice of this standard of reference is problematic. The Western
market shares of the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland are too small and, there-
fore, lead to unstable results of the analysis. A standard of reference that
consists of all the other Central and Eastern European countries, unfortu-
nately, is not able to ease the instability (Hoen and Wagener, 1989, p. 67).
Thus total world exports have been taken as the standard of reference and
the analysis is repeated for each country.
With regard to classification of commodities and regions of destinations
it has to be realized, once again, that small export groups may effectuate
large fluctuations. It enhances the robustness of analysis to restrict the
amount of commodities and regions. A selected part of the Western Euro-
pean market has been chosen: Belgium and Luxembourg (have been grouped
as one unit), the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Austria, and Switzerland - hereafter referred to as EUR(8). These
countries absorb approximately 70 percent of joint CSFR, Hungarian, and
Polish exports to GECD Europe. They are important (potential) Western
trading partners for the three countries considered. The choice to include EC
member states, as well as EFTA countries, is deliberate, for possibly it facil-
itates statements on inaccessibility of the EC market, something which has
often been put to the fore by authorities of the Central European countries.
Supply constraints in traditional central planning were manifested in a
comparative disadvantage in those products characterized with a wide vari-
ety, and for which after-sales services play an important role. These aspects
are very relevant to manufactures. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to
40f course, in this case the CMS identity has to be written in growth rates, as it is
impossible to calculate, for example, the Hungarian market shares in Polish and CSFR
exports.
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these factors. In order to avoid deviating classifications used in Eastern Eu-
ropean trade statistics, registrations of the importing Western countries have
been relied on. From Standard International Trade Classification (SITC),
the following division has been applied:
SITC 5: Chemicals.
SITC 6 (minus 68): Semimanufactures excluding nonferrous metals (nonfer-
rous metals have been excluded because of low-grade processing).
SITC 7: Machines and transport equipment.
SITC 8 (minus 84): Manufactured consumer goods excluding clothing.
SITC 84: Clothing.
This division is based on the fact that, during the period from 1968 to
1991, these groups of products cover at least 10 percent of the manufacturing
exports of all three countries under investigation. This approach increases
the comparability of the three countries. Data are taken from OECD (various
years).
Results
In 1968 Hungarian and Polish manufacturing exports to EUR(8) were less
than US$100 million. In 1989, the year in which the collapse of the political
system occurred, the manufacturing export of both countries comprised a
nominal value of about US$1.7 billion. During the same period the value of
CSFR manufacturing exports to the EUR(8) increased tenfold and reached a
similar level. A survey of the developments of manufactures' market shares
in the EUR(8) is presented in Table 9.1. The table shows that Hungary
and Poland have been able to increase manufactures' market shares in the
period from 1968 to 1989. It has to be acknowledged, though, that from
the late 1970s until nearly the end of the communist regime both countries
experienced comparable decreasing market shares. Although 1968 is some-
what tainted with interpretation problems, a similar pattern can be deduced
for the CSFR, be it that the decreasing trend o~ market shares in the 1970s
came up earlier, and that for two decades the net result was a decline.
To what extent the observed changes in market shares are to be ascribed
to regional and commodity dispersions of the manufacturing exports or to
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Table 9.1.
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
Market shares in the EUR(8), in percent.
CSFR Hungary
0.42 0.17
0.45 0.22
0.51 0.26
0.51 0.27
0.49 0.30
0.48 0.33
0.44 0.34
0.45 0.32
0.42 0.36
0.41 0.35
0.36 0.30
0.39 0.34
0.34 0.32
0.37 0.33
0.39 0.31
0.37 0.30
0.35 0.29
0.32 0.25
0.32 0.26
0.28 0.26
0.28 0.26
0.27 0.27
0.29 0.32
0.35 0.39
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Poland
0.18
0.17
0.21
0.25
0.29
0.32
0.32
0.36
0.37
0.39
0.39
0.34
0.36
0.29
0.23
0.21
0.26
0.23
0.23
0.22
0.24
0.25
0.37
0.46
competitiveness is found in Table 9.2, which contains the results of eMS
decomposition according to identity (9.7).5
The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 9.2. On the
whole, world trade effects (scale effects) have been the largest for all three
countries.6 The period consisting of the first two years of the transition is
an important exception in this respect. The influence of the other structural
effects, however, appears to have been less decisive for export change. Espe-
cially since 1984 the size of these components relative to the export change
never exceeded 10 percent for all three countries. In the late 1960s and 1970s
5The table contains the yearly cumulated effects and does not present the results of the
decomposition for each year.
6Por the period 1980-1984 negative scale effects do appear, as the dollar accounted
value of world exports decreased due to the appreciation of the dollar and a relatively slow
global economic growth.
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Table 9.2. Decomposition of the CSFR, Hungarian, and Polish manufac-
tures' export change, in million dollars. a
1968-1973 1973-1980 1980-1984 1984-1989 1989-1991
CSFR
Scale effect 332 1,033 -184 1,136 564
Region effect 111 -60 53 -8 87
Commodity effect 106 134 39 -61 -109
Interaction effect -101 48 -122 -9 22
Competition effect -90 -450 -12 -301 603
Export change 358 706 -225 756 1,167
Hungary
Scale effect 178 835 -251 941 568
Region effect 13 51 139 7 153
Commodity effect 17 462 -14 -39 -17
Interaction effect -12 -77 -71 -1 5
Competition effect 90 -476 -144 5 833
Export change 286 795 -341 914 1,541
Poland
Scale effect 165 921 -255 833 561
Region effect 33 -118 102 -11 153
Commodity effect 30 140 4 -22 -36
Interaction effect -29 90 -32 7 40
Competition effect 72 -194 -278 90 1,543
Export change 271 839 -458 897 2,261
aDue to rounding, stated totals do not always correspond to the sum of the parts.
they were somewhat higher, but generally they did not contribute to a stable
pattern.7
The competition effects, on the other hand, seem to have played a ma-
jor role in manufactures' export change during the whole period from 1968
to 1991. For Hungary and Poland these exceeded region and commodity
effects in all of the observed discrete changes. With the exception of the
period from 1968 to 1973, the magnitude of the yearly cumulated CSFR
competition effects was of the same relative order. From the development of
competitiveness a clear pattern can be disentangled. Hungary and Poland
lost ground in the mid-1970s. They appeared unable to respond to increas-
ing competition on world markets. In the period from 1984 to 1989, thus
7Therefore, the further disaggregation of commodity and region effects is not included
in the paper.
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before the collapse of the communist system, the export performance of
Hungary and Poland stabilized, or even slightly improved. From the yearly
decomposition, which is not given in the table, it appears that an enormous
competitiveness improvement occurred in 1988. For the years 1986 and 1987
one could only speak of maintaining competitive positions in the EUR(8).
In the case of the CSFR the disappointing export performance was due
to lacking competitiveness even in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. With
respect to this period, one is inclined to refer to the very conservative policy
of the 1970s, which did not divert trade from East to West, but rather
achieved the opposite effect. All industrial programs stemmed from CMEA
agreements, which shaped the CSFR export products for these markets.
Besides, the balancing of Western trade after the oil shock of 1979 was
almost exclusively achieved by direct import cuts, while exports remained
merely to finance necessary imports (Dyba and Kupka, 1987). Thus trade
specialization was not accorded comparative advantages.
It is clear, however, that neither the CSFR nor Hungary and Poland
were able to catch up in the 1970s and 1980s. It seems plausible to connect
these results with the events of the oil price shocks in the 1970s, pressing
the Western countries to implement important structural changes. Due to
CMEA agreements, such price shocks did not materialize and thus adjust-
ments in production were not enforced. Until the collapse of the communist
system in 1989 there was a cumulative loss of export change due to compet-
itive factors of about US$900 million, US$500 million, and US$300 million
for the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland, respectively. These figures are quite
large, taking into account that export change in the period from 1968 to
1989 was some US$1.5 billion for each country.
In the years of transition (1989-1991) the downward trend for the CSFR
has been reversed; Poland and Hungary could further improve their export
performance after their moderate successes in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, it
remains to be seen whether they will experience a long-term improvement in
competitiveness. The period from 1989 to 1991 is only two years. Moreover,
the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland did not start their transformation programs
at the same time. Hence, one has to be very careful in relating these results
to the current policy strategies. Nevertheless, Poland and Hungary seem to
be somewhat more successful than the CSFR. The Polish improvement might
even be called dramatic. Different legacies have possibly played a role in this
respect. While reforms were attempted in Poland and Hungary in the 1980s,
they were rarely tried in the CSFR (Jermakowicz and Thompson Follis,
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1989). Thus not only current policy options but also different legacies of the
past are to be taken into consideration. But to make further statements more
information, is necessary, e.g., with respect to which markets contributed to
the loss or gain of competitiveness.
Total competition effects can be split into the contribution of specific re-
gions and commodities. Disaggregation of these effects might improve insight
with respect to competitiveness on the various markets. For each market the
disaggregations of the competition effect on regions and commodities is given
by the following formulas:
In formula (9.8) the first term denotes disaggregation to regions of des-
tination, for it aggregates over commodities; the second refers to commodity
disaggregation.8
Disaggregation of the competition effects on commodities is given in
Table 9.3. While, in the three countries, total competition effects showed
similar developments, it appears from Table 9.3 that disaggregation of com-
modities extricates diverging patterns. Before the collapse of the commu-
nist system, the CSFR performed constantly less satisfactorily than could
be expected with machines and transport equipment and with manufactured
consumer goods (clothing excluded). In the period comprising the first years
of transition a significant improvement in machinery and semimanufactures
is evident, while other commodity groups did not positively contribute as
much to the total competition effect.
Right after the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism, clothing
appeared to be Hungary's most competitive sector, followed by semimanu-
factures. Declining competitiveness since then has been manifested in the
traditional strong sectors (clothing and semimanufactures) and has culmi-
nated in a dramatic overall picture for the period from 1980 to 1984. As was
the case with Poland and the CSFR, negative results for clothing (SITC 84)
8This disaggregation has been criticized by Jepma (1986, pp. 47-49). According to
Jepma it cannot be concluded that the disaggregation represents the size of the residue
that can be solely attributed to the markets of destination or to the commodity market,
because these are interlinked. The size of the residues on a certain market is also influenced
by the competitiveness of the commodities actually sold on those markets and vice versa.
A solution is proposed by normalizing the elements. In this paper the suggestion has not
been followed, as it only allows cross-section analysis, while intertemporally the analysis
becomes meaningless.
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Table 9.3. Competition effects of the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland, disag-
gregated to commodities, in million dollars.a
1968-1973 1973-1980 1980-1984 1984-1989 1989-1991
CSFR
SITC 5 Chemicals -4 30 11 -33 20
SITC 6 Semimanufact. 21 -110 35 -125 215
SITC 7 Machines -113 -98 -52 -40 303
SITC 8 Man. cons. goods -3 -17 -17 -55 35
SITC 84 Clothing 8 -254 12 -49 30
Total -90 -450 -12 -301 603
Hungary
SITC 5 Chemicals 7 57 -17 -26 64
SITC 6 Semimanufact. 38 -18 -15 23 276
SITC 7 Machines -1 11 -39 23 132
SITC 8 Man. cons. goods 1 15 -37 21 365
SITC 84 Clothing 45 -540 -37 -35 -4
Total 90 -476 -144 5 833
Poland
SITC 5 Chemicals 1 -25 -23 51 481
SITC 6 Semimanufact. 13 27 -50 75 615
SITC 7 Machines 20 2 -144 -70 73
SITC 8 Man. cons. goods 10 1 -50 6 171
SITC 84 Clothing 27 -200 -11 29 202
Total 72 -194 -278 90 1,543
aDue to rounding, stated totals do not always correspond to the sum of the parts.
were evident especially in the period from 1973 to 1980.9 A development of
a backward-falling Hungarian clothing sector seemed to be persistent, as it
even negatively contributed to the positive competition effect in the period
from 1988 to 1991, while all other specified groups gained market shares.
Other manufactured consumer goods and, to a lesser extent, machines and
transport equipment were the best competing commodity groups in the early
stages of transition.
Over time Poland's total competition effects developed in a way similar
to Hungary's. Disaggregation, however, shows marked differences between
the various commodities, except for the period from 1980 to 1984, when both
9This development was due to a dramatic decline in Dutch clothing imports in 1979.
At first glance one is inclined to believe that these poor results for all three countries stem
from data errors. Such, however, is not the case. Table 9.4 also indicates the negative
results on the Dutch market.
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Table 9.4. Competition effects in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland, disag-
gregated to regions, in million dollars.a
1968-1973 1973-1980 1980-1984 1984-1989 1989-1991
CSFR
Belgium/Luxembourg -8 -4 -10 -11 -30
Germany 29 -51 -38 -117 493
France -108 -79 24 -47 30
Italy 3 -67 -14 -48 47
Netherlands -2 -230 23 -40 20
Austria -4 9 4 -21 45
Switzerland 0 -29 -1 -17 -2
Total -90 -450 -12 -301 603
Hungary
Belgium/Luxembourg -1 -1 0 10 28
Germany 70 85 -140 2 382
France -4 -4 -14 0 33
Italy 10 2 -24 -15 152
Netherlands 4 -516 9 -2 13
Austria 9 -28 21 27 218
Switzerland 2 -16 4 -15 6
Total 90 -476 -144 5 833
Poland
Belgium/Luxembourg 11 -31 -4 3 110
Germany 59 -25 -143 147 1,159
France -17 4 -42 -50 133
Italy -2 39 -85 -4 32
Netherlands 17 -196 9 5 79
Austria 5 5 -9 13 24
Switzerland 0 9 -4 -23 6
Total 72 -194 -278 90 1,543
BDue to rounding, stated totals do not always correspond to the sum of the parts.
countries suffered under debt crises, preventing an improvement in compet-
itiveness. While in the 1970s and the early 1980s chemicals negatively con-
tributed to the total competition effect, they significantly improved it after-
ward. The same holds true for semimanufactures. Machinery and transport
equipment remains a rather poor group, also the least positively contributing
in the first stage of transition. In contrast, clothing seems to recover from
bad performance in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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An overview of regionally disaggregated competition effects is given in
Table 9.4. In the CSFR, regional disaggregated competition effects show
negative contributions over the period from 1968 to 1989, or at best small
positive figures. Here, Germany takes an exception in the period of normal-
ization and stabilization. If the period from 1980 to 1984, which due to a
very small total competition effect is somewhat tainted with interpretation
problems, is disregarded, it has to be concluded that until the collapse of
communism the CSFR performed badly in all the specified regions of desti-
nation. Afterward, its greatest improvement was on the German market.
In the 1970s Hungary's export performance on the German markets con-
tributed positively to the total competition effects, even in the period from
1973 to 1980 when total competition effects dramatically declined. In the
early 1980s it was particularly bad on German, French, and Italian markets.
Since the start of the transition period, it has become competitive especially
on the larger destination markets, to wit, Germany, France, and Italy, but
also special ties with Austria seem to have been successfully exploited.
With respect to Poland's export performance before the collapse of com-
munism, no striking conclusions can be drawn, except for the fact that the
performance on German markets has for most of the time contributed sig-
nificantly to the total competition effect. In the 1980s Poland was also
performing badly on the French market. The positive turnaround after 1989
stems mostly from exports to Germany, while in the other countries smaller
improvements were achieved.
As far as EC protectionism is concerned, the following has to be noted.
Regional disaggregation does not confirm systematic differences between rel-
ative performance on EC and EFTA markets. Although market accessibility
is under any circumstances to be preferred, there seems to be some indica-
tion to conclude that the revealed protectionism of the EC was no bigger
than that of EFTA.tO Moreover, Germany's active Ostpolitik, which entailed
strong pleas for Central and Eastern European integration, may possibly be
reflected in the positive results in terms of competitiveness for the Visegrad
countries. To a lesser extent, perhaps, the same holds true for Austria and
Hungary.
lOHoen and Wagener (1989) included Scandinavian markets in the regions of destination
for a study on Hungary's export performance. Performance on these markets also appeared
not to exceed competitiveness in EC regions.
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The empirical results which were obtained by the CMS analysis do not sug-
gest any explanation for slackening or improving competitiveness. A compre-
hensive analysis of the causes of poor competitiveness of the three countries
in the period from 1968 to 1991 is not the goal of this study. A comparison
of the performance of the three countries, however, raises questions about
the impact of market-oriented reforms on competition in the framework of
centrally planned economies.
Why did the empirical evidence not confirm the expectation that, for
instance, in the 1970s and 1980s Hungary, which was put in the vanguard
of communist reform attempts in Central and Eastern Europe, with the in-
troduction of the New Economic Mechanism, would at least outcompete the
CSFR, a country which neither took any significant decentralizing measures
in respect to foreign trade nor stated any political intentions to shift trade
relations from East to West?
Second, why did findings for 1989-1991 on improved competitiveness
thwart expectations with respect to the effects of diverging opted policies
on transformation? During the first years of transition Hungary, which to
a large extent has followed a gradual approach, performed in-between the
CSFR and Poland, the two countries that opted for the radical approach.
In linking competitiveness and collective interests Hoen (1992) evaluates
the effectiveness of the New Economic Mechanism on Hungarian export per-
formance, the CSFR serving as a point of reference. It could be inferred that
the internal dynamics of the Hungarian reform attempts during the 1970s
and 1980s diverted from the initial aims of marketization. On the one hand,
rent-seeking opportunities did emerge from foreign trade for protectionist
import-substituting producers, while the CMEA market remained an at-
tractive alternative virtually not affected by reforms, and, thus, generating
welfare-distributing instead of welfare-creating effects.
As far as persistence in autarkic behavior is concerned, one has to admit
that it is very difficult to pinpoint coalitions, as they are changing over time.
Nevertheless, there appears to be convincing arguments for strong bargaining
positions of import-substituting producers. Firstly, from the traditional en-
vironment of the centralized bureaucratic system of administrative allocation
and control, they had long enduring relations with the ministries. Foreign
trade merely served as a protective belt for domestic production targets, the
function of exports coming to the fore as financing necessary imports. Ex-
ports had a residual status that did not stimulate lasting bargaining power
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at the higher levels of the hierarchy. Secondly, with the introduction of a
strategy of diversifying exports, homogeneity of the exporters interested in
free trade was to a certain extent distorted. Within the export sector, lob-
bies were dominated by producers relatively less dependent on (diversified)
imports. The exports mostly entailed homogeneous commodities, such as
grain, meat, basic chemicals, and steel (Wass von Czege, 1987, pp. 236-
239). Enterprises interested in genuine liberalization existed in a very large,
but dispersed, group. In short, the trade structure in the 1980s in many
ways still resembled the autarkic situation that existed during traditional
central planning period.
With respect to the disappointing Hungarian competitiveness in the
1970s and 1980s, one has to take into account the survival of another impor-
tant rent-seeking opportunity: the CMEA market. Foreign trade reforms
during the period of the New Economic Mechanism only superficially af-
fected the conducting of CMEA trade. Just as was the case with the other
Central and Eastern European countries, trade was the result of bilateral
negotiations. It was clear that these negotiations led to a trade-off between
world market and CMEA market exports, the latter market being a non-
competitive outlet enfeebling the comprehensive reforms.
The persistence in autarkic behavior and inconsistencies due to unaltered
CMEA trade may serve as an explanation for the relatively small differences
in export performance between Hungary, the CSFR, and Poland, before
the collapse of the system in 1989. It remains questionable whether the
reform package performed better at all than the traditional system of central
planning in Hungary. On the one hand, the improvement of competitiveness
in the period between 1968 and 1973 may be seen as a temporary break
with former structures of power, recovering after a certain period of time
and, once more, leading to the same institutional sclerosis (Olson, 1982).
On the other hand, this temporary revival of competitiveness may have
been due to the impetus of the introduction of an import-led growth policy.
As Poland also appeared to be able to improve its export performance in
the same period, without relying on the same sort of reform attempts, this
argument seems to be more convincing. Moreover, it is not by accident that
the export performances in Hungary and Poland were more severely hit by
the debt crisis than in the CSFR, which at least in part was the result of
this policy. Hence, differences in export performance were not so much due
to system reforms, but reflected different policies.
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Broadly speaking, all three countries did perform very badly in the 1970s
and 1980s. Differences are to be noted with respect to the phasing and sever-
ity of decline in competitiveness. The CSFR was the first to be confronted
with straggling export performance on Western markets, followed by Hun-
gary and Poland. As far as severity is concerned, it can be concluded that,
in the early 1980s, Hungary and Poland were to a larger extent hampered
in their export possibilities due to debt-inspired import constraints, that is,
by the boomerang effect of an import-led growth policy.
It has to be concluded that none of the three countries was able to
improve export performance vis-a-vis the reference group, containing the
rest of the world. It is true, in the period between 1968 and 1989 Hungary
and Poland gained manufactures' market shares, but performance in the
distinguished periods clearly showed that since the late 1970s actual export
growth was below expected change. The CSFR even lost market shares with
respect to the total period before the collapse of the communist system.
Manufactures' market shares in 1989 were below those in 1968. Declining
competitiveness, and not destination and commodity composition of exports,
seems to be responsible for these observed trends in manufacturing exports.
In the late 1980s Poland and Hungary were able to maintain or even slightly
improve their export performance, which may be partly due to intensified
reform attempts.
Statements on the success or failure of shock therapies versus gradual
reforms in respect to competitiveness during the first years of transition are
rather premature. Moreover, the applied CMS analysis does not give any
clues with respect to the effectiveness of the various policies. It rather points
to a certain indifference. The moderate Hungadan approach to institutional
change is clearly progressing and increasing competition, whereas the CSFR
and Polish shock therapies coincide with significantly different competition
effects, although positive for both countries. To stick to the policy seems
more important than the policy itself. What is needed for the hoped-for
supply response is a stable economic policy that diminishes uncertainties.
In accordance with other studies (e.g., Hughes and Hare, 1991), the
CMS analysis shows diversity of the relatively strong commodity sectors
within the Visegrad countries. While in 1989-1991, the CSFR has proved
to be rather competitive in the exports of machines and transport equip-
ment, and to a lesser extent in semimanufactures, strong sectors in Hungary
have come to the fore especially in manufactured consumer goods (clothing
excluded), while chemicals and semimanufactures have largely contributed
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to the improvement of Polish exports since the collapse of the communist
system. This diversity allows international specialization within this group
of countries, without too much competition.
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Part III
Enterprises and Trade Restructuring

Chapter 10
Factors and Effects of Trade
Reorientation in Hungary
Laszlo Halpern*
Introduction
The collapse of the CMEA and the falling domestic demand have dramat-
ically changed the economic environment of Hungarian firms. According
to standard assumptions a typical firm in a centrally planned economy has
a rather slow, if any, price and cost responsiveness. While these assump-
tions might have been true for other Eastern European economies until the
1990s, enterprise behavior in Hungary had already gone through significant
*This paper was produced as a part of the "Industrial Restructuring and Trade Reorienta-
tion and East-West European Integration" project of the ACE program of the Commission
of European Communities and supported by grants from the Ford Foundation (No. 910-
0383) and from the SPES program of the Commission of the European Communities (No.
Ej90100033jPRO) for the Center for Economic Policy Research. The first results of this
research were obtained while the author was a visitor at the Department of Applied Eco-
nomics at Cambridge University with support from an ACE fellowship. Earlier versions
of this paper have been presented at the Seventh Annual Congress of the European Eco-
nomic Association in Dublin, September 1992, at the Second Conference of the European
Association of Comparative Economic Studies (EACES) in Groningen, September 1992,
and at the workshop of the ACE program in Vienna, November 1992. Comments and
criticisms of the participants are gratefully acknowledged, but the views expressed remain
the responsibility of the author. An earlier version of this paper was published as a CEPR
discussion paper (Halpern, 1993).
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changes prior to the political landslide of 1989-1990. This paper analyzes
the most important foreign trade aspects of the more responsive enterprise
behavior. Because most Hungarian enterprises currently exporting to West-
ern economies were already operating under the previous regime, the pattern
of changes in their behavior may be an indication for future rearrangements.
The paper combines time series and cross-sectional analysis. This
twofold attempt is the only way one can analyze the problem of structural
change and the evolution of the corporate sector at the same time. As trade
reorientation from Eastern to Western markets mainly occurred in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s and in 1991, it was impossible to verify empirically the
specification of traditional trade models based on time series only; for this
reason the use of cross-sectional analysis was unavoidable.
The first part of the paper describes and analyzes the performance of
firms exporting regularly to both East and West. The regular exporters' po-
sition in this case did not necessarily imply the pressure of efficiency imposed
by foreign markets on the firms, since the profitability of both ruble and dol-
lar exports were heavily influenced by the impact of central regulation.! In
addition, the eventual losses of exporting activities might have been com-
pensated for in the domestic market, which was more or less sheltered from
the competition of imports by import licensing.
The sample used in the first part of this paper contains firms exporting in
both ruble- and dollar-trade directions between 1981 and 1990. This sample
certainly reflects the changing pattern of enterprise adjustment influenced
by the internal and external environments.
In the second part of the paper the effect of trade reorientation is inves-
tigated on the profitability and growth of firms belonging to another sample,
which includes all the firms with a significant amount of dollar exports be-
tween 1988 and 1991.
Trade Reorientation
The data base used for our analysis consists of the most important balance
sheet as well as profit and loss accounts data, together with data on foreign
trade activity, for 212 firms. These firms were selected from the population
1 Dollar-accounted trade denotes trade flows settled in convertible currencies carried out
with Eastern or Western countries. Ruble-accounted trade covers the trade with CMEA
countries paid in transferable rubles. This distinction is of primary importance, since the
same contracting agents behaved differently in a deal settled in transferable ruble compared
with a deal settled in convertible currencies.
Factors and Effects of Trade Reorientation
Table 10.1. Share in the sample of regularly exporting
firms as compared to the whole corporate sector, in percent.
1981-1989 1990
Sales 18-20 16
Ruble sales 45-53 37
Dollar sales 44-49 36
Assets 18-22 17
Profit 16-24 14
Number of employees 18-19 19
Earnings 17-20 16
Source: Own computation using KOPINT-DATORG data base.
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of virtually all Hungarian firms on the basis of their trade profile.2 Table
10.1 shows, in several dimensions, the size ofthe share of regularly exporting
firms in the Hungarian corporate sector. No newly established firms were
taken into account in the sample due to the lack of information on their
birth and early evolution. Nevertheless, the principal goal - namely, to
analyze the behavior of those enterprises which already existed before large-
scale trade reorientation - can be fulfilled. The analysis of the link between
enterprise performance and institutional transformation - commercialization
or privatization - is beyond the scope of this paper.
The main deficiency of the data set is the lack of firm-specific price data
and foreign-demand information. This means that only nominal variables
were available. In the course of our analysis, however, aggregate sectoral
price indices were used to compute real variables for our firms and also
certain foreign-demand variables were constructed.
Econometric estimations
In this section the results of an empirical econometric analysis are presented.
The detailed analysis of the sample is given in Halpern (1992a). The present
estimation can be regarded as a continuation of previous works (Halpern,
1989; and Halpern and Szekely, 1992) that focused on the econometric esti-
mation of an aggregate export equation. Here an extension is offered: time
series and cross-sectional data are used to estimate a panel model. The shift
from macro level to micro level reflects our aim at analyzing microeconomic
factors of trade reorientation.
2The data originate from the Ministry of Finance; access to it was arranged through
KOPINT-DATORG.
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The first assumption made in the analysis is that in the period under
investigation (1980-1991) there was no demand constraint on dollar exports
of Hungarian firms. This is, of course, a rather strict assumption, since
there were, and still are, certain Hungarian products which have to face
quota regulations when entering, for example, the EC market. Because no
enterprise-level information was available for quotas, we assumed, for the
time being, a lack of demand constraint.
It is also assumed that the Hungarian firms could not be considered
fully irresponsive, inward-oriented, centrally commanded economic agents;
a certain degree of cost sensitivity and market orientation is assumed to be
present in their action.3 A positive supply response to changes in subsidies,
prices, and profitability is expected. The analysis does not intend to in-
vestigate the degree of profit-orientation or to test the eventual behavioral
shift of the firms from wage maximization to profit maximization.4 Our
analysis is confined to the quantification of supply responsiveness, which is
assumed to be present and varying. This type of analysis is possible, because
in Hungary during the 1980s the possibility of individual firms influencing
the central regulation for advantageous discretionary treatment had largely
been reduced.
It is widely known that for many years exporting in the framework of
ruble-accounted trade was advantageous in many respects for Hungarian
firms: instantaneous payment was guaranteed by the Hungarian govern-
ment; delivery conditions were as a rule very loose; virtually no marketing
and servicing costs were needed; and positive economies of scale effects could
be achieved. Ruble exports gave rise to long-term losses by compelling Hun-
garian exporters to lower technical and quality standards; however, these
were offset by the short-term gains. In fact, enterprises exerted constant
pressure on the Hungarian government to increase the annual ruble-export
quota. Enterprises always used their ruble-export quota at the maximum
level. Due to decreasing willingness to supply raw materials or the emerging
constraint on the capacity ofraw material production in the Soviet Union in
the late 1980s the Hungarian government had to adjust the export quotas to
the expected value of imports, since no mechanism was accessible to convert
3In fact, in the macroeconomic context, it was shown that there was a significant supply
responsiveness of exports (see Halpern, 1989; Halpern and Szekely, 1992; and Oblath,
1988).
(It is supposed that the behavioral pattern in foreign trade can be investigated sepa-
rately at this stage. Further research is needed to incorporate the results of this paper
into a general model of the behavior of the firm during transition.
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the "transferable" ruble-trade surplus into hard currency or into imports of
hard products.
The decreasing ruble-export quotas set by the Hungarian government
resulted in the perception of a reduced demand at the enterprise level; there-
fore, in the case ofruble exports, demand at the enterprise level was (almost)
always equal to supply. In the short run the falling ruble-export demand
might have had an effect on inventory accumulation of finished goods or
on domestic sales or on dollar exports. In this analysis the last direct im-
pact will be quantified; the indirect effects through the changing domestic
demand on the dollar exports are not investigated.
Trade reorientation means a growing share of dollar trade at the expense
of ruble trade. This can be represented by the annual change in the share
of dollar exports in total sales. That is why in our econometric estimation
the dependent variable is the change in the share of dollar export volume in
total sales volume of an enterprise [~(XD/X)]. The sketchy formula of the
equation we tested is as follows:
Four groups of explanatory variables are distinguished: subsidies granted
to dollar exports (SD), costs (CD), dollar export prices (PD), and demand
(dD). Two types of demand variables are defined. The first is a proxy
variable which tries to capture the effect of demand through the behavior of
the inventory of finished goods, claiming that the effect of demand has its
impact first on the inventory of finished goods. The second type of demand
variable is simply the volume of ruble exports according to the considerations
given above. The expected sign of price and subsidy coefficients is positive.
It is expected that the coefficient will be negative in case of the costs and
in the case of both demand variables: that is, the higher the inventory
of finished goods and/or ruble-export demand, the lower the dollar-export
supply, all things being equal.
It is supposed that trade reorientation may be influenced by other fac-
tors, too. These can be represented by the productivity level, the capacity
utilization, the real wage, the technical level, and the level of inventories of
intermediate inputs. In the course of the estimation it was tested whether
these factors had an impact on the dependent variable. It was also tested
whether the given parameters were stable over time. If the stability hypoth-
esis of a parameter was rejected, then different parameters were used for
different time periods for the same variable.
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This section presents only the final specification of the panel model (see
Table 10.2). According to these results the change in the share of dollar
export was significantly influenced by the change of its relative profitability
(represented by the cost variable), by the change in dollar-export subsidies,
by the change of relative dollar-export price, and by the change of ruble-
export demand. According to the Wald test these parameters jointly are
significantly different from zero. Neither the second-order serial correlation
test nor the Sargan test indicate misspecification.
The specification includes two lagged values of the dependent variables.
No higher orders oflags showed a significant effect. The impact of the lagged
dependent variables refers to the presence of adjustment costs. It is obvious
that trade reorientation required efforts in terms of costs.
The two-digit figures after the name of a variable in parentheses refer to
the period in which this explanatory variable had to be taken into account.
For the remaining years the variable was set to zero.
The subsidy variable had an impact on the export shares only in the
last two years, because prior to that period a major part of the subsidies
was a flat-rate subsidy granted over the exchange rate. In the earlier period
Hungarian economic policy preferred this type of general export-incentive to
devaluation. The subsidy variable was significant neither for the whole esti-
mation period nor for the period before 1989. This result seems to contradict
the macroeconometric estimations presented in Halpern and Szekely (1992).
A direct comparison, however, may be misleading since the dollar-export
subsidy was always higher for the irregular exporter firms than for the regu-
lar exporter firms making up our sample (Halpern, 1992). The dollar-export
subsidy of the irregular exporters might have been a significant explanatory
variable even before 1989.
Two cost variables are taken into account in the equation. Their effect
on trade reorientation was quite important in comparing the magnitude of
these coefficients with that of the other explanatory variables. The first cost
variable was only effective between 1984 and 1988, while the second one, the
two-year lagged variable, was significant over the whole estimation period.
Several attempts were made to specify the cost effect in the period of fast
trade reorientation (Le., in 1989· and 1990), but they were not successful.
Significant cost adjustment took place during the period of slow trade re-
orientation (Le., prior to 1989); when this process started to accelerate, the
cost adjustment somehow disappeared. The estimated positive coefficients
Factors and Effects of Trade Reorientation
Table 10.2. Final results of the panel model. a
Variables Coefficientb
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T statistic
Dependent
b.(XD/X)
Explanatory
b.(XD/X)(-l)
b.(XD/X)(-2)
b.SD (89-90)
b.CD(84-88)
b.CD(-2)
b.PD(-l)
b.(XR/X)(86-87)
b.(XR/X)(89)
Test for second-order serial' correlation:
Wald test of joint significance:
Sargan test:
0.2584
-0.0931
0.0376
-0.1761
-0.0546
0.0345
-0.0354
-0.0291
0.390
798.9
84.7
12.2
-8.0
3.0
-23.2
-6.7
2.1
-3.6
-2.0
[212]"
[ 8]
[ 65]
XD/X
SD
CD
PD
XR/X
(dollar-export sales/dollar-export prices) / (total sales/total sales
prices).
dollar-export subsidies/dollar-export sales.
(dollar-export costs/dollar-export sales) / (total costs /total sales).
dollar-export price/total sales prices.
(ruble-export sales/ruble-export prices) / (tot al sales / tot al sales
prices).
difference operator.
QThe estimation method was the so-called Generalized Method of Moments (see Arellano
and Bond, 1988). The estimation period is 1984-1990 since three observations are lost
because of the difference form and the two-year lagged explanatory variables. The details
of the estimations and further results can be found in Halpern (1993).
bThe coefficients refer to standardized variables (mean=O, standard deviation=1) for the
sake of comparability of their effects on the dependent variable.
"Degree of freedom.
for the period between 1989 and 1990 were not significant in any specifica-
tion. The available information was not sufficient to specify the causes of
this disappearance of the cost adjustment during the period of intensified
trade reorientation.
The explanatory variable of a one-year lagged change in relative price
(measured in national currency) proved to be significant with positive coeffi-
cient. This conforms to the general assumption of an export-supply equation.
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The change in ruble-export sales significantly influenced the change in
dollar exports over three years. The sign of the parameter conforms to our
expectation.
In every specification time dummies were added. They were always
jointly significant explanatory variables, and their parameter was rather high
in 1990 and in 1988 showing that time-specific effects were also important
and were not represented by other explanatory variables. One possible vari-
able hiding behind the time dummies could have been the exchange rate,
which has no firm-specific effect, only time-specific effects. It should be em-
phasized, however, that the exchange rate had been represented through the
cost variables (though it had its impact only combined with other factors
like the impact of foreign prices, the share of imported intermediate inputs,
etc.).
Besides time dummies the effect of other dummies were also tested, like
dummies for the specific industries, profitability, and asset size. It was as-
sumed that these factors may add to the explanation of the difference in
pace of trade reorientation in different firms. In general this assumption had
to be rejected, since a significant effect was found only in one sector (ser-
vices). The failure of finding additional significant dummies, however, might
have been due to the inappropriate representation of the above-mentioned
variables.
Effects of Trade Reorientation
Trade reorientation of Hungarian sales was accelerated in 1990 and 1991
by several factors such as the demise of the CMEA, the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, and the unification of East and West Germany. Since in
this analysis we record trade reorientation in the terms of ruble- and dollar-
accounted trade, the decision to shift to convertible currencies in payments
with former CMEA partners from 1991 onward was instrumental in speeding
up the process.
Accordingly, trade reorientation in this sense was almost completed by
1991; no room for further trade reorientation was available, since the ruble
export had practically vanished in 1991. In the second part of the paper
the behavior of dollar-exporting firms is investigated during and after trade
reorientation. For this analysis a new panel of firms was required. In the
following, first the macro-performance of the Hungarian economy and the
development of the profitability of the corporate sector are examined. Then
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Table 10.3. Ratio of direct and overhead costs to sales in the corporate
sector, in percent.
Direct costs, all sales
Domestic sales
Ruble exports
Dollar exports
Overhead costs
Total costs
1988
82.7
82.6
89.5
79.6
13.0
95.7
1989
81.6
82.0
85.2
75.3
13.9
95.5
1990
81.3
81.1
98.1
78.8
16.3
97.6
1991
76.6
76.9
80.2
74.2
22.8
99.4
a detailed analysis of cost structure and profitability of exporting firms in
the period between 1988 and 1991 follows.
Macro-performance and the profitability of the enterprises
Since 1989 the Hungarian economy has fallen into a deep recession. During
1990 and 1991 the GDP fell by 14.8 percent, the gross output by 16.7 percent,
and the consumer prices grew by 74.4 percent. Nevertheless, the volume
of dollar trade increased: the dollar exports by 26.2 percent, the dollar
imports by 22.2 percent compensating for the shrinking ruble trade. The
current account balance which was in bad shape in 1988 and 1989 improved
in 1990 and 1991 and became positive in spite of the huge amount of interest
payments on Hungary's external debt.
The steep decline in domestic demand and the drop of trade with former
CMEA economies resulted in a very steep increase in unemployment and
capacity underutilization in the Hungarian economy.
The cost structure of the corporate sector reflected this crisis. The over-
all profitability (sales minus total costs related to sales) has almost disap-
peared; it was between 4.3 and 4.5 percent in 1988 and 1989, it then fell to
2.4 percent in 1990, and in 1991 it was only slightly positive: 0.6 percent
(see Table 10.3). The ratio of direct costs to sales improved in 1990 and
1991 for both domestic and dollar-export sales, while the sharply declining
ruble exports were hardly able to cover the direct inputs the enterprises used
for their production. This latter meant that exporting firms had no more
possibility of rechanneling costs from domestic or dollar-export sales to ru-
ble exports. The accounted high direct costs of ruble exports, as well as the
alleged benefits of imported raw materials and energy from former CMEA
countries, were the arguments that the enterprises used in bargaining for
subsidies from the central authorities in these years. The share of overhead
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Table 10.4. Structure of sales in the sample of exporting firms, in percent.
Domestic sales
Ruble exports
Dollar exports
Total sales
1988 1989 1990 1991
76.6 75.3 76.0 73.1
9.1 8.5 5.3 0.4
14.3 16.2 18.7 26.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
costs in total sales increased very fast: it was only 13.9 percent in 1989, and
after the increases of 2.4 and 6.5 percentage points arrived at 22.8 percent
in 1991. This increasing tendency was mainly due to growing banking costs
and the falling level of capacity utilization.
Cost structure and profitability of exporting firms
The sample of dollar-exporting firms selected for our analysis consists of
those firms which exported more than US$1 million in any year between
1988 and 1991.5
Within the four years of our analysis the number of firms belonging to
the sample increased from 711 to 952. They made up more than 96 percent
of the dollar exports between 1988 and 1990, and 86.5 percent in 1991. Their
share in ruble exports was also dominant.
The sales structure of the sample firms (see Table 10.4) reveals a very
fast increase in dollar exports and the collapse of ruble exports, but the
overall share of exports shows a substantial increase only in 1991. By 1991
the average firm in the sample exported more than one-fourth of its total
sales for convertible currencies, which means that between 1988 and 1991
this share had almost doubled.
The cost structure of the sample firms showed very similar tendencies
compared with that of the corporate sector. There was a substantial - 4.3
percentage points - improvement (i.e., decrease) in the indicator of direct
costs on dollar exports. The change of this indicator reveals many impacts
like the effect of the exchange rate, foreign and domestic prices, and so on.
As a consequence of the large-scale decline of ruble exports in 1990, the
level of even the direct costs exceeded the sales revenues. In 1991 a further
increase of direct costs of ruble exports (by the level of 103.2 percent of sales
5This analysis is based on Halpern (1992b) contracted for the Hungarian Ministry of
Finance. The data base covers the relevant balance sheet as well as the profit and loss
account data for the sample firms.
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Table 10.5. Profit rate in the sample of exporting firms, in percent.
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Return on assets
Pre-tax profit rate
After-tax profit rate
1988
5.3
4.1
2.4
1989
5.9
5.0
2.6
1990
4.5
3.4
2.0
1991
0.2
-0.1
0.2
revenue) was accompanied by a 5.5 percent jump in overhead costs. The
different profitability indicators in Table 10.5 confirm the tendency outlined
above: that the level of profit decreased after 1989, and in 1991 it was
practically zero in the sample.6
This decline in profitability can partly be explained by the decrease
in subsidies, especially for dollar exports (Table 10.6). Subsidies to ruble
exports were with the exception of 1989 very high, but their macroeconomic
effect became marginal by the end of the period.
Now we turn to an analysis of the profitability in different sales direc-
tions. As demonstrated above, direct costs revealed substantial improvement
in the dollar-export sales and a deterioration in ruble exports. As far as in-
direct costs are concerned one cannot avoid the task of disaggregating the
overhead costs to sales directions, since the overhead costs are also somehow
covered by the revenue of the sales. The approach used in this analysis is dis-
aggregation of the overhead costs at the firm level following the proportions
of the direct costs of each sales direction.1 The result of this procedure gives
the profitability measures which incorporate the effect of subsidies and the
imputed overhead costs in addition to the direct cost indicators (see Table
10.7). As one can observe a significant droP.in average profitability took
place in 1991, which can almost exclusively be explained by the collapse of
the profitability of domestic sales, which fell by 5.3 percentage points and
became negative. The fall in ruble-export profitability was much larger; but,
since the share of ruble sales fell even faster, it exerted, in fact, a positive
effect on overall profitability. In contrast the small decrease of dollar-export
profitability was fully compensated by the growing share of dollar-export
sales within total sales.
Dollar export was the most profitable activity during the four years. The
peak level of the profitability of dollar exports in 1989 was 10.6 percentage
6The after-tax profits in 1991 exceeded the pre-tax profits, since the firms were refunded
their excess advance profit tax payments in 1990.
7The alternative approach could have been to make a similar calculation at the aggre-
gate level or to follow the proportion of sales.
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Table 10.6. Ratio of net subsidiesa to sales in the sample of exporting
firms, in percent.
1988 1989 1990 1991
Domestic sales -3.8 -2.3 -3.5 -1.9
Ruble exports 18.6 7.2 18.7 17.6
Dollar exports 10.4 8.6 5.4 4.0
Total sales 0.2 0.2 -0.7 -0.2
aSubsidies minus taxes.
Table 10.7. Profit rate in different sales directions in the sample of export-
ing firms, in percent.
1988 1989 1990 1991
Domestic sales 3.1 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Ruble exports 3.9 -2.7 -12.7 -32.1
Dollar exports 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Total sales 4.1 5.0 3.4 -0.1
points higher than its bottom level in 1991. An analysis of the direct-cost
indicators shows that the development of direct costs do not explain this
decline.
The good profitability in 1989 can be explained by the coincidence of
favorable price movements in the external markets and by the possibility of
transferring the firms' costs from dollar to ruble exports. The comparison of
domestic- and export-sales price indices shows that in spite of the accelerat-
ing domestic inflation the price index of exports did not lag behind that of
the domestic sales. The difference between the average annual price indices
of domestic and export sales between 1988 and 1991 was 1.7 points. The
annual real effective exchange rate index was 92.9 percent, 99.4 percent,
101.3 percent, and 112.1 percent in the years 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991
respectively (Source: National Bank of Hungary Monthly Bulletin, 1993,
Nos. 2-3). These two factors meant that the exporting firms managed to
improve their dollar-export prices to counterbalance the effect of the real
appreciation of the Hungarian currency in 1990 and, especially, in 1991.
The two main factors responsible for the sudden decline of the profitabil-
ity of dollar exports after 1989 were the large fall of subsidies and the steep
increase in overhead costs due to the decline of ruble exports and domestic
sales. Since the growing share of dollar exports and the decreasing share of
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Table 10.8. Correlation between the share of exports to total sales and
the return on assets in the sample of exporting firms, in percent.
1988 1989 1990 1991
Unweighted
Ruble -ll.l a -3.3 -3.5 -3.7
Dollar 9.6b 1.5 -1.4 11.0a
Weighted by total sales
Ruble -4.4 -8.1b -8.0b -4.7
Dollar 12.0a 5.3 -11.3a 0.1
aSignificant at 1 percent level.
bSignificant at 5 percent level.
ruble exports were the main trends between 1988 and 1991, two questions
arise. Did a firm with a higher share of dollar exports (and with a lower share
of ruble exports) have higher or lower profitability? Did a higher share of
dollar exports improve the profit at the aggregate level? In static terms the
answers depend on the link between the variables in questions.
The correlation coefficient between the export shares and the rate of
return on assets reveals certain links (Table 10.8). There is a weak significant
negative correlation with ruble exports in 1988, and over time this negative
correlation did not change but became insignificant. In 1988 and in 1991
there was a weak significant positive correlation between the dollar exports
and the rate of return on assets, while there was no correlation at ail in 1989
and 1990. These results give a partial answer to the first question. The
link between the profitability and the export .share at the firm level may
have stronger relation at the aggregate level if the size of the firm turns out
to be a significant factor. The results of the calculations which take into
account the size of the firms show a somewhat different picture. In 1988
the two correlation rates for dollar exports do not differ, while in 1991 the
correlation taking into account the size factor is insignificant. Moreover, the
correlation with size effect was weak, significant, and negative in 1990.
These results somehow reflect the different effects of fast trade reori-
entation, and show that the role of cost adjustment, presented in the first
part of the chapter, has diminished. It seems that the positive link between
profitability and export exposure reappeared in 1991, but its effect has not
yet materialized at the macro level.
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Distribution of exporting firms
On the basis of our diversified and comprehensive data base it is possible to
further investigate the profitability situation of dollar-exporting firms. For
this purpose nine criteria have been selected to calculate and analyze the dis-
tribution of dollar-exporting firms, their dollar exports, and the profitability
ratios:
• Rate of return on assets (Table 10.9).
• Profitability of dollar exports (Table 10.10).
• Rate of growth of dollar exports (Table 10.11).
• Share of dollar exports (Table 10.12).
• Value of dollar exports (Table 10.13).
• Sectors (Table 10.14).
• Number of employees (Table 10.15).
• Share offoreign assets (Table 10.16).
• Organizational form (Table 10.17).
Rate of Return on Assets
The number of firms with negative profits increased by about 100 in 1990
and in 1991 (Table 10.9). Their role in dollar exports was quite important.
In 1990, 17.9 percent of the overall dollar exports was produced by loss-
making firms; in 1991 it was 23.8 percent. If the break-even firms are also
included, their share in dollar exports amounts to almost one-third in 1991.
On the other end of the distribution, the share of the most profitable firms
also increased.
There was no major shift in the distribution of profits on domestic sales
and dollar exports by the rate of return on assets. In the group with the
highest rate of return, the profit rate of domestic sales remained practically
unchanged; but, in the group with the smallest rate of return, there was
a substantial decline. The same occurred with dollar exports in a reverse
order: the most profitable ones with the highest rate of return lost more
than half of the profit rate, but the profit rate in the group with the lowest
rate of return remained the same. Because of these two changes, the profit
of total sales has moved downward only in the groups with the lowest return
on the assets.
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Table 10.9. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the rate
of return on assets, in units and percent.
Rate of return on assets 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of firms
Negative 36 56 155 267
Zero 30 39 75 111
0-2 percent 93 102 133 158
2-5 percent 154 187 132 128
5-15 percent 303 287 214 172
Above 15 pe)'cent 92 120 116 115
TotalQ 708 791 825 951
Dollar exports
Negative 2.5 2.8 17.9 23.8
Zero 1.6 1.5 6.6 8.9
0-2 percent 12.2 15.3 13.9 15.9
2-5 percent 22.4 16.7 12.2 10.9
5-15 percent 49.0 45.6 34.5 23.6
Above 15 percent 12.2 18.1 14.8 16.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit rate of domestic sales
Negative -2.2 -6.6 -6.9 -15.4
Zero -0.6 -6.3 -9.8 -12.4
0-2 percent -1.4 -1.8 2.1 -1.5
2-5 percent 1.5 2.5 3.3 2.0
5-15 percent 4.4 4.8 7.4 5.9
Above 15 percent 8.2 9.4 9.5 7.4
Average 3.1 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Profit rate of ruble exports
Negative -6.7 -12.8 -14.2 -39.2
Zero 5.4 -4.6 -3.9 -20.5
0-2 percent 16.2 5.4 -11.8 -46.0
2-5 percent -4.4 -2.5 -6.5 -8.6
5-15 percent 6.2 -11.8 -22.8 -21.7
Above 15 percent -3.4 8.0 9.9 -51.4
Average 3.9 -2.7 -12.7 -32.1
Profit rate of dollar exports
Negative -8.6 -9.4 -1.0 -8.0
Zero -0.8 2.6 -7.4 -8.3
0-2 percent 5.5 6.3 -1.2 14.4
2-5 percent 11.2 10.3 3.7 3.0
5-15 percent 8.8 15.6 10.1 5.2
Above 15 percent 21.0 22.1 12.1 10.7
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Profit rate of total sales
Negative -3.0 -8.2 -6.5 -13.3
Zero 0.2 -4.7 -8.5 -11.0
0-2 percent 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.7
2-5 percent 2.6 3.2 2.8 2.2
5-15 percent 5.2 5.6 6.5 5.7
Above 15 percent 9.3 11.3 9.8 8.3
Average 4.1 5.0 3.4 -0.1
QDue to missing data the total number of firms is less than the number of firms in the
sample.
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Profitability of Dollar Exports
In 1989, more than half of the dollar exports was carried out with a profit
rate over 15 percent, whereas in 1991 only 18.5 percent of dollar exports was
exported with a profit as high (Table 10.10). At the same time the share
of dollar exports with a profit rate below 5 percent increased threefold. The
distribution was modified mainly in 1990.
It is worth mentioning that the average profit rate of the best-performing
dollar exporters (i.e., those achieving a profit rate of more than 15 percent)
increased by one-third in the year 1991 from 26.1 percent to 34.7 percent.
Accordingly the most profitable (over 15 percent) firms were selling a much
smaller share of Hungary's exports, but achieving a higher average profit
rate.
One can find no correlation between the profitability of dollar exports
and that of domestic sales. The average profit rate of domestic sales did not
reveal any differentiation according to the profit of dollar exports. In 1991
the best and the worst dollar-exporting firms had almost the same, slightly
negative, profit rate on their domestic sales.
Rate of Growth of Dollar Exports
Between 1989 and 1991 some 50 firms in the sample were able to double the
volume of their dollar exports. Approximately the same number of firms
belonged to the group that achieved an export growth between 50 and 100
percent (Table 10.11). On the other hand, an increasingly large number of
firms suffered a loss in their export volume on dollar markets.
In the first two years the impact of the most dynamic firms was rather
low; they represented only between 3 and 4 percent of the total value of
dollar exports, thus supporting the view that only small firms were able to
grow fast. By 1991 these firms accounted for 18.2 percent of dollar exports
and their role became significant.
The change in the link between the growth rate and the profit rate of
dollar exports has been fundamental. In 1989 firms with stagnating dollar-
export volume had higher profits than firms with positive growth, and even
the firms with declining export volumes had higher profits than the firms
with the fastest growth rate of dollar exports. In 1990 and particularly in
1991 this correlation turned around: the fastest growing firms had signifi-
cantly higher profit rates, while those firms which had to reduce the volume
of their dollar exports suffered losses.
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Table 10.10. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the profit
rate of dollar exports, in units and percent.
Profit rate of dollar exports 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of firms
< -5 percent 179 182 264 362
-5-0 percent 66 70 91 102
0-5 percent 61 89 85 102
5-15 percent 124 143 150 156
> 15 percent 232 269 209 199
Total 662 753 799 921
Dollar exports
< -5 percent 16.1 8.7 25.6 26.6
-5-0 percent 10.9 8.7 13.5 16.0
0-5 percent 11.4 14.0 6.8 15.7
5-15 percent 24.7 17.7 24.2 23.3
> 15 percent 36.9 50.9 29.9 18.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit rate of domestic sales
< -5 percent 6.1 5.2 4.2 -1.7
-5-0 percent 4.6 5.9 3.7 0.1
0-5 percent 5.5 2.5 3.4 -0.9
5-15 percent 2.9 4.0 2.5 0.6
> 15 percent 0.9 3.7 5.4 -1.4
Average 3.1 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Profit rate of ruble exports
< -5 percent 8.1 5.0 -4.3 -45.6
-5-0 percent -0.2 -6.8 -4.4 -24.4
0-5 percent 3.5 1.0 -20.4 -45.2
5-15 percent 4.8 -0.5 -9.2 -16.4
> 15 percent 0.9 -9.4 -29.7 -37.9
Average 3.9 -2.7 -12.7 -32.1
Profit rate of dollar exports
< -5 percent -20.7 -22.3 -19.4 -21.0
-5-0 percent -1.8 -2.5 -2.0 -2.4
0-5 percent 1.3 3.2 2.6 2.7
5-15 percent 11.2 8.9 8.9 9.2
> 15 percent 28.3 26.9 26.1 34.7
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Profit rate of total 'sales
< -5 percent 3.2 2.2 -1.0 -6.6
-5-0 percent 3.1 3.7 1.8 -1.0
0-5 percent 4.8 2.5 2.3 0.4
5-15 percent 4.7 4.6 3.1 3.4
> 15 percent 4.8 6.9 7.1 4.2
Average 4.1 5.0 3.4 -0.1
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Table 10.11. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the growth
rate of dollar exports, in units and percent.a
0.5
23.0
32.5
34.0
6.7
3.3
100.0
Growth rate of dollar exports
n.a. b
Decrease more than -10 percent
Between -10 and +10 percent
Increase between 10 and 50 percent
Increase between 50 and 100 percent
Increase more than 100 percent
Total
n.a.
Decrease more than -10 percent
Between -10 and +10 percent
Increase between 10 and 50 percent
Increase between 50 and 100 percent
Increase more than 100 percent
Total
1989 1990
Number of firms
34 17
125 196
132 116
160 121
43 50
55 49
549 549
Dollar exports
0.6
11.2
35.9
42.9
5.3
4.1
100.0
1991
20
238
69
132
43
47
549
0.2
23.9
15.7
33.9
8.1
18.2
100.0
n.a.
Decrease more than -10 percent
Between -10 and +10 percent
Increase between 10 and 50 percent
Increase between 50 and 100 percent
Increase more than 100 percent
Average
n.a.
Decrease more than -10 percent
Between -10 and +10 percent
Increase between 10 and 50 percent
Increase between 50 and 100 percent
Increase more than 100 percent
Average
n.a.
Decrease more than -10 percent
Between -10 and +10 percent
Increase between 10 and 50 percent
Increase between 50 and 100 percent
Increase more than 100 percent
Average
Profit rate of domestic sales
3.7 14.0
2.5 3.2
2.4 3.1
5.4 -0.1
3.7 5.1
4.2 0.9
4.0 4.2
Profit rate of ruble exports
14.2 30.9
0.2 -17.3
2.9 -5.4
-14.4 -26.6
-4.4 -12.8
15.2 -6.6
-2.7 -12.7
Profit rate of dollar exports
0.9 24.3
11.7 -0.8
16.0 0.9
14.6 13.3
13.9 9.9
5.1 8.9
13.6 4.9
Profit rate of total sales
n.a. 3.8 14.3
Decrease more than -10 percent 3.1 1.4
Between -10 and +10 percent 6.0 2.0
Increase between 10 and 50 percent 5.5 1.5
Increase between 50 and 100 percent 4.5 4.6
Increase more than 100 percent 4.6 1.8
Average 5.0 3.4
aSectoral price indices were used to compute growth rates.
bIn the base year the dollar export was zero.
-1.5
-0.7
-3.3
-3.4
8.4
-9.7
-1.1
-49.7
-43.8
-29.2
-36.3
-43.7
-14.6
-32.1
0.4
-5.9
4.6
1.6
10.4
22.0
3.0
-1.4
-1.7
-0.6
-1.2
8.5
0.3
-0.1
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There was no link at all between the growth rate of dollar exports and
the profitability of domestic sales in 1989 and in 1990. In 1991 it turned out
that a decline of exports had a less detrimental impact on the profit rate
of domestic sales, while firms with the fastest growing dollar exports had
the highest losses in their domestic sales. There was only one class of firms
with positive profit rate, the firms with a growth rate between 50 and 100
percent.
Was there any correlation between the growth rates of dollar exports and
domestic sales? It turned out that in 1989 and in 1991 a positive connection
between the two growth rates existed: the higher the growth rate of dollar
exports, the higher the growth rate of domestic sales. Moreover only those
firms had a positive rate of growth of domestic sales which increased the
volume of their dollar exports by more than 50 percent. This link was
totally missing in 1990, however, partly because in this year domestic- and
ruble-export sales declined at almost the same pace.
Share of Dollar Exports
Dollar exports have played an increasing role in the activity of the sample
enterprises: by 1991 more than half of the firms had a higher than 25 percent
dollar-export share in contrast to less than one fourth of the firms with such
an export share in 1988 (Table 10.12). Firms with higher than 25 percent
dollar-export share in sales made up more than 80 percent of dollar exports
in 1991, a 20 percentage point increase in three years (from 59.1 percent in
1988 to 83.1 percent in 1991).
In 1988 firms with a higher share of dollar exports in sales were more
profitable than those with lower share, but this rule ceased to exist in the
subsequent years. Until 1991 there was no clear connection between the
share of dollar exports and the profit rate of domestic sales either. In 1991,
however, we see the emergence of an interesting relation: the higher the share
of dollar exports, the higher the loss on domestic sales. The only exception
here was the group of firms with no dollar exports.
Size of Dollar Exports
The number of firms with dollar exports between US$l million and US$25
million has increased considerably (Table 10.13). The small and large ex-
porters increased their share at the expense of medium exporters. The mush-
rooming number of small exporters and their role in dollar exports could
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Table 10.12. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the share
of dollar exports in total sales, in units and percent.
Share of dollar exports 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of firms
Zero 40 29 28 34
0-10 percent 291 287 202 181
10-25 percent 212 244 265 221
25-50 percent 119 168 228 279
> 50 percent 43 55 105 237
Total 705 783 828 952
Dollar exports
Zero 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0-10 percent 12.5 lOA 6.9 5.3
10-25 percent 28.5 24.4 26.6 11.6
25-50 percent 43.2 51.2 42.4 36.2
> 50 percent 15.9 14.0 24.1 46.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit rate of domestic sales
Zero 1.5 3.4 -1.3 -9.3
0-10 percent 4.1 4.9 6.4 2.9
10-25 percent 2.5 3.6 1.8 -0.7
25-50 percent 1.1 2.6 3.1 -5.9
> 50 percent 1.1 -5.1 0.6 -10.1
Average 3.1 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Profit rate of ruble exports
Zero -10.5 5.8 -66.1 -93.0
0-10 percent 0.8 -1.6 -4.8 -23.6
10-25 percent 9.0 404 -8.3 -50.2
25-50 percent 0.5 -14.0 -4.3 -20.8
> 50 percent -3.5 1.0 -80.2 -37.9
Average 3.9 -2.7 -12.7 -32.1
Profit rate of dollar exports
Zero
0-10 percent 4.8 12.5 5.9 6.8
10-25 percent 5.1 6.0 8.8 -2.8
25-50 percent 13.9 17.7 -1.0 3.0
> 50 percent 11.1 1204 10.5 4.0
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Profit rate of total sales
Zero 104 3.5 -1.3 -9.5
0-10 percent 3.9 4.8 6.2 3.0
10-25 percent 3.9 4.1 2.2 -1.2
25-50 percent 5.0 6.2 1.1 -2.8
> 50 percent 7.2 7.7 1.7 -0.8
Average 4.1 5.0 304 -0.1
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increasingly counterbalance the impact of the dozen firms that exported al-
most 30 percent of the overall dollar exports in 199L
The largest exporters always had the highest profit rate on their dollar
exports, but this rate has rapidly been falling. It was close to 25 percent in
1989 and went below 10 percent in 1991.
The activity of large exporters in the domestic market was not very
successful: in 1988 and 1991 their profit was the lowest and, in fact, negative.
Their overall profit was also falling and was only 0.6 percent in 1991.
The medium-sized and small exporters had to cope with a falling profit
on their dollar exports. There was a major difference between medium-
sized and small exporters though; the medium-sized exporters improved their
profitability on the domestic market, while the small exporters in this market
became loss-makers in 1991.
Sectors
Mechanical engineering, transport, and foreign trading activities increased
their share in dollar exports at the expense of metallurgy, chemicals, and
domestic trade (Table 10.14). Food processing and agriculture also suffered
very heavy losses in profitability: the former in 1990, the latter in 1991.
Number of Employees
The number of large firms in the sample in terms of employees decreased
a bit in 1991 (Table 10.15). This implies that the number of small and
medium-sized firms increased very fast. The share of large firms in dollar
exports was above 95 percent in 1988 and 1989 and this ratio went down to
82.1 percent by 1991. On balance mainly the share of medium-sized firms
increased.
The large and medium-sized firms had similarly very high (above 10
percent) profit rates on their dollar exports in 1988 and 1989. The fall was
very dramatic for medium-sized firms; their profit went below zero, while the
large firms preserved part of their advantage in the next years. On the other
hand, the small firms had huge losses in 1988, while in 1991 their profit rate
on dollar exports was at 8.4 percent.
There were no differences among the different size firms in profit rates
on domestic sales. The profit of small firms in 1988 is an exception. All the
three groups lost profit in 1991, and, as a consequence, the only group with
positive profit on overall sales was the group of small firms.
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Table 10.13. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the value
of dollar exports, in units and percent.
Value of dollar exports 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of firms
< US$l million 169 183 109 159
US$l million-25 million 490 558 668 737
US$25 million-100 million 40 42 42 44
> US$100 million 9 8 9 12
Total 708 791 828 952
Dollar exports
< US$l million 1.1 1.2 0.6 0.8
US$l million-25 million 44.1 44.3 48.2 47.4
US$25 million-100 million 29.6 30.6 24.5 22.5
> US$100 million 25.1 23.9 26.6 29.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit rate of domestic sales
< US$l million 5.1 3.5 0.3 0.2
US$l million-25 million 3.7 4.4 5.1 -1.5
US$25 million-100 million 2.9 2.4 4.9 4.6
> US$100 million -2.3 5.9 1.1 -8.8
Average 3.1 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Profit rate of ruble exports
< US$l million 7.9 0.7 -15.9 -44.3
US$l million-25 million 3.2 0.0 -6.2 -34.1
US$25 million-100 million 8.0 2.8 -5.6 -38.4
> US$100 million -15.9 -57.0 -61.7 -21.5
Average 3.9 -2.7 -12.7 -32.1
Profit rate of dollar exports
< US$l million 4.1 20.3 -6.5 -15.4
US$l million-25 million 6.2 8.8 3.4 0.4
US$25 million-100 million 7.5 11.6 -3.2 1.5
> US$100 million 19.1 24.6 15.3 8.8
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Profit rate of total sales
< US$l million 5.2 3.8 -0.3 -0.1
US$l million-25 million 3.9 4.6 4.4 -1.2
US$25 million-100 million 4.7 4.5 1.6 3.4
> US$100 million 4.9 9.7 3.5 0.6
Average 4.1 5.0 3.4 -0.1
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Table 10.14. Sectoral distribution and profitability of exporting firms, in
percent.
Sector 1988 1989 1990 1991
Dollar exports
Mining 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4
Electricity 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Metallurgy 11.1 12.6 13.3 6.9
Mechanical engineering 15.2 15.1 15.4 20.9
Building materials 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.6
Chemicals 18.1 17.5 17.0 14.5
Light industry 8.9 8.2 8.0 7.2
Other industries 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Food processing 16.7 16.8 15.2 15.5
Construction 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9
Agriculture 3.3 3.7 3.2 3.5
Forestry 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.6
Transport 9.1 9.0 10.6 12.0
Telecommunication 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7
Domestic trading 6.0 6.1 4.7 4.5
Foreign trading 6.4 5.7 6.1 8.4
Water supply 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Other material services 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit of dollar exports
Mining 26.1 18.7 31.5 4.5
Electricity 28.4 -14.5 17.6 15.8
Metallurgy 18.8 22.0 5.2 -8.5
Mechanical engineering 1.3 4.2 -1.8 1.1
Building materials 16.7 13.2 11.3 -9.9
Chemicals 10.0 18.2 3.1 0.1
Light industry 3.0 4.7 2.1 -2.1
Other industries -0.1 8.2 4.3 -16.2
Food processing 9.6 15.6 -1.3 -0.4
Construction -1.6 9.4 12.8 7.2
Agriculture 11.4 13.0 7.2 0.9
Forestry 33.4 30.4 19.1 13.9
Transport 19.7 16.1 19.9 19.4
Telecommunication 1.6 36.8 -5.6 35.2
Domestic trading 11.2 13.1 8.1 12.0
Foreign trading 1.8 3.7 5.1 1.9
Water supply 0.7 -1.5 41.9
Other material services 45.4 1.7 9.4 8.7
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
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Table 10.15. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the num-
ber of employees, in units and percent.
Number of employees 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of firms
< 51 11 33 45 80
51-300 51 81 125 241
> 300 644 657 652 627
Total 706 771 822 948
Dollar exports
< 51 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.4
51-300 2.5 3.4 6.0 15.5
> 300 96.7 95.3 92.3 82.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit rate of domestic sales
< 51 36.5 4.8 2.1 -0.8
51-300 4.9 3.4 5.4 -1.4
> 300 3.0 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Average 3.1 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Profit rate of ruble exports
< 51 1.6 -3:0 -13.9 -34.9
51-300 0.3 -0.4 11.8 -5.8
> 300 4.0 -2.7 -14.3 -37.2
Average 3.9 -2.7 -12.7 -32.1
Profit rate of dollar exports
< 51 -27.6 -0.4 0.9 8.4
51-300 10.1 11.3 -2.7 -0.5
> 300 10.1 13.8 5.4 3.5
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Profit rate of total sales
< 51 1.9 2.1 1.0 2.5
51-300 5.4 4.6 4.0 -1.0
> 300 4.1 5.0 3.5 -0.1
Average 4.1 5.0 3.4 -0.1
Share of Foreign Assets
The number of firms in the sample with a significant share of foreign assets
increased very rapidly (Table 10.16): in 1989 it was 77 and in 1991, 206.
In 1991, 27 percent of the dollar exports was produced by firms with some
foreign ownership.
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Table 10.16. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the share
of foreign assets, in units and percent.
Share offoreign assets 1988a 1989 1990 1991
708
Zero
0-10 percent
10-25 percent
25-50 percent
> 50 percent
Total
Zero
0-10 percent
10-25 percent
25-50 percent
> 50 percent
Total
Number of firms
708 714
34
3
33
7
791
Dollar exports
100.0 88.4
8.2
0.1
3.2
0.2
100.0 100.0
705 745
38 48
16 31
39 72
24 55
822 951
85.0 73.0
6.5 7.2
2.5 6.6
5.0 9.4
0.9 3.8
100.0 100.0
Profit rate of dollar exports
Zero 9.8 14.1 6.4 3.7
0-10 percent 8.8 -2.0 -1.2
10-25 percent -U.8 -10.2 10.3
25-50 percent 13.8 -4.3 -2.6
> 50 percent -4.4 1.7 -0.8
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Q1n this year no information was collected by the authorities on foreign assets; however,
their share was significantly lower than in 1989.
Higher share of foreign ownership does not necessarily mean a higher
profit rate of dollar exports. Only two positive rates were observed in 1991:
in the group with no foreign shares and in the group with foreign assets
between 10 and 25 percent.
Organizational Form
The privatization and the commercialization of state-owned firms brought
about the proliferation of firms with new organizational forms (Table 10.17).
These firms had one-third share in dollar exports in 1991, while the tradi-
tional state-owned firms still maintained their share above 60 percent.
Surprisingly the traditional state-owned enterprises (SO Es) managed to
keep afloat: in 1991 they had a profit rate above 10 percent on dollar exports,
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Table 10.17. Distribution and profitability of exporting firms by the or-
ganizational form of enterprises, in units and percent.
Organizational form 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of firms
Traditional SOEs" 175 180 188 179
Self-governing SOEs 326 327 329 321
Limited companies 13 52 90 175
Joint-stock companies 52 93 119 176
Agricultural cooperatives 28 28 28 33
Other cooperatives 46 49 50 49
Others 71 65 27 19
Total 711 794 831 952
Dollar exports
Traditional SOEs 37.5 37.2 37.4 29.4
Self-governing SOEs 35.5 33.9 32.2 34.4
Limited companies 6.8 8.8 12.2 15.4
Joint-stock companies 12.4 13.2 14.3 17.6
Agricultural cooperatives 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.0
Other cooperatives 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5
Others 5.5 3.8 1.1 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Profit rate of domestic sales
Traditional SOEs 2.1 3.8 5.8 -0.3
Self-governing SOEs 5.0 4.4 2.0 -2.9
Limited companies -2.4 9.0 6.3 -0.1
Joint-stock companies 3.3 4.8 3.5 0.4
Agricultural cooperatives 4.1 3.6 1.3 -7.0
Other cooperatives 2.3 1.8 -1.8 -4.8
Average 3.1 4.0 4.2 -1.1
Profit rate of dollar exports
Traditional SOEs 12.2 18.4 7.5 10.5
Self-governing SOEs 8.5 10.7 2.9 0.1
Limited companies 22.5 20.1 10.3 0.2
Joint-stock companies 4.0 8.0 -3.0 -2.6
Agricultural cooperatives 15.2 11.5 6.3 -2.3
Other cooperatives 13.9 14.1 15.0 11.8
Average 9.8 13.6 4.9 3.0
Profit rate of total sales
Traditional SOEs 3.5 5.9 5.9 1.8
Self-governing SOEs 5.1 4.7 0.9 -2.2
Limited companies 3.5 3.9 3.0 0.1
J oint-stock companies 5.0 5.7 1.6 -0.6
Agricultural cooperatives 5.3 5.1 2.0 -6.2
Other cooperatives 5.1 4.4 1.3 -0.0
Average 4.1 5.0 3.4 -0.1
"State-owned enterprise.
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a rate that other significant exporters could not even approach. On the
other hand, only the joint-stock companies could achieve a positive profit
on domestic sales in 1991 among the most important four enterprise groups;
their advantage over these groups, however, was marginal. As a result, in
total sales the traditional SOEs had the highest profit rate, followed by the
limited liability and joint-stock companies with profit rates around zero.
Summary
The collapse of the CMEA dramatically changed the foreign trade envi-
ronment of the former member states and of the individual firms in these
economies. In the Hungarian case trade reorientation had begun earlier,
and unambiguous results had been achieved. The responsiveness of firms
to changing foreign market conditions has been improving. These improve-
ments, however, have taken place still in the framework of the modified
centrally planned economy. Many other institutional changes have been
necessary to establish a market economy proper, where further structural
changes in trade would inevitably take place.
Econometric estimations show the presence of immediate cost adjust-
ment until 1988 in respect to trade reorientation. In the period of the more
intensive trade reorientation this cost adjustment has dissipated. In 1989
and 1990 export subsidies played an active role, showing that the reduction
of the subsidies does not necessarily mean that their effect will disappear.
Relative dollar prices with a one-year lag always turned out to be a signif-
icant explanatory variable of the trade reorientation in the whole period.
The direct impact of the reduction of ruble exports on dollar exports was
important only in 1986, 1987, and 1989.
Exporting firms managed to adjust their activity to the consequences of
the collapse of regional integration and to increase their dollar exports. In
1991 after the period of trade reorientation (in the sense of disappearance of
ruble trade) the direct costs of dollar exports were lowered. The profitability,
however, declined, which was the compound effect of a real exchange rate
appreciation, foreign price increase, cost adjustment, and a steep increase
in overhead costs. The increase in overhead costs was an outcome of rising
banking costs and the falling demand in domestic market leading to capacity
underutilization.
The profitability of dollar exports had an increasing effect on the overall
profitability of exporting firms. The factors behind this were the growth of
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the share of dollar exports, the rising differentiation of profitability, and the
falling profitability on domestic sales.
The positive relationship between the growth rate and the profitability
of dollar exports was the first aspect of this differentiation instrumental in
furthering the differentiation of exports from domestic sales. On the other
hand, there was a strengthening positive link between the growth rates of
domestic and dollar-export sales.
The reorientation of trade to dollar markets still has further dimensions,
since the potential positive effects offoreign ownership and the new corporate
forms have not yet been realized.
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Chapter 11
The Effects of Privatization
on Enterprise Production
and Trade Strategy*
Janusz M. Dabrowski
Introduction
Privatization of state-owned enterprises is a major component of economic
transformation in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union. Finding private owners for" state-owned firms, which in
the late 1980s still accounted for more than 80 percent of the gross na-
tional product in the region, is not an easy task. If we take into account
*This study uses results of monitoring research on privatization processes that has been
carried out by the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (Dabrowski et al., 1992a, 1992c;
Kaminski, 1992). It covers the operation of more than 60 enterprises in various stages of
privatization and subject to various transformation formulas. The firms analyzed differ
from one another in terms of size, location, and branch affiliation (Tables 11.1 and 11.2
present the structure of the sample). The occurring changes are monitored comprehen-
sively (the research involves the operations of privatized firms in all fields of their activity,
the progress of the privatization process and its effects, and the barriers to privatization)
and dynamically (the research is repeated every six months). The analyses provide, first
of all, the comparison of the four major privatization paths in Poland. The justification
for this approach stems from the fact that the four individual paths distinguish themselves
both in scope and in the set of measures they are supported with.
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Table 11.1. Privatization path and size of the firms in the sample.
Number of employees
Very
Small Medium Large large
Privatization path <200 201-500 501-1000 >1,000 Total
Capital path 1 4 4 9
Public offering 2 2 4
Invitation to negotiate 1 2 1 4
Employee buyout 1 1
Liquidation
through privatization 8 11 3 2 24
Sales of assets 2 2 4
Contribution to equity 1 1
Leasing 6 9 3 1 19
Liquidation
by bankruptcy 9 2 1 1 13
Sales of assets 8 2 1 0 11
Contribution to equity 1 1
Leasing 1 1
Commercialization 2 3 4 9
Total 17 16 11 11 55
Table 11.2. Sectors, branches, and privatization paths of firms in sample.
Liquid. Liquid. Commer-
Capital through by bank- cializa-
Branch path privat. ruptcy tion Total
Industry 7 7 8 7 29
Metallurgical 1 1
Electromachinery 1 2 4 6 13
Chemical industry 3 3
Mineral industry 1 1
Paper industry 1 1
Light industry 2 1 3
Food processing 3 2 2 7
Construction 1 6 2 2 11
Transportation 2 2 4
Trade & services 1 8 9
Agriculture 1 1 2
Total 9 24 13 9 55
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the lack of market links and institutions, the small number of professional
managers, and the shortage of real capital resources needed to take over the
privatized assets, we can assess the scope and difficulty of this venture more
realistically. Privatizing a major part of state-owned assets in a relatively
short time, however, seems to be the necessary prerequisite for upgrading
the economies of the region from their levels of efficiency and production
quality. It is also a prerequisite for overcoming the atrophy of economic mo-
tivation and establishing firms that are viable to respond to the challenge of
competition in the world market.
It became apparent already in the first, stormy months of the "autumn of
nations" that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe have no way out
but to restore the capitalist, market-type economy. This is the only option
open if they want to join the world economy and if they want to overcome
the economic and functional inefficiencies of their former economic regimes. 1
Hence, the discussion has very quickly moved from the issue of whether it is
right to restore the market and private ownership to the problem of how fast
and in what way this should be done. It turned out that the characteristic
features of the economic, social, and motivational relations were so unique
that applying related international experiences, e.g., privatization methods
used in Britain or stabilization programs in Latin American countries, was
in fact not possible. The need for specific policies was also strengthened
by the individual characteristics of each country in the region, such as the
differences in the strength of former market relations, the different rates of
inflation, the importance of foreign trade, and the size of the private sector.
These factors pushed each country to look for its own road to the market
economy.
The search for new solutions is particularly true for the privatization of
state-owned enterprises. The range of possible solutions is very broad. Each
country has worked out its own specific measures and policies.2 For example,
I An interesting evaluation of post-communist economies at the "starting point" of the
transformation process and of privatization prospects has recently been presented by P.
Reynolds and P. Young of the Adam Smith Institute (Reynolds and Young, 1992).
2The Hungarian policy is, for instance, dominated by the sale of a large majority of
enterprises to strategic (including foreign) investors. In the former CSFR the stress was
put on "voucher privatization," while in the former GDR, in a situation different from
that of the other countries of the region, investors who would be willing to invest in and
restructure state-owned enterprises (contract price is of secondary importance here) are
actually sought. Yet different privatization routes are preferred in the Balkan countries
and in the countries that have emerged from the former Soviet Union (e.g., the idea of
"overnight privatization" in Lithuania and free privatization vouchers in Russia).
296 Janusz M. Dabrowski
in Poland intensive privatization processes were started in the mid-1990.
Poland's framework is still being revised and supplemented; an example of
the latter is the program of mass privatization. The pattern of privatization
in Poland differs considerably from those adopted by the other countries,
mainly because of its multi- tier structure.
The experience of Polish privatization gives rise to questions about the
incentive structures after privatization, the pace of the process, and the
obstacles it faces. A crucial issue is the effect of privatization on enterprise
behavior. The following analysis concentrates on the operation of privatized
firms, especially on market strategies, changes in the production process
and on the financial standing of the enterprises. These aspects of enterprise
behavior are interrelated. The sales opportunities of a firm define the scope
of necessary production adjustments, which are, in turn, defined (limited)
by the financial capacities of the firm and influence its sales structure.
The process of ownership transformation can possibly influence each field
mentioned above. An ideal combination would be the increase of ownership
pressure (creating a "real" owner and setting up control institutions) and ad-
ditional contributions to develop managerial skills. These two factors should
exert their impacts on the quality and intensity of production and market
strategies. If the aforementioned factors are complemented with capital and
technology transfer, a chance of production restructuring is provided, on the
one hand, and a chance of financial restructuring, on the other. The potential
for sales of products manufactured by the company are facilitated by access
to selling outlets, which can also be extended as a result of privatization.
Not every ownership transformation means that all these leverages come
into force. In this paper I attempt to analyze the impact of the transfor-
mation on major fields of enterprise activity and to find out whether the
above-mentioned leverages have been present.
To enhance the analysis of the complex process of privatization in
Poland, a comprehensive description of all privatization paths applied to Pol-
ish enterprises is presented in the next section. The following section gives
an account of changes in the responses of privatized firms in the context of
developing market strategies. Another section is devoted to production ad-
justment in enterprises, followed by a discussion on their financial standings.
In the last section, I summarize the lessons of the analysis.
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The Legal Framework of Privatization in Poland
The privatization law adopted by the Polish Parliament (the Sejm) on July
13, 1990, provides for ownership transformation of state-owned enterprises,
by means of differentiated privatization formulas and instruments. This law
is partly the result of the long and extensive political and economic debate
of the 1980s (see Proposals, 1989), but it is also an attempt to find a com-
promise between the opinions and preferences (and interest groups) of those
involved in the process. The privatization law and supplementary laws pro-
vide the possibility of ownership transformation of an enterprise through the
following basic paths: "capital path," liquidation by privatization, liquida-
tion because of bankruptcy, commercialization, and (still not fully adopted
by the Parliament) participation in the mass privatization program. Each
has slightly different economic and social objectives, and usually also applies
to different groups of state-owned enterprises.
Creating a capital market in the Polish economy, with a stock exchange
as its central institution, is seen as the basic objective of capital privatization
(capital path). Besides, capital privatization allows wide distribution of
ownership titles among the public. Privatization through public offer is the
first privatization technique within this framework. A state-owned enterprise
is transformed into a joint-stock company owned by the state treasury, and
then the company's shares are sold (according to the valuation of assets).
The law provides for 20 percent of the shares to be sold to the company's
employees, who are entitled to preferential purchases of shares (for half of
the selling price). This results from the strong impact the employees' (self-
government) lobby exerted on the final version of the law and from the
widespread popularity of the employee stock ownership concept pursued in
the 1980s (see Ludwiniak, 1989; Groszek and Ruszkowski, 1989). By the
end of June 1992,12 enterprises (of 36 firms privatized in the capital path)
had been transformed by public offering.
Some shares may be sold to a chosen investor or to the management.
After the shares have been subscribed for, potential small shareholders are
given preference or applications are considered successively.
Another capital privatization technique is the method of public invita-
tion to negotiations. Compared with the public offer, it requires less time
and effort to prepare a firm for privatization. In this method, large parcels of
shares are offered to potential active investors, with 20 percent of the shares
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reserved for employees. During negotiations between the investor, the repre-
sentative of the state treasury, and the firm, the price for a parcel of shares
to be purchased by the investor is set. This technique makes it possible
for a particular firm to choose a specific active investor, thus encouraging
technology transfer, and funds are earmarked for new investments and new
outlets, quite aside from the buyout. This method was used in 16 cases up
to mid-1992.
Sale by tender is another privatization technique within the framework
of the capital path. It is usually connected with the so-called quick sale
method and refers to relatively small enterprises (by June 1992 this method
had been used in six cases). In this case, privatization procedures are limited
to a necessary minimum. Detailed and comprehensive information is made
available about enterprises, which are then put out for tender by the Ministry
of Ownership Transformations in packages of several firms. Potential buyers
may purchase at auction an entire firm, with the exception of the 20 percent
parcel of shares reserved for employees.
Another technique applied in the capital path provides for employee or
management buyout, with the majority of shares acquired by employees or
the management. In this case various forms for the supplementary financing
of the privatization process are usually applied (e.g., leveraged buyout).
Those acquiring the enterprise pay only part of its real value to the state
treasury; the rest is to be contributed by repaying a collateral credit secured
by the enterprise assets. No lengthy, preliminary procedures are necessary,
as investors have perfect knowledge of the entity they buy. By mid 1992
only two enterprises have been privatized through this method.
The liquidation path allows, then, for the implementation of two dif-
ferent forms of privatization. The first is based on the law on state-owned
enterprises and concerns firms liquidated due to their bad economic condi-
tion (this type of transformation was applied in 707 firms up to mid-1992).
The second form, based on the privatization law, provides for liquidation
and then ownership transformation of firms in good financial condition (542
firms used this during the same period). In both cases three liquidation
procedures are possible: the sale of an entire enterprise or a part of it, con-
tributing the enterprise's assets (in full or in part) to a company's equity,
and various kinds of leasing.
The procedure of selling the assets of an enterprise is applied, first of all,
in the case of bankruptcy. Parts of the assets of a bankrupt enterprise may
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be sold to potential buyers. To this end, a liquidator representing the state
treasury is appointed by the founder body. The tasks of the liquidator in-
clude: making an inventory of the firm's assets, setting principles regulating
the sale of those assets, and carrying out those sales.
Contributing all or part of the assets of an enterprise to a company's
equity means starting the process of evaluation of an enterprise, setting the
principles of sale in agreement with the buyer of the enterprise, as well as
transforming the firm and transferring the organized assets of an enterprise
to an already existing company. To this end, a liquidator representing the
state treasury is also appointed.
Leasing the whole or part of enterprise's assets is possible when, for
instance, the move for liquidation has been initiated by the employee council,
the majority of employees of the liquidated enterprise has joined the new
company, and the amount of share capital or initial capital is not less than
20 percent of the book value of the enterprise. Leasing is based on an
agreement concluded on behalf of the state treasury by the founder body.
The amount charged for using the assets of the state treasury and the value
of those assets are determined by an appraisal done by the founder body.
The total charge for using the state treasury assets consists of a principal
and an annuity set at the level of three-quarters of the current interest rate.
The liquidation path, due to its specific privatization technique, has an
important advantage over the capital method. It is much more efficient (in
the sense of the number of firms privatized in a given period) than capital
privatization, as it does not have to be either managed or organized from
the beginning to the end by the state administration (the Ministry of Own-
ership Transformations and/or the founding bodies). It requires a great deal
of initiative from potential owners, but at the same time releases the cen-
tral administration from time-consuming preparations for privatization. It
allows for the simultaneous privatization of a large number of state-owned
enterprises (a largely autonomous process), while by the capital method the
number of privatized firms is limited by the capacities of the central admin-
istration, the banking system, etc. Besides, in the liquidation path method
analysis requirements (financial analyses, preparation of prospectuses, etc.)
are much smaller than in the capital method. Another advantage of the
liquidation path is the possibility of purchasing the enterprise under favor-
able conditions provided by long-term credits, substantially alleviating the
financial barrier privatization has to face.
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Commercialization means the transformation of a state enterprise into a
joint-stock company owned by the state treasury, without a commitment to
further steps toward privatization (in fact it is not real privatization). As a
result of commercialization, a joint-stock company or a limited liability com-
pany owned solely by the state treasury is established. In a commercialized
enterprise a board and a supervisory council are appointed. Two-thirds of
the council are to be state treasury representatives and one-third employee
representatives. At the same time the employee council is dissolved (having
first agreed to enterprise transformation). Commercialization also means the
possibility of reducing the financial burdens imposed on state enterprises by
the special capital tax and excessive wage increase taxes.
By the end of June 1992, 464 enterprises had been "commercialized,"
among which 36 were privatized through capital way and 178 firms were
included in the mass privatization program. This program takes on the
problem of the capital barrier to privatization. This is done by an almost
free distribution (small registration fee) of state-owned assets among the
population (Lewandowski and Szomburg, 1989, 1990a, 1990b).
The mass privatization program (Program, 1992) provides for the pri-
vatization of about 600 relatively large and healthy state enterprises. After
preliminary selection these enterprises are to be transformed into compa-
nies owned by the state treasury. At the same time, a number (10-20) of
"national investment funds" are to be set up (in the form of joint-stock
companies with limited issuing capacities) to deal with investment in and
turnover of the securities of the enterprises included in the program. Each
fund will have small shares (1 to 3 percent) in many of the privatized en-
terprises and large shares (33 percent) in 10 to 15 chosen companies. The
funds are to have boards and supervisory councils, which will hire foreign
firms to manage investment portfolios.
Adult Polish citizens will be given investment certificates representing
one share in each investment fund. The fund's shareholders will be mainly
or entirely ordinary citizens with investment certificates.
The funds are allocated share portfolios (33 percent of shares in each
firm owned by a single fund and 27 percent distributed among the remaining
funds). Employees of privatized enterprises will be given 10 percent of their
shares cost-free. The remaining 30 percent will be reserved for the state
treasury, which in the future will have the right to sell these shares on the
open market or use in another way.
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Market Strategies of Privatized Enterprises
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The measures aimed at stabilizing the Polish economy which were under-
taken in early 1990 resulted in a fairly sharp decline in production. Accord-
ing to estimates, by the end of the first quarter of 1992, the real value of
the sales of Polish enterprises declined by almost 40 percent. This can be
attributed to the "tough money" policy, adoption of realistic interest rates,
limitation on the rise of household incomes (e.g., through the imposition of
excess wage tax), and price liberalization, which has brought about a de-
cline of effective demand in the economy. Consequently, the production of
goods which were "useless," of poor quality, or manufactured at excessively
high costs was almost immediately eliminated (import competition effect).
Hence, the first result of the stabilization program was the "self-purification"
of the economy which got rid of production rejected by the market, espe-
cially with regard to consumer goods production. In the following periods
the cuts in production started to affect the manufacturers of semi-processed
goods to a constantly growing extent. This was the consequence of reducing
production costs by firms operating in consumer goods markets, of getting
rid of excessive inventories of raw materials and semi-processed goods (elim-
ination of shortages), and of abandoning import substitution (see Dabrowski
et at., 1991a).
In the sample, the extent to which privatized enterprises were hit by the
recession differed considerably. Only very few firms were able to maintain
the output levels of early 1990 (in real terms). The output in real terms of
most enterprises plummeted quite considerably (in the bankruptcy liquida-
tion cases, liquidation was preceded by a production decline of more than
70 percent). It can be stated that firms privatized following the capital path
were able to adjust themselves the best to the new conditions of operation.
On the average, the real value of their sales dropped by only 10 percent.
Their advantages lay in manufacturing good-quality products, maintaining
stable market positions, and being well established on the dollar markets
for some time. In early 1990 the share of exports (mostly to the EC, North
America, and Asia) in those firms' sales amounted to 47 percent on the av-
erage. Following two years of economic and ownership transformations this
figure fell to some 38 percent. This was not a result of falling exports in
those enterprises, but rather was due to a decline in the real value of the US
dollar in that period (see Jasinski, 1992). It is difficult to estimate precisely
the rate of growth of production for exports in those companies, as some of
them exported to the former CMEA countries back in 1990. Conservative
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estimates, however, put the rise in their dollar exports at some 20 to 30
percent.
It is worth remembering here that firms chosen for capital method priva-
tization should, by definition, show high shares of export production. Only
one of them, at the moment of privatization, did not export its products as
a result of loss of Western markets in 1989 (due to obsolete technology and
lack of finances to purchase a packaging line). In this firm the consequences
of privatization are most noticeable. As a result of selling 80 percent of its
shares to a foreign investor, the necessary funds were gained for investment
and for access to the American market. Three months after privatization
had been completed the share of exports in the company's turnover (which
in the meantime doubled) increased to some 90 percent.
At the same time, privatization through public offer and through "cap-
ital" employee buyout had no significant impact on the change of market
strategies of companies in transition. The fact that they were able to keep
their positions on foreign markets, and especially on domestic markets, indi-
cates that their market activity was already relatively intense. Between 1990
and 1992 the enterprises in question stepped up sales promotion on the do-
mestic markets through the development of advertising activities (formerly
neglected or unnecessary), established networks of company shops, and set
up special marketing departments. As compared with other firms (privatized
and state-owned), their activities in these areas were much more intensive.
It is worth pointing out that these enterprises were trying to maintain their
Western markets even if sales became less profitable than those on the home
market (due to the fixed exchange rate). Most were ready to build their
future on expansion into those markets. The obstacles, however, were the
absence of new channels of distribution (there were no new investors with
access to such markets) and the lack of funds for modernizing production
and upgrading the quality of products (this badly needed fresh capital was
not secured by privatization).
The situation of firms privatized through the sale to a chosen investor
was slightly different. The positive impact exerted on the enterprise by a
large foreign active investor is quite apparent here. This usually involved
capital support, transfer of technology, and access to new selling outlets. In
both firms analyzed in this group, their situations improved substantially
after privatization.
In addition, the takeover of large parcels of shares in privatized com-
panies by major domestic investors has produced only meager results. The
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barriers have been the lack of ideas for restructuring the firms (which were
troubled by financial difficulties at the time of buyout), as well as difficulties
in acquiring new markets. Consequently, privatization of these firms, at least
in the early stages, has not changed the ways in which they function. Own-
ership transformation has involved only the change in legal status. It seems
that without overcoming the barriers mentioned above it will be difficult to
achieve positive effects of privatization with this method.
There are similar problems with so-called commercialization. One may
argue that it should not be regarded as one of the privatization paths (100
percent of shares are owned by the state), but only as the first step in that
direction. Commercialized companies are firms selected for further privati-
zation either separately or in the mass privatization program. They must
register better than average financial standings at the moment of transfor-
mation.
In these firms, real turnover declined by more than 35 percent from 1990
to 1992. What is more important, the bulk of the decline took place in late
1991 and early 1992, Le., shortly after the transformation of most of these
firms was completed. It seems that the "purification" of management struc-
tures from the influence exerted by employees and giving the management
boards more power in fact weakened the position of the boards instead of
strengthening them. In the firms there were no new means allotted for in-
vestment purposes, and there was neither new know-how and experience nor
"open-minded people seeing into the future." This means that most of the
companies followed the strategy of waiting for further developments (they
left it to the state to initiate new solutions).
Most ofthese firms export part oftheir output to foreign markets (mostly
Western ones). The bulk of the established trade contracts were concluded in
the 1980s. This is why the share of exports in total sales of those enterprises
amounted to some 25 percent. Two years later this share fell to 20 percent.
A part of this decline could, as in the capital path, be attributed to the
depreciation of the dollar and the loss of traditional foreign markets (mostly
the former CMEA).
The transformation itself did not result in an intensification of the activi-
ties of these firms on the domestic market. Changes in the economic environ-
ment, however, induced them to attach more importance to their marketing
activities, to develop distribution networks, and to participate more often
in promotion activities (advertising, fairs). As in many other cases, these
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changes being launched in early 1990 had a much more pronounced impact
on enterprise behavior than the transformation process itself.
For most firms privatized through liquidation the process of transforma-
tion was part of a strategy worked out in early 1990. These firms, unlike
firms privatized following the capital and commercialization paths, are small
enterprises conducting their activities in a competitive environment and op-
erating mostly in the domestic market. In early 1990 the share of exports
in their total sales amounted to some 8 percent, on average, and increased
to more than 9 percent in early 1992. The real value of turnover declined in
that period, on average, by 29 percent.
Since the start of systemic transformation the firms privatized through
liquidation have concentrated on protecting their positions in the domestic
market. This is why their activities have involved making their offers on the
market more attractive. To this end they have allowed price discounts, de-
veloped acquisition activities, and established specialized sales departments.
At the same time, they usually have not had sufficient financial means for
advertising or for setting up distribution networks. They have been fairly
flexible in modifying their procurement systems (choosing new suppliers and
new raw material sources, including foreign ones), which have made it pos-
sible to cut down costs and to be flexible in setting prices for their products.
In the group of firms privatized through liquidation positive effects were
found in those with large (20 to 70 percent) parcels of shares or stocks sold to
active investors. Nevertheless, in some cases (sales of whole companies) the
effects of privatization were less beneficial. The most advantageous changes
took place in one company with foreign participation (50 percent), where
the transfer of knowledge and experience, as well as moving the company
into the international distribution network, contributed to a substantial rise
in turnover and to a sizable improvement of financial standing. This was
a natural effect of the long-term cooperation between the Polish and the
foreign firms.
In most companies with a dominating employee and management cap-
ital participation, the transformation brought about few changes in market
strategy. In some of them, however, the value of exports recorded a con-
stant fall, mostly due to deteriorating profitability (caused by rising costs
and nominal exchange rate "rigidity"), and consequently these companies
started to lose to their competitors on Western markets. The companies
were too weak to afford subsidizing export production even in the short run.
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A major problem they are facing now is that of maintaining their posi-
tions in the domestic market; in the future, they must expand their activ-
ities into foreign markets. The firms willing to accomplish this task need
substantial capital support (their assets are usually depreciated) andpoten-
tial investors will have to provide their own channels to enable these firms
to gain access to new markets. In view of this, development chances of
employee-owned companies are much smaller here.
The absence of development chances is a major problem that firms liq-
uidated due to poor financial standing are facing. Transformation means,
in most cases, the annihilation of a firm. Perhaps a few enterprises will
manage to survive, following the introduction of extremely radical cuts in
employment and wages, as well as the sale of part of the fixed assets.
Of course, this form of liquidation can hardly be regarded as a classical
privatization method. In this case, compulsory transformation results from
the very bad economic condition of the firms. This has usually been caused
by the lack of adjustment measures or lack of preparedness for the challenge
of competition (mostly foreign) in the domestic market and by the fact that
in the 1980s large shares of the production were oriented toward the former
CMEA countries. The decline in sales in this group of firms (in real terms)
amounted to some 65 percent from 1990 to 1992. Its nadir was recorded in
early 1991 and was the delayed effect of opening up the Polish economy and
the collapse of trade with Eastern Europe. In this group of firms the share
of exports in sales dropped from some 16 percent in early 1990 to less than
7 percent in 1992.
It should be added that most firms liquidated due to poor financial
standing did not implement the necessary changes into their strategies in
1990 when they were still doing well. As a result, they started to be "drawn"
rapidly by the new circumstances. It is true, however, that the necessary
changes required more or less investments. These firms usually had no suffi-
cient means, while the credit conditions of 1990 did not encourage decisions
involving external financing.
Thus, it can be said that in the period of working out new market strate-
gies, ownership transformations had a positive impact on the operations of
the firms that attracted a foreign active investor, but only when know-how,
technology, or investments for the modernization of the enterprise were pro-
vided. Still, the opening of external outlets for the firms' products by the
investor seems to be most important. Privatization did not bring about any
substantial changes in the market strategies of firms privatized following the
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capital path, liquidation, or commercialization. Most of them had instituted
some measures in this field prior to privatization by responding to changing
market environment. As a result they managed to maintain their positions
on foreign markets as well as their links with foreign markets.
Production Changes and Investment
In early 1990, state-owned enterprises were at first shocked by the totally
changed market conditions. Many of them began immediately thinking over
their current conditions, production opportunities, and prospects for future
development. The need for coming to terms with these problems was made
even more acute by the sluggish demand for their own products, by falling
profits, and by more difficult (due to high nominal interest rate) access to
financial means. Enterprises that under the old regime were not used to
performing an active role started very quickly to look for opportunities for
adjusting their activities to the changed and still-changing market demand
structure. They preferred actions that did not require new investments.
Adjustments were mostly reflected in the increased output of one item at
the expense of discontinuation or reduction' of output of another, as well as
in enhancing the quality and attractiveness of manufactured goods, if this
were possible without too heavy a financial burden. Adjustments of this kind
were most frequently found in firms facing the biggest difficulties in selling
their output and in those which first encountered such difficulties (food-
processing, light, and electronics industries). The bulk of these changes took
place in 1990 and early 1991. In this period most of the opportunities for
extensive production adjustments in enterprises were used up (Dabrowski,
et al., 1991b).
Thus, privatization has not exerted a decisive impact on intensifying
basic production adjustments, since such adjustments had been enforced by
the economic environment even prior to ownership transformations. In prin-
ciple, however, the activity in this field has proved insufficient for being able
to match the increasingly more unfavorable market conditions, Le., growing
foreign competition. For most Polish enterprises depreciated assets and ob-
solete technologies do not allow competition with foreign firms on an equal
footing. High production costs also result from inefficient employment struc-
tures, inappropriate organization of production, and heavy social burdens.3
3 For example, nurseries, schools, enterprise-administered housing, holiday resorts, local
heating plants, and even playgrounds and sports clubs.
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Many firms need production modernization or sometimes changes in the
scope of production and new technologies to stay on the market. The scale
of necessary changes usually goes far beyond the investment opportunities
of an enterprise on its own.
Ownership transformation is often seen as a chance for changing the
production patterns of a privatized firm. It turns out, however, that only in
a limited number of cases were the expected results achieved. In this context
the situation of those firms is better where privatization by the capital path
and through liquidation was carried out. In more than half of them produc-
tion modification was introduced during or after the privatization process.
These changes involved diversification of the supplies, a substantial quality
upgrading, and changes in production techniques. Such activities usually re-
sulted from long-term modernization processes in the enterprises, combined
with the introduction of new employment and organization structures. How-
ever, in only very few cases were deep assortment changes or restructuring of
production patterns introduced. For example, considerable modernization
was carried out in all firms privatized following the capital path (except cases
of buyouts by domestic investors) and in more than half of the enterprises
privatized through liquidation (leasing).
Even less frequent were the cases of making major investments in pro-
duction with the aim of introducing new technologies. They were found
almost exclusively in firms in which the foreign investor took upon himself
a prior commitment for technology transfer and/or a modernization invest-
ment. The positive effect of capital support (rise in sales and in profitability)
was recorded in all firms included in this category after a very short time
(three to six months).
It is also worth noting that the majority of privatized firms used their
own funds to finance investment projects, because they thought a bank credit
was too expensive. Only in six cases (three in the capital path and another
three in privatization through liquidation) a large bank credit was used.
However, this was characteristic for firms enjoying a very good or good
economic standing, having a stable market position, and hoping for a quick
return on invested capital. In several cases small credits were taken as a
supplementary source for carrying out production changes in connection with
getting new, nontypical orders. Applications for foreign credits are becoming
more and more frequent because of the lower nominal interest rates on those
credits.
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Commercialized firms and those privatized through liquidation recorded
relatively rare and superficial production changes. In the former, ownership
transformation did not enhance adjustment activity (lack of both managerial
new blood and investment means). In several cases there were only attempts
at minor modernization of the firms or adjusting production capacities to
new orders. Again, however, they did not result from transformation but
resulted from the pressure exerted by the market environment that had been
realized earlier.
In firms liquidated due to bad financial standing, production changes
were also rare. Their reactions to the new situation usually came very late.
Although in the first year of economic transformation they were not hit par-
ticularly hard, still little was done to prevent the difficulties looming ahead.
In the following year there was a rapid accumulation of unfavorable develop-
ments (collapse of Eastern markets, losses in dollar trade, shrinking domestic
market as a result of growing foreign competition), and, despite desperate
attempts, the enterprises in question gradually plunged into a no-way-out
situation. Since there were no investment opportunities, extensive measures
(closing down subsidiaries or departments, group layoffs, wage reductions,
sales of some fixed assets) were mostly applied. It seems that in only two out
of thirteen cases examined did such measures give the enterprises a chance
to survive.
Generally, production adjustments of privatized enterprises were, as in
the case of sales strategies, the result of the necessity to adjust the fields of
activities of state-owned firms to new market conditions rather than direct
effects of transformation. The extent of necessary changes usually went far
beyond the financial and staff capacities of the privatized enterprises. In
many of the enterprises (mostly those transformed by way of the capital
path or leasing) the transformation was a natural part of long-term adjust-
ment strategies based on an evolutionary modernization of the firms. The
scope, however, was limited by their own investment means. Only in firms
with foreign capital participation, were sizable modernization investment
projects, involving transfer of know-how, completed. In several other firms
with relatively good financial standing, decisions were made to take bank
credits for financing replacement or modernization investments. It should
also be added that the firms whose reaction to systemic changes were rela-
tively quick (at the beginning in 1990 or earlier) managed, to a considerable
extent, to avoid later difficulties. Those who missed that moment lost twice.
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They wasted their time and a chance of "fitting themselves" into the new
reality that emerged in 1990.
Financial Standing of Privatized Enterprises
The description of the changes taking place in the fields of market strategy
and adjustment in production cannot be complete without the analysis of
the financial standing of the privatized enterprises. It constitutes a part of
both the production and market strategies and determines possible changes
in these fields.
The financial standings and economic conditions of privatized enterprises
have been and still remain very differentiated. On the one hand, this results
from natural differences between economic performances achieved by par-
ticular firms. On the other hand, the placement of a firm on a particular
privatization path is to a great degree related to its financial standing.
In as much as the above statement is obvious and does not require fur-
ther explanation, it also calls for the examination of the dynamics of basic
financial indicators describing a company's performance in relation to a pri-
vatization path chosen. From this point of view, the most relevant indicators
are the firm's ability to create profits (profitability rate) and its financial
liquidity (receivables to payables ratio, the share of receivables/payables in
total sales, or payables to gross profit ratio). These measures provide an
approximate and comprehensive picture of the economic standing of a firm,
describing its investment (restructuring) capacities and limits to access to
current money revenues (in Poland this aspect is of particular importance
due to the acute problem of constantly growing" payment arrears, bad debts,
and so on).
Between 1990 and 1992 the profitability of privatized firms was subject
to substantial changes (see Table 11.3): both in average level and in dif-
ferentiation along the different paths of privatization. It should be noted,
first of all, that irrespective of the transformation method privatized firms
experienced a relatively sharp decline in profitability from January 1990 on.
It should be added, however, that in the same period a similar drop in
profitability was recorded for the whole economy, including all state-owned
enterprises (see Dabrowski et al., 1991a, 1992a). Hence, the rapid decline
in financial performances of privatized firms should be interpreted not as a
result of ownership transformations, but rather as the consequence of the
introduction of the stabilization program in Poland.
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Table 11.3. Profitabilitya relative to the privatization path, in percent.
1990 1991 1992
Privatization path Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Mar
Capital path 47.4 32.4 23.3 12.8 15.3
Liquidation through
privatization 35.7 25.5 17.9 5.5 -2.1
Liquidation by bankruptcy 31.6 9.5 -25.5 -44.0 -40.3
Commercialization 52.7 58.8 28.3 19.9 9.5
Total 39.9 29.5 9.7 -2.7 -6.4
a Profitability: gross profits/costs.
Table 11.4. Credit arrears and privatization path: receivables to payables
ratio.
1990 1991 1992
Privatization path Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Mar
Capital path 2.43 3.40 1.45 1.82 1.06
Liquidation through
privatization 3.28 2.02 1.65 1.34 1.12
Liquidation by bankruptcy 1.81 1.02 0.47 0.40 0.54
Commercialization 2.77 2.42 1.53 2.08 1.90
Total 2.47 2.07 1.32 1.30 1.10
Nevertheless, the rate of profitability decline was not similar for all
groups of firms. The relatively smallest decline was recorded in firms pri-
vatized following the capital path. In early 1992 the downward trend was
even halted. Still, claiming that this was due to adjustment measures and,
in more general terms, that it was the first result of privatization would
definitely be premature.
The problem of payment arrears, posing a barrier to the operation of
most Polish firms, is also relatively less acute in the group of enterprises
privatized following the capital path. In just over two years in the whole
sample the receivables to payabIes ratio declined by almost 2.5 times (see
Table 11.4). It is worth adding here that after the act of privatization,
generally there was a steady improvement of the receivables to payables
ratio. Most privatized firms managed to balance receivables with payables
and to improve the ratio of their sums to the amounts of turnover. Hence,
these firms improved their financial liquidity, although the relevant measures
for the whole economy were very unfavorable at that time.
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It can be stated that firms following the capital path managed the best
recovery from the "stabilization shock" and their financial performance is
still much better than that of an average firm in the economy or those firms
that were transformed in another way.
The situation of firms liquidated according to the provisions of the priva-
tization law was slightly different. Within more than two years profitability
in this group of enterprises declined, on the average, by almost 40 percent.
However, the most important fact is that the biggest decline took place in
the second half of 1991. For most of these firms it was a period in which
the ownership transformation process was under way or had just been com-
pleted. It would probably be unjustified to claim that privatization was the
primary cause of financial troubles of many of these firms (e.g., repayment
of leasing installments), but it surely had its impact on their financial stand-
ings. As a result of privatization their contributions to the central budget
increased (leasing installments were higher than taxes paid before). More-
over, production costs also increased due to a substantial rise in average
wages after privatization (the share of wages in production costs increased
in that period from some 22 percent to some 30 percent). Wage increases in
these companies were similar to the increases in the capital path and much
bigger than in commercialized firms, although the financial performance of
liquidated firms was much worse in that period. This was true mostly for
firms whose principal shareholders were their own employees.
Although in 1990 most of the firms achieved very good economic per-
formance (all the enterprises examined gained profits), in early 1992 the
average profitability was already negative (this was, however, mostly due to
the performance achieved by firms liquidated through the sale of assets). In
the group of firms liquidated within the framework of the privatization law
there was a more than threefold decline in the receivables to payables ratio
in the period analyzed. In early 1992 one could in fact talk about reaching
a balance in payment arrears. Nevertheless, an improvement of this ratio is
still, to a lesser degree, a result of measures aimed at the execution of col-
lecting the dues or a result of privatization, and should be attributed, rather,
to a steady fall in those firms' profitability and a rise in payables. The eco-
nomic condition of enterprises liquidated due to poor financial standing is,
for obvious reasons, much worse. In early 1990 the average profitability of
these firms was relatively high. Since late 1990 there has been a quick and
uninterrupted deterioration of their financial standings. Although in early
1992 the average profitability of these firms showed an improvement, this
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was due not to well-established strategies but to ad hoc measures made un-
der actual pressures. These measures included the curtailment of the scope
of activities, employment reduction, and the sale of some fixed assets.
It should be added that in the group of firms to be liquidated through
bankruptcy the situation involving payment arrears was also disastrous. In
these firms the receivables to payables ratio was constantly declining. This,
of course, was the consequence of a systematic financial "collapse" of these
companies and their rapidly growing payables. It is also striking that as
recently as 1990 an average firm in this group needed only one month's
profit to fully meet its payables.
On the other hand, during the entire period analyzed, enterprises trans-
formed into companies still owned solely by the state treasury (commer-
cialization) enjoyed relatively favorable financial conditions. In 1990 they
definitely showed the highest profitability ratios, but in the second half of
1991 the standing of these firms started to deteriorate relatively quickly.
Because by this period commercialization of most of these firms was com-
pleted, we might conclude that commercialization did not bring about an
improvement of the financial standing of these enterprises. Nevertheless, the
time perspective is too short to venture to say that this form of transfor-
mation had negative consequences for the financial situation of enterprises
in transition. Basic causes of decline of profitability in this group of firms
are similar to those found for other privatization paths. A possible addi-
tional cause, however, might have been the repeated evaluation of former
and present management that led to the postponement of necessary actions
toward restructuring (including financial changes).
In the context of payment arrears the position of commercialized com-
panies is peculiar (see Table 11.4). After cutting their receivables/payables
ratio in mid-1991 these companies again produced high credit arrears. This
points to a lack of interest, suitable strategy, or real possibilities of balancing
receivables with payables.
In summary, it should be stated that the deteriorating financial standing
of the firms privatized in the recent years did not result from the starting
up or the completion of the process of ownership transformations, but was a
consequence, first of all, of the implementation of the stabilization program.
Hence, one may venture to say that capital privatization gave enterprises a
chance for financial restructuring and allowed them to halt, at least for the
time being, the drop in profitability (see Table 11.5 for summary of effects
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Table 11.5. First effects of ownership changes and methods of privatization.
Manage- Owner- Capital Transfer Access
Privatization rial know- ship lllJec- of to
path ledge pressure tion technol. markets
A +- + + + +
Capital B +- + +-
C +-
Liquidation A +- + + + +-
through B +- + +-
privatization D +-
Liquidation by bankruptcy
Commercialization
A = Foreign investor.
B = Domestic investor.
C = Dispersed property rights (most public offering).
D = Insider owners (employee buyout).
of privatization methods). At the same time, the first phenomenon accom-
panying privatization along the liquidation and commercialization paths was
a quick drop in profitability and constantly deteriorating financial liquidity.
The story with bankruptcy liquidation was a different one, since in this case
the transformation, in fact, resulted from bad economic condition of these
enterprises. Quite often, however, there was an improvement in the condi-
tions of liquidated firms due to employment reductions and sales of fixed
assets.
Closing Remarks
Summing up the findings and observations discussed in this chapter, the
following general conclusions may be formulated:
1. In the years between 1990 and 1992 most Polish enterprises embarked
on more or less profound adjustments in the fields of production, as
well as in market strategies. These measures, however, have been stim-
ulated not by the process of ownership transformation but rather by the
qualitative changes in the economic environment as a result of the im-
plementation of the national program of economic transformation and
stabilization. The more demanding market environment uncovered the
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size of technology and organization gaps and outlined the scope of indis-
pensable production and market-related changes in Polish enterprises.
It became apparent that most firms were unable to meet the challenge
of both foreign competition (first of all) and domestic competition, by
solely relying on their own resources.
2. Most changes that had been implemented by enterprises prior to the
launching of ownership transformation were simple, unsophisticated
measures mobilizing the firms' internal reserves. Most of these resources
were relatively quickly exhausted, while more sophisticated, qualitative
adjustments (e.g., entering new markets, modernization of production,
changes in the organization and management of the company) encoun-
tered substantial internal barriers (financial and human).
3. The first experience of the Polish privatization shows that due to the
legacy of a substantial technology gap, depreciation of assets, rigid mar-
ket links, and lack of cooperation, as well as the generally poor financial
standing of most enterprises, the change of property rights (in the sense
of visible pressure of an owner) and the inflow of new managerial know-
how are by far inadequate for leading most privatized firms to recovery.
The change of legal status alone brought positive results only in a few
cases of good firms privatized in the capital way and in a few cases
of firms privatized through liquidation. These, however, were usually
relatively modern enterprises, well established on markets, with skilled
employees, and already with very good management.
4. Clearly, positive consequences of privatization emerged relatively quickly
in the firms in which control parcels of shares have been acquired by for-
eign investors. Usually, as a result of such a privatization scheme a
firm gets access to new selling outlets, together with capital support
and technology transfer. Firms experiencing this kind of transforma-
tion, however, are still rather few in number; these are mostly large and
medium-size firms.
5. The takeover of a company (or of its major part) by a domestic investor
usually does not produce results as positive as in cases where an enter-
prise is bought out by a foreign investor. The experience gathered so
far seems to indicate that domestic investors are much less aware of the
decisions they take: at the moment of purchase of shares they are not
well acquainted with the firm, cannot specify their position in it, and
have no ideas about how it should operate. Moreover, cases of giving
capital support to firms privatized by domestic takeover are not very
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common, and the examples of privatized firms accessing new markets or
new domestic orders or initiating technological modernization are very
rare.
6. The first results of taking over the firms by employees (both by "capi-
tal" employee buyout and through lease of assets by employees) seem
to confirm the expectations about a consumption-oriented approach of
most employees as owners of their firm. On the one hand, following
privatization, wages in these firms rapidly increase while their economic
performance deteriorates. On the other hand, these enterprises maintain
the flexibility adjustment that was worked out earlier, and aggressively
defend their market positions (rise in dollar export, staying on the do-
mestic market). Undoubtedly, the lack of inflow of investment means is
a major problem faced by these firms.
7. In a vast majority of cases, commercialization does not have a positive
impact on a firm's operation. Moreover, commercialization sometimes
petrifies the inefficient organization and management structure in an
enterprise, bringing about nothing in exchange.
8. Privatization through liquidation as a specific form of a firm's
bankruptcy has so far been performing its function to the extent that it
allowed for reallocation of the means of production from "dying" firms
to efficient ones. So far, this mechanism has been working, although
not very smoothly, in most firms that were selling some of their assets.
It also makes it possible to rescue some firms, although in a mutilated
form, through the sale of their unessential capital assets. Nevertheless,
the shortage of new investments may make further activities of these
firms impossible.
9. If ownership transformation is to contribute to intensified restructuring
in production and markets, as well as to raise economic efficiency at
the micro and macro levels, and, by the same token, to increase the
competitiveness of Polish products, the following steps seem necessary:
(a) Enhancing the attractiveness of privatized enterprises as a target
for foreign investment (promotion, economic stability, clarity, and
permanence of legal provisions and financial incentives).
(b) At least partial departure from the formula of the equivalent sale
of assets of "collapsing" state-owned companies that has made re-
allocation of production resources and restructuring of enterprises
after transformation difficult.
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(c) Allowing enterprises to retain a part of the privatization revenues
(e.g., as a long-term, low-interest loan with a grace period) in or-
der to facilitate financial restructuring and to initiate additional
adjustment processes.
(d) "Flattening" the financial burdens imposed on firms that lease their
assets, avoiding excessively high contributions to the budget paid
by them in the early months (years) after their transformation.
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Comments on Janusz M. Dabrowski's Paper
Sandor Richter
Sandor Richter
Dabrowski's paper is a pioneering work. The author addresses the problems of pri-
vatized enterprises in Poland, in the sense that privatization in the former centrally
planned economies is an unprecedented phenomenon, with which privatization in
no other part of the world economy compares. Further, privatization in the former
socialist economies has begun only now and for the most part is in its initial stage.
Thus, Dabrowski's investigation provides one of the first insights into the "brave
new world" of newly privatized enterprises in former centrally planned economies
through the careful analysis of a sample of enterprises.
Dabrowski is right in saying that Eastern Europe cannot learn much from the
privatization experiences in Latin America or Great Britain. It is all the more im-
portant to compare the experiences offormer centrally planned economies with one
another since in this situation just the opposite is true: the similar preconditions
and external and internal environments of transition from central planning to mar-
ket economies make the comparison of privatization techniques invaluable to finding
solutions which are the most efficient and involve the least social tension. This is
especially true for the "latecomers" in privatization where merits and shortcomings
of the pioneers can still influence the privatization strategies to be applied.
Dabrowski describes the four ways of Polish privatization: "the capital path,"
liquidation through privatization, liquidation by bankruptcy, and commercializa-
tion. The first three ways have three subcases. The sample, in which there are
enterprises from all groups and subgroups, consists of 55 newly privatized firms.
Of these 55 enterprises no less than nine belong to the group of commercialized
enterprises, which went through the stage of transformation from traditional state
enterprise to joint-stock company but have not been privatized yet. I have reserva-
tions about commercialization as a way of privatization. True, commercialization
is a sine qua non of privatization but the example of the Hungarian privatization
demonstrates that commercialization is the easiest path to the privatization pro-
cess. There can be, and at least in the Hungarian case there has been, a substantial
time lag between commercialization and privatization. I think commercialized but
not yet privatized enterprises constitute a separate group between traditional state
enterprises and privatized enterprises, hence interpreting commercialization as one
way of privatization is not fully justified. This group cannot be regarded as a tran-
sitional category. There will always be a fluctuation since some of these enterprises
leave this group when they become completely privatized and other enterprises will
join this group after being commercialized. Most probably this category will prevail
for a couple of years. It is very difficult to create clear categories in privatization:
to mention only one example, is a joint-stock company whose majority shareholder
is a bank, which is 60 percent state owned, really a private firm?
The time span between privatization and the investigation of the performance
of the enterprises was very short, one to two years. This makes interpretation of the
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findings extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the author promises to repeat this survey
every six months. The results of this first survey will be even more important when
the results of surveys over a longer period are available.
Dabrowski compares the performance of the enterprises in the sample with
one another, since his main purpose is to analyze the impact of various forms of
privatization on the ensuing performance of these enterprises. In the paper the
firms in the sample are compared with traditional state-owned enterprises, as well.
Since for a discussant nothing is "too expensive," for the future, I would find a
comparison with the enterprises of the "genuine" private sector, i.e., with those
firms which were established as private enterprises, very interesting, too.
The description of the differences according to the impact of recession on the
performance of the various groups of enterprises in the sample is especially interest-
ing. In Poland, as the author writes, the real value of sales in the economy declined
by nearly 40 percent from early 1990 to the end of the first quarter of 1992. The
drop of sales in the four main groups of the sample varied substantially from -10
percent in those enterprises following the "capital path" to privatization to -65
percent in the case of those firms which were privatized by bankruptcy. It is, I
think, impossible to find an unambiguous explanation for the variation in the rates
of decline, since, on one hand, the various ways of privatization must have had an
impact on the performance and, on the other hand, for each way of privatization a
group of enterprises with a similar financial stance was attached: e.g., only the best
firms could follow the "capital path" to privatization. Nevertheless, I have problems
with the qualification of decline in the various groups of the sample. In those en-
terprises that were liquidated by privatization the decline was -29 percent, whereas
in those enterprises liquidated by bankruptcy contraction amounted to -65 percent.
Decline in the first group, for which typically profitable small firms were selected,
may cover streamlining, elimination of uncompetitive capacities and production, a
process that will soon result in increased efficiency which lays down the basis for
a forthcoming expansion of the output. Contrary to this, when privatization took
place through liquidation by bankruptcy decline may be explained partly by inertia
which does not bring about preconditions of recovery. In this group, however, even
the "good" type of decline may be very strong as the bad initial conditions demand
more sacrifice than they do in the other group.
An important lesson from the paper is that in nearly all of the few successful
cases within the sample a foreign investor was involved. In these cases investment
occurred not only in the financial sense. (The distinction offoreign direct investment
between capital inflow into a bank account and actual investment in a technological
sense is very important. In Hungary, which received at least one-third of all foreign
direct investment in Eastern Europe in the last three years, the first type of foreign
investment makes up a substantial part of total foreign direct capital inflow.) New
technology, financial injection, integration into the sourcing process of the foreign
mother company, and new sales channels seem to be the main components of success
for newly privatized companies. Most probably this will apply to other countries in
Eastern Europe.

Chapter 12
Monopoly Power, Import
Competition, and Price
Liberalization in the CSFR
John S. Earle and Andreas Worgotter*
It is pointless to liberalize
prices in a monopolistic environment.
Vaclav Klaus, 1990.
Introduction
The post-socialist countries have inherited monopolistic market structures,
in which few but large firms produce for the home market in many branches
of the economy.! Beyond the standard microeconomic arguments that price-
setting firms tend to produce lower quantities and charge higher prices com-
pared to price-takers, the possible presence of monopoly elements in the
transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe is of special concern for
a number of reasons. First, it is apparent that the enormous level of concen-
tration under central planning was well beyond the degree justified by the
*We would like to thank Alena Buchtikova and Jarko Fidrmuc for valuable research assis-
tance with the calculations and data gathering.
IThis feature has been particularly widespread in the former Soviet Union. See Snyder
(1993) for an informative presentation of these distorted market structures.
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possible presence of scale economies. Second, as large enterprises are pri-
vatized, there is reason to fear that the hoped-for benefits of the economic
reform package will be swallowed up by monopoly profits, with negative
consequences for both growth and distribution. Third, one of the most im-
portant, and still unresolved, issues in privatization is the timing of restruc-
turing - one of the most important components of which is the breakup of
the large enterprises into firms that are smaller and "more competitive" (in
every sense). Finally, the domination of enterprise managements by mem-
bers of the "nomenklatura" imparts a political aspect to the problem of
monopoly: the public is likely to have especially low tolerance for the reform
policy if this class is perceived as its prime beneficiary.
For these reasons, it has sometimes been argued that transition policy
should first seek to break the power of the monopolies, prior to liberaliz-
ing prices. This sequencing argument that demonopolization must precede
price liberalization and privatization has been countered by the proposition
that import liberalization, implemented simultaneously with price liberal-
ization, would create sufficient competition. Empirically2 and theoretically,3
however, the issue remains unresolved.
In practice, most of the post-socialist. economies have chosen the sec-
ond route: rapid "big bang" liberalization of many areas of the economy
simultaneously. It has been hoped that freeing prices would create positive
incentives and that import competition would dampen "excessive" price in-
creases. The results of these policies are well known: among other things,
prices skyrocketed and output collapsed. In many of the countries, these re-
sults are attributed in large part to the freedom now granted to monopolies
to exercise their previously restrained power. Several countries, for exam-
ple, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine, are considering reintroducing price
controls for just this reason. But the degree to which the price increases
actually reflect the presence of monopolies, rather than a number of other
factors, remains unknown.
2See, for instance, Jacquemin and Sapir (1990) in a study on the the completion of the
European internal market, who make the following statement: "External trade liberalisa-
tion is, however far from being a perfect substitute for domestic competition and could
even have perverse effects - for instance, when a small number of foreign firms dominate
the market."
3See Ross (1988) who provides a theoretical treatment of this issue and concludes, "In
some cases the lower tariff did serve to control price increases, but in others it did not."
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This paper presents a preliminary analysis of price behavior of Czechoslo-
vak industries in the first year after liberalization, in an attempt to assess the
competing views on policy sequencing. We examine the behavior of prices
and other variables at both the industry and firm levels, and consider the
relationships of the movements of these variables with concentration ratios
by industry. In the next section, we examine the patterns of price changes
by 2-digit industries after price liberalization in 1991. Remarkably, prices in
nearly all industries jumped almost immediately in the first quarter of 1991
to new levels at which they then more or less remained. The following sec-
tions catalogue the factors that may have contributed to this price behavior
and report preliminary results of a test of the import discipline hypothesis.
The last section contains conclusions and our ideas for future research.
Price Behavior in the Year after Liberalization
In the classic centrally planned economy, prices are per definition regulated.
Unlike some of its neighbors, Czechoslovakia under socialism retained most
of the features of classic central planning, including the setting of prices by
a central authority, right up to the changes in 1989. Czechoslovak prices
were massively and rapidly liberalized starting in January 1991, reducing
the regulation ratio (proportion of goods and services set by the state) from
85 percent in 1990 to between 5 percent and 6 percent in October 1991. At
the same time, maximum ceiling prices for "sensitive" goods and services like
public utilities, rent, coal, fuel and oil products, and metallurgical products
were introduced. An additional regulation covered industrial sectors with a
"high degree of market power," which were made subject to obligatory prior
notification of price increases, the "time-related price regulation" (OECD,
1991).4
Price liberalization was hardly the only systemic change in the transfor-
mation process of Czechoslovakia after the fall of the old regime in late 1989.
Already in 1990 exchange rates were devalued several times until pegged to a
currency basket after January 1991. The first steps to introduce current ac-
count convertibility were made, and most parts of trade with former CMEA
4 Although price liberalization started in January 1991, for several energy, fuel, and
chemicals prices administered increases were carried out beginning in the last quarter of
1990. In the following section, we focus on the outcome of price liberalization which was
introduced in January 1991.
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Figure 12.1. Total domestic producer, import, and export prices in the
CSFR, December 1990 to June 1992, 1990 December = 100 percent. Source:
Federal Statistical Office.
countries had to be carried out with hard currency transactions.s The evo-
lution of domestic prices therefore cannot be studied in isolation. In the
following analysis we compare the movements of import and export prices
and evaluate and interpret domestic producer price movements during the
introduction of price liberalization.
Figure 12.1 displays the aggregate import and export prices and the
domestic producer prices. This graph provides a drastic image of the most
important stylized facts of the aggregate outcome of price liberalization.
First, it is remarkable that most of the price change in 1991 was completed
by February. Between December 1990 and February 1991 prices rose (in two
steps) by more than 50 percent. After February 1992, the monthly price
increase averaged below 1 percent.
5HrnCif and Klacek (1991) mention price liberalization, privatization, and convertibility
as foundations for the new economic, social, and political developments described as the
return of the CSFR to Europe.
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The second remarkable feature is the simultaneous deterioration of the
terms of trade. By March 1991 aggregate import prices rose by more than 80
percent relative to the level of December 1990. Export prices increased by
only one-fourth of this value. The reason for this disparity is only indirectly
related to price liberalization. In the course of the dissolution of the CMEA,
energy import prices increased by almost four and a half times. This increase
was larger and hit the CSFR economy much harder than the energy price
increases in 1973 and 1979-1980 could affect the 0 ECD countries. Currently
energy imports account for nearly one-quarter of total CSFR goods imports.
This is by orders of magnitude greater than in all OECD countries. Energy
prices alone accounted for more than three-quarters of the aggregate import
price increase.
The other factor contributing to the strong terms-of-trade loss was the
breakdown of trade with other CMEA economies. The trade with Eastern
European economies was reduced dramatically within a short period of time,
an enormous shock in itself. For the CSFR, only a strong increase of foreign
trade with OECD countries could replace the loss of markets in the East. In
order to overcome entry barriers to new markets in the West, export prices
had to be kept low.
Figures 12.2 to 12.4 reveal the development of domestic producer prices
during the period of price liberalization for 19 industries grouped into energy
and basic materials (Figure 12.2), heavy industries (Figure 12.3), and light
industries (Figure 12.4). The abbreviations can be identified in Table 12.1.
Table 12.1 shows the levels of domestic wholesale prices for all industries in
January, April, July, and October 1991.
Figure 12.2 presents the image of stable energy and raw material prices
in Czechoslovakia after the first price level adjustments were made. Prices of
fuels had already increased by 50 percent in the last quarter of 1990. Price
liberalization, therefore, did not bring many additional price changes. En-
ergy prices (basically electricity) had also already increased in 1990, but price
liberalization contributed to a further considerable price adjustment. Iron
and noniron metallurgic product prices nearly doubled in the 18 months after
price liberalization was introduced in January 1991. Whereas noniron met-
allurgic products show some overshooting, iron metallurgic product prices
exhibit a more gradual approach to their new equilibrium level. It may seem
justified to talk about equilibrium prices not only in these two cases, be-
cause after May 1991 not many price changes may be observed. Fuels and
raw materials have approximately changed in the same proportion as the
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Table 12.1. Domestic wholesale prices in CSFR industry in 1991, 1 January
1989 = 100 percent.
Sector Jan. 1991 Apr. 1991 Jul. 1991 Oct. 1991
Total 145.2 177.8 178.6 178.7
Fuels (F) 154.3 173.4 176.9 177.1
Energy industry (E) 154.2 254.3 258.1 265.4
Iron metallurgy products (I) 150.6 183.3 188.3 189.7
Noniron metallurgy products (N) 156.6 213.5 201.7 201.2
Chemicals, rubber, asbestos (C) 210.4 222.9 221.4 223.7
Machinery (M) 123.7 165.5 175.3 177.0
Electrical eng. products (E) 129.4 174.0 173.8 169.7
Building materials (B) 133.5 168.0 171.7 168.3
Wood (W) 128.3 165.5 168.4 167.9
Metal processing (W) 160.3 205.2 204.3 206.7
Paper and pulp (P) 131.7 192.7 191.1 184.7
Glass, ceramics, porcelain (G) 154.6 194.9 195.3 195.9
Textile (X) 145.2 183.8 176.3 172.4
Clothing (C) 131.4 152.7 154.9 154.9
Leather (L) 161.0 183.1 185.8 177.5
Printing (P) 101.3 215.6 214.3 214.7
Foodstuffs and seasonings (F) 117.3 127.1 122.2 121.7
Tobacco, frozen food,
mineral water (B) 226.4 230.9 232.0 232.0
Other industry production (0) 116.3 160.9 159.7 153.4
Letters in parentheses refer to letters in Figures 12.2 to 12.4.
Source: Federal Statistical Office.
average price index (relative to 1989). Only energy prices rose considerably
more.
Figure 12.3 shows the price development for heavy industry. Again
one has to consider that prices of chemicals had already increased by three-
quarters in late 1990. Once more we find that large price changes only
occurred during the first month of price liberalization. Later, the monthly
price variation is by orders of magnitude smaller than the initial jumps.
More action can be seen in Figure 12.4, illustrating the evolution of
prices in the light industries. The initial price jumps not only vary much
more, but the subsequent behavior of prices also shows more variation.
A sectoral disaggregation of import and export price data replicates the
general features of domestic price data. Price adjustment takes place mainly
in the first months of 1991, and relative price changes are considerable.
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On this basis, let us summarize two stylized facts of Czechoslovak price
behavior after the liberalization:
1. There was a considerable price jump in all industries, which was in nearly
all cases essentially completed within two or three months. After April
1991 aggregate producer prices stayed approximately constant. Thus
price liberalization increased the average price by about 80 percent above
the 1989 level. Price liberalization allowed a rapid adjustment of price
levels without contributing to higher inflation.
2. Relative prices changed considerably. Energy prices rose 50 percent
faster than the average producer price and food prices increased by 30
percent less. This span is approximately equal to the size of the aggre-
gate price increases during the liberalization period. Price liberalization
thus allowed a considerable adjustment of relative prices.
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Factors Affecting the Price Behavior of Enterprises
What factors could explain the interindustry pattern of price jumps in
1991? The real socialist economies were characterized by monetary over-
hang and widespread shortages; most obviously, elimination of these short-
ages would be accomplished through price increases in competitive markets.
The Czechoslovak economy is often considered to have had relatively little
macroeconomic imbalance (see, for instance, Angelis, 1991), but queues were
also common for many goods. Moreover, since prices bore little relation to
relative scarcities, even if there was little aggregate overhang, the degree of
shortage likely varied from industry to industry. Thus, even if everything
else were constant across industries, price increases would vary with the prior
degree of shortage.
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Interindustry variations in price increases may also be a reflection of
variations in cost functions. A relatively steep marginal cost function implies
that shortages would be eliminated more through price increases rather than
by increases in output. The apparent lack of aggregate "supply response" to
price liberalization has been considered at length by macroeconomists, but
it is also clear that supply responsiveness can differ from sector to sector.
Differences in the demand functions faced by industries, and by individ-
ual firms within industries, may also account for differences in price behavior.
Industrial structure and therefore behavior and performance varies signifi-
cantly from sector to sector. Some industries are characterized by a high
degree of concentration, while others have many small producers. All else
equal, industries characterized by monopoly would have raised prices more
and quantities less, relative to competitive industries. It is important to
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note, however, that while competitive industries always increase output as
well as prices to eliminate a shortage, the output behavior of monopolists
depends on the pre-existing degree of shortage. If prices were fixed at a
very low level prior to liberalization, it is possible that profit-maximizing
monopolists would increase output after price liberalization.
Nonetheless ifthis were the whole story, then the finding that output had
fallen in a particular sector would be sufficient to conclude that monopoly
power existed in that sector. Only the characterization of sectors which expe-
rienced output increases would remain in doubt. As we have seen, however,
output declined in nearly all sectors. Simultaneous with the price liberal-
ization occurred a number of other changes that render quite difficult the
assessment of the role of monopoly in the price jumps.
First, as mentioned above, foreign trade was liberalized and currency
convertibility for current account transactions was introduced. Trade lib-
eralization involved a removal of most licensing requirements and granting
permission to any registered enterprise to engage in foreign trade, thereby
abolishing the monopoly of the Foreign Trade Organizations (Benacek and
Mejstrik, 1991).6 From the perspective of domestic producers of tradable
goods, this was equivalent to a demand sh<;>ck. Consumers substituted im-
ported for domestic goods for reasons of quality and variety as well as price.
This demand shock by itself could not have resulted in reduced output in
competitive industries, as long as prices rose, and thus the inference that
reduced output implies the presence of monopoly is not directly overturned.
The structure of many industries, however, was affected: domestic demand
became more elastic. In the extreme case, domestic monopolists became
competitive firms in the world market. Other markets simply became less
monopolistic. This, of course, is the "import discipline hypothesis" that im-
port competition can dampen monopolistic behavior (see De Melo and Urata,
1986; Caves, 1980; Jacquemin, 1982; and Jacquemin and Sapir, 1990).
For the sake of completeness, a second change with a potentially similar
effect should also be listed: entry of domestic producers was liberalized.
Although in the long run, the development of new private firms and the
6To complicate the picture, a temporary import surcharge of 20 percent was introduced
simultaneously and applied to consumer goods such as food, cigarettes, textiles, clothing,
consumer electronics, cars, and furniture. The surcharge was reduced to 18 percent in May
and 15 percent in June 1991. There were also global import quotas for some agricultural
products. Furthermore, access to foreign exchange was supposed to be free, but the State
Bank required many imports to be financed through trade credits; this was abolished in
October 1991 (see OECD, 1991).
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restructuring of the product lines of old state enterprises may be the most
important factors in creating a competitive environment, it was clearly a
minor factor in the short time since liberalization of prices of those goods
that we are considering.7
Third, the Czechoslovak koruna was successively devalued in late 1990
and early 1991. A 55 percent devaluation in October 1990 and 16 percent
on 28 December 1990 resulted in a rate of CSK 28 to the US dollar. This
policy had at least two effects: it raised the costs of imports, including many
important raw materials, but it also limited the competitiveness of imports
in domestic markets. The first effect is a type of negative supply shock,
the second a positive demand shock; both could differ from sector to sector.
With regard to the former, because negative supply shocks would reduce
output, even competitive industries may have experienced output declines.8
With regard to the latter, interindustry differences in structure and in cost
functions implies that the level of the exchange rate also matters for the
ability to import a price structure from abroad.
Fourth, the shift to hard currency in internal CMEA trading also func-
tioned as a supply shock, raising import prices for inputs. Accompanying
this was a tighter budget constraint on hard currency (which after internal
convertibility had to be purchased at market rates) for enterprises, which
prevented many from obtaining needed inputs.
Fifth, the breakdown of the coordination of central planning meant that
the supply of inputs was reduced and became in general less reliable. Again,
this functioned as a supply shock to domestic producers.
In addition to these simultaneous changes, a number of special factors
of these economies in transition make it difficult to draw conclusions about
market structure.
First, despite the rhetoric of the imposition of hard budget constraints
on enterprises, a number of avenues of soft support still existed. Banks still
engaged in lending that was not tied to rational evaluations of the prof-
itability of alternative investments, and real interest rates were negative.
Moreover, inter-enterprise debts (together with the expectation, which was
later partly realized) provided an escape from hard constraints.
1The domestic output response becomes important for the working of the import disci-
pline hypothesis if foreign firms are the source of monopoly power (Geroski and Jacquemin,
1981).
8 A further negative aggregate supply shock resulted from the real balance effect of the
price increases consequent upon the devaluation.
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Second, enterprises may have continued to behave in their old, irra-
tional (at least, from the social point of view) mode. Perhaps the interests
of workers dominated the maximization of profits in enterprise behavior.
For instance, if enterprises behaved like producer cooperatives, then theory
would predict the response of a reduction in output to an increase in price.
Third, it is important to note that the degree to which these price in-
creases were anticipated affected behavior even prior to the liberalization.
For instance, an important part of the story is inventory behavior, both of
inputs and of finished goods. To the degree that industries vary in their
capability to hold inventories, price behavior may be affected. For instance,
industries that accumulated output inventories in 1990 probably had smaller
price and output movements in 1991 (Blinder, 1982).
Anticipated price changes also affected demand. It is well known that
goods of all kinds were hoarded and store shelves were empty just prior to
the liberalization on 1 January 1991. As long as firms were on their supply
functions (a heroic assumption, for reasons just cited), this expectational
effect only served to exacerbate shortages beforehand, and should therefore
not have shifted demand either before or after the price liberalization.
A Test of the Import Discipline Hypothesis
Although the movements of the price variables described in the previous
section may be intrinsically interesting and could appear sometimes to be
suggestive of the possible presence of monopoly power, their usefulness in
this analysis suffers from a basic weakness: nearly all the variables are en-
dogenous. Moreover, while it is tempting to draw inferences on the basis of
the magnitudes of the changes from pre- to post-liberalization, in fact, such
inferences are very difficult, since it is practically impossible to know what
the pre-existing degree of distortion was. A large change (for instance, in
price or in output) may simply be the result of a larger prior distortion.
In the preliminary results reported here we maintain the hypotheses
that concentration and imports may be regarded as exogenous in the case
of CSFR enterprises in 1991,9 and seek to measure their relationship with
monopoly elements, as represented by profitability. We can test the relative
importance of imports and concentration for the exercise of monopoly power,
as measured by profitability, with the help of a simple regression. First we
9Imports were found exogenous by De Melo and Urata (1986). This is a hypothesis
that we plan to test in future research.
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Table 12.2. Industry indicators in the CSFR in 1991. a
Production Real production Profit in Concentra-
Sector in mill. CSK 1984 = 100 mill. CSK tion ratio
Fuels 92,619 57.1 28,235 0.58
Energy 95,784 40.2 35,608 0.84
Ferrous metallurgy 142,129 91.2 9,575 0.71
Nonferrous metallurgy 31,672 72.0 2,204 0.50
Chemicals 184,014 88.4 18,236 0.47
Mechanical engineering 258,231 78.5 20,226 0.22
Electrical engineering 57,398 4,561 0.15
Building materials 34,306 2,605 0.21
Woodworking 38,538 96.1 3,011 0.19
Metalworking 59,618 109.7 5,890 0.22
Paper and pulp 31,592 85.6 2,267 0.48
Glass and porcelain 25,056 101.3 4,083 0.33
Textile 54,835 79.3 4,664 0.13
Clothing 12,185 80.4 686 0.48
Leather 29,141 69.9 2,027 0.60
Printing 9,635 1,156 0.31
Foodstuffs and seasonings 172,289 72.5 13,999 0.11
Tobacco 9,486 69.6 2,856 0.84
Others 18,997 2,223 0.40
Industry total 1,357,525 75.9 164,112
BFor explanation see footnote 10.
examine the pair-wise correlations of profitability and concentration and of
profitability and imports, and then we conduct it multivariate analysis of the
relationships among them.
Most studies of profitability and concentration have found only a small
and statistically weak relationship (see Schmalensee, 1989). We constructed
four-firm concentration ratios using data on medium and large enterprises
in Czechoslovakia for each 2-digit industry.lO
leThe data set contains all enterprises in industry with 100 employees or more. The
concentration ratio for a given industry is defined as the ratio of the sum of the output
of the four largest enterprises in the industry to the total output of all firms that are in
the industry and that are represented in the data set. Thus, small firms (less than 100
employees) are excluded; if there is significant variation across industries in the importance
of smaller firms, then these ratios could be biased. We are also aware that the concentration
ratio should best be defined in terms of total domestic sales, including imports in the
denominator and excluding exports from both numerator and denominator; we are working
to obtain the data necessary to calculate this better measure.
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In Table 12.2 we find the concentration ratios for 19 industrial sectors.
The range is quite large, from 0.11 in food and 0.13 in textiles to 0.84 in both
energy and tobacco, with a mean of 0.41 and standard deviation of 0.23. The
highest concentration ratios can be found in energy, tobacco, fuels, ferrous
and nonferrous metallurgy, and leather industries. Low concentration ratios
are present in food industries, textiles, wood products, building materials,
metalworks, and mechanical and electrical engineering.
It is very difficult to judge how much the past concentration ratios tell
about today's market power in the CSFR. The large privatization only began
in 1992, and especially the large enterprises are in a process of reconstruction
and reform. Again a safe conclusion seems to be that concentration ratios
vary considerably from branch to branch.
We calculated the correlation of this concentration ratio with profitabil-
ity, defined as the ratio of profits to sales revenue. The correlation for 1991
was large (0.613) and significant at 1 percent level. Thus, there seems to be
a strong association of concentration and profitability across Czechoslovak
industries, which is evidence for the presence of monopoly elements.
The import discipline hypothesis suggests that the ability of monopo-
lies to exercise their power may be disciplined by foreign competition that
increases demand elasticity. It is an implication of oligopoly models with
conjectural variation that the greater the elasticity of demand, the lower
the price-cost margin (see Tirole, 1988). We therefore constructed import
penetration measures, defined as the ratio of imports to domestic sales, for
each industry.ll The variable's range is from 2 percent (energy) to 33 per-
cent (electrical engineering) in 1990 and from 3 percent (energy and glass
and porcelain) to 48 percent (fuel) in 1991. There is a very high correlation
(0.85) of import penetration across the two years, possibly implying that
little change in the structure of imports occurred. Moreover, the correlation
of this variable with profitability is weak: 0.11 for 1991. Perhaps imports
did not constrain domestic monopolists much after all.
To consider the joint effects of concentration and imports on profitabil-
ity in 1991, we specified a regression function with profitability ('ll") as the
11 Disaggregated data have been obtained from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade
for import products, which we then matched with our industry data to obtain industry
import estimates. Imports were unavailable for two industries, printing and other, for
the year 1990, so we have only 17 observations for that year. Unfortunately, we had
no industry export data for 1991, so the denominator of the import penetration variable
includes exports; we are working to obtain this 1991 data to improve this measure.
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dependent variable and the concentration ratio (CR) and the measure of
import penetration (IP) as independent variables:
where i indexes industries and u is an additive disturbance. This specifi-
cation treats CR and IP as exogenous. Since 1991 was the first year of
liberalization, the former exogeneity assumption seems easily acceptable;
the second should perhaps be amended, but other studies (e.g., De Melo
and Urata, 1986) have rejected the endogeneity of imports (albeit with dif-
ferent data for a different country). Previous studies of the effects of imports
add other covariates (see Schmalensee, 1989), such as the export ratio and
various proxies for the presence of scale economies and diseconomies, to the
equation, but the justification for their inclusion is not entirely clear. Our
simple specification has the added virtue of parsimony.
The results of estimation with the 19 2-digit industries for 1991 were as
follows:
7l"i = 0.008 + 0.250CRi + 0.093IPi + Ui
(0.451) (0.794) (0.145),
with estimated standard errors shown in parentheses, R2 = 0.39, and stan-
dard error of the regression (SER) equal to 0.077. Concentration is positive
and strongly significant, but the coefficient on imports has the wrong sign,
although it is not statistically different from zero. Of course, in the long run,
imports should not affect the profitability of a competitive industry, but it is
somewhat surprising that they seem to have so little impact in the disequi-
librium environment of a transition economy. Collusion between foreign and
domestic producers could also generate a positive coefficient, but again this
seems unlikely in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1991. This result therefore
seems to further support the hypothesis that imports provided little effective
competition for the domestic monopolists.
The industrial organization literature contains some basis for the argu-
ment that the more appropriate specification allows the effect of imports on
profitability to vary with the level of concentration. The specific hypothesis
is that high concentration is associated with a stronger (negative) impact
of imports on profitability. We therefore added an interaction term: the
product of IP and CR. This term could also be interpreted as the effect of
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imports on the concentration-profitability relationship. In either case, we
would expect its coefficient to be negative. The results were as follows:
1rj = 0.029 + 0.200CRj - 0.049IPj + 0.336CR· IP + Ui
(0.064) (0.130) (0.324) (0.678),
with R2 = 0.40 and SER = 0.079. The coefficient on imports now has the
predicted sign, but it is still insignificant. The interaction term has an effect
opposite to that predicted: either imports increase the effect of concentration
on profitability or concentration lowers the (negative) effect of imports on
profitability, but neither is very intuitive.
Among others, we also tried a specification that dropped the CR vari-
able. The variable IP had a negative and almost statistically significant
effect,12 but the interaction term remained large, positive, and quite signifi-
cant. It seems, paradoxically, that the negative effect of imports on profits
is less, the more concentrated the industry.
A final specification examined the effect of changes in the measure of
import penetration from 1990 to 1991, the argument being that it is only
the new imports, responding to profitable opportunities, that represent real
competition for domestic monopolists. This variable (AlP) was defined
simply as IPgcIPgo. The results using only this and CR as independent
variables were as follows:
1ri = 0.027 + 0.226CRi + 0.582AIPj + Ui
(0.035) (0.075) (0.266),
where R2 = 0.54 and SER = 0.072. These results imply that an increase
in import penetration actually raises profits, even holding the concentration
ratio constant! Don't look for any empirical support for the import discipline
hypothesis here.
Conclusion
The discussion in this paper remains preliminary because we believe this
topic merits treatment at the firm level, or as disaggregated as possible. Un-
fortunately, our price data are only at the level of major sectors (2-digit);
we intend to re-examine these relationships with at least 3-digit price and
other data. Furthermore, the fundamental question of the degree to which
12The small sample size, arguing for the use of a higher significance level, should be
borne in mind.
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monopoly power is exercised in the Czechoslovak economy, and therefore
what the optimal policy sequence may be, can only be answered with struc-
tural estimation. This requires formalizing the choice problem of enterprises,
including all the considerations and constraints suggested by the analysis in
this paper. We hope to report on the results of such an inquiry at some
future date.
Nevertheless we would like to mention a few pieces of basic statistical
information which we consider remarkable. At first it is clear that price
liberalization did bring a great deal of relative price changes. This has been
the main goal of eliminating most price controls and thereby allowing prices
to reflect relative scarcities. It has to be remembered that, at least for our
analysis, unfortunately quite a lot happened simultaneously in Czechoslo-
vakia in 1990 and 1991. Not only did domestic prices reveal many relative
changes, import and export price changes also varied considerably by sector.
The simultaneity of devaluation, energy price shocks, and price liberal-
ization makes it difficult to isolate the relation between foreign trade and
domestic monopoly power. Our simple regression experiments delivered a
positive relation between the increase of import penetration from 1990 to
1991 and profitability. Under the assumption that profits are a result of the
past, while imports are responding to above average profit opportunities, we
could conclude that import competition will finally have a dynamic effect
reducing domestic monopoly power.
The static effects of current monopoly power on average inflation of
producer prices during price liberalization in 1991 are certainly negligible
relative to the contribution of the devaluation in 1990 and the fuel price
increases to the price level jump in 1991.
The merits of foreign trade liberalization may therefore have more to
be seen in their dynamic effects contributing to incentive-related supply ef-
fects through productivity increases which are generated by international
integration.
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Comments on John S. Earle and Andreas Worgotter's Paper
Michael Jones
Professors Earle and Worgotter present an informative paper on a transition econ-
omy. The reforms of internal price liberalization and unrestricted international
trade in goods aim to promote efficiency of resource allocation and the usefulness
of money. Prerequisites for markets to work well in this sense are profit-maximizing
incentives on the part of firms and the absence of pervasive market failures. When
privatization is incomplete and/or significant market power is unleashed, the move
to markets replaces old problems with new ones. If it can be shown that convert-
ibility in the absence of a fully competitive environment implies greater transitional
costs and delays than would a future, simultaneous movement on all fronts, there
may be a case for gradualism. For most of the formerly planned economies, this
issue is largely hypothetical: to maintain credibility, there is no turning back on
the key reforms. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the functioning of the
economy caught in the gray area ofliberalized markets but perverse incentives, both
to measure the cost of this reform sequence (relative to the competitive ideal and
to no reform) and to recommend policies to ease the transition.
Czechoslovakia exemplifies this gray area. It aggressively freed internal prices
from administrative control. It offered unlimited convertibility to hard currencies
at a unified exchange rate for most current account transactions, and now has
an average tariff which is low, even by Western standards. On the other hand,
Czechoslovakia has moved more cautiously toward privatization than some of its
neighbors; and it lacked the experience with Western markets and the tradition of
small-scale market experiments of Hungary or Poland. Potential market power, as
reflected in concentration ratios, exists. Unfortunately, as the authors document,
Czechoslovakia has been subjected to so many shocks between 1990 and 1992 that
it is impossible to infer from the aggregate data how market imperfections have
affected the adjustment to liberalization or what the pattern of adjustment implies
about the extent of market imperfections. The authors are appropriately cautious
in drawing detailed conclusions. Accordingly, I limit my comments to three aspects
of the role of monopoly power in the CSFR transition.
First, the paper suggests but does not resolve the extent and cost of monopoly
power in Czechoslovakia. The authors construct four-firm concentration ratios and
profit rates for 19, 2-digit industries. Comparisons between these ratios and those
of the West and those of the other transition economies would be informative.
The concentration ratio average of 40 percent at the 2-digit level is very high by
Western standards, and the anecdotal evidence suggests high potential power in
many industries. On the other hand, the profit rates tell a more moderate story.
If we crudely estimate Harberger deadweight losses by assuming a unitary demand
elasticity and using the estimated markups which average at 12 percent, we obtain
a cost of monopoly power on the order of 1 percent of industrial output. This
moderate deadweight loss is dwarfed by the real output reductions of recent years.
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A convincing analysis awaits a refinement of the profit rates and a sharper sectoral
breakdown, but I am surprised that the initial data do not show more dramatic
inefficiencies.
Indeed, deadweight losses based on profit rates will overstate the cost of
monopoly, for at least two reasons. First, such calculations do not account for
the countervailing pressures in an economy where market failures are pervasive. In
essence, if production inputs are in fixed supply, then not all sectors can produce
too little, and power exercised in one market will mitigate the impact of monopoly
in another. Also, monopoly power indirectly lessens the environmental damage of
the large industries. Piecemeal application of antimonopoly policy can do harm
in this second best setting. Second, a snapshot of monopoly cannot reveal the
dynamic process of future entry and the cost-saving incentives of potential compe-
tition. Few Czechoslovak industries are natural monopolies: current concentrations
are the residue of central planning rather than scale economies. The profits we ob-
serve now are the incentive for new entry. It will be interesting to see whether entry
can substitute effectively for formal restructuring and antimonopoly law. My sense
is that entry will resemble a desirable piecemeal policy with pervasive monopoly,
because entry should occur most readily in sectors where market power has gener-
ated the highest monopoly profits and inefficiency. For these reasons, the paper has
just begun to penetrate the extent and cost of market power in the CSFR.
A second focus of the paper is on how heavily Czechoslovakia can rely on
the forces of free trade for antitrust. Czechoslovakia took the essential steps of
stopping the rationing of hard currency among importers and minimizing quanti-
tative restrictions on imports. Without these steps, the monopoly power of firms
which serve the domestic market with import substitutes would be maintained and
perhaps enhanced by facilitating collusion. Tariffs retain the fundamental feature
of free trade: the unlimited availability of imports which substitute for domestic
goods must increase the elasticity of demand for home goods and hence lower mar-
ket power. Exactly how effective this check on monopoly power will be depends on
the cross price elasticity of demand between imports and domestic goods. If import
penetration is positively related to the cross price elasticity in the cross section,
then high import penetration should result in small profit rates if free trade is re-
straining market power. Instead, the authors find a weak and sometimes positive
relationship between import penetration and profits rates.
I do believe that free trade has limited antitrust potential, but the authors'
regressions cannot tell us this. Surely, import penetration is sensitive to the profit
markup; thus, the regressions suffer from a simultaneous determination of import
penetration and the profit rate. The regressions may simply show that sectors which
attempt large markups attract imports. What we need is independent evidence
on the cross price elasticities, which awaits empirical demand studies. Perhaps
we might appeal for guidance from the many studies on goods substitutability in
international trade. Purchasing power parity studies on tradable, homogeneous
goods reveal significant violations of the law of one price. Econometric studies of
substitution elasticities between home goods and import substitutes in the USA
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reveal a wide range of elasticities but an average between 2.5 and 3. These numbers
tell us that markups over cost in a monopolized domestic industry could be as high
as 50 percent. Especially in the short run, the absence of quantitative restrictions
lessens, but will not eliminate, monopoly power.
A third issue is: short of restructuring to promote competition, what should be
done to lessen the monopoly problem? The goal is to increase the flow of resources
to the monopolized sectors. Unfortunately, of the several ways to do this, none is
compelling or immediately available to the transition economies.
1. We could intervene directly in the monopolized market. For example, we could
subsidize production, enriching the monopolist. Or we could impose a scientif-
ically determined price ceiling, which could avoid the increase in profit. Either
way, we reintroduce the controls that liberalization was meant to replace. This
is unacceptable, for it would destroy the credibility of the reforms.
2. We could act indirectly to drive resources out of other markets. In particular,
we could raise tariffs on the consumption imports which compete with home
goods. This policy can increase real income, but it is risky. It is a fine-tuning
policy, which balances one distortion against another. Also, in the sector with
market power, the gain is an increased profit which outweighs consumer loss.
Because of this distribution, if the expansion is funded from abroad or through
direct investment, the home country is likely to hurt itself.
3. Finally, and most attractive, Czechoslovakia might encourage capital inflows.
The expansion of new enterprises that foreign capital finances will disperse
monopoly power, even in the nontradable sector. As profits are shifted from
home firms, a gain is not guaranteed - but in many instances there will be
net national gain. Direct investment has the further advantage of bringing
productivity-enhancing knowledge. From the perspective of antimonopoly, as
well as general needs for growth and transition, we must wonder when and how
Czechoslovakia can begin to run a larger current account deficit.



